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FOREWORD
The contemporary challenges underpinning interagency
cooperation within the U.S. Government are not entirely
new. For decades since the formation of the defense
establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, U.S.
cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military
services—all those involved in providing for the common
defense—have struggled to overcome differences in policy
and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even
basic terminology. This new century’s post-September 11,
2001 (9/11), international system and security environment
have placed additional strains on the U.S. Government’s
interagency processes.
U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted
civilian policymakers and senior military officers with
a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and
counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses
the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions
that place the most pressure on interagency communication
and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad
reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and
that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and
military elements is a prerequisite for success.
While the present volume represents a significant effort
towards addressing the current interagency problems,
much more discussion is required. The baseline goals of this
partnership effort between the Bush School and the Strategic
Studies Institute are to generate knowledgeable interaction
and chart a way forward for government, private sector,
and academic actors to reexamine interagency reform as
a precondition for acheving real change. Such an initiative
could not be more relevant or time sensitive.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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PREFACE
The interagency process was the focus of a Capstone
project and Research Symposium at the Bush School
of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M
University during the 2006-07 academic year. The Bush
School’s Capstone seminar is a semester-long graduate
course in the Master’s Program in International Affairs
that provides a research experience for students in the
final semester of the 2-year program. As part of their
leadership development, the students operate in teams
to address an important policy issue (under the direction of a faculty member) and in support of a client.
In this case, the client was the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.
Our thanks to Colonel Richard Lacquement and
Dr. Janine Davidson for sponsoring our Capstone
interagency project.
The Capstone was entitled “The Interagency Process
in Support & Stability Operations: Integrating and
Aligning the Roles and Missions of Military and Civilian
Agencies in Conflict and Post-Conflict Environments.”
With topics ranging from provisional reconstruction
teams in Afghanistan to strategic communication to
leadership education, the student papers are included
in this monograph, making valuable contributions to
this critical dialogue.
In concert with the Capstone interagency project,
the Bush School and the U.S. Army War College’s
Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a research
symposium to outline interagency policy issues and
craft recommendations. The symposium, entitled
“The Interagency Process in Support and Stability
Operations: The Integration and Alignment of
Military and Civilian Roles and Missions,” was held
ix

on April 5-6, 2007, at Texas A&M University. Present
were more than two dozen military officers, national
security scholars, and practitioners who have been on
the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of whom are
heavily involved in interagency analysis. The majority
of the concerns, questions, and ideas discussed during
the symposium are articulated and expanded upon in
the following chapters.
Let me thank the Director of the Strategic Studies
Institute, Professor Douglas Lovelace, for sponsoring
the interagency research symposium. Thanks also go
to the Strategic Studies Institute staff memberes Dr.
Dallas Owens, Colonel Trey Braun, and Colonel Greg
Cusimano for their efforts in conference planning.
Special thanks go to Ms. Marianne Cowling and
Ms. Rita Rummel for their professional and selfless
editorial support in publishing this volume. The
symposium participants, including experts from both
the policy community and academia, all contributed
their ideas for addressing the pressing issues surfaced
in this book. Let me also thank our graduate students—
Patrick Baetjer, Chris Cline, Carlos Hernandorena,
Brian Polley, Kate Rogers, Amanda Smith, and Tyson
Voelkel—and especially Jay Boggs, who served as the
symposium’s assistant director. In addition, our Bush
School staff performed numerous tasks in planning
and executing the conference. Thanks to our superb
staff members, Michelle Sullens, Joe Dillard, Laura
Templeton, and Mary Hein, for their professionalism
in arranging all administration and support.
Finally, to the readers of this volume, we thank you
for your interest and ideas. Please do take the time to
provide feedback to the Strategic Studies Institute from
the field and from your personal reflections on these
critical issues. We have been as comprehensive as time
has allowed. We fully realize, however, that much
x

work remains to be done to improve U.S. and coalition
efforts across the globe in aligning and integrating the
interagency process in Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. We look forward to hearing from you.

			
			
			
			
			
			
			

Richard A. Chilcoat
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Ret.)
Dean and Holder of the Edward
and Howard Kruse Chair
George Bush School of Government
and Public Service
Texas A&M University
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INTRODUCTION
Jay W. Boggs
Too many American military personnel, diplomats,
and government officials are returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan claiming that success in bringing stability
to those two countries has been minimal and difficult
to sustain. Continually cited as a fundamental obstacle
to U.S. progress is the interagency process controlling
the interaction among the various deployed military
services and government organizations. Flaws in the
way the different components align their objectives,
resources, and strategic thinking lead to limited
communication and integration when conducting
daily operations. Extremely complex and asymmetric
environments in counterinsurgency warfare in the
current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan require a
more cooperative and efficient interagency system to
synchronize all elements of U.S. power and ensure
success.
If the interagency process is in such obvious need
for adjustment and so vital to current efforts, why
is it so difficult to instigate the necessary reforms?
The answer emerges from the vast multitude of
contradictory organizational perspectives and cultures.
The challenging task is to analyze this issue broadly and
in a comprehensive, unbiased manner. In the research
symposium “The Interagency Process in Support and
Stability Operations: The Integration and Alignment
of Military and Civilian Roles and Missions” held at
Texas A&M University in April 2007, jointly sponsored
by the Bush School Capstone team and the Strategic
Studies Institute, attendees sought to isolate the core
policy issues and generate long-term proposals to
foster leadership and decisive action. To guide their
1

research and discussion, the following five questions
were examined in detail:
1. What are the roles and missions of U.S. military
and government agencies in stabilization and
reconstruction efforts as part of counterinsurgency
warfare (historical background from case studies)?
2. What are the recommended ways to improve
leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and
missions) in the interagency coordination of militarycivilian operations?
3. What are the military and civilian leadership
functions, or skill sets, for conflict and post-conflict
environments?
4. How should military and civilian agencies
develop those leadership skills needed in the short
term and the long term?
5. Does the U.S. Government have a means
for measuring the effectiveness of civil-military
coordination?
In order to better frame the symposium and
this book, the articles have been organized into four
different parts. The goal of Part I, Issues and Challenges
in Support and Stability Operations, is to outline the
key concepts and introduce the primary factors which
affect the interagency process and its role in stability
operations. Recent government efforts at reform such as
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 and National
Security Presidential Directive-44 are detailed. While
some initiatives have experienced success and some
progress has been achieved, the consensus is that
too many obstacles remain to reform the interagency
framework easily, cheaply, or expeditiously.
Part II, Case Studies and Field Experiences, provides
insight into the lessons learned from current and
historical instances of stability operations. American
practices in Iraq, the development of provincial
2

reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, the U.S.
model of reconstruction in postwar Japan, and an
international experience combating an insurgency are
discussed. While such case studies reveal much about
the nature of interagency alignment and effective
operational techniques, they also demonstrate that
there is no magic checklist that can be applied to
every contingency. Yet, these field experiences
serve as necessary templates and references so that
policymakers can direct their strategies and avoid
repetition of mistakes.
Part III, Learning, Innovation, and New Initiatives,
introduces a number of new proposals to effect change
in the interagency process. There is a significant effort
underway in Washington to create awareness of this
issue and press Congress to enact forceful legislation.
Similar to Goldwater-Nichols, the Project on National
Security Reform seeks to expedite the cultural
transformations needed to alter the way departments
and agencies communicate and think across functional
areas and organizations so as to align and integrate
policy and operations.
Part IV, Leadership, Education, Training, and
Development for Interagency Operations, and
the concluding chapter address roles of education
and development for achieving significant and
permanent change in the interagency process and in
the organizational players themselves. Organizational
reform of this scope can be secured only with dynamic
leadership on all levels. The U.S. Government must
nurture and develop military and civilian leaders who
can think beyond their own institution’s parameters and
can approach problems with a strategic, interagency
mindset. The chapters in this section elaborate upon
a number of the promising, nascent leadership and
training initiatives emerging in the military services
and U.S. Government.
3

Part I:
Issues and Challenges
in Support and Stability Operations
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CHAPTER 1
CHALLENGES IN SUPPORT AND STABILITY
OPERATIONS:
WHY EACH ONE IS DIFFERENT
Dennis C. Jett
Any discussion of how the U.S. Government should
respond when confronted with a complex contingency
operation (CCO) in a post-conflict situation faces
two obstacles—the past and the future. The past is a
problem because the lessons supposedly learned from
the last operation may not be applicable to the next one.
The first part of this chapter will discuss why lessons
learned from the past may not result in problems
avoided in the future. As Yogi Berra might have said,
prediction is very difficult, especially about the future.
So the second part of the chapter will discuss the range
of scenarios that might be encountered and the factors
that can have the most influence on their outcome. How
the CCO will be conducted will depend on the ability
of the decisionmakers to deal with those factors.
It has often been said that generals train to fight the
last war. The implication is that focusing on the past
leaves them unprepared for the future. Lessons can be
learned from any military operation, but assuming the
next one will be similar to the last one is often a mistake.
Lessons learned can constrain thinking about future
contingencies rather than help prepare for them if the
implicit assumption is that the past will be repeated. It
is useful therefore to think more freely about the types
of situations that might be encountered and what kind
of responses they might require.
7

It should also be recognized that planning has its
limits and often has more to do with the immediate
past than the distant future. Political leaders, when
describing the actions taken by their governments,
will occasionally admit, “Mistakes were made.” They
will seldom say, however, that those mistakes were
the result of the failure of their policies or judgment.
Instead, they will blame those who try to implement
poor decisions rather than blame those who made the
decisions.
As a result, bureaucratic reform and reorganization
are often promised as the means through which a
repetition of the failure will be avoided. However,
when reforms are proposed and the bureaucracy
is reorganized, it often does not matter whether
the changes implemented make any meaningful
improvements. The reasons for the reform are to deflect
criticism from political opponents, shift the focus of the
news media elsewhere, and placate public opinion in
the wake of a policy failure. Whether the government
is really better prepared to respond to the situation
is something future policymakers will have to worry
about. The immediate problem, i.e., the bureaucratic
problem, has been solved and responsibility for the
failure avoided.
The State Department’s talk about “transformational diplomacy” is a case in point. The thrust of this
putative reform effort is that American foreign policy
will become more popular with audiences abroad if our
diplomats are moved closer to the people, i.e., from huge
embassies in the capitals to small offices in the outlying
areas. But would moving diplomats around in such a
fashion really change public opinion about American
policy? There are nine cities of a million or more in the
United States. Would a foreign diplomat in each one
8

of them transform American public opinion about the
policies of the country the diplomat represents? Or is
this bureaucratic reorganization merely a reaction to
the failure of current American policy and the inability
of Washington to admit that?
The current administration is hardly the only one
that deals with failure through bureaucratic subterfuge.
Reacting to the difficulties encountered in Somalia and
Bosnia, and to a degree of success in Haiti, President
Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)56 in May 1997. PDD-56 was supposed to “improve
the political, military, humanitarian, economic and
other dimensions of the U.S. Government’s planning
for interventions that are identified as complex
emergencies.”1 It was also supposed to correct “the lack
of meaningful coordinated planning” which “produced
setbacks” whenever Washington attempted to manage
such emergencies.2 PDD-56 was not designed to make
policy or decisions but was created instead to guide
the process of integrating the government’s response
once the decision to intervene had been made.3 To
accomplish this, the Directive set up an Executive
Committee of assistant secretaries from the various
departments involved that was to be a standing crisis
action group.
However, the Executive Committee mechanism set
up by PDD-56 was little used in the remaining years
of the Clinton administration. It fell short of what
was promised when the PDD was signed because,
according to one analyst, of “a lack of NSC staff followup and enforcement” in the face of domestic agency
resistance. He added, “It nonetheless raised awareness
of problems in coordination and did result in a useful
series of interagency education and training events.”4
Another writer described the failure to implement
PDD-56 differently. He attributed the failure to
9

continued congressional pressure over who would
make decisions about when and where to deploy
American forces, and to organizational friction at the
departmental level, that combined to produce a style
of presidential decisionmaking relying on a small
group of key advisors.5 Some officials in government
at the time have a still different explanation. They
claim that not using the PDD-56 structure stemmed
simply from the fact that interagency cooperation and
personal relations between key policymakers became
so much better that no real need for the formal PDD-56
mechanism arose.6
Whatever the reason for the lack of use of the structure established by PDD-56, the Bush administration
lost no time in getting rid of the directive. The general
approach of the new administration seemed to be
to reject whatever policy was being followed by its
predecessor. Thomas Friedman, in his column in the
New York Times, referred to this approach as ABC—
Anything But Clinton—when it came to the Middle
East.7 ABC was initially applied across the board in
other foreign policy areas such as North Korea, while
also downplaying the types of threat that PDD-56 was
conceived to meet.
While PDD-56 was formally rescinded shortly
after the new administration took office, it was not
replaced with an alternative approach for several
years, not even when a true CCO first arose. When
it came to the initial decisions about post-war Iraq,
they were made by a secretive, little-known group.
At least that is the assessment of Lawrence Wilkerson,
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff and a
former Army colonel. Wilkerson added that the official
ultimately responsible for ensuring at least some level
of interagency coordination and cooperation on vital
10

national security issues, National Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice, “was simply steamrolled by this
cabal.”8
Whether the work of a cabal or not, the results of
the decisions taken on Iraq have been a disaster and
may well be regarded collectively as the biggest foreign
policy mistake ever made by any administration. In
another column in October 2006, Friedman mused
that Barnes & Noble bookstores would have to open a
whole new section that might fill the entire basement
just to contain the books being written about the fiasco
that Iraq had become.9 The expenditure in lives and
money, the absence of weapons of mass destruction,
the increasingly diminished chances for Iraq to
become a functioning democracy, and the lack of any
contribution toward making America more secure and
achieving its goals in the war on terror will provide the
material for many more books yet to come.
And what was Washington’s response to these
colossal failures of policy and judgment—to rearrange
the bureaucratic deck chairs on the Titanic once
again. In December 2005, President Bush signed
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44
which empowered the Secretary of State to “improve
coordination, planning, and implementation for
reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign
states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from
conflict or civil strife.”10
NSPD-44 did not end the problems in Iraq or make
any noticeable change in the government’s ability to
deal with post-conflict situations. As the Washington
Post reported on March 22, 2007: “The U.S. Government
was unprepared for the extensive nation-building
required after it invaded Iraq, and at each juncture
where it could have adjusted its efforts, it failed even
11

to understand the problems it faced, according to the
special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.”
In a stinging, wide-ranging assessment of U.S.
reconstruction efforts, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., said that
in the days after the invasion, the Defense Department
had no strategy for restoring either government
institutions or infrastructure. And in the years since,
other agencies joined the effort without an overall
plan and without a structure in place to organize and
execute a task of such magnitude.
Lines of authority remained unclear in the
reconstruction effort. With a demand for speed and
a shortage of government personnel, much of the
oversight was turned over to contractors doing the
work. There was little coordination among the various
agencies. The result was a series of missed opportunities
to address the unraveling situation.11
While NSPD-44 failed to solve the problem,
it did create a new bureaucratic entity within the
State Department, the office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The
Coordinator was never given the budget nor the
authority to accomplish all the lofty goals envisioned.
His primary activity seems to have been conducting
bureaucratic planning exercises.
In one of them, a matrix of essential tasks to be
undertaken in the first 2 to 3 years of post-conflict
reconstruction and stabilization was drawn up. This
list of essential tasks runs some 50 pages. Saying a 50page to-do list is comprised of “essential” tasks does
not inspire confidence that this particular planning
exercise had much to do with the real world. The tasks
involved read more like what is required to turn a wartorn country into Switzerland and would take decades
to accomplish rather than the 2 to 3-year period S/CRS
says is its planning horizon.
12

The practice of looking to solve a problem through
bureaucratic measures rather than well-considered
policy, effective interagency coordination, and realistic
resourcing has not abated in the wake of NSPD-44 and
despite over 4 years of experience in Iraq. On January
10, 2007, President Bush announced a new strategy
for Iraq. In addition to a troop surge to improve
security, the new policy included economic, political,
and diplomatic elements. Instead of focusing on large
infrastructure projects, the emphasis of American
efforts was shifted to technical assistance programs to
increase the capacity of Iraqis to plan and shape their
country’s development.
The current coordinator, Ambassador David
Satterfield, told a Senate committee on March 2, 2007,
that at the center of this effort was the expansion of
the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which
are comprised of representatives from the military,
the State Department, the Agency for International
Development (AID), and other agencies.12 An article in
the Foreign Service Journal does not give much reason
to think this strategy will be any more effective than
previous ones or that the problems of interagency
coordination are being resolved. It notes that
“establishing the teams in Iraq has been challenging,
in part because of high-level wrangling between State
and the Defense Department over who would provide
security, support, and funding. No memorandum of
understanding was in place to delineate each agency’s
responsibilities.”13
It was not only the logistics of the PRTs that
were unclear, but also what they were supposed to
accomplish other than giving the appearance of action
and initiative to the President’s plan. The article goes
on to say:
13

A common refrain from Foreign Service members
speaking about their experiences in new PRTs is that
they have felt like “pins on a map,” sent out so officials
in Washington could say they were there. They felt “cut
off” and were not given clear instructions on their role or
on how the chain of command between civilian members
was to be defined and function.

Part of the challenge to the State Department has
been to find the personnel to fill the expanded number
of PRTs. State had to ask the Pentagon to come up with
military or civilian personnel that could fill about 120
of the 350 new positions required. The Pentagon agreed
to do so, but only on a temporary basis.14 Arguments
about 120 positions may seem strange, given the
Defense Department’s $400 billion budget and the 2.5
million members of the armed forces and reserves it has
at its command. State has only 6,500 Foreign Service
officers, and USAID only about 1,000, and both groups
have to be spread around the globe. Before we become
too critical of the Department of Defense, however, we
should keep in mind that the 120 positions in question
call for considerable seniority, politico-military skills,
and technical skills often involving foreign language
requirements. These are the very sorts of skills needed
by the military itself, and they are in increasingly short
supply, especially if long and repetitive tours are to be
avoided.
At least Secretary Rice and Secretary Gates were
able to work out a temporary solution to this staffing
problem. Not all the disputes between these two
departments have worked out so well. In fact, the
conclusion one would draw from recent history is that
while everyone agrees that an effective mechanism
for interagency coordination is desirable, it is not easy
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to achieve and often does not work. In the midst of a
CCO, it is difficult for any bureaucrat to surrender turf
or budgetary appropriations. What may seem easy
in a planning exercise in Washington becomes more
difficult in the field under actual conditions.
Washington politics, whether it is relations between
the executive and legislative branches or relations
between departments, conspires against efforts to
convert the lessons learned from the last CCO into a
structure that will make the response to the next CCO
better. Reorganizing the bureaucracy in order to avoid
taking responsibility for errors in judgment is not
limited to the next operation.
That process continues with the current CCO in
Iraq even though the war is well into its 5th year. The
Washington Post reported in April 2007 that the White
House wanted to name a high-powered czar to oversee
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to reorganize
management of the conflicts. They approached three
retired four-star generals, all of whom declined to be
considered.15 One of the generals explained his decision
as follows:
Cabinet-level agencies, organizations, and their leadership must buy into the position’s roles and responsibilities. Most important, cabinet-level personalities must
develop and accept a clear definition of the strategic
approach to policy. . . . There is no agreed-upon strategic
view of the Iraq problem or the region. We have never
gotten it right in Iraq. These huge shortcomings are not
going to be resolved by the assignment of an additional
individual to the White House staff.16

The State Department’s former coordinator put it more
succinctly: “An individual can’t fix a failed policy.”17
And neither can bureaucratic reorganization by itself,
whether in the midst of a CCO or after it is over.
15

Because the past may not be the best guide to the
future, it might be best to consider the full range of
possible scenarios rather than training to fight the last
war. One other cautionary note would be to avoid
an excess of ambition in considering what tasks to
undertake. As noted earlier, the S/CRS’s 50-page matrix
of “essential” tasks is neither essential nor doable in a 2
to 3-year time frame.
The aim in most post-conflict situations should
be to keep the country together long enough to have
a legitimate government take over. The emphasis
should be on security, meeting basic human needs, and
encouraging a political process that puts a legitimate
government into place as quickly as possible.
Iraq provides many examples of how not to conduct
a CCO. A stunning example of being distracted by the
irrelevant is the inclusion by the head of the Coalition
Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,
among his most significant accomplishments “the
lowering of Iraq’s tax, the liberalization of foreign
investment laws, and the reduction of import duties.”18
Bremer would have better served U.S. interests by
spending the time he worried about taxes and import
duties on the implications of throwing former Ba’ath
Party members out of the Iraqi government and
disbanding the Iraqi army. Through these two actions,
Bremer effectively converted a disorganized and low
level of resistance into a full-blown insurgency and
civil war.
Hopefully, the tendency to prepare for the last
CCO will be avoided as well as the imperial overreach
that characterized what happened in Iraq. Instead,
each situation should be assessed to see what the U.S.
Government really has to do and what can best be left
to the international community. United Nations (UN)
16

peacekeepers are cheaper than American soldiers or
civilians and bring with them the legitimacy of the
international community.19 While some would argue
that the UN is an ineffective instrument of U.S. policy,
there is something to be said for sharing not just the
cost, but the responsibility, for the outcome of a CCO
with more than a rump coalition of the coerced and
co-opted. This is particularly true, as we shall see, in
a situation where the peace has been imposed rather
than negotiated.
To assess each situation that might involve a CCO
requires considering the nature of the conflict, the
nature of the peace, and the critical factors that can
prevent the peace from becoming permanent. In this
regard, there are two kinds of war, four kinds of peace,
and three critical factors to worry about.
The two kinds of wars are a war between two countries and a war within one country. The combatants,
weapons, stakes, and victims are different in each case.
Intrastate wars are also far more common today and
create much more complex contingency operations
than the interstate kind.
A war between two countries is usually over
territory. It involves the armed forces of those two
countries, which generally have some level of training
and discipline, and they employ a wide range of
weapons. They tend to inflict casualties on the other
side’s army and usually do not specifically target
civilians. When a ceasefire is achieved, the main task of
the CCO is to provide the time for a process that results
in negotiating where the border should lie. Through
monitoring the ceasefire and taking other confidencebuilding measures—steps to be performed by outside
forces that are not parties to the conflict—the former
combatants can have the opportunity to settle the
underlying issues without resorting to more fighting.
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In a civil war, however, the situation is much more
complex because far more is required of outside forces
that intervene. The stakes in this kind of war are political
power. The combatants are the army defending those in
power and the insurgent forces trying to wrest power
away. The rebels, and frequently the national army,
have little training, discipline, or equipment beyond
AK-47s and rocket-propelled grenades. They frequently
attack civilians because civilians do not shoot back and
are an essential part of the political legitimacy of the
other side. Because of these characteristics, civil wars
create the humanitarian crises associated with CCOs.
Since the stakes are political power, the fighting
can continue as long as neither party will capitulate.
If a ceasefire is achieved, the intervening powers often
must disarm most of the former combatants and assist
their reintegration into civilian society. A new national
army needs to be created out of some of the remnants
of the opposing forces. A political process, usually
culminating with elections, must be carried out to
establish a legitimate government. At the same time,
economic reconstruction must be initiated and basic
humanitarian aid provided.
Whether between states or within one, wars end in
one of four ways—(1) when one side wins, (2) when
peace is imposed by an outside power, (3) when a peace
is negotiated between the parties in good faith, or (4)
when one is negotiated in bad faith. A clear military
victory is difficult in a civil war because as long as
one side is willing to resist, it does not take much for
a low-level insurgency to continue. The problem with
political power is that it is hard to divide, especially
in a country where both the economy and the political
institutions are underdeveloped. Each side knows that
it will end up either in power or out of luck. There is
18

little space in the political institutions or in the economy
left to inhabit for the losers of a civil war.
In a war between two countries, the fighting tends
to be shorter and more intense, but may not be any
more conclusive. When both sides realize their goals
cannot be militarily achieved, it can lead to a “hurting
stalemate” that provides room for the international
community to negotiate a ceasefire. A peace imposed by
an outside power is possible only if that power has the
strength and the interest to stop the fighting. In many
third world conflicts, the international community
bemoans the fact that a humanitarian disaster has
occurred, but does not have the political will to end
the war. That requires the willingness to take, as well
as inflict, casualties.
Often handwringing is preferable to taking decisive
action when the problem is remote and little understood
by the voters back home. The current situation in
Darfur is a case in point. Three years after Secretary
Powell declared that genocide was being committed,
the killing continues and the international community
has done little to stop it. An African Union force has
been sent in, but it is too small and weak and lacks the
mandate to impose a peace. While there is mounting
sentiment in the United States to do something
about Darfur, concern has not yet reached the level
of actually provoking action other than speeches by
U.S. Government officials. Given the burdens of the
commitments to the struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan,
it is unlikely American troops will be sent to intervene
even if the humanitarian disaster gets worse. For the
moment, the policy seems to be one of asserting that
there is less violence, and therefore genocide is no
longer occurring.20
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In addition to the frequent lack of willingness
to both take and inflict casualties, the problem with
imposing a peace is that those who do the imposing
inherit ownership of the situation. Secretary Powell
once referred to the “Pottery Barn rule” in regard to
Iraq.21 The principle that “if you break it, you own it”
continues to apply in an imposed peace. Ending the
war leaves the intervention force responsible for the
peace and the process that follows to make the peace
permanent. If it is a political process, the losers can
always claim the process was manipulated by the
occupying power and is therefore illegitimate. The exit
strategy is never completely under the control of the
intervening force.
If a peace is negotiated, it can lead to a mechanism
for determining the border in a war between two
countries or for determining a legitimate government
in the case of an internal struggle for political power.
In both cases, the parties have to be willing to accept
an outcome that may not give them everything they
were fighting for. So a peace negotiated in good faith
can, when it comes to actually implementing the terms
of the peace agreement, result in one side or the other
demonstrating bad faith.
When it comes to dividing territory, it can be more
politically expedient to live with an indefinite ceasefire
than to accept a line on the map that cannot be sold to
the local public. In the case of political power, the sides
have to be willing to surrender their military power
and take their chances in a political process that could
leave them with little or nothing. They would not be
the only politicians to believe a free and fair election is
only one that their side wins.
Finally, once the peacekeepers are on the ground,
they cannot control everything regardless of whether
20

they are first-rate troops from first world countries
or third-rate ones from the third world. Three critical
factors come into play which can be influenced but
not controlled completely. Are the combatants willing
to accept peace and the risks that go with it? Are the
parties fighting over who will control lucrative natural
resources? And do the neighboring states, regional
powers, and others want peace, or are they more
interested in a proxy war for their own purposes? If
the parties see the peace only as a useful respite, or if
they are unwilling to accept any outcome that does not
leave them in power, the peace will not endure. If the
country’s natural resources generate large amounts of
cash, as oil and diamonds do, then there will be the
incentive and the means to resume the fighting. And
if the neighboring states, regional powers, or other
countries see it in their interest to undermine the peace,
then they can easily make it possible for the combatants
to continue the struggle.
It would be instructive to look at the kinds of war,
the kinds of peace, and the critical factors in terms of
a particular case. Iraq is not a typical case and does
not neatly fit into the categories outlined above, but it
is the most complex contingency operation currently
underway. While the Coalition forces wanted to take
and control Iraq’s territory, the purpose was not to keep
any portion of that territory, but to instead to bring
about regime change. That mission was accomplished,
but as the occupation dragged on, the political process
put in place was not accepted by all the Iraqis and
some outsiders. The peace that the Coalition continues
to attempt imposing has not held, and there does not
seem to be any political process underway that would
result in a negotiated cessation of hostilities. So U.S.
forces and the dwindling number of Coalition partners
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are stuck trying to impose a peace on factions that are
willing to continue fighting for their own aims.
That a great deal of oil is present in Iraq is not
helpful. There are almost no functioning democracies
among countries whose economy depends on
exporting oil. The opportunities for corruption are
simply too great and too tempting. Democratic
government means spreading the oil wealth around.
An authoritarian government can make sure it enriches
only the privileged few. Britain and Norway, both oil
exporters, had strong democratic institutions before oil
exports began. No country has had much success in
developing democracy and exporting oil at the same
time.
Iraq is thus left with parties that will not accept the
prospect of having little political power; with a resource
that provides an incentive for continuing the fighting;
and with neighboring states, notably Iran and Syria,
that would not mind seeing the conflict continue.We
shall have to wait and see whether an additional 22,000
U.S. troops can change any of those factors.
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CHAPTER 2
PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE-56:
A GLASS HALF FULL
John F. Troxell
In October 1993 the American people awoke to the
morning broadcast of horrific scenes of the bodies of
American service members being dragged through the
streets of the far-off city of Mogadishu. A failed effort
on the part of an elite unit of Army Rangers to capture
Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid resulted
in widespread carnage, leaving 18 American dead,
74 wounded, and perhaps as many as 1,000 Somalis
killed. The story has since been immortalized in the
book and subsequent movie, Blackhawk Down. David
Halberstam referred to this crisis as a “major league
CNN-era disaster.”1 It led President Bill Clinton to
announce to the nation that the effort in Somalia,
after an initial reinforcement, would be completely
withdrawn in 5 months. Two months after the disaster,
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin left the administration.
It has since been learned that the Somalia debacle
also fed the appetite of Osama bin Laden to drive
the United States from the Middle East. One positive
outcome of the U.S. experience in Somalia, however,
was that it challenged the interagency to reexamine
its policymaking procedures.2 The eventual outcome
of this effort was Presidential Decision Directive-56
(PDD-56), codifying the Clinton administration’s
policy on managing complex contingency operations.
PDD-56, however, did not work, as attested to by
25

the growing demand for reform of the interagency
process surrounding the assessment of ongoing
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The purpose of this
chapter is to explain why the directive did not work
and what the challenges for interagency coordination
are in consideration of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and
the continuing conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. To
accomplish this purpose, the author will first clarify
terms; describe the prelude to PDD-56 in the post-Cold
War world; and examine the provisions, intentions,
and ultimate fate of the document. Next, the attempts
of the Bush administration to deal with interagency
coordination, particularly as lessons from Iraq have
begun to accumulate, will be analyzed. Finally, the
principal shortcomings in the current efforts and
suggestions for the way ahead for the interagency
process will be discussed.
Fixing the interagency along the lines proposed by
PDD-56 addresses only half of the problem. PDD-56
and a host of follow-on adjustments and initiatives have
done a good job of focusing on the challenge of better
planning. But better planning without the capacity
or capability to execute the plan is fruitless. In fact, it
might be better to have properly structured and trained
capability, even in the absence of a coordinated plan,
than to have a well-coordinated plan in the absence
of capability. The author will therefore argue that the
predominant focus on improving the interagency has
been misplaced. As a nation, we have been reluctant
to adequately resource measures for furthering our
interests in the 21st century security environment. The
key to success in the future is resourcing the measures
needed to address the challenges of nation-building,
and the shortest route to creating those capabilities is
through the military, not the interagency.
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Clarifying Terms.
Interagency coordination is important even in
intense combat operations, but the primary concern
of interagency operations is lower on the spectrum
of conflict scale. The terminology used to describe
these operations is vast and ever changing. It has
ranged from the broad categories of smaller scale
contingencies, to military operations other than
war, to post-conflict operations, to humanitarian
interventions. More specific definitions have included
peace operations, the formulation under the Army’s
doctrinal response to Somalia, and more recently
stability operations, which subsumed peace operations
as one of the 10 broad types.3 PDD-56 was directed
at complex contingency operations defined as peace
operations. The most recent policy pronouncements
from the Bush administration include Department of
Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, “Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations,” and National Security Presidential
Directive (NSPD)-44, “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization.”
The DoD Directive defines SSTR as operations which
“lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S.
interests.” But the document then goes on almost
exclusively to discuss stability operations which are
designed or established to “maintain order in states
and regions.” NSPD-44 does not include a definition
for reconstruction and stabilization.4
Thankfully, others have stepped in to clarify the
definitional jumble. U.S. Army Colonel Bryan Watson,
in a recent paper published by the Strategic Studies
Institute, has offered useful definitions. Stabilization
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is defined as the effort to create a secure and stable
environment and to provide basic human needs of the
population. It is most closely linked to the immediate
conclusion of major military operations and is partially
aimed at preventing the conditions that could fuel a
continuing insurgency. Reconstruction, on the other
hand, represents a shift toward creating self-sustaining
political and economic institutions that will ultimately
permit competent self-government. Colonel Watson
concludes that military capabilities under military
control are more suited for stabilization, whereas
reconstruction is more suited for civilian agencies
and intergovernment organizations (IGOs) and
nongovernment organizations (NGOs).5
The key point is that the most problematic operations, those that have received so much study and
attention, are those operations and crisis situations
that require the blending together of both military
and traditional civilian capabilities and spheres of
operations in the gap between conflict and peace.
The military can win the wars, and humanitarian,
relief, and diplomatic entities can operate in the
“neutral” or “humanitarian space” to further the
peaceful development of states and their integration
into the international community. But how should
the government go about winning the peace? How
do we successfully transition from stabilization to
reconstruction? One recent study has concluded, “No
military solution is possible absent a political and
economic solution, and the persistent conditions of
insecurity prevent enduring, positive, political and
economic development.”6 To be successful in the 21st
century security environment, the U.S. Government
must develop a conceptual framework and then
resource the needed capabilities to operate in this
dangerous middle ground.
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Prelude to PDD-56.
The United States has never been good at
coordinating and applying all of the elements of
national power in a synchronized fashion. General
Albert Wedemeyer, author of the World War II victory
plan, argued that “our failure to use political, economic,
and psychological means in coordination with military
operations during the war also prolonged its duration
and caused the loss of many more American lives.”7
For most of the Cold War period, we have been able to
muddle through and avoid irreversible disasters. But
we owe to fallen heroes like those of Blackhawk Down
and to the service members and civilians on the front
lines in Afghanistan and Iraq the debt of being better
prepared for the next stabilization and reconstruction
mission.
According to Michele Flournoy, the principal
author of PDD-56, “One of the most powerful lessons
learned during the 1993 operation in Somalia was that
the absence of rigorous and sustained interagency
planning and coordination can hamper effectiveness,
jeopardize success, and court disaster.”8 Somalia
was not the first post-Cold War stabilization and
reconstruction operation, and regime change did
not begin with the operations to oust the Taliban or
Saddam Hussein. In December 1989 the United States
forceably removed the regime of Manuel Noriega
from Panama in the largely successful Operation JUST
CAUSE. The follow-on stabilization phase, Operation
PROMOTE LIBERTY, however, was another matter.
Planning was incomplete and haphazard; there were
insufficient civil affairs, engineers, and military police
for the rebuilding effort; and interagency cooperation
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was poor because many of the agencies were excluded
from the DoD planning effort.9 Real scrutiny of the
problems associated with operations in Panama may
have been diverted by the focus on the Persian Gulf
only 8 months later, or because of the absence of a
“Blackhawk Down” type incident. However, the
Clinton administration’s political misfortune following
Somalia led to a major institutional improvement in
the conduct of interagency operations.10
The after-action review (AAR) process associated
with Somalia was intense, representing real bureaucratic battles within the interagency community and within DoD. The Army was largely successful in deflecting
attention away from its performance. The most critical
lesson from the United Nations Operations in Somalia
(UNOSOM) II peace enforcement mission, according
to the Army, was the need to improve the interagency
planning process (the Army was preparing to
publish Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations, a new
doctrinal statement which would address its revealed
shortcomings).11 The Army’s focus on the interagency
was basically well-advised, and Flournoy, as the Office
of Secretary of Defense (OSD) lead, recognized it as
such. Flournoy was intent on developing an integrated
interagency planning process that would both help
define the strategy and highlight policy disconnects
for decisionmakers.12 The military was also keen on
developing improved coordination procedures with
the interagency and proceeded to take the lead in
numerous developmental efforts. One of the most
important such initiatives was the establishment of the
U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania. This small but highly effective body
played a key role in the eventual development of the
interagency planning process that became imbedded
in PDD-56.
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The first post-Somalia test case was Haiti. Atlantic
Command (USACOM) was responsible for planning
Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, and, along with
DoD, conducted extensive interagency coordination.
USACOM’s Haiti Planning Group prepared a
detailed “Interagency Checklist for Restoration of
Essential Services.”13 The Haiti Executive Committee
(ExCom) was established and developed the first ever
interagency political-military plan (POL-MIL plan),
which articulated the mission and an interagency
strategy. The POL-MIL plan was rehearsed prior to
the launch of the U.S.-led multinational force.14 Other
interagency planning activities included those of
Southern Command, under General Wesley Clark,
who was quite active in attempting to institutionalize
interagency planning conferences; General Anthony
Zinni, as the Commanding General, 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force from 1994 to 1996, sponsored interagency planning exercises in the Pacific; and General
George Joulwan, Supreme Allied Command Europe
(SACEUR), sponsored the major implementation force
(IFOR) rehearsal at Aachen, Germany, complete with
the full range of interagency partners.
One of the noted success stories related to conducting detailed interagency planning activities, complete
with a POL-MIL plan, was the U.S.-supported United
Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern
Slavonia (UNTAES). UNTAES was established on
January 15, 1996, with a mandate to demilitarize the
Eastern Slavonia region, including the city of Vukovar,
which had been overrun by Serbian forces several
years earlier. Under the leadership of Jacques Klein, a
senior American Foreign Service Officer, UNTAES was
able to demilitarize the region, monitor the safe return
of refugees, and conduct local elections. The territory
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was peacefully returned to Croatian control in January
1998. The planning process outlined in the soon-to-be
published PDD-56 was instrumental in the success of
this operation.15
The final post-Somalia, but pre-PDD-56, interagency
planning effort that had an impact on the publication
of PDD-56 was never executed but proved useful
nonetheless. In the late spring and early summer of
1996, United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutrous
Boutrous-Ghali was pushing to conduct contingency
planning in preparation for a peacekeeping mission to
Burundi. The Tutsi/Hutu conflict that had produced
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was reappearing in
neighboring Burundi. The Clinton administration, in
contrast to its reluctance to get involved in Rwanda,
was a strong supporter of this effort in the Security
Council. A team of military and interagency leaders
and planners was sequestered at the Army War
College with the task of developing a POL-MIL plan
for intervention in Burundi. The detailed planning
effort revealed the extensive force package required to
achieve a relatively uncertain outcome. The military
balked, and the decision was made not to intervene.16
It was the detailed POL-MIL interagency planning
process that generated consensus behind the no-go
decision.
Concurrent with the last of these military/
interagency planning efforts, the Joint Staff, sensing a
lack of guidance on the subject, and not to be outdone
by the Army’s publication of FM 100-23, published
Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During
Joint Operations, in 1996. The document discussed
interagency processes and players, outlined the
principles for organizing interagency efforts, and
assigned roles and responsibilities for joint task forces
(JTFs). Although the publication was a welcome
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addition, it did not “adequately explain methods for
interagency planning, coordination, and execution.”
Thus, DoD and other agencies reiterated the need for
the sort of policy guidance that would eventually find
expression in PDD-56.17
Presidential Decision Directive-56.
The military was seeking three goals in its efforts
to transform the interagency process. Fundamentally,
it wanted to infuse better planning in interagency
operations, and thus it supported the adoption of the
military planning process. Second, it clearly recognized
the need for unity of effort. And finally, the military
remained concerned about mission creep and wanted
to delineate those tasks that should be specifically in the
purview of other civilian agencies. With the possible
exception of the third issue, the desire to avoid mission
creep, all of these objectives made perfect sense and
dovetailed with the needs of the interagency planning
community.
PDD-56 was approved and promulgated by the
Clinton administration in May 1997. The stated intent
of the directive was to establish a specific planning
process for managing complex contingency operations,
and identify implementation mechanisms to be
incorporated into the interagency process with the
ultimate goal of achieving unity of effort among U.S.
Government agencies and international organizations.
The planning process and implementation mechanisms
selected closely mirror major military innovations
and thus reinforce claims that PDD-56 attempted to
impose a version of the military planning process on
the interagency. This is perfectly understandable given
that a core competency of the military is planning, and
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that few, if any, other government agencies have any
specific operational planning experience. Consequently,
the structure of the plan and the supporting activities
enumerated in PDD-56 adopted the best practices of
the military.
Unity of effort was to be achieved by the appointment
of an Executive Committee (ExCom) appointed by the
Deputies Committee. The ExCom was responsible
for the day-to-day management of U.S. participation
in a complex contingency. The ExCom was to use an
integrated interagency plan to identify critical issues,
establish priorities, evaluate agency concepts of
operations, and conduct the AAR.18
The PDD required that a political–military
implementation plan be developed. Commonly
referred to as the POL-MIL plan, it was developed
using the generic political-military scheme as a
template. This template was modeled after the fiveparagraph military operations order, covering at a
minimum the situation, assessment, national interests,
mission statement, objectives, concept of operations
and organization, various tasks, and participating
agencies’ mission area plans.19 Unity of effort is a
desired outcome of the pol-mil planning process. This
planning process clearly supports two of the military’s
most important principles of war. The first is objective:
direct every operation towards a clearly defined,
decisive, and attainable objective. The second is unity
of command: for every objective, ensure unity of effort
under one responsible commander.20
The next two elements of PDD-56 focused on critical
practices drawn from the reinvigorated Army training
regime at the National Training Centers and the Battle
Command Training Program: rehearsals and AARs.
PDD-56 directs the Deputies Committee to rehearse the
pol-mil plan. ExCom members present the elements
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for which they are responsible to include all applicable
supporting agency plans. After the conclusion of the
operation, the ExCom is also charged with conducting
the AAR. This after-action review, a comprehensive
assessment of interagency performance, will include a
review of interagency planning and coordination, as
well as problems in interagency execution. Appropriate
lessons learned will be captured and disseminated
throughout the interagency community to ensure that
future operations do not repeat the same mistakes.21
The final stipulation directs the National Security
Council (NSC) to work with various educational
institutions to develop an annual training program
aimed at mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant
Secretary level) to train them in the development and
implementation of pol-mil plans. The intent is to create
a cadre of trained professionals who are familiar with
PDD-56’s integrated planning process, and thus able
to improve the government’s ability to manage future
operations.22
Throughout, the military played a major role in
the development of various aspects of the planning
process outlined in PDD-56. Since planning is a core
competency of the military and the military’s focus is
on operational preparedness, it was only natural that
best practices from the military would migrate into the
interagency planning and implementation process. The
military also formalized the inclusion of the POL-MIL
plan in their own plans and orders process. According
to Joint Pub 3-08, “Interagency, Intergovernmental
Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I,” dated
March 17, 2006, “The commander will be guided by
the interagency provisions of the POL-MIL plan, when
provided, and will disseminate that guidance to the
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joint force in Annex V, the Interagency Coordination
Annex of the combatant commander’s OPLAN.”23 Thus
the Pentagon formally recognized the importance of
including civilian agency requirements in the deliberate
planning process.
Interagency Planning Post-PDD 56.
Michele Flournoy, in a recent evaluation of PDD-56,
acknowledged that the directive had never been fully
implemented, although in those cases in which it was
applied, it generated useful planning processes and
tools. She went on to say that “the process produces
more than just a set of documents: it allows key players
to build working relationships, hammer out differences,
identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize
their actions, and better understand their roles.”24 The
innovative aspects of PDD-56 made substantial progress
in building institutional planning capacity, but pockets
of resistance to interagency planning remain, reflecting
both an anti-planning bias on the part of some agencies
and an overestimation of the effort needed to conduct
a full-fledged planning effort.25 The lack of a “planning
culture” outside the DoD represents a significant
challenge to institutionalizing a standard planning
paradigm. “Whereas military officers are taught to
see planning as critical to success in operations and
trained in its finer points,” a Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) report titled Beyond
Goldwater-Nichols concluded, “The notion is largely
foreign to other agencies like the Departments of State
and Treasury.”26 These civilian agencies also tend not
to have dedicated planning staffs or expertise.
The Bush administration had originally decided to
develop a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD)
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to replace PDD-56, and initial reports indicated that
it would propose some useful enhancements to the
interagency planning process. A new PDD-56 was
postponed, however. In the case of Afghanistan,
according to Flournoy, there was no person or entity
in charge of interagency planning and coordination.27
Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
shared the view that the Afghanistan reconstruction
effort had been mishandled by the State Department,
resulting in a dysfunctional division of authority
between State and the Pentagon.28
The Bush administration’s long-advertised successor to PDD-56—National Security Presidential Directive
(NSPD)-44, “Management of Interagency Efforts
Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization”—was
finally issued on December 7, 2005. Its purpose was
to “promote the security of the United States through
improved coordination, planning, and implementation
for reconstruction and stabilization” operations.29 It
establishes a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC)
for reconstruction and stabilization to oversee and help
integrate all DoD and civilian contingency planning.
It specifies that the State Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) should take
the lead in integrating the efforts and capabilities of
the interagency for reconstruction and stabilization
purposes. S/CRS is also tasked with developing
strategies and identifying states which may become
unstable, a proactive and preventative approach
not found in PDD-56. Finally, S/CRS is tasked with
developing a civilian response capacity for these types
of operations. Several of the “military” aspects of
PDD-56 are missing: no specifics about a POL-MIL plan
or associated template, no mention of a rehearsal, and
no guidance for a training program. The AAR is also
absent, but NSPD-44 does direct the identification and
37

subsequent incorporation of lessons learned. PDD-56
had a strong military flavor; NSPD-44, in contrast, has
a distinctly foggy-bottom taste.
As lessons from Iraq begin to accumulate, there is a
great deal of focus on interagency planning. According
to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “A lot of Defense
Department folks wonder where the rest of the
government is in this war. There is clearly a need for
greater interagency collaboration.”30 Contrary to popular belief, however, there was considerable interagency planning and post-conflict planning associated with
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Numerous military and
other interagency personnel were very active. The
problem was not the lack of planning, but generally
poor assumptions about conditions in Iraq and about
uncooperative or unfocused indigenous leaders.31 From
this perspective, Paul Bremer concluded, “We planned
for the wrong contingency.”32 Certainly the planning
process, although not nonexistent, was flawed. This
deficiency was addressed by the Iraq Study Group,
as well as other commissions.33 At the core was the
challenge to harmonize planning, which for civilians
and military, Bryan Watson concluded, “means two
different things.” Watson continues:
The military planning process starts with an objective, is
handed over to the many layers of the military planning
machine adding in resources, strategy, intelligence,
training, and gaming. Given the objective, the military
will come up with a plan to achieve it. The civilian
planning process up until now has been much more ad
hoc and more conceptual in nature. The planning process
tends to concentrate more on developing the objective—
what it should be—and less on the exact details of how to
get there. As a result, post-Iraq reform proposals attempt
to meld the two approaches—informing the military
planning process with the subtleties of reconstruction
challenges, and operationalizing civilian planning.34
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Before leaving the issue of interagency planning, we
should revisit one area that seems to warrant further
consideration. PDD-56 and its immediate successor
NSPD-44 have focused on interventions, stabilization
operations, and reconstruction operations abroad. In
fact, PDD-56 specifically stated that it did not apply
to domestic situations. The aftermath of 9/11 and the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
have opened up an entirely new arena in which
coordinated interagency operations are critical. Joint
Pub 3-08 splits its crisis response coverage between
domestic and foreign operations. The potential exists
to adopt or, at a minimum, consider a new planning
model, the National Response Plan (NRP) and
its associated Emergency Support Function (ESF)
annexes. The NRP, last updated May 25, 2006, forms
the basis of how the federal government coordinates
with state, local, and tribal governments and the
private sector during domestic incidents. The ESF
annexes describe the primary means through which
the federal government provides assistance to state,
local, and tribal governments or to federal departments
and agencies conducting missions of primary federal
responsibility. They represent an effective mechanism
for grouping capabilities and resources under the
functions that are most likely to need to be performed
during actual or potential incidents where a coordinated
federal response is required. The ESF scheme provides
a modular structure for identifying the precise
components that can best address the requirements of
a particular incident.35 The new strategy development
framework being developed by S/CRS, which includes
the delineation of Major Mission Elements, has some
features similar to the ESF approach.36
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Challenges for the Interagency Process and the Way
Ahead.
Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers
can do it.
Former UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld

There’s nothing wrong with [doing] nation-building, but
not when it is done by the American military.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

The interagency planning effort that began with
PDD-56 and continues to evolve and strengthen is
focused on the development of the ends (the strategic
objectives) and the ways (how to accomplish those
ends). But without the means (capabilities and capacities
to execute the plan), the planning effort is nugatory.
The major cause of poor performance in complex
interagency operations is the lack of adequate means;
as one security analyst has noted, “The real shortfall in
the interagency process is the lack of adequate capacity
to conduct operations outside Washington.”37
There are only two sources for the capabilities and
expertise needed to bring to bear all of the elements
of power to help right a failed state: civilian and
military. However, most civilian agencies in the U.S.
Government lack rapidly deployable experts and
capabilities. Civilian agencies lack an operational
culture and organization; consequently, even if tasked
to perform a critical mission, they lack the personnel
who are trained and ready for these missions. They also
lack the authorities and resources to rapidly deploy
them and to quickly establish programs in the field.38
Findings from a Post-Conflict Strategic Requirements
Workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College
concluded that the lack of quick response capability
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by civilian agencies would ensure that the military
would have to bear the brunt of all essential tasks in a
stabilization and reconstruction operation.39 The lack
of civilian partners creates mission creep, as military
personnel conduct tasks for which they are ill-suited
or ill-prepared. It is precisely this concern with mission
creep that made the military such eager partners with
the PDD-56 effort. As one study has noted, the military
has always been a partner that cannot afford to forget
its primary mission—defending the nation:
Incomplete or failed integration of non-DoD agencies
into the development of strategy and plans for
responding to complex contingencies [could] also result
in demands for the military to perform tasks outside
its range of skills and competencies. Deficiencies in
the interagency process could extend the military’s
involvement in an intervention beyond the need for
unique military personnel and assets to cope with the
complex emergency.40

DoD, on the other hand, has the capability and
certainly the capacity to deploy that capability virtually
anywhere on the globe almost overnight. But there is a
cultural bias on the part of the military, nicely summed
up by Colin Powell while still Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff:
Let me begin by giving a tutorial about what an armed
force is all about. Notwithstanding all of the changes that
have taken place in the world, notwithstanding the new
emphasis on peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace
engagement, preventive diplomacy, we have a value
system and a culture system within the armed forces of
the United States. We have the mission to fight and win
the nation’s wars. Because we are able to fight and win
the nation’s wars, because we are warriors, we are also
uniquely able to do some of these other new missions
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that are coming along—peacekeeping, humanitarian
relief, disaster relief—you name it, we can do it. . . . But
we never want to do it in such a way that we lose sight
of the focus of why you have armed forces—to fight and
win the nation’s wars.41

Because of the lower priority of lesser contingencies, the
Army has planned poorly for stabilization operations
and is not properly resourced or structured to handle
these increasingly relevant missions. One study prior to
9/11 noted that “neither budgets nor forces have been
designed to take into account the sober fact that during
the last decade any major deployment of military
force to resolve a crisis . . . has ended by creating new
long-term force requirements to keep the situation
stabilized. . . .”42 A more recent study draws the same
general conclusion that the Army mortgaged its ability
to conduct stability operations and deliver the required
enduring results. Also worrisome is the claim that
the Army’s projected Modular Force transformation
in effect discounts the importance of stabilization
operations, and fails to provide the modular and
scalable force pool of stabilization capabilities that are
required.43
DoD seems a little schizophrenic on the issue. On the
one hand, it has recently issued DoD Directive 3000.05
“Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” which explicitly
defines stability operations as a core U.S. military
mission to be given priority comparable to combat
operations.44 At the same time, in the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), DoD presents a strong case that
resources should come from the increasing interagency
and coalition partner capacities. An example would be
the effort to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) stabilization and reconstruction capability
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and a European constabulary force.45 There is certainly
nothing wrong with encouraging partners to do more,
with burden-sharing having long been a divisive
element of our alliance politics. But this suggestion was
from former Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who some
have claimed supported a strategy of nation-building
“lite,” involving a rapid transition to local control.46
Efforts to create expeditionary civilian capability
have proliferated recently. One of the first was the call
for a postwar Reserve Corps in legislation sponsored
by Senator Richard G. Lugar. The intent is to deploy
civilian experts in civil affairs, law enforcement,
engineering, economic development, and government
operations as quickly as possible after the fighting
ends, thus allowing U.S. military forces to be
withdrawn sooner.47 Another proposal is the Active
Response Corps, a State Department effort to increase
the surge capacity within the Department to support
stabilization and reconstruction missions. The initial
goal is to expand this capability to 30 personnel by
the end of 2007.48 These efforts should not be belittled.
Capacity from any source is to be welcomed, but efforts
that provide such small increments of capability may
generate more difficulty deploying, integrating, and
sustaining them than they are worth. In addition, the
stance taken by the Defense Science Board seems on
track in this regard when it concluded that “the rest
of the Executive Branch has made very little progress
toward the development of operational capabilities
applicable to stability operations; and the Congress
has not provided Departments other than Defense
with appropriate authorities and resources in order to
develop these capabilities.”49
The capability to conduct stabilization and
reconstruction operations resides predominantly in
the military. “The creation of greater civilian nation43

building capacity would not let the armed forces off the
hook,” military historian Max Boot has observed. “No
matter how much civilian management improves,” he
continues, “the bulk of the manpower for any nationbuilding assignment would still have to come from the
Pentagon. The armed forces need to do a much better
job of preparing for such work. . . .”50 The military has
civil affairs, engineers, military police, medics, and
the full gamut of logistical expertise. This expertise
is organized and prepared to rapidly deploy and
is equipped to operate in the dangerous conditions
between peace and war that often characterize
stabilization and reconstruction operations. Eventually
the operation can transition to civilian capability, but
only after security has been established, largely as a
result of the early and effective deployment of military
forces organized for the stabilization and reconstruction
mission. DoD Directive 3000.05 explicitly places
a priority on stability operations and capabilities,
meaning the military’s long-standing cultural aversion
to the use of U.S. military power for nation-building
should no longer be a factor. The QDR recognizes the
need to rebalance the mix of joint capabilities and forces.
This rebalancing effort should be in the direction of
creating robust stabilization and reconstruction forces
along the lines originally proposed by the National
Defense University (NDU) study on Transforming for
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. This study
called for the organization of two stabilization and
reconstruction (S&R) division equivalents within
the U.S. military that would plan, develop doctrine,
train, and exercise for S&R missions.51 The details
of the organization are open to debate, but the need
for a dedicated capability within the military also
corresponds with the strategic argument put forward
by Thomas Barnett in the The Pentagon’s New Map
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(2004). Barnett presents a convincing case that the
United States needs to transform toward a bifurcated
military: one that specializes in high-tech, big–violence
war, and one that specializes in relatively low-tech
security generation and routine crisis response.52
Conclusion.
Trends in the global security environment suggest
that stabilization and reconstruction operations are
likely to be a major component of U.S. strategy in the
coming decades. Success in these operations requires
what the QDR refers to as “unified statecraft: the
ability of the U.S. Government to bring to bear all of
the elements of national power at home and to work
in close cooperation with allies and partners abroad.”53
Unified statecraft obviously implies interagency
collaboration, and thus the planning framework
originally presented by PDD-56 and since modified
will continue to be of prime importance. The military
aspects of the framework will also likely endure as
the military planning culture will continue to drive
the planning process toward acceptable and feasible
ways to accomplish the interagency-derived national
objectives.
The most robust planning procedure will not result in success unless the necessary means are available
to execute the plan. Stabilization and reconstruction
operations are so distinct from warfighting operations
that they require special organizations and capabilities.
The military will always be the predominant supplier
of these capabilities, and it will require a cultural
change on the part of the military to fully accept the
dictates of DoD Directive 3000.05, which puts stability
operations on the same level as “fighting and winning
45

our nation’s wars.” DoD and the Army will need to
develop programs, organizations, and plans to be
more effective in the stabilization and reconstruction
environment. PDD-56 represents a glass half full
concerning successful interagency operations. Its
realistic planning framework needs to be coupled with
adequate and dedicated means to top off the glass and
allow the United States to be successful in this new and
complex security environment.
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CHAPTER 3
A “PEACE CORPS WITH GUNS”:
CAN THE MILITARY BE A TOOL
OF DEVELOPMENT?
H. Allen Irish
The violent politics of the 20th century was dominated
by great powers, states like Nazi Germany or the former
USSR that were too strong. Today, it is instead weak or
failing states that are the source of international troubles
like poverty, disease, refugees, human rights abuses,
and, as has been vividly clear since September 11, 2001,
terrorism.1
					
Francis Fukuyama

In the aftermath of what at first appeared to be
successful and relatively painless “regime changes,”
the unanticipated demands of stabilizing Iraq and
Afghanistan in the aftermath of major combat
operations, as well as the strategic consequences of
possible post-conflict failure, have become painfully
evident. As a result, the national security community
has devoted substantial intellectual energy to analyzing
the challenges inherent in the aftermath of conflict
and developing new organizations, doctrine, and
techniques to address them.
At the same time, similar strategic challenges that
exist at the other end of the conflict spectrum—those
occurring before conflict—have received somewhat
less attention.2 A cursory review of the recent conflicts
in which the United States has chosen or been forced
to intervene reveals that nearly all have roots in
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instability and a lack of economic and social maturity
that consigned those nations to the status of “fragile
states.”3 Many scholars have suggested that the biggest
challenges the United States and the international
community face in this century are those posed by
the failure of much of the world to achieve a level of
stability that is typically an outcome of development.4
Although the United States and most other mature
societies devote substantial resources to bilateral and
multilateral initiatives to further the economic and
societal development of fragile states, the U.S. military
has had relatively little involvement in international
development and has generally not sought a greater
role in such activities. In part, this reflects the view of
many military and civilian actors either that there is
no appropriate role for the military in international
development or that involvement of military personnel
in such activities should be an exceptional occurrence.
This author argues, however, that increased military
involvement in support of this strategic objective as
part of a “whole of government” approach would not
only further the interests of all parties, including—and
particularly—the military itself, but would enhance
the military’s capacity to handle the more difficult
challenges of post-conflict reconstruction.
The Strategic Importance of International
Development.
International development in a form that is recognizable today began in the aftermath of World War
II, primarily in support of European reconstruction.5
Although initiatives such as the Marshall Plan focused
on postwar reconstruction, they contained many of the
elements that later became common in most assistance
programs, such as a focus on economic development.
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Gradually, as Western Europe and Japan recovered in
the war’s aftermath, the focus of such programs shifted
to countries that had never achieved industrialization or
developed a market economy, particularly the nations
that emerged from the European colonial empires to
achieve independence during the generation following
World War II.6
As the theory and practice of international
development have matured, our approach has evolved
significantly, with less emphasis on centrally controlled,
large-scale “macro” projects, such as dams and large
industrial facilities, and more on dispersed “micro”
projects.7 As one development practitioner observed,
“The primary trajectory [of international development]
has been along a path that began with centrallyplanned, state-dominated strategies to market-led
polycentric approaches with the state as coordinator
and regulator rather than as the sole or predominant
actor.”8 However, there is no consensus among
development agencies and practitioners on how best
to succeed, and, particularly in view of the failure of
many development schemes to ameliorate intractable
poverty in many developing nations, many observers
have concluded that international development, as
currently practiced, often does more harm than good.9
In light of the mixed success of international efforts
to promote economic and social development outside
the Western democracies, many have questioned
not only the efficacy of U.S. efforts, but also the
appropriateness of pursuing such goals with taxpayer
dollars. Indeed, what is the strategic rationale for doing
so? The National Security Strategy (NSS) establishes
global economic and social development not merely as
a worthy goal, but as a national objective. As the NSS
notes, “Helping the world’s poor is a strategic priority
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and a moral imperative. Economic development,
responsible governance, and individual liberty are
intimately connected.”10 In the same vein, the most
recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) argues that
“by alleviating suffering and dealing with crises in
their early stages, U.S. forces help prevent disorder
from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis. They also
demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the
United States.”11
This is not merely empty rhetoric—the United
States has historically devoted considerable national
treasure on behalf of this policy objective. As noted
by former U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) Administrator Randall Tobias, “The United
States’ FY 2008 State and USAID foreign assistance
request is $20.3 billion, a $2.2 billion or 12 percent
increase over FY 2006 enacted levels. Given current
budget pressures, this increase reflects the importance
this Administration places on foreign assistance, not
just as a moral obligation to alleviate suffering, but as a
foundation of our national security strategy.”12
The Military’s Historical Involvement
in Development.
Although they have not generally viewed them as
central to their mission, the armed forces, particularly
the Army, have long been involved in activities that
fall within the ambit of “development.” Like Moliere’s
“Bourgeois Gentleman,” who was surprised to learn
he had been speaking in prose, military actors have
been involved in conducting development assistance
without being aware that they were doing so.
The Army itself was established and funded in large
part to assist in the nation’s economic development,
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particularly along the country’s western frontier as it
advanced toward the Pacific. The 19th century Army
took the lead in accomplishing such nation-building
tasks as exploration, road construction, compilation
of scientific records, aiding overland travelers, and
improving river transportation. Army posts fostered
settlement by providing security. In the absence
of a mature civil service, soldiers often provided
basic governmental services such as mail delivery,
agricultural support, and maintaining weather
records.13 These activities were not incidental to the
Army’s mission, but the result of a fully considered
policy and rationale for maintaining a regular army of
any size.14
As the United States became increasingly engaged
in overseas conflicts, it fostered efforts to improve
conditions in countries where the military operated
and, when the United States was an occupying power,
often did so beyond minimalist legal and moral
requirements. As one study observed, “The American
officers in control of Havana, Manila, and other cities
occupied by the Army engaged in efforts to promote
public health, judicial reform, tax equalization, honest
government, and public education. . . .”15 While some
of the impetus for these activities was to support
counterinsurgency efforts, much of it reflected the
progressive and reformist American character.16
This pattern of military involvement in development
activities, such as providing improved infrastructure,
governance, education, etc., continued during and
after numerous conflicts, including World War II,
Korea, Vietnam, and those in Central America.17
Particularly in the postwar occupations of Germany
and Japan, our efforts went far beyond those required
by international law, reflecting a fundamental
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desire to remake those societies more in our image.
In Vietnam, in particular, fostering that country’s
development was a key component of U.S. strategy.
This led to the establishment of the Civil Operations
and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
program, which supported the goal of fostering South
Vietnam’s economic and social development as a
principal means of defeating the Viet Cong insurgency
by capturing the populace’s “hearts and minds.”18
In the aftermath of Vietnam, however, counterinsurgency and stability operations fell from favor,
and the Army put relatively little concerted effort into
maintaining doctrine and capabilities. Even so, virtually
every contingency operation beginning with Operation
URGENT FURY in Grenada confronted the military
with the need to address post-conflict economic,
governance, rule of law, and other development
challenges.19 Despite this, political and military leaders
invariably continued to view these tasks as exceptions
to the rule that the military does not do “nationbuilding.” As a result, the military typically addressed
these post-conflict challenges in an improvised, ad hoc
manner.
The inevitable requirement to address fundamentally political questions in such operations further
exacerbated this reluctance to develop post-conflict
doctrine and capabilities.20 Even the inadequate
planning for post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq was
founded on the assumption that the duration of the
uniformed military’s role in the reconstruction of those
countries would be brief, and that civilian agencies
would assume responsibility in short order.
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In the Aftermath of Afghanistan and Iraq:
A New Reality.
Well-documented difficulties in Afghanistan and
Iraq in the aftermath of the initial maneuver phases of
the wars have focused new attention on post-conflict
operations and their critical nature. The President
issued National Security Presidential Directive 44
(NSPD-44), which designated the State Department
as lead agency for such operations, instructing it to
“prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and
reconstruction activities” in coordination with other
executive branch agencies, including the Department of
Defense (DoD).21 The directive instructs the interagency
“to anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible,
and respond quickly and effectively when necessary and
appropriate to promote peace, security, development,
democratic practices, market economies, and the rule
of law.”22 The principle underlying this approach is
that such states must not come to be “used as a base
of operations or safe haven for extremists, terrorists,
organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat to
U.S. foreign policy, security, or economic interests.”
This policy directive, along with DoD’s new
directive on stability operations, has generally been
interpreted as a reaction to deficiencies in postconflict capabilities exposed in Iraq and Afghanistan.23
However, this policy guidance has implications for the
U.S. military and the foreign policy apparatus that go
well beyond operations following major combat. The
central operating premise of U.S. foreign policy has
always been that deterring conflict is preferable to
having to deal with it once it has broken out. Given
that fragile and unstable states are viewed not only as
the primary locus of conflict in the world but also as the
principal source of terrorism and other asymmetrical
59

threats, the imperative to mitigate such instability and
fragility is obvious. While the NSS, as well as NSPD-44,
acknowledges the need to foster the development
of such states as a means of reducing that threat, the
means of doing so and the division of labor among the
instruments of national power is unclear.
If one accepts the premise that furthering the
development of fragile and unstable states enhances
U.S. national security and is an appropriate national
objective, what is the appropriate role for DoD and,
in particular, the uniformed military? Given that the
military’s participation in international development
has heretofore largely been peripheral, would increasing its involvement be desirable from the perspective
of either the military or the development community?24 Let us examine these issues.
From the military’s perspective, it has generally
viewed involvement in stability operations, including
humanitarian or development activities, as, at best,
a distraction from core warfighting competencies.25
Operation DESERT STORM’s rapid, high-intensity
conventional operations, followed by prompt
redeployment, represented the military’s preferred
mode of employment. Despite this preference, in the
years following DESERT STORM, an unwelcome
reality asserted itself. The nation called upon the
military, particularly the Army, to undertake a virtually
continuous series of unconventional or peacekeeping
operations of one kind or another, including Somalia,
Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As one writer noted,
This trend was a source of great angst among senior
military leaders and aggravated [their] long-standing
cultural aversion to the use of U.S. military power
for nation-building. These operations represented
everything military commanders hope to avoid: extended
and open-ended deployments, ambiguous political and
military objectives, no clear signs of military victory, and
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indifference among Americans at home for their sacrifice.
The increasing frequency of these missions around the
world, however, was dismissed as an aberration rather
than a forewarning of the future security environment
and the role of America’s Army.26

More significantly, the nongovermental development community has, for its own reasons, expressed
concern about military involvement in development
or relief operations and has promoted international
guidelines that disfavor such involvement.27 This is
somewhat grounded in legal and moral concerns, but
is also likely to have been motivated by a generalized
antimilitary disposition in many development
organizations and partly by apprehension about
the emergence of another “competitor” entering the
fray.28
Regardless of what may motivate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to oppose military
involvement in relief and development activities,
the principal rationale they offer for doing so is
contained within the concept of “humanitarian
space.” In this view, humanitarians adhere to a
fundamentally different set of principles than do
military or governmental actors (primarily neutrality
and impartiality). Because they do not seek to achieve
a governmental or political objective, they seek
operational independence, or humanitarian space, in
which to accomplish their work.29 Indeed, many relief
and development organizations steadfastly oppose the
use of the term “humanitarian” in reference to military
actions, or even those of governmental organizations.30
Such organizations premise their particular use of
the term “humanitarian” on the requirement for such
organizations to maintain a strictly neutral posture,
providing aid to any who need it without reference to
political consideration.31
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Military and other governmental organizations that
are involved in development and relief activities do so
not out of altruism or individual benevolence on the
part of the individuals involved. Rather, they intend
their efforts to support in some manner U.S. foreign
policy objectives. As noted by USAID official Michael
Miklaucic,
For a variety of reasons, [humanitarian] space—which
provides a comfort zone for contemporary humanitarian
and development workers—is shrinking. In particular,
we at USAID can no longer find comfort in this declining
neutral space—because since 9/11 U.S. foreign assistance
has been aligned closely and self-consciously with U.S.
foreign policy, and U.S. national security policy in
particular.

Miklaucic goes on to state,
Although this may appear to be an anomaly related to
Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in fact consistent with the
history of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the Marshall
Plan was established in 1947 U.S. foreign assistance has
been an element of U.S. national security policy. The
first recipients of Marshall Plan assistance were not the
defeated and destroyed axis countries or our closest
World War II allies, but rather Greece and Turkey,
which were both facing internal communist threats. As
the Cold War emerged U.S. foreign assistance was often
used to shore up allied countries in the developing world
to keep them from alliance with the Soviet Union.32

The observation that the United States promotes
development, at least in part, to further its own national
security objectives neither implies nor concedes that
such relief activities or development projects are in any
way morally or practically inferior to those delivered
by humanitarian organizations. However, with regard
to the contention by NGOs and others that aid given to
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advance political ends—particularly that provided to
help achieve tactical military objectives—is somehow
not “humanitarian,” it is important to consider whether
political motivation of the part of the benefactor either
taints the aid in the eyes of the recipient or vitiates its
humanitarian effect.33
Although, as noted, Congress provides USAID with
substantial budgetary resources, USAID is, in contrast
to DoD, an extremely small agency in personnel
terms, and its personnel have little, if any, role in the
direct provision of development assistance provided
by it. Rather, its role is more properly characterized
as management and oversight.34 It actually delivers
virtually all of its development assistance through socalled “implementing partners.” These are frequently
NGOs whom USAID either hires as contractors to
accomplish specific tasks or funds through cooperative
agreements or grants.35 The Agency has traditionally
accomplished its work through a relatively decentralized process conducted with great autonomy by local
USAID missions, although that is changing somewhat.36 In contrast, to the extent that military personnel
have been involved in development assistance, they
have largely done so either as direct providers or
through hiring local national contractors.37
Toward Full-spectrum Stability Operations?
Afghanistan and Iraq have persuaded the military
as well as most international organizations and NGOs
that they must—albeit reluctantly—accept that military
forces will necessarily be present and be engaged in
development-like activities in the aftermath of war. For
most in the military, as well as other national security
agencies such as the State Department and USAID,
the context in which this new emphasis on stability
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operations has developed has led to a general conflation
of stability operations with “post-conflict” operations.38
The new DoD directive on stability operations appears
to reflect, to some degree, that assumption. Although
it defines “stability operations” as those “military and
civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from
peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states
and regions (emphasis added), most of its references
to specific tasks characterize them in such terms as
“rebuilding” or “reviving.”39
Given the historical disinclination on the part of
all parties to employ military forces to accomplish
such tasks other than incidentally to the aftermath of
combat or during peacekeeping operations, is there,
and should there be, a significant stability operations
role for military actors in preconflict settings? This
question is particularly provocative in cases where
the military would be working in support of civilian
agencies already conducting development assistance
activities. Certainly, greater military involvement in
development outside of post-conflict settings would
be controversial among NGOs and civilian agencies.
Absent the compelling factor of large numbers
of personnel performing traditional military roles,
civilian organizations would view a larger military
role in development with suspicion, particularly
since to the extent the development community has
reluctantly accepted military involvement in relief and
development activities, it has done so primarily in the
context of Afghanistan and Iraq.40 Even so, the concept
of any military involvement in “humanitarian” work or
acting as a direct provider of aid, even in those situations,
remains controversial among NGOs. However, while
many civilian organizations acknowledge the need for
military involvement in a post-conflict context, they
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generally maintain their opposition to the military
acting as a direct provider of aid.41 Given that much of
the development community would have misgivings
about greater military involvement in development
in other-than-post-conflict settings, it is important to
consider whether the advantages of such involvement
would outweigh such potential opposition. Finally,
assuming greater military involvement in this area
is indeed desirable, in what manner would the U.S.
foreign assistance framework best incorporate military
assets?
Although DoD has historically consumed the
lion’s share of the national security budget, the
situation is quite different when looking only at the
foreign assistance component. The majority of the
State Department’s Fiscal Year 2008 budget request of
approximately $36 billion goes to Bilateral Economic
Assistance.42 In contrast, DoD currently spends a very
small amount on comparable programs directed toward humanitarian assistance and development, such
as the roughly $103 million requested for the Overseas
Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA)
program in its FY08 budget.43 Comparing budgets,
however, does not reveal the fundamental difference
in how the agencies approach this issue.
As previously noted, USAID conducts most
development activities through third parties, and
its role, and indeed that of the United States which
underwrites the assistance, is presumably less important
than the beneficial effect of the assistance itself.44 The
U.S. Government, as benefactor, is presumably content
to empower other organizations, which typically have
their own agendas and organizational objectives, on the
premise that doing the good deed is more important
than getting the credit.45
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DoD, on the other hand, typically conducts its smallscale humanitarian/development activities, such as
OHDACA or the Commander’s Emergency Response
Program (CERP), either in support of the combined
forces commander (e.g., Provincial Reconstruction
Teams in Afghanistan) or as a component of a
larger theater security cooperation program (TSCP)
conducted by a Combatant Commander. Because the
stated purpose of TSCP, in particular, is engagement
with military and civilian authorities, there is logically
more focus on its public diplomacy aspects—the
interaction with the local government and the people
themselves.46 In TSCP doctrinal terms, these activities
support the “shaping of perceptions” and “building of
relationships with friends and allies.”47
This distinction between the work of development
agencies, where development itself is the primary
objective (the “end” in an ends-ways-means construct),
and the work of military forces, where the primary
objective is to engage with the host nation’s society or
government, perhaps suggests that the military should
emphasize the public diplomacy benefits more so than
the development outcome itself.48 In public diplomacy,
receiving the credit for a positive development
outcome is indeed the strategic objective.49 This is a
false dichotomy, however, since both the development
outcome and the communications effect are strategic in
nature. But despite the two-fold benefit that could result
from using military assets in development activities,
the Combatant Commands have not widely done so,
other than incorporating rudimentary humanitarian
assistance activities, such as medical inoculations, into
theater security cooperation programs.50
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Synchronizing the Three “Ds.”
The United States has heretofore failed to exploit
fully all the capabilities it can bring to bear on the task
of fostering development around the world. In light of
the strategic requirement to strengthen fragile states in
order to prevent them from becoming failed states, the
United States should not only apply all of the relevant
instruments of national power to this task, but should
also do so in a coordinated and synchronized way. In
this regard, Canada’s approach to this issue can be
instructive.
Canada, as a small nation, cannot duplicate U.S.
military or diplomatic capabilities, but, like the Nordic
countries, it has chosen to exercise influence through
such initiatives as peacekeeping. In keeping with this
policy preference, Canada has held responsibility
for the operation of the Kandahar Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan since
August 2005. It is in that context that Canada’s “3-Ds”—
defense, development, and diplomacy—approach has
manifested itself.51 This strategy, also characterized as
the “whole of government” strategy, essentially seeks
to integrate and utilize these three principal elements
of national power to achieve strategic objectives. This
concept is not entirely new, resembling in some ways
the emerging approach to effects-based operations,
which seeks to expand the planning and conduct
of operations from a predominantly force-oriented,
military-on-military approach to one that incorporates
all elements of national power (diplomatic, information, military and economic, or DIME) and directs
them against an adversary’s nodes using system-ofsystems PMESII analysis.52
The Netherlands is employing a similar approach in
its Afghanistan role. The Dutch, who operate a PRT in
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Uruzgan Province, have consciously adopted the 3Ds
approach.53A recent conference held in the Netherlands
on this topic issued an excellent compilation of the
elements of the 3Ds approach. These recommendations
set out an integrated and collaborative approach to
development that emphasizes interagency cooperation
and specifically urges against organizational stovepiping. Additionally, the Netherlands organizes its
PRTs around the central proposition, “Be as civilian as
possible and as military as necessary.”54
This approach, even as adopted by countries that
have traditionally had less contentious relationships
with the development community than has the
United States, has raised concerns among NGOs.
For example, the Canadian Council for International
Cooperation (CCIC) expressed a familiar NGO doubt
about the implications of the new “integrated” model
for “international cooperation in situations of conflict.”
In the CCIC’s view, “Integration of humanitarian
assistance within military and foreign policy challenges
fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and
independence, and threatens the effectiveness of lifesaving assistance.”55
In the U.S. approach to integrating the three “Ds,”
however, the dynamic between civilian and military
elements has all too often been one of competition, not
cooperation. For example, although the coalition had
established a relatively successful template for PRTs in
Afghanistan (with military commanders augmented
and supported by civilians), when the concept was
proposed for Iraq, Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice strongly advocated that Iraqi PRTs be led and
predominantly staffed by State Department civilians,
particularly in the operational and functional positions,
but the process has been marked by interagency
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disputes.56 By all accounts, the performance of PRTs in
Iraq has been deficient.
For example, the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, Stewart Bowen, issued this evaluation
of Iraq PRTs:
As reported during numerous interviews with civilian
officials and military officers directly involved with
managing the PRT program, a basic problem had been
the poor working relationship between the [Embassy’s
National Coordination Team] and [military] elements.
Contributing factors included [State’s] inability to fill
staff positions; program leadership and control issues,
including employment of civil affairs assets; and
disagreement over the PRT mission.57

This reference (along with many others) to the problems
with State-led PRTs in Iraq is not intended to apportion
blame between the State and Defense Departments,
but rather to highlight how far the United States must
go to build interagency cooperation and implement a
true 3-Ds approach.58
Given such recent difficulties in integrating the
3-Ds in a post-conflict environment, is there hope
that these capabilities can be successfully applied to
preconflict challenges in a way that takes advantage of
the comparative advantages of each element of national
power? Indeed, given a historical lack of enthusiasm
on the part of both DoD and Department of State (DoS)
for pursuing a “whole of government” approach to
stability operations, do military assets possess special
capabilities that provide them a comparative advantage
in development activities?
There are indeed several important advantages
that the military possesses in a post-conflict setting
that apply throughout the entire spectrum of conflict:
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military personnel are subject to military discipline,
can be involuntarily mobilized and deployed to
insecure environments, and have the capability to
operate independently once there. That it is difficult to
require civilian personnel—including Foreign Service
officers—to serve for extended periods in unpleasant
and dangerous settings is the major impediment to a
larger civilian role in stability operations.59 Secretary
Rice has adopted as one of her major initiatives the
concept of “transformational diplomacy.” Among other
things, transformational diplomacy seeks to reposition
State Department employees away from European
capitals to places where their skills are needed more.60
To date, however, for a variety of reasons, it is unlikely
that significant numbers of civilians (whether from DoS
or other agencies) could be involuntarily dispatched to
insecure pre- or post-conflict arenas.61
An Operational Concept for a Military Role
in Development.
With the acknowledged strategic goals of fostering
international development and poverty reduction, it
makes no sense to abstain from using the most robust
element of national power assuming there is enough
of it. Given that using military resources could have
synergistic effects by both promoting development
and creating a full range of political, military, and
economic effects, under what operational concept
could military assets be employed? The military
possesses a number of quite relevant capabilities, some
of which have self-evident application in stability
operations in general and development in particular.62
Specifically, engineers and medical units have robust
capabilities that they have applied to developing
infrastructure and delivering humanitarian medical
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services. To the extent that warfighting requirements
permit, such assets can be (and have been) deployed in
support of U.S. engagement with developing nations.63
However, in addition to units with capabilities that can
translate from warfighting to development, the Army
and Marines both maintain a relatively robust civil
affairs capability fundamentally designed for stability
operations, including having doctrinal capabilities that
explicitly support development activities.64
Despite these capabilities, military assets in general
and civil affairs units in particular, have not been
extensively utilized in Phase 0 stability operations. A
number of organizational, conceptual, and legal factors
are responsible for this under-utilization.65 Much of
the relevant force, particularly for civil affairs, resides
in the Reserve component, and many commanders
view it as difficult to access, particularly for other than
short-duration training deployments.66 Additionally,
although Combatant Command (COCOM) staffs have
some level of civil-military expertise and typically
have habitual relationships with reserve civil affairs
organizations, this organizational construct has not
heretofore resulted in large numbers of detailed,
executable civil affairs plans that are focused on
development activities.
There are a number of other structural and
conceptual problems that have impeded using civil
affairs and similar forces to support development
activities. The way in which USAID has traditionally
accomplished its development assistance mission
has frequently not meshed well with DoD’s highly
centralized and detailed planning and execution
culture. Well-staffed COCOM’s have responsibility for
all military operations taking place in large geographic
areas, while international development is highly
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decentralized, with the U.S. Ambassador, USAID
mission chief, and other members of the country team
directing activities in their country. That the U.S.
Director of Foreign Assistance has only recently put
in place a requirement that, for the first time, country
teams develop plans in conformance with a nationallevel strategic framework highlights how fragmented
foreign assistance has traditionally been.67
Those familiar with military planning processes
would undoubtedly be astonished to learn that we
have heretofore conducted a strategically important
and costly governmental function like foreign
assistance without formal strategic guidance or a
requirement for detailed planning. Indeed, because
of their fundamentally different structures and ways
of pursuing U.S. foreign policy objectives, effecting
the critical connections between Defense and State
in planning, coordination, and execution of specific
projects has often been difficult.68
This disconnect is particularly problematic in that
most discrete TSCP activities are generated through
a system under which the U.S. ambassador requests
military support, whether for military-to-military
activities or otherwise.69 Although the assignment of
an Office of Military Cooperation or attaché to the
country team adequately supports traditional security
assistance activities, there is generally no comparable
established mechanism to integrate military capabilities
into development planning or execution.
Beyond these structural problems, many argue that
such development activities are not a core military
competency, and that there is neither a need for nor a
comparative advantage to using military assets in that
capacity. While that observation might well be true of
traditional warfighters, the presence of special purpose
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units, particularly civil affairs, which are doctrinally
capable of supporting development, undercuts this
contention.70 Indeed, the relevance of civil affairs to
a development mission is reflected in the fact that its
personnel frequently refer to themselves as a “peace
corps with guns.” Moreover, employing civil affairs
and similar assets in support of country development
strategies not only brings additional capabilities to
bear, but also has the important collateral benefit of
providing engaged participants, particularly those
from special purpose forces, with much needed
experience.71
As part of the transformational diplomacy initiative
to reform how the United States conducts foreign
assistance, the State Department is proposing to
implement, at least in theory, a “whole of government”
approach.72
Although
post-conflict
challenges
engendered new DoD policy support for stability
operations, operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will
eventually wane. Given the strategic importance of
reducing poverty and fostering development, it would
be regrettable if DoD, as it did after Vietnam, seeks
to avoid these challenges and return to business as
usual following the current conflicts.73 Despite only
intermittent and unfocused use of the military in
support of international development efforts in the
past, this area is ripe for greater utilization of military—
particularly civil affairs—forces.
Conclusion.
Given that the importance of improving conditions
in lagging parts of the world, such as Africa, is
not seriously disputed, why is the United States
not pursuing, or at least seriously considering, a
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“whole of government” approach to development?74
Unfortunately, the disputes over roles and
responsibilities in international relations have proven
to be an impediment to cooperation. DoD is seeking
new authorities to conduct operations that State views
as infringing on its primacy in conducting foreign
affairs, such as an expansion of DoD’s recently gained
authorities under Section 1206 of the National Defense
Authorization Act and its efforts to gain additional
authorities.75 While appropriate new authority for
DoD to conduct its operations, including humanitarian
operations, is necessary and useful, interagency
cooperation, rather than competition, between DoS
and DoD would further both their interests.
There have been reports of unhappiness at the
ambassadorial level as well.76 Senator Richard Lugar’s
committee conducted an examination of this issue
during the last Congress and found a number of
areas in which there was friction between State and
Defense.77 Obviously, antagonism between these
important agencies is counterproductive and must be
avoided or at least minimized. A role for the military in
international development will be, by necessity, small,
and this chapter does not advocate a primary role for
the military, or even for civil affairs forces. However,
given that the military will inevitably conduct such
operations in post-conflict settings or peacekeeping
operations, participation in Phase 0 operations
will provide the experience and understanding
to its specialized troops that they need in order to
accomplish these difficult tasks effectively. The “whole
of government” approach logically applies at all points
of the conflict spectrum. Although the military often
speaks of “force multipliers,” the counterproductive
focus on who is in charge of stability operations quite
clearly fails to qualify as one.
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CHAPTER 4
THE PERILS OF PLANNING:
LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ
Joseph J. Collins
For planners and bureaucrats, Afghanistan and Iraq
appear to present a puzzle.1 In Afghanistan, on one
hand, we had little time for planning; we did lots of
innovative things on the cheap; our small, international
force has taken relatively few casualties; we have had
strong local and international support; and, even with
recent setbacks by most accounts, a good outcome is
possible and even likely.2 On the other hand, in Iraq,
we had over a year to plan; our national policy has
been expensive and often unimaginative; a relatively
large, primarily American force has taken over 30,000
casualties; we have had severe and continuing problems
with local and international support; and the outcome
is still very much in doubt. In terms of international
legitimacy, Afghanistan—a war of necessity for the
United States—deserves an “A” grade, while the
conflict in Iraq—a war of choice—in its best moments
has been a “C-”.
A wag might conclude from the above recitation
that Americans should avoid planning at all costs. It
brings bad luck, stifles creativity, and interferes with
our penchant for achieving success through our normal
standard operating procedure: the application of great
amounts of material resources guided by brilliant
improvisation and dumb luck.
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This conclusion would, however, be flawed. As
President Dwight Eisenhower was fond of saying,
“Plans are nothing; planning is everything.” Our
problem in Iraq was not too much planning, but not
enough of it. Problems in planning contributed to
serious shortcomings connected with Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. With 3 years of hindsight, it is clear that
these shortcomings included:
• A series of unchecked, sensitive assumptions
that overemphasized potential Iraqi gratitude
and patience, but underestimated the problems
of occupying a fractious Muslim country the
size of California;
• Ineffective civil and military plans for stability
operations;
• The provision of inadequate forces to occupy
and secure Iraq, which encouraged the initiation
of an insurgency;
• Inadequate military reaction to rioting and
looting in the immediate post-conflict environment, which further encouraged lawlessness
and insurgency;
• Slow civil and military reaction to the growing
insurgency;
• Problematical funding and contracting mechanisms that slowed services and basic reconstruction, both of which were a partial antidote
to insurgency;
• Failure to make effective use of former Iraqi
military forces, which, when coupled with
deep de-Ba’athification, further alienated the
Sunni minority and deprived the government
of skilled technocrats;
• Slow and, at first, ineffective development of
new Iraqi security forces;
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• Inability to provide enough trained civilian
officials, diplomats, and aid workers to conduct
effective stabilization and reconstruction activities; and,
• Slow creation of an interim Iraqi authority
that could have minimized the perception of
occupation and enhanced the perception of
liberation.3
Successful innovation and favorable circumstances
on the ground made the war in Afghanistan easier
than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both
cases have had much in common with other complex
contingencies, such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.
All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations
of stove-piped, single-agency planning systems. In the
future, we will have to conduct planning in a dynamic
security environment marked by numerous challenges,
and will accordingly need to be highly adaptive. Not
only must we do better in mid-range interagency
planning, but we will also have to develop and refine
new capabilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspects
of contingencies. In turn, this will require changes in
the organizational cultures of the armed forces and the
Department of State. The first step in understanding
this challenge will be to appreciate the environment in
which it will take place.
Security Environment.
First, U.S. conventional military power is unparalleled. No country or nonstate actor in its right
mind seeks conventional battle with the United States.
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated that the
armed forces, with minimal allied help, can attack a
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significant opponent at a 1:6 force ratio disadvantage,
destroy its forces, and topple a mature, entrenched
authoritarian regime, all in a few weeks. Unfortunately,
however, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM also showed
that victory in war today is much more dearly obtained
than success in an initial military operation.
For our enemies, guerrilla tactics and terrorism—
pre-conflict, post-conflict, and extra-conflict—are the
order of the day. At the same time, the U.S. armed forces,
generally oriented on conventional operations, have
been slow to adapt to this new kind of war, a problem
we have seen many times in our history, albeit under
different circumstances. In both Afghanistan and Iraq,
it took over a year to adapt to the requirements posed by
stabilization and reconstruction in a counterinsurgency
environment.
Not only are American planners often surprised
by the “What kind of war is this?” questions, but
they also have not done well in thinking beyond the
last bullet of what appears to be the climactic battle
of a war. Once enmeshed in post-conflict stability
operations, the United States has had great difficulty
in establishing effective unity of effort and coherent
chains of command. In the Cold War and thereafter, the
United States has consistently done poorly at bridging
the wide gap between success in battle and victory in
war.
Second, in recent years, the United States has entered
into conflicts only in areas that were undergoing some
sort of humanitarian crisis, which has been a focal
point of the war effort or a critical factor in winning
the support of the local populace. In these operations,
winning the war and solving the humanitarian crisis
both had to be first-priority activities, especially since
the armies of developed nations have the will and
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technology to assure the welfare of civilian populations.
A humanitarian disaster—a tragedy in its own right—
could create the perception of a Pyrrhic victory or
an insensitive policy. Intense news media scrutiny,
moreover, raises the stakes for democratic nations.
The military has also become a player in what
are normally civilian activities such as humanitarian
assistance, stabilization activities, civil governance,
and reconstruction. Military units, nongovernment
organizations (NGOs), and elements of international
organizations work in close and, at times,
uncomfortable proximity. The dividing line between
civil and military enterprise is further blurred by
the presence of government contractors who may be
performing formerly military functions or conducting
humanitarian activities similar to those of more
politically disinterested NGOs.
Third, in Afghanistan and Iraq, unlike in Bosnia
and Kosovo, there was no discrete, post-conflict
phase. In both of the current conflicts, conventional
war A was followed immediately by unconventional
war B. In turn, war B was complicated by the need to
conduct simultaneous stabilization and reconstruction
activities. Neither soldiers nor diplomats were ready
for this development. To be ready in the future, they
will have to change how they organize, plan, and train
for conflict.
Fourth, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the insurgents
decided after a few months that they had to defeat
reconstruction in order to force the evacuation of
coalition forces and discredit the people who worked
with the coalition. In both conflicts, counterinsurgency,
stabilization, and reconstruction have become strands
of the same rope.
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Fifth, for the soldier, the news media and
information systems have gone from merely intrusive
to omnipresent. In this respect, conflicts such as those
in Afghanistan and Iraq are much more affected
by the media than the small wars of the early 20th
century.4 Today, the ugly realities of irregular warfare
continuously stream into Western living rooms. Senses
of gain or loss and effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
operations, are magnified by the work of relentless
journalists, whose editors freely admit that “if it
bleeds, it leads.” Activities such as police training or
well digging lose out to grisly combat scenes.5
The nature of media coverage makes policy
execution more difficult and time-sensitive. With
intense media scrutiny, democratic governments
have to get it right early and keep things moving in
a positive direction. Where democratic governments
once had years to experiment with solutions to the
sticky problems of irregular warfare, today they have
months or weeks before the steady drumbeat of “all is
lost” begins to sound.
None of these facts about the media have been lost
on our adaptive enemy. Empowered by the Internet
and bad intentions, the creation of mayhem and bad
publicity for the Coalition is not a by-product of
enemy action, but its objective. While we are stuck
in the mindset of doing good and then trying to
get appropriate publicity, the media-savvy enemy
concentrates on providing self-serving footage that
everyone from ABC to al-Jazeera finds irresistible.
Indeed, the Internet and the 24/7 media environment
have provided the modern-day insurgent or terrorist
a potent weapon, one strong enough to humble a
nation that, ironically, is home to both Hollywood and
Madison Avenue. Al-Qaeda is in no small way the evil
spawn of globalization and the Internet.
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One scholar compared the terrorists’ use of the
Internet to Napoleon’s levee en masse, where commercial
presses galvanized public support for France and
allowed Napoleon to effectively mobilize the entire
French nation. Here’s how the 21st-century levee en
masse works in Iraq:
Insurgent attacks are regularly followed with postings
of operational details . . . and tips for tactical success.
Those who use insurgent chat rooms are monitored by
the hosts, and, if they seem amenable to recruitment,
contacted via email. Insurgent sites contain everything
from practical information for traveling to Baghdad
to morale boosters for those currently involved in the
struggle. Videos of killings by the “Baghdad Sniper” or
[others] . . . are posted on the web. Cyber-mobilization
has changed the face of war, making it harder for the
United States to win in Iraq. . . .6

Clearly, better mid-range planning is essential for a
media and information environment that empowers
the terrorist and the insurgent and is intolerant of
missteps by great powers. More than ever, protracted
conflict favors the insurgent and the terrorist. As one
Taliban leader noted, “The Americans have all the
wristwatches, but we have all the time.”7 Democratic
powers need wise policy and decisive execution if
they are going to succeed in stability operations. In
effect, they have to be good enough to win a protracted
conflict in an unprotracted time frame.
These problems are not likely to go away. While
some strategists believe that the United States will and
should turn its back on irregular warfare and stability
operations,8 the future is likely to present a set of such
challenges that will require significant institutional
and cultural adaptation. In the next decade, the United
States—in addition to maintaining readiness for
conventional wars—must:
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• Continue stability operations and reconstruction
activities in Afghanistan and Iraq for at least
another 5 years;
• Execute counterterrorist operations activities in
the Middle East, Africa, and Asia;
• Support future peace operations in the Middle
East and Africa (Gaza? Golan Heights? Lebanon?
Darfur?);
• Be ready to manage system shocks from regime
failure or radical changes in some hostile
regional powers (North Korea? Cuba?);
• Deter or manage traditional threats or future
peer competitors, deal with the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); and,
• Improve homeland defense against terrorist
groups, including those who might use weapons
of mass destruction.
In the next decade, the need for effective joint, combined, and interagency planning and policy execution
will remain salient. Major institutional planning
changes will require complementary changes in
training, resource allocation, and organizational
cultures.
Improving Mid-Range Planning.
The U.S. Government has already begun upgrading
mid-range planning. The aftermath of September
11, 2001 (9/11), saw the creation of a Department of
Homeland Security, a Homeland Security Council,
and a National Counterterrorism Center, as well as a
set of intelligence community reforms. There are joint
interagency coordination groups in many combatant
command headquarters. The Department of State
now has a senior Coordinator for Reconstruction and
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Stabilization to improve planning, and it has changed
personal assignment patterns to better support national
priorities, interagency activities, and the war on
terrorism. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) has created an “Office of
Military Affairs” to improve its connectivity with the
Pentagon and its various field commands.
In the Department of Defense (DOD), a new
directive on stability operations is being implemented
under the close supervision of energized defense policy
executives. Preparation for stability operations has
been put on a par with preparation for combat. The
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) also emphasized
stability operations and preparation for irregular
warfare. Special Operations forces will be dramatically
increased.9 In Iraq and Afghanistan, amid all the strife
and bad news, there have been highly successful
improvements in counterinsurgency—including a
new, joint Army and Marine Corps manual—and
security assistance operations. Military, diplomatic,
and USAID teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq are
working together much more closely than even a year
ago. In the long stretch of history, however, these recent
improvements will be recorded as the first baby steps
in improving our national capabilities to deal with
failed states and complex contingency operations.
The following eight recommendations will build on
these improvements and help planning in the future.
First, we need a new charter for complex contingency
planning. The Clinton administration’s oft-ignored
bible on political-military planning for complex
contingencies, Presidential Decision Directive-56,
was headed in the right direction. Early in the first
term of President George W. Bush, the Pentagon
blocked a National Security Council (NSC) staff
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attempt to publish a new contingency planning policy
document, all in the name of preserving the freedom
of action of cabinet officers and keeping civilians out
of the contingency planning business. More input into
contingency planning from civilians, of course, is not
the problem; it will be a key part of the solution. We
do not need to protect stove-piped systems, we need to
strive for more integration in policy formulation and
execution.
War plans are rarely briefed outside military
channels. Inside the Pentagon, only a handful of
civilians have access to them. This prohibition may
make sense for major conventional war plans, and it
certainly makes sense for security purposes. However,
when conflicts continue even after the last hill is taken,
when they include activities such as stabilization and
reconstruction that we want civilians to lead, there
must be a broader sharing of contingency planning
responsibilities. The 2006 QDR’s recommendation
for a new interagency document called “The National
Security Planning Guidance” is clearly a step in the
right direction.10 The QDR calls on this new document
to “direct the development of both military and
nonmilitary plans and institutional capabilities. . . .
[It] would set priorities and clarify national security
roles and responsibilities to reduce capability gaps and
eliminate redundancies.”
Second, every executive department should insist
on interagency experience for its most senior civilians
and make it a prerequisite for promotion to the senior
executive in civilian agencies or the Foreign Service.
Interagency experience should count as the equivalent
of joint experience for military officers. Too often,
the best and brightest avoid interagency assignments
where the hours are terrible and the rewards are less
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than those at the home agency. Too many inexperienced
junior personnel occupied the NSC staff in the last two
administrations. NSC personnel at the director level
should optimally be members of the senior executive
service or at least colonel or GS-15 level personnel. The
first step to improve interagency planning would be
to improve the quality of agency personnel across the
board and increase the number of the best and brightest
who have lived and worked in the interagency world.
The U.S. Government should also follow through
on its plans to create a corps of civilian and military
National Security officers who will become the masters
of interagency work. Plans are also in train to create a
consortium among the government’s higher learning
institutions to ensure a better focus on the needs of
interagency work.
It is often said that we need a Goldwater-Nichols
type of reform for the interagency community.11 This
is a worthy ideal, but one must ask whether this
landmark legislation for DoD sets the bar too high.
The Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986 were stewing
for almost 40 years and were enacted only after a series
of disappointing operations where it was clear that
America’s military power was unequal to the sum of
its parts. Moreover, Goldwater-Nichols concerned a
department that is firmly under the command of one
powerful secretary. It also concerned a relatively small
number of congressional committees.
A Goldwater-Nichols reform for the interagency
would involve a wide array of departments and
agencies, and dozens of congressional committees,
each of which is as resistant to diminutions of its
power as any cabinet department is. Finally, if one
takes the thought of a Goldwater-Nichols reform
literally, there would be a shift of power from the
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cabinet departments to “the interagency”; that would
mean shifting power away from confirmable cabinet
officers to appointive NSC staff personnel who are
not accountable to Congress. Such a shift would
undermine hundreds of laws that empower cabinet
officers and ensure that many bucks stop before they
get to the President’s desk. Such a shift could create
situations where responsibility for policies becomes
fuzzed over. While a literal Goldwater-Nichols for the
interagency may be a bridge too far, it has the right
spirit. Improving interagency policy decisionmaking
and execution is clearly within our capability, whether
we pursue radical systemic change or step-by-step
improvements.
Third, in a related vein, we need a better system for
exporting interagency groups to the field. Interagency
coordination in Washington is possible, but in the field
during complex contingencies, the U.S. Government
habitually has either (1) a system in which one cabinet
department is nominally in charge, such as the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, or the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, or (2) a more
cooperative system, such as we have today in Kabul
and Baghdad. This cooperative system features a senior
military officer and a senior diplomat working together,
with neither having overall charge of U.S. policy, and
both answering to their respective superiors. Today,
in both Kabul and Baghdad, the arrangements are
working well, but better arrangements may be possible.
Getting this system right should be the subject of war
games and experiments conducted by cooperating
agencies and supervised by Joint Forces Command and
the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The United
States is not likely ever to have a “viceroy” system, but
more effective, efficient, and predictable arrangements
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that offer more unity of command are possible. We
cannot afford situations where difficult personalities or
ad hoc arrangements on the ground or in Washington
stand in the way of effective national policy. While
all potential solutions to this problem are subject to
criticism, we are today practicing turf-fight avoidance
and not talking about this critical issue. Experiments
and scholarly investigation may well lead to solutions
or at least a set of mutually acceptable expectations.
For its part, S/CRS at State—which will have
the national lead in reconstruction and stabilization
operations—must have an Active and a Reserve
response corps, full of interagency and civil specialists.
This will take hundreds of millions of dollars per
year, which Congress has thus far been unwilling to
appropriate. In the future, S/CRS should be able to
draw on the entire government as well as on the private
sector to build a tailored multifunctional team for any
specific mission. If the U.S. Government fails to build
this capability, there is little reason to maintain S/CRS
and the entire conceptual system that has been built
up around it, because it will remain a hollow shell, an
office with an impressive name but lacking resources.
Fourth, all improvements to interagency advice
and policy implementation will require cultural
and organizational change. To start, the military
establishment needs to focus its planning and training
more on victory in the total war, and less on success in
climactic battles. It is folly to pretend that success in a
“final” battle will lead directly to victory. Particularly
in cases of regime change or failed states, post-combat
stability operations (Phase 4 in war plan lingo) will be
the key to victory. They are every bit as important as
the ability to move, shoot, and communicate in battle,
the normal preoccupations of the soldier. However,
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studies of post-combat planning in Iraq show that Phase
4 planning did not receive the attention it demanded.
Washington deserves the lion’s share of criticism for
Iraq planning failures, but there were glaring holes in
the military planning effort as well.12
Occupation, stabilization, reconstruction, and
other issues associated with state-building must be
better integrated into the curriculum of staff and war
colleges. Language and cultural studies are already
becoming more important for military officers. War
games and experiments also need to focus more on
stability operations. None of this is meant to imply
that the military should take over critical post-combat
activities from the State Department and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID). The
opposite is the case: State and USAID need to be
resourced, organized, and directed so that they can
fulfill the awesome responsibilities that they have been
assigned.
Fifth, the Department of State and USAID
personnel and organizations need to become more
operational, that is, able to lead in the management of
grand enterprises in unsafe and austere environments.
General Tommy Franks’s memoirs contain the right
thought: after the battle, you need lots of “boots”
but also lots of “wingtips” on the ground.13 Absent
the wingtips, the boots in Iraq have had to do much
more than they should under optimal circumstances.
This problem continues to the present day, where, for
lack of civil presence, there is still too much military
supervision of reconstruction and civil governance
activities. In Afghanistan (and now in Iraq), the
Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which include
military, diplomatic, and USAID personnel, have
mitigated the “too many boots, too few wingtips”
problem that hampers coalition operations in Iraq.14
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The personnel strength of State and USAID is clearly
inadequate to meet their expanded roles in the war on
terror.
At the national level, the Bush administration is
grappling with this problem and has designated S/CRS
to be the national lead. The administration must now
follow through and ensure that this good idea is realized
in a powerful center of excellence. This office should
also become the centerpiece for interagency planning
and exercises throughout the government. Interagency
staffing has begun and should be increased. It needs a
healthy budget, which will be a problem in a poorly
funded department that is usually focused on current
policy, not mid-range contingency planning. S/CRS is
a toddler. This administration and its successor must
ensure that it matures into a robust adult.
There is a danger here in encouraging all of the
cabinet departments to get involved in post-conflict
stabilization and reconstruction activities. At times,
this has represented real value added. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, long focused on projects at
home and in bases abroad, has done superb work in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Other departments, however,
have not been so lucky. Many of them are not manned
to do these tasks and have fewer usable assets than
one might imagine. Others are likely to lack cultural
or historical perspective and rush in to try to do things
American style. Others have and will fall victim to
departmental SOPs, reflecting the old saw: “If all you
have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
In Iraq and Afghanistan, participation by cabinet
departments with a domestic focus has been a mixed
blessing. Many well-intentioned efforts have ended
up poorly coordinated or out of synch with cultural
conditions. A number of show projects have had
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little to show for their efforts. Better coordination by
State and USAID, and better peacetime preparation,
is needed before agencies that do not have overseas
missions are ready to take their game on the road.
Stabilization and reconstruction operations should not
become an interdepartmental pick-up game.
Sixth, for the State Department and USAID to
become more operational, they must be better funded
across the board. Today, State and USAID spend (on
all of their functions, including security assistance)
less than one-tenth of what the Pentagon does on its
many missions. There are less than 8,000 Foreign
Service officers in State and USAID combined. With
this elite small force, our diplomats and development
specialists have to cover their extensive Washington
headquarters, as well as over 120 countries and 265
diplomatic and consular locations. State and USAID’s
chronic underfunding is the single greatest impediment
to effective planning, developmental assistance,
reconstruction, and stabilization. State cannot be
equipped only with good ideas, while Defense has
all the money and most of the deployable assets. This
is a prescription for an unbalanced national security
policy.
As long as there are few “wingtips” on the ground,
the “boots” will be forced do move into the vacuum.
As long as State is a budgetary midget, it will play
second fiddle to the Pentagon colossus. If we want to
fix planning and execution for complex contingencies,
we must fund State and USAID as major family
members and not poor cousins of the Pentagon. At a
minimum, over the next 5 years, the Foreign Service
personnel strength of State and USAID should be
raised by 50 percent and the entire budget of state
and USAID should be doubled, across the board.
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Priorities for new spending should be given to public
diplomacy, stabilization and reconstruction activities,
and development assistance focused on preventing
state failure in the developing world.
Seventh, to get better at planning and executing
complex contingencies, we will have to untangle the
legal and regulatory impediments that hobble the Departments of State and Defense. This will be especially
important now, if State begins to operate in the field on
large-scale post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction problems. Many of these legal provisions serve
only to protect congressional committee prerogatives.
Still others are meant to prevent human rights abuses
or serve some other valid purpose. How else can
you explain that one group at State is in charge of
refugee affairs, but USAID is charged with looking
after internally displaced people? Why, given the
importance of law and order to development, is
USAID forbidden from funding and managing police
development programs, a major element in restoring
stability in failed states? It is tempting to say that these
dysfunctional legal or regulatory provisions should be
waived or eliminated. This should be done, however,
only after a full assessment of the rationale behind each
of them.
Eighth and last, to gain legitimacy and promote
better burden sharing, the United States should make
its most powerful allies full partners in complex
operations. We have run two operations in which
many allies were brought into the plan after the action
began. This did no great damage in Afghanistan,
where the international perception of legitimacy has
been high. Indeed, NATO has moved into the lead in
Afghanistan, having transitioned from peace operations
into combat a year ago. In Iraq, however, the United
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States continues to pay a stiff price for its excessively
narrow focus in 2003. History will judge the wisdom
of that decision, but, in the future, bringing the allies in
before the takeoff may make for a rougher flight but a
smoother landing.
Afterword.
As this volume goes to press, all of the modest
steps we have made as a nation to prepare better for
complex contingencies are in serious trouble. Congress
has refused to adequately fund some of them, and
our leadership has not fought the good fight to get it
to do so. S/CRS, for example, remains the national
leader for stabilization and reconstruction in name,
but it is still a woefully weak office. It has the lead,
but not the assets, to get the job done. Some experts
in Washington already wonder out loud: After S/
CRS is declared defunct or overcome by events, what
comes next? Other national security experts believe
that the issues surrounding state-building and postconflict stabilization and reconstruction are—because
of problems in Iraq—old hat and no longer crucial. As
one told me, “We won’t step on that rake again.” They
believe—like candidate George W. Bush in 2000—that
the United States can turn its back on state-building and
stability operations and simply choose not to become
directly involved. Indeed, some recommend that we
return to concentrating on high-tech conventional
operations, and once again direct the preponderance of
defense spending toward the Navy and the Air Force.
This group desperately wants to focus like a laser beam
on conventional conflict and conflict scenarios in East
Asia.15
At the same time that the forces of bureaucratic
interest have begun to question our efforts at
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improving our governmental capabilities for complex
contingencies, the war in Iraq grows in unpopularity.
After every unpopular and costly war, the United States
has suffered a self-inflicted “never again” syndrome.
After the Korean War, we turned our back on even the
possibility of limited warfare and created a strategy of
massive retaliation. This was one of the great bluffing
strategies of all times, but one that, in the end, had
to yield to a strategy characterized by more flexible
options. After Vietnam, we buried our understanding
of counterinsurgency so deep that we still haven’t
unearthed it completely. Needless to say, this pattern
of “learning” is dysfunctional and inefficient. It is not
in the national interest to fail to understand and adapt
to the environment that one lives in.
Post-Iraq, my worry is that the forces of bureaucratic politics will meld with a natural tendency to look
at tough wars and say “never again.” A new administration, probably with some perceived blessing from
public opinion polls, could defund our small steps
toward improving our capabilities to address irregular
warfare and its aftermath; disestablish S/CRS; cut
money for foreign assistance; and erase increases to
Army and Marine end strength and to special operations
forces. A new team could wipe out all efforts at making
State, USAID, and DoD adapt to the reality of a world
of failed and failing states. In place of improving
our national capabilities for irregular warfare and
stabilization and reconstruction activities, we might
even buy more high-tech conventional weaponry or
increase our investment in domestic social programs.
It is my fervent hope that the readers of this chapter
will fight ostrich-like attempts to turn back the clock
to the day when so-called experts proclaimed that
superpowers “do not do windows,” pretending that
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the United States can exist in splendid isolation from
parts of the developing world that desperately need
our leadership and our help.
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CHAPTER 5
U.S. PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS
IN AFGHANISTAN, 2003-2006: OBSTACLES TO
INTERAGENCY COOPERATION
Carlos Hernandorena
In the aftermath of major combat operations launched by U.S. and coalition forces in October 2001 during
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the United States
and other participant nations were presented with
the daunting task of rebuilding the fractured Afghan
state. Following the rapid collapse of the Taliban
and the destruction of al-Qaeda training camps, the
United Nations Security Council enacted Resolution
1386 on December 20, 2001. Resolution 1386 sought
to support Afghanistan’s new interim government by
establishing security in Kabul through the creation
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
Efforts were soon made to expand the scope of ISAF
into the Afghan countryside as a means of stabilizing
the war-torn nation.1 Afghanistan remained unstable
due to lingering elements of al-Qaeda and the Taliban,
which began waging an active insurgency against
coalition forces and the Afghan Interim Authority.
Additionally, tribal factionalism, powerful warlords,
and the lack of any established legal system posed other
challenges to peace in the region.2 Coalition and ISAF
forces found themselves fighting an insurgency while
carrying out Support for Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations.
As a result of the security threats posed to both
military and civilian personnel involved in recon121

struction missions and of burden-sharing inequities
among coalition partners, U.S. officials developed the
concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
in 2002 and established the first teams by early 2003.3
Consisting of both civilian and military personnel from
different government agencies, PRTs were designed to
spread the “ISAF effect” through a combination of quick
impact reconstruction projects, security sector reform,
and the extension of the Afghan Central Government’s
influence, all under the protection of embedded military
forces. Initially, the United States set up the first few
PRTs along with coalition partners such as Germany,
the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. As the PRT
program took off, the United States began to hand over
some PRTs to coalition allies and ISAF participants.4
Eventually, by late 2006, all PRTs in Afghanistan were
placed under ISAF control.5
The civil-military and interagency aspects of
PRTs make them a unique case study. In order for
PRTs to function the way they were intended, high
levels of coordination between team components
were needed, yet not always present. Assessing the
manner in which different agencies as well as civilian
and military personnel interacted, especially within
a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment, provides
an excellent entree to improving future interagency
teams.
Although opinions vary greatly regarding the
effectiveness of PRTs in Afghanistan, much of the
literature concerning the teams views them as having
had a positive impact in the region. A report written by
the USAID claims that “provincial reconstruction teams
(PRTs) have been an effective tool for stabilization in
Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and districtlevel institutions and empowering local leaders
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who support the central government.”6 Another
report written by a specialist on support and stability
operations affirms that PRTs, while plagued with
difficulties, made a number of helpful contributions by
providing “a positive international presence in places
where there otherwise would have been only combat
forces conducting kinetic operations.”6 Indeed, many
experts on SSTR believe that PRTs were and continue
to be a useful option for countries such as Afghanistan
and Iraq with the proviso that certain changes be made
to maximize the efficacy of the teams and overcome
some of the challenges they face.
While the broad debate over PRT effectiveness is
important, the key purpose of this chapter is to focus
more narrowly on obstacles to interagency cooperation
in the U.S. PRTs during Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM, specifically during the period 2003 to
2006. This chapter assumes that PRTs were useful tools
in Afghanistan and models to improve upon for the
future. As previously stated, there are various opinions
regarding the usefulness of PRTs in Afghanistan and
their potential in future SSTR roles. There has also
been considerable discussion of the interplay between
the PRTs and nongovernment organizations (NGOs)
operating in the same regions. These are all important
issues that must be resolved; however, an assessment
of interagency cooperation is particularly salient.
An analysis of interagency cooperation within
PRTs in Afghanistan is essential for determining the
optimum structure and guidelines of future PRTs or
other interagency organizations operating in COIN
environments. Considering the high probability
that future U.S. operations may involve support,
stability, and reconstruction functions, we would be
remiss to disregard the lessons presented in cases
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such as Afghanistan. The United States must prepare
itself to conduct SSTR operations in any threatening
environment in which insurgencies, terrorism, and
other dangers constitute a genuine menace to the
military and civilian agencies aiding in reconstruction.
An example of this need can be seen with the current
deployment of PRTs in Iraq where efforts are being
made to ameliorate dire security threats to rebuilding
efforts there.
The U.S. Army’s new COIN field manual, FM 3-24,
contains a section dedicated solely to explaining the
importance of interagency coordination for successful
COIN operations. It states that:
the integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial
to successful COIN operations. All efforts focus on
supporting the local populace and Home Nation
government. Political, social, and economic programs
are usually more valuable than conventional military
operations in addressing the root causes of conflict and
undermining an insurgency. COIN participants come
from many backgrounds. They may include military
personnel, diplomats, police, politicians, humanitarian
aid workers, contractors, and local leaders. All must
make decisions and solve problems in a complex and
extremely challenging environment.7

This quotation shows the importance of PRTs in
establishing a joint mechanism for dealing with
situations such as Afghanistan, where security threats
must be met with a multifaceted approach involving
military and civilian resources. Most importantly, in
the Army’s COIN manual explicates persuasively the
critical nature of interagency cooperation between
the various entities involved in support and stability
operations in a COIN environment.
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Development
History.
The concept of PRTs was not introduced at the outset
of U.S. and coalition operations in Afghanistan. It took
more than a year from the initial stages of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM before the integrated civilmilitary units designated as PRTs were deployed.8
Planning for civil-military cooperation, deemed
essential for reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from
the beginning, coincided with the initial preparations
for military operations against the Taliban. The
military coordinated with a number of humanitarian
agencies to prepare for the rebuilding efforts which
would be needed after the conclusion of major combat
operations. One author describes events as follows:
Humanitarian agencies, including InterAction the
World Food Program (WFP), were invited to participate
in a Coalition Coordination Council, based with the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, which
was created to enhance coordination between coalition
partners, UN agencies, and the nongovernmental health
agency (NGHA) community.9

As preparations continued for military operations in
Afghanistan, General Tommy Franks, the commander
of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), relayed
orders to establish the Coalition Joint Civil-Military
Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF). This task force
consisted of a command and control unit designed to
direct the actions of all civil affairs teams operating in
Afghanistan during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
and to establish the precursors of PRTs.10
Shortly after the fall of the Taliban in December
2001, the CJMOTF established the coalition’s first
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civil affairs teams in country. Labeled Coalition
Humanitarian Cells (CHLCs, or “chiclets”) consisting
of outposts of approximately 12 U.S. Army civil
affairs soldiers, they were deployed with the intent of
winning the “hearts and minds” of the local populace.
As Afghan reconstruction expert Robert Perito
explains, personnel of the CHLCs were assigned the
“task to assess humanitarian needs, implement smallscale reconstruction projects, and establish relations
with the United Nations (UN) Assistance Mission
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and nongovernmental
organizations already in the field.”11
The Army civil affairs personnel composing
CHLCs fulfilled a role as noncombat troops with
unique Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Their
background was primarily as reserve unit soldiers
with considerable experience in the civilian realm.
These “citizen-soldiers” were called to active duty
already possessing a vast array of specific knowledge
and training in law enforcement, cultural affairs,
labor, education, logistics, health care, and various
other areas of civil service.12 The purpose of these civil
affairs members operating in CHLCs was to provide
Army commanders in the field with readily available
and deployable sources of civilian technical skills that
could be adapted to minor reconstruction projects
throughout the Afghan countryside.13
In November 2002, the deployment of CHLCs was
soon followed by a plan to create Joint Regional Teams
(JRTs). During a series of meetings in Kabul attended
by NGOs, diplomats, UN representatives, and ISAF
and coalition military personnel, the concept of JRTs
was outlined. During these meetings, participants
determined that remnants of the Taliban and alQaeda, in addition to increased infiltration of hostile
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forces across the Afghan-Pakistani border, posed a
significant threat to personnel involved in support and
stability functions. Participants were, of course, briefed
on the conceptual phasing of the overall reconstruction
effort. According to a report by Barbara Stapleton of
the British Agencies Afghanistan Group, Phases I and
II involved the toppling of the Taliban and al-Qaeda,
Phase III related to stabilization efforts, and Phase IV
was labeled the reconstruction phase.14
To accommodate reconstruction efforts while simultaneously addressing legitimate security concerns, a
Joint Regional Team (JRT) initiative was designed with
three parts: (1) mobile Civil Affairs Teams (CATs); (2) a
civil-military operations center headquarters; and (3) a
contingent of combat troops to provide force protection.
The JRTs had four primary functions. The first consisted
of coordinating the activities of the numerous entities
involved in reconstruction, ranging from NGOs to
the Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). Second,
JRTs would identify possible reconstruction projects
that could further improve Afghan civilians’ opinion
of coalition and ISAF forces. Third, the teams would
conduct individual village assessments to determine
the needs of the local populace. Fourth, JRTs were
expected to liaise with regional commanders on matters
relating to security and reconstruction efforts.15
When the idea of JRTs and their intended mission
was developed and presented to Hamid Karzai,
the interim president of the Afghan Transitional
Authority, in December 2002, he expressed eagerness
to have the teams deployed as soon as possible. Karzai
did, however, present the United States and its allies
with one request: he asked that the title of the teams
be changed from Joint Regional Teams to Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. The Afghan president
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felt that the concept of regional teams promoted
factionalism, bolstering the idea of regions controlled
by warlords. Shifting from the term regional to
provincial implied that the purpose of the teams was
to “provide support to the government (as opposed
to regional powerbrokers or warlords) and to denote
reconstruction as the principal activity of the teams.”16
The first PRT was formed in the city of Gardez
in February 2003. Soon after, teams were deployed
to the cities of Bamian, Kondoz, Mazar-e-Sharif,
Kandahar, and Herat.17 By October 2005, there were
22 PRTs operating inside Afghanistan, with 12 of them
controlled by U.S. forces. The other PRTs remained
under the control either of members representing the
Combined Forces Command–Afghanistan (CFC-A)
or of ISAF, led by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members.18
U.S. PRT Model and Mission.
The U.S. Government embraced three primary goals
for PRTs, the first of which involved enhancing security.
The United States, in conjunction with its coalition
partners, hoped to create a secure environment in which
U.S. Government agency representatives, international
aid organizations, NGOs, and UN assistance programs
could work to develop Afghanistan’s infrastructure.
PRTs were intended to achieve this by helping “defuse
factional fighting, support deployments by the
Afghan National Army and police, conduct patrols,
and reinforce security efforts during the disarming of
militias.”19
The second PRT goal called for a strengthening
of the Afghan central government’s reach. President
Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government was weak,
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possessing little influence outside the capital of Kabul.
The U.S. PRTs’ mission stipulated that the teams
work in conjunction with local provincial leaders on
promoting local elections and undertaking quickimpact projects. These projects, designed to better
the Afghan people’s everyday life, were expected to
improve the population’s perception of the central
government and thereby solidify Kabul’s influence
over the Afghan countryside.
The third goal aimed to facilitate reconstruction
in Afghanistan. PRTs were called upon to provide
direct aid for small reconstruction projects and, more
importantly, to help representatives from different
U.S. agencies implement civilian-funded projects. Additionally, PRTs were expected to work cooperatively
with international aid organizations and NGOs. These
groups, such as the International Committee of the Red
Cross and Doctors Without Borders, possessed greater
experience in certain areas of development, a deeper
understanding of local customs and culture, and better
access to some volatile regions of the country because
of their perceived impartiality.20
While all three goals were valued as critical
components for effective support and stability
operations in the region, many countries adopted
different priorities for operating PRTs in Afghanistan.
The U.S. PRTs worked primarily toward extending the
influence of the central government’s authority and
on quick-impact reconstruction projects. The United
Kingdom (UK), on the other hand, focused less on
physical reconstruction efforts and worked harder to
promote security sector reform and defuse factional
fighting between Afghan tribes.21
Each coalition partner involved in Afghanistan’s
reconstruction followed a particular structural model
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for its PRT. Different states varied the proportion
of military and civilian personnel in the teams,
leadership roles, PRT mission statements, and rules
of engagement (ROE). According to a special report
written by the United States Institute of Peace, “The
size and composition of U.S. PRTs vary depending on
maturity, local circumstances, and the availability of
personnel from civilian agencies. Combined Forces
Command (CFC) does, however, have a model, which
U.S. PRTs generally emulate.”22
As of 2006, American PRTs consisted of some 82
personnel give or take. The teams were led by an Army
lieutenant colonel who commanded the approximately
82 other civilian and military members. Civilian
components included a representative from the State
Department, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),
and the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), although in some cases contractors filled in
for USAID officials.23 PRTs also incorporated a member
of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI), in most
situations an officer from the Afghan National Police,
and three or more local interpreters.
The military component of the PRT represented a
number of specialized Army units. An Army officer,
normally a ranking lieutenant colonel along with his
command staff, always commanded the teams. Each
PRT, depending on regional demands, was expected to
have two Army civil affairs teams; a military police unit;
a psychological operations unit (PSYOP); explosive
ordnance/demining unit (EOD); intelligence team;
medics; force protection unit, normally composed of a
40-man infantry platoon; and administrative support
and personnel.24 Each of these PRT elements played
different roles in promoting the team’s mission and its
interaction with the local civilian population.
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The U.S. PRT commander’s duties included, first
and foremost, acting as a liaison with key Afghan
government and civilian personnel. Considering that
the primary mission of PRTs in effect an extension of the
Afghan government’s control over its territory, constant
communication with key local officials remained
critical for efficient coordination. The commander
maintained contact with provincial governors, police
chiefs, mayors, and any other influential figures such
as tribal leaders who possessed influence over the
region. Because international organizations (IOs) and
NGOs often worked in U.S. PRT areas of operations,
the commander, while not required to, regularly acted
as a liaison with and between these groups as well. The
commander also routinely attended meetings of the
Provincial Development Council, where development
projects were coordinated with local Afghan officials,
and Combined Forces Command (CFC) coordinated
military operations with combat units located within
the PRTs’ vicinity. Finally, the commander chaired the
team’s Project Review Committee, which reviewed
and decided which projects to undertake and fund.
According to Robert Perito, PRT State Department
representatives “have no standard job description,”
but served primarily as political advisers to PRT
commanders and Afghan provincial governors. They
also operated as members of the Project Review
Committee and often acted as a key source for reporting
PRT activities to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. In many
cases, State Department officers represented the PRTs’
principal source of information regarding local culture
and politics.
The representative from the USAID was tasked
with acting as the team commander’s and Afghan
provincial governor’s main adviser on topics related
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to development. Much like State Department officials,
USAID members reported directly to the U.S. embassy
in Kabul on the local government’s suitability and
capacity for development projects. Representatives
also worked as key members of the Project Review
Committee and directly interacted with Army Civil
Affair Teams and local NGOs to maximize the impact
of development projects.
USDA representatives were selected from a number
of different specialties, ranging from veterinarians to
soil specialists. According to a report from the USDA
website:
Representatives served as agriculture advisors working
actively with the PRT Commander, aid organizations,
and the national and local governments to enable,
support, and foster reconstruction of the Afghan
agricultural sector and to help build the ability of the
central government to support and provide services to
the agricultural sector.25

USDA projects included cotton and soybean variety
trials, animal health issues, water management and
irrigation systems, farm planning, and livelihoods
alternative to opium poppy production.26
Along with the PRT commander, Army Civil
Affairs “A” Teams constituted one of the more
important military elements involved in actual Afghan
reconstruction efforts. These teams, comprised of four
soldiers each, were tasked with assessing the needs of
the local population and feasibility of providing for
those needs. Each team had a different role to play:
[“A” teams conducted] assessments of reconstruction
needs and contracting with Afghan firms to build schools,
clinics, bridges, and wells. Civil Affairs “B” Teams
operated the PRTs’ Civil Military Operations Center
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and coordinated with the UNAMA regional office and
international NGOs engaged in providing humanitarian
relief and development assistance.27

Obstacles to Interagency Coordination within U.S.
PRTs.
PRTs were designed and structured to integrate
military and civilian agencies so they might coordinate
a joint effort in establishing security, extending the
influence of the Afghan central government, and
promoting reconstruction. In order to achieve this goal,
close cooperation between the military and the various
civilian entities proved critical for accommodating to the
diverse security, political, and cultural environments
present throughout Afghanistan. FM 3-24, the Army’s
new guidebook for COIN, states: “Military efforts are
necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN)
efforts, but they are only effective when integrated into
a comprehensive strategy employing all instruments of
national power.”28 Considering that PRTs implement
such a strategy, it is imperative to identify any obstacles
that hamper or retard the teams’ ability to accomplish
their mission.
An assessment of civil-military coordination
within U.S. PRTs from 2003 until early 2006 revealed
an interagency process that varied in its levels of
effectiveness.29 PRTs were designed to be flexible so
they could adapt optimally to the different needs of the
34 Afghan provinces. This adaptability also subjected
PRTs to different province-specific challenges, making
it difficult to identify broad common problems that
affected most U.S. PRTs’ interagency coordination.
Additionally, after-action interviews of civilian and
military PRT members conducted by the United States
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Institute of Peace,30 far from identifying manifest,
universally agreed-upon problems, revealed a diverse
array of opinions on the quality of cooperation
between team members. Such lack of clear consensus
was probably owing to a high turnover rate for PRT
personnel. In spite of these challenges, an assessment of
U.S. PRTs identified five frequently noted impediments
to the smooth working of the interagency process
within these teams.
The first factor causing difficulties for interagency
coordination in U.S. PRTs was the lack of clear guidelines and goals for key PRT personnel. As previously
mentioned, the teams were structured to be flexible and
adaptive to regional needs. In order to maintain this
flexibility, the designers of the PRT concept believed
that creating a static set of guidelines would prevent
teams from sustaining the malleability necessary for
adapting to their region-specific operational needs.31
One author, however, describes how this mentality
adversely affected team coordination:
Absent an established concept of operations and a clear
set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT
commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was
problematic because military officers and civilian agency
personnel came from different “corporate cultures” and
had different, sometimes competing mandates. Without
an interagency pre-agreement on individual roles,
missions, and job descriptions, it took time and trial and
error to achieve a common understanding of mission
priorities.32

More often than not, PRT personnel, especially
representatives from civilian agencies, found
themselves in-country with little understanding of
the specific role they were expected to fulfill. The fact
that other team members often proved incapable of
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providing new arrivals with operational guidelines
due to the uncertainty of their own specific PRT roles
exacerbated the situation.
While adaptability remained an important feature
for PRTs, the lack of individual mission descriptions
sacrificed productivity and cohesion between team
members. A Foreign Service Officer (FSO) who spent
4 months stationed in the Parwan PRT as the State
Department representative commented that his
initial deployment to Afghanistan was devoid of any
operational instruction. During an interview with the
United States Institute of Peace, he stated that “nobody
really gave me any guidance. I was just basically cut
loose and told ‘Okay, you’re at the PRT’ and that was
about it. Nobody told me anything. I had no idea what
my function, what my role was going to be.”33 Under
these circumstances, a key member of an interagency
team spent the first few weeks of a relatively short
deployment uninformed of his duties and incapable of
fulfilling a meaningful role within his PRT.
Not all civilians assigned to PRTs experienced
the same lack of instruction. Analysis of other State
Department and USAID representatives’ interviews
demonstrated that, in some cases, individuals did
receive limited instruction from their respective
agencies, or from the PRT commander, regarding
the functions they should carry out. Civilian team
members also attempted to identify their roles through
research and communication with acquaintances
possessing PRT experience. The fact remains, however, that an established system for disseminating
guidelines and individual mission statements did not
exist; an authoritative source of institutional memory
and guidance was absent due to the novelty of PRT
operations in Afghanistan.
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The second obstacle adversely impacting interagency coordination in U.S. PRTs was the rigid military-oriented structure of teams. A U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, or major in the case of smaller-sized
teams, always commanded American PRTs.34 Officially,
PRT doctrine dictated that civilian representatives
from the State Department and USAID take the
lead on political and reconstruction issues, while
the commander had authority over matters related
to security. Yet, according to a USAID interagency
report, “PRT culture, people, and resources were
predominantly military.”35 This factor created a sense
of military dominance which, in some instances, caused
interagency cooperation to suffer. The combination of a
lack of mission guidance, along with the predominance
of military staffing, created a situation in which
personalities played a disproportionate role (especially
the personality of the PRT commander) in determining
the direction of PRT efforts.36 In a situation where the
vast majority of the team was comprised of military
personnel, and most of the resources came from the
Department of Defense (DoD), it became very easy
for a commander to feel the unit’s focus and projects
should be military in nature.
Civil-military tensions ran highest during the initial
stages of PRT development. As previously mentioned,
a limited or complete lack of guidance on mission
and individual roles resulted in considerable friction
between military and civilian personnel. One author
explained the friction as follows:
Many of the State Department personnel and other
civilians on the team had military experience, but this
did not reduce civil-military tensions. On the contrary,
some of the harshest criticisms of the military personnel
on PRTs came from retired military members of the team.
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During one of the author’s trips to a PRT, a member of the
team confided, “Those briefing slides look good, but this
place is completely dysfunctional.” Civilians complained
that the military personnel on the PRTs were reluctant to
support them and treated them as outsiders.37

In a June 2006 Interagency Assessment written by
USAID, its authors determined that situations, such as
the one referred to above, in which the PRT commander
failed to reflect “non-DoD” team components’ views
and advice in leadership decisions caused the overall
mission of the team to suffer.38
PRTs not only had to contend with civil-military
tensions within the teams, but in some instances their
attachment to larger combat maneuver units created
external influences that negatively impacted a wider
interagency process. PRTs, depending on their location
and the security environment they operated in, often
worked alongside larger combat units or task forces.
The teams were expected to coordinate with these larger
units in order to supplement their force protection and
work jointly to diffuse regional political challenges.
The combat maneuver units also provided additional
military cover that allowed PRTs to function in wider
areas of operations or in regions with greater security
threats. These relationships, however, were not always
cooperative or cordial. Robert Perito states that “in
some cases combat units looked down on PRTs and
treated their civilian affairs teams and National Guard
units as [bogus soldiers] who required protection. In
extreme instances, tension between soldiers in PRTs
and those in combat units precluded cooperation.”39
The case of a PRT Civil Affairs (CA) member—who
was a retired Foreign Service officer, spoke Farsi, and
had previous operational experience in Afghanistan—
illustrates the interagency difficulty between some
teams and their associated combat units. Assigned to
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the PRT located at Herat for a few months, this CA
member’s role was to act as a political and cultural
adviser to the team commander and other civil affairs
members. Task Force Saber, a combat unit charged
with disarmament efforts and general security of the
area, was also present in the region. In a situation such
as this, the military officer in charge of the task force
outranked the PRT commander. As the CA member
described the situation to interviewers, the task force
commander assumed a very active role in the political
affairs of the region, which was dominated by the
volatile warlord, Ismael Khan. According to United
States Institute of Peace interview transcripts, the task
force commander, lacking any civil affairs advisers
of his own, refused to accept any counsel from the
PRT CA cultural and political specialist and ignored
advice from other civil affairs members when it came
to selecting reconstruction projects.40
It is important to note, however, that there were
many cases in which the high proportion of military
staff and resources in PRTs did not hamper interagency
coordination. In these instances, PRT commanders
went out of their way to integrate civilian personnel
in key decision processes and project implementation.
The important factors to consider in these cases are
that U.S. PRTs were always led by military personnel,
and insufficient guidance existed for directing
commanders to integrate civilian team members into
key decisionmaking processes.41
The third challenge that threatened the U.S. PRT
interagency process involved poor tour synchronization and team deployment policies. The sudden and ad
hoc nature of PRT development resulted in considerable
personnel gaps, poorly established team member
relationships, and periods of relative disjointedness
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among PRT staff. The combination of teams being
assembled in theater, in addition to different tour
lengths for the various civilian agencies involved,
ultimately had a degrading effect on interagency
coordination.42
The matter of tour lengths influenced the deployment lengths of civilian personnel to PRTs in Afghanistan. The basis for acquiring civilian representatives was
a volunteer system. The Department of State, USAID,
and USDA could not force employees to accept a
posting in a hazardous working environment such as
Afghanistan. In the initial stages of PRT development,
keeping tour lengths as low as 3 to 6 months acted as
an enticement for volunteers who might not want to
spend longer periods of time in country.43 However,
some locations with higher insurgent activity were
viewed as hardship posts, and civilian agencies
found it difficult to find people willing to spend more
than 3 months at these PRTs. One State Department
representative who served two 90-day tours on PRTs
in Jalalabad and Tarin Kowt explains:
I basically went to places that nobody else wanted to go,
and actually places I didn’t want to go. So, that’s why
I went 90 days. But they prefer at least six months and
would really like to have you for a year. It was either me
at 90 days or nobody. So they took me. Ninety days was
their bare minimum.44

Both civilian and military team members regularly
admitted that 90-day deployments were too short
to establish effective working relationships. They
described a turbulent environment in which PRT staff
cycled in every 3 to 6 months, at a time when team
members finishing their deployments were up to speed
and had a unified vision of the way to proceed with PRT
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projects. The replacement of these members with new
ones forced many teams to start from scratch, thereby
nullifying much of the progress previously achieved.45
Poor tour synchronization among the civilian
agencies also led to gaps within key PRT positions.
Numerous cases existed in which for a period
teams lacked State Department, USAID, or USDA
representatives because former members finished
their tours and departed, but were not immediately
replaced by their agencies. One PRT commander
interviewed commented on this challenge: “There
was no consultation about which State officers would
be posted at what PRTs, and on what schedule. This
resulted in gaps at critical times.”46 In these situations
PRT commanders often scoured the ranks of military
personnel with civil affairs training to fill in civilian
gaps and took the lead on political and reconstruction
issues.47
Michael J. McNerney, Director of International
Policy and Capabilities in the Office of the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations,
stated that toward the end of 2003 plans were made to
extend civilian representatives’ tours to 1 year.48 Yet,
a review of over 50 PRT members’ tour length from
different agencies showed a wide span of deployment
lengths ranging from 3 months to 1 year, with the
average being around 6 months. The deployment of
military personnel and commanders appeared far
more consistent, with most tours lasting approximately
1 year.
The creation of PRTs in theater was another
critical factor related to U.S. PRT deployment. As new
PRTs emerged to spread the “ISAF effect,” U.S. team
members were simply assigned to their new postings
and rarely, if ever, had any contact with other PRT
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components until they arrived on site. Consequently,
there were periods of lost productivity and a lack of
civil-military coordination as teams took time to build
internal relationships and align their individual mission
roles with that of the team’s overarching mission. A
lack of civilian representatives with interagency team
experience and understanding of the military further
retarded initial cooperation.49
Lack of prior training for civilian agencies and
key military figures composing PRTs represented the
fourth obstacle to interagency cooperation. In the case
of U.S. PRTs, no training regimen was implemented
for State Department, USAID, or USDA officials prior
to their deployment.50 One of the primary complaints
of these officials was that they received little if any
instruction on how to operate within a militarydominated or interagency environment. Additionally,
the Department of State, USAID, and U.S. Army
provided minimal guidance or instruction about the
cultural and sociopolitical surroundings in which
civilians and military PRT personnel were expected to
operate.
The integration of numerous agencies into a
team of individuals expected to coordinate with one
another required that the different components have
a basic understanding of each other’s institutional
culture and standard operating procedures. Thrusting
civilian representatives with poor understanding of
the armed forces into a military-dominated group such
as a PRT often resulted in poor understanding and
communication between team members. The same rang
true for military personnel with no experience working
with civilians. Fortunately, a good portion of the civilian
representatives assigned to U.S. PRTs had either prior
military service or working experience with military
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personnel.51 Most PRT commanders also possessed
backgrounds working in joint operating environments
with civilians. In spite of this fact, no predeployment
training existed for civilian representatives lacking in
civil-military work experience. One State Department
official who served on a PRT commented that “getting
some sort of acquaintance with military structures and
military operations would be very useful. There are a
lot of acronyms that fly around and a lot of things that
are just common language for everybody involved with
the military and really alien for people who aren’t.”52
Civilian and military PRT members also complained
about the lack of language and cultural training they
received prior to their assignments. Civilians and
military civil affairs members often acted as political
and cultural advisers to team commanders and were
expected to use their knowledge to recommend
reconstruction projects that would be beneficial to
the local Afghan populace. A poor understanding
of the local culture or lack of basic native language
skills not only impaired the ability of PRTs to function
within Afghanistan, they ultimately had a negative
impact on interagency cooperation within PRTs. One
commander assigned to the PRT in Jalalabad claimed
that when he inquired about a pre-command course to
prepare him for his role, he was told there would be
no predeployment training and that, in fact, no such
course existed.53
State Department representatives vented similar
frustrations with their agency’s failure to institute a
language or cultural training regimen prior to their
assignments. True, many PRT Department of State
representatives were selected based on their prior
backgrounds, experience in the region, and linguistic
abilities, and in some cases former Foreign Service
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Officers were brought out of retirement to serve on PRTs.
But when interviewed by the United States Institute of
Peace, a high percentage of these representatives stated
they wished the Department of State had provided
them with more time and resources to either learn
or brush up on language skills and cultural aspects
of Afghanistan. One representative from the State
Department described his predeployment language
training as 2 weeks of self-taught practice and a
Rosetta Stone audio guide.54 Ultimately, the absence of
sufficient training designed to increase PRT members’
understanding of the cultural environment in which
they operated compounded the problems PRTs faced
in achieving interagency coordination.55
The fifth impediment to interagency coordination
confronting U.S. PRTs involved the inadequate
staffing and resources provided by civilian agencies.
The Department of State, USAID, and USDA proved
incapable of supplying sufficient representatives with
proper backgrounds to satisfy the increased demand
PRTs created. As we’ll see below, civilian agencies
also fell short in supporting their representatives with
necessary logistics and resources to effectively carry
out their missions. These two factors increased friction
between the civil and military camps and impeded
team coordination.
Many of the USAID, State Department, and USDA
representatives were described as being inexperienced
junior officials or Personal Services Contractors hired
because of staffing shortages.56 PRTs lacked seniorlevel civilian professionals with experience operating
under diverse cultures and within interagency teams,
thus creating gaps between the military and civilian
personnel. A PRT interagency assessment by the
USAID explains this disparity:
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Military and civilian representatives were doing
extraordinary work under very difficult conditions. They
were smart, energetic, and dedicated. However, junior
or non-direct hired staff civilian representatives often
lacked experience with and knowledge of their own
agencies. By comparison, most military counterparts
had 16-20 years experience prior to PRT command.57

Because of this experience gap, military commanders
in some cases felt their civilian representatives were
unqualified, and therefore excluded them from the
decisionmaking process and project implementation.
At the same time, civilian representatives, with
minimal training and poor logistical support from
their respective agencies, found it difficult to establish
their credibility and promote their ideas no matter how
energetic and well-meaning the representatives were.
Even when civilian agencies were capable of
providing PRTs with representatives, they lacked
the necessary funding and resources to adequately
support their staff in the field. In the initial stages
of PRT development, neither the State Department
nor USAID supplied their team representatives with
independent funding for reconstruction projects. DoD
provided all the financing for reconstruction projects
using Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
(OHDACA) and Commander Emergency Response
Program (CERP) funds. By 2004, however, funding
availability for PRTs improved in the civilian agencies,
and Department of State and USAID began supplying
their representatives with independent financial
resources.58 Even with the addition of separate funding,
however, civilian representatives still depended on the
PRT military component to provide transportation, interpreters, and other essential operational resources.59
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One civilian PRT member stated in an interview, “I
do wish the Department of State provided more than
just one person. I think that we’d be more effective if
we had our own interpreters, our own transportation,
and some programming funds to be able to bring to
the table.”60 The added burden of providing resources
for civilian representatives, which should have been
supplied by their corresponding agencies, sometimes
frayed interagency cooperation between military and
non-DoD personnel.
With respect to the five obstacles to interagency
coordination in the U.S. PRTs discussed above, it
is important to note that they were not present in
every situation. There were cases in which PRT
commanders eagerly integrated civilian agencies in
the decisionmaking process and accepted counsel on
cultural and political matters. Additionally, in spite
of an absence of clear guidelines, on certain occasions
U.S. PRTs had no trouble discerning the roles different
agency representatives needed to fulfill. There were
also instances in which civilian representatives had
extensive backgrounds in Afghan culture and language
abilities, proving indispensable to the team’s mission.
An analysis of PRT assessments based on interviews
with former team personnel, however, revealed that on
a number of occasions, the challenges discussed above
did creat significant barriers to effective interagency
cooperation, hampering the overall mission.
Recommendations.
Establishing operational guidelines to create seamless cooperation between the different components of
U.S. PRTs is a far more daunting task than identifying
the challenges that obstruct team coordination. Yet,
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there are reasonable solutions to mitigating many
of the complications that plagued the interagency
process within American PRTs in Afghanistan. These
solutions involve a mix of different approaches
including changes to team command structure, the
implementation of individual mission/role guidelines,
various predeployment training programs, increased
participation and resourcing by civilian agencies, and
judicious imitation of aspects of other nations’ PRT
models that had proven to be particularly successful.
Fortunately, several of the recommendations to follow
have been anticipated in the organization of PRTs in
Afghanistan and Iraq after 2006, but we shall lay out
here the main recommendations along with their
rationales for the sake of a comprehensive view.
The first recommendation for improving
coordination within U.S. PRTs is the creation of
leadership opportunities for civilians. Allowing both
military and civilian personnel to command PRTs,
depending on the conditions of the region, would
make for better tailoring of the command structure.
Leadership positions for civilians could also address
the prevalent complaint concerning PRTs’ lack of
senior-level officials with extensive experience.62
One of the key advantages of PRTs was their
adaptability. The concept that teams would remain
flexible and mold their missions and operational
procedures to fit the various cultural and political
environments present in Afghanistan proved essential
for effectiveness. Yet, this flexibility did not seem
to apply to leadership. It makes perfect sense that
military commanders take the leading role in a PRT’s
activities in regions afflicted with high levels of
insurgent activity and with poor security conditions.
Under these circumstances, it is critical for the team’s
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focus to remain on the security of its members and
of the Afghan populace within its area of operations.
In environments where security is less of a concern,
however, a civilian team leader could prove more
effective in promoting the PRTs’ mission and improving
interagency coordination. This rationale is supported
by one author who believes that establishing civilian
command of PRTs allows the entire team to align its
focus along the same axis, establishing more unified
operational policies and team coordination.63
There are additional advantages to creating
leadership opportunities for civilian PRT members.
Having a civilian leader within a military-dominated
structure could act as a balancing factor. As previously
mentioned, PRT staff and resources were predominantly supplied by DoD, thus aligning PRT culture with
the military and, in some cases, marginalizing civilian
representatives.64 Placing a non-DoD official in charge
of the civil-military teams in regions where the security
environment allows could be a more efficient way to
promote interagency cooperation. One former PRT
member mirrored this sentiment:
I think you need, [for] understanding the challenge,
senior level, experienced managers to be assigned for
the civilian leadership piece and civilian leadership on
interaction with the local government as well as on a
PRT. Any other additional staff needs to be subordinate
to a civilian leader who can then be the counterpart to
the military liaison. I think that would go a long way
towards managing relations, managing priorities, and
working towards how you can deconflict and develop
complementary approaches between the civil affairs
teams of the military and the civilian agencies.65

While PRT resources and personnel would still be
overrepresented by the military, the decisionmaking
process would be mainly under the auspices of a
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senior civilian representative, most likely from the
Department of State. This PRT structure would create
a far more uniform dispersal of influence between
civilian and military components, forcing the different
members of the team to coordinate their efforts in order
to accomplish their mission.
Another advantage to be attained by creating U.S.
PRT leadership positions for civilians is the recruiting
potential within non-DoD agencies. The possibility
of a command role on teams designed for SSTR
operations could entice senior-level civilians with
extensive experience to seek assignment in the U.S.
PRTs, especially if it is a way to get promoted. The
context in which civilians view their assignments to
PRTs is essential. If most civilians, especially seniorlevel officials, see deployment to PRTs as having a
negative or irrelevant impact on their future career
advancement, they will remain unwilling to accept
such hardship posts. Placing State Department or
other nonmilitary staff in charge of PRTs, however,
could make assignment to the teams a coveted position
because of the leadership experience gained while in
Afghanistan. Having a greater number of qualified and
experienced civilian personnel within U.S. PRTs would
remove a significant obstacle hindering interagency
coordination. Doing so would also aid in establishing
a higher degree of confidence team members have
in each other’s ability to fulfill their individual roles,
thus increasing their willingness to cooperate with one
another.
Lessons from the German PRT model, which
operated out of Konduz, provide useful insight in a
PRT structure under civilian leadership. The German
provincial reconstruction team possessed a design
considerably different from the U.S. model. Termed
a “heavy PRT” by Colonel Gerd Brandstetter, an
148

International Fellow from Germany in the U.S. Army
War College Class of 2005, the German team, with
400-plus personnel, was almost five times the size of
the “light” American PRTs.66 Brandstetter describes
the PRT at Konduz as an “interministerial venture
between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA),
the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), the Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC),
and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).”67 A separate,
“robust” contingent of German civilian representatives
supplemented the large military task force responsible
for protecting and facilitating PRT mission goals.68
Due to a more relaxed security environment in the
region, the German PRT at Konduz, in contrast to the
U.S. model, had a senior member from the MoFA in
command of the team. This leadership structure made
the German military commander, who took the lead
on all operational facets linked to security issues,
subordinate and responsible for coordination with
the MoFA in all PRT-related matters. Ultimately, the
German PRT leadership structure, in conjunction with
the support of civilian components, allowed the team
in Konduz to foster strong interagency coordination
among team members in spite of a strong military
presence.69
A second recommendation that could prove useful
in establishing better interagency cooperation in U.S.
PRTs is to establish specific guidelines that explain
the roles, missions, and authority of individual team
members.70 A Foreign Service Officer who spent over a
year deployed in Afghanistan explains:
A lesson learned right up front is, if you’re going to have
these types of entities like a PRT, . . . people need to be
fully briefed up on the interagency, the role of the PRT,
what they do and don’t do, have the documentation,
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understand what the expectations for these bodies are,
and . . . right up front, before either getting deployed or
going out to visit, have a sense of what a PRT strategy
is.71

While it remains important for PRTs and their
methods of operation to be adaptable to regional
demands, keeping the roles of team personnel obscure
and unclearly outlined does more harm than good.
The confusion and uncertainty many PRT members,
especially civilian representatives, suffered from during
their initial tours in Afghanistan, which wasted time,
resources, and hampered interagency coordination,
must be improved. Disseminating guidelines prior
to deployment that delineate the duties each PRT
component is expected to fulfill and the specific areas
for which it has responsibility is a means for doing so.
Such guidelines would have a strongly positive
impact on the interagency process of U.S. PRTs. They
would eliminate much of the confusion team members
experienced when first deployed to PRTs. While it is
always somewhat bewildering to begin work within a
new environment, especially one as alien and complex
as Afghanistan, having a clear notion of your mission
and role provides a platform from which to operate.
When PRT representatives deployed to their teams
without understanding their functions, they were, in
some cases, marginalized by other PRT components. If
all agencies provide their representatives with a clearer
understanding of their team functions, however,
the different PRT components are far more likely to
coordinate effectively.72 Even if the different demands
PRTs must meet in the various regions of Afghanistan
make it necessary to evolve individual missions, it is
easier to do so when team members have a fundamental
understanding of their roles within the PRT.
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Interagency predeployment guidance would also
inform many of the civilian PRT representatives of the
authority they possess within the team. From the initial
stages of PRT development, representatives from the
Department of State and USAID were expected to
take the lead in all matters related to governance and
reconstruction. Yet, according to a government report,
“Very few PRT staff, civilian or military, understood or
had seen U.S. national policy guidance on their roles
within the PRT.”73 As a result, on several occasions
military personnel construed the civilian team
components as advisors rather than decisionmakers.
Civilians, unaware that U.S. policy put them in charge
of reconstruction and governance matters, found it
difficult to overcome such impressions, and accordingly
were not in a position to take proactive charge of their
portfolios. Disseminating clearer guidelines to all U.S.
PRT components prior to their deployment would
prevent the misinterpretation of team members’ roles
within the civil-military group. Civilian representatives
would be able to assume responsibilities aggressively
in their respective areas of expertise while working
closely with the military commanders, ultimately
developing interagency cooperation as individual
missions were aligned within a unified team strategy.
Significant joint predeployment training for
U.S. PRTs is the third recommendation intended
to improve interagency coordination among team
components. Michael McNerney, who worked on
Provincial Reconstruction Team policy for the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, states that “military and
civilian personnel should be educated, trained, and
equipped for stabilization and reconstruction missions
in tandem, and not 6 weeks before deployment but
over their entire careers.”74 One of the major complaints
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from former PRT members interviewed by the United
States Institute of Peace involved the lack of training
available to them prior to their deployment. Both
civilian and military personnel stressed the importance
of receiving training on the cultural background of
Afghanistan; instruction on languages such as Pashto,
Dari, or Farsi; and guidance on how to operate within
an interagency environment.75 Requiring all members
to undergo such training, especially as a team, would
provide significant enhancements to their ability to
coordinate with each other once in theater.
Training together as a team prior to deployment
would assist in developing good working relationships
between team members. It takes time and a concerted
effort from all parties to develop trust and proper
communication between individuals—factors critical
to good interagency coordination. Expecting these
relationships to blossom immediately when PRTs are
assembled in theater is wishful thinking. Requiring
that team members train and deploy together would
allow individuals to gain insight into the capabilities
of other PRT components, so they would know how
best to communicate and interact with them prior to
conducting operations.
PRT representatives not only need to establish
individual bonds with other team members, they
must gain at least a rudimentary understanding of
how agencies other than their own operate and are
structured. By training alongside the military, civilian
PRT representatives would gain a basic understanding
of the military chain of command, standard operating
procedures, and lexicon. Military personnel can gain
valuable insight into their civilian counterparts’
operational strengths and limitations, as well as
important interagency work experience. Numerous
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sources point out the British and some ISAF models for
emulation in respect to joint predeployment training.
Prior to the United Kingdom’s establishment of a PRT
at Mazar-e-Sharif, both civilian and military members
were subjected to joint training before being deployed
and supported as a team.242 According to a U.S.
Government report, some ISAF countries “identify
PRT members as much as a year in advance and have
the members undergo significant training together.”76
This critical preparation allowed British and ISAF PRT
components to attain substantial understanding of the
structure and abilities of the different agencies involved,
resulting in high levels of interagency coordination.77
Joint training and deployment for U.S. PRT members
also creates a partial solution to the challenges posed
by poor tour synchronization. Eliminating the ad hoc
manner in which PRTs were assembled by sending
the team in as a group and requiring all personnel to
undergo predeployment training would reduce much
of the confusion experienced by members when first
arriving in theater. In order to complement PRT joint
deployment, civilian and military tours need to be
standardized and made uniform as a way to prevent
premature rotation of personnel as well as gaps in key
staffing positions.78
Perito states that “at a minimum, State Department
and USAID representatives should receive a predeployment introduction in Dari or Pashto, briefings
on Afghan society and culture, and orientation on
the unique requirements of working with the U.S.
military.”79 The availability of cultural and language
training to operate more effectively in the diverse regions
that compose Afghanistan would create greater trust in
State Department and USAID representatives assigned
to U.S. PRTs. Making these individuals indispensable
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to the PRT commanders, as well as to the Army civil
affairs component, would increase their willingness
to actively integrate civilian representatives into the
team’s decisionmaking deliberations, especially in
matters related to governance and reconstruction.
Efforts were made by the U.S. military to institute
a PRT predeployment training regimen in late 2004.
PRT commanders began receiving unit-sponsored
training, and the military, in collaboration with the
National Defense University, initiated development of
a leadership PRT instruction program. Similar efforts
need to be undertaken by civilian agencies. The State
Department, USAID, and USDA should strongly
consider both creating their own agency-specific
programs and sending their representatives to military
training programs. The Department of State’s Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization,
established in 2004, should make an effort to become
the driving force in the integration and adoption
of civil-military training programs for future PRT
deployments.80
The fourth and final recommendation is to
substantially increase of civilian involvement in and
support for PRTs. Implementing training programs
in addition to staffing and supporting PRT operations
demands a significant increase of funding and personnel
from civilian agencies. Undoubtedly, financial and
budgetary constraints on the State Department, USAID,
and USDA make this goal difficult to achieve, yet
increased civilian participation remains essential for the
continued improvement of interagency coordination
within PRTs.81 Additionally, the costs of training are
relatively inexpensive compared to the financial and
political costs incurred when opportunities are lost and
mistakes are made because of dysfunctional PRTs.
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When civilian agencies failed to produce
adequate numbers of representatives to staff PRTs in
Afghanistan, other team components had to fill the
void. A representative from the Department of State
assigned to the Herat PRT illustrated this problem:
Every PRT is supposed to have one civilian each from
the Department of State, USAID, and the Department
of Agriculture, in addition to one Afghan Ministry of
Interior representative. My PRT didn’t have any of
those people, so USAID, in the absence of any of their
employees, would delegate their duties to State, so the
whole time I was there, I was also wearing a USAID
hat.82

Relegating important duties to representatives who
are not specifically trained for such work can be
unproductive and cause disruptions in interagency
coordination. Civilian agencies must make an extra
effort to provide sufficient personnel to PRTs so that
teams consistently have the correct staff to fulfill all the
roles necessary to accomplish the team’s mission.
In addition to producing enough personnel to
staff PRTs, civilian agencies need to supply their
representatives with ample resources so that they
are not dependent on the team’s military component
for logistical support or funding for reconstruction
projects.83 Civilian PRT members often found
themselves at the mercy of the military staff for
transportation and other needs that should have been
delivered by their respective agencies. This resulted
in a disproportionate level of military influence
within U.S. PRTs. Agricultural specialists deployed to
PRTs, for example, received no funding whatsoever
from the USDA. They were reduced to soliciting
financial resources from the Commanders Emergency
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Response Program Fund (CERP) which necessitated
the military commander’s approval.84 Providing
civilian representatives with control over the majority
of resources assigned for quick-impact PRT projects
would improve full-spectrum performance, as well
as interagency cooperation, within the militarydominated teams.
The British PRT model illustrates how civilian
control of reconstruction funds improves team
cooperation. While the UK’s PRT located at Mazar-eSharif was under the command of a military officer, a
civilian representative was in control of the majority of
funding resources. According to Michael McNerney:
The UK military relied on its government’s Department
for International Development for funding assistance
projects. While this limited the military’s freedom of
action, it may well have been a blessing in disguise. UK
military personnel coordinated closely with their civilian
agency counterparts in order to access their funding.85

In the case of U.S. PRTs, the majority of readily accessible
resources dedicated for reconstruction projects should
be provided or placed under the control of USAID or
State Department representatives.
It is important to mention that USAID staff deployed
to PRTs did have easy access to the considerable
resources of the Quick Impact Program (QIP), a funding
mechanism with $137.3 million designed to support
reconstruction projects in the USAID representatives’
areas of operations.86 In spite of QIP, projects funded
with USAID money were difficult to get authorized and
progressed considerably slower than assistance projects
financed through DoD CERP funds.87 One former PRT
member claimed that during his 6-month deployment
to Afghanistan “not one red cent” of USAID money
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was spent.88 It does little good for civilian agencies to
provide resources such as those in the QIP when their
representatives cannot easily access or employ them to
accomplish their missions.
The foregoing recommendations by no means
cover all the efforts that must be made to improve
cooperation within U.S. PRTs. They do, however,
suggest means for overcoming some of the major
obstacles that hampered interagency coordination
within U.S. PRTs operating in Afghanistan from 2003
until early 2006. Creating leadership positions for
civilians, establishing clear guidance on individual
team member roles, requiring joint predeployment
training, increasing civilian participation in PRTs,
and emulating best practices from other nations’ PRT
models where applicable are all realistic and achievable
objectives that would provide tangible benefits for
future cooperation within U.S. PRTs.
Recent PRT Developments.
The use of PRTs to aid in SSTR operations has not
diminished since the 2006 time frame that this case
study is based on. In fact, efforts have been made to
expand the number of PRTs operating in Afghanistan
using NATO and coalition forces. As of 2006, all PRTs
supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM were
placed under ISAF command, subject to management
by NATO and coalition forces.89 PRTs are also being
deployed in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
As of November 2006, there were 10 operational PRTs
located throughout Iraq, with plans for an increase in
their numbers.90 In January of 2007, President Bush,
during his address to the nation presenting “The New
Way Forward” in Iraq, called for a doubling of PRTs
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deployed in Iraq.91 Owing to the increased demand
for PRTs in both Afghanistan and Iraq, some changes
have been made to U.S. PRT structure and deployment
policy, based on lessons derived from the experiences
of earlier teams. Reviewing some of these key changes
provides insight into the U.S. Government’s efforts to
improve interagency coordination within PRTs.
One of the most notable differences between
earlier U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan and current ones
operating in Iraq is the leadership and civil-military
composition of the teams. As previously discussed,
PRTs in Afghanistan had an Army lieutenant colonel
commander and were predominantly staffed by
military personnel. According to a senior program
officer at the United States Institute of Peace, PRTs in
Iraq are “led by a senior State Department official and
composed primarily of civilian personnel.”92 The 10
new teams sent as part of President Bush’s expansion
of the PRT program will be embedded with U.S. Army
brigade combat teams (BCT) so as to receive necessary
force protection. The military commander of the BCT
will assume charge of all matters related to security
while the PRT’s civilian leader will have control on all
economic and governance issues.93
The change in PRT command and personnel
composition shows a genuine attempt to integrate
civilian agencies and their representatives into the
civil-military teams. Providing larger numbers of
civilian staff and placing a senior State Department
official as head of the PRTs illustrate how attempts
have been made to institute a uniform level of influence
within the team. Under this new structure, interagency
cooperation should increase because military personnel
will have little choice but to coordinate with their
civilian bosses, while civilian agencies must continue
to rely on the military for protection.
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Another major change is the creation of joint training
programs for DoD staff, reservists, contractors, and
other interagency personnel. New PRTs deployed to
Iraq will be created in stages. Prior to assignment of
the majority of personnel, a “joint management” team
consisting of 40 different civilian representatives will
assess the various needs and environmental conditions
of the PRT site so that the team can be tailored to
meet regional demands. Moreover, these teams “will
undergo predeployment training together.”94
This prior preparation is a 16-day predeployment
training and processing program hosted at three different venues. The first 5 days are spent at the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute (FIS) in
Washington, DC, training for PRT interagency
coordination. This is an 18-module instructional
course designed by the many U.S. agencies with
representatives present in Iraqi PRTs. During this
session, PRT members are exposed to lessons from past
team deployments; Iraqi culture and history; the PRT
role, mission, and strategy; and additional instruction
on interagency coordination, including simulation
exercises.
Training at FIS is followed by 5 days at the
Diplomatic Security Training Center exercising on the
State Department’s Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat
Course (FACT). According to the DoD predeployment
training itinerary, “This course is expected to meet the
needs of personnel traveling overseas by featuring
practical, hands-on training in surveillance detection,
counterterrorism vehicle operation, explosives and
weapons familiarization, and emergency medical
training.”95
The final two stops for PRT personnel are the Army
Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement
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Center at Fort Bliss, Texas, where team members are
processed, medically validated, supplied equipment,
and given environment and cultural awareness
training. The last part of predeployment training and
processing is spent with the National Coordination
Team in Baghdad. This 3- to 5-day orientation session
covers assignment responsibilities, debriefing of
current conditions in the region, and a description of
administrative support.96
This training regimen represents a giant leap
forward in comparison to what was available for earlier
PRT personnel deployed to Afghanistan. The program
reflects much of the previously recommended training,
including instruction on interagency coordination,
cultural history, and guidance on individual as well as
PRT roles and missions. All these training endeavors,
if executed properly, will aid the interagency process
in future U.S. PRTs.
The true impact of these changes to PRT structure
and deployment policy has not yet been felt, making
an assessment of their effectiveness difficult. The
PRT interagency training schedule described above,
for example, received its first candidates as recently
as March 2007. Yet, the signs are encouraging. A
combination of increased civilian participation,
manning, and resources in U.S. PRTs; improved
training; leadership positions for non-DoD staff; and
more efficient deployment policies all suggest that PRT
development as related to interagency coordination
is headed in the right direction. It is imperative that
different agencies continue to study how these recent
changes affect cooperation among current and future
PRTs, as a prelude to making further changes.
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Conclusion.
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
operations will continue to play a prominent role in
the future of U.S. foreign policy. The current situations
in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate a need to adapt
SSTR operations so that they can function in hazardous
COIN environments which pose multiple threats to
civilian and military personnel. Establishing seamless
and effective interagency cooperation is a key, if not
the most important, component to adapting SSTR
functions for high-risk locations. Identifying, analyzing,
and incorporating lessons from previous experiences,
such as those of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan, represent
a critical tool for improving future interagency teams
conceived to operate in COIN environments.
The U.S. PRT experience in Afghanistan from
2003 to 2006 reveals several serious impediments to
cooperation between team members. First, the failure
to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities
individual team members are expected to fulfill
creates confusion, drains resources, and obstructs
team members’ ability to coordinate with one another.
Second, giving any one agency, in this case the military,
a disproportionate share of influence and resources
can lead to a credibility gap and the marginalization of
other team representatives. Third, assembling teams in
theater, deploying team components at different times,
and misaligning tour lengths impair relationshipbuilding and cause team disjointedness. Fourth, the
failure to provide sufficient interagency, language, and
cultural training results in some team members being
unprepared to operate in a multiagency and culturally
diverse environment. Fifth and finally, inadequate
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participation and logistical support on the part of
civilian agencies overburdens other team members,
results in operational gaps, and causes an imbalance
within the civil-military team structure. These factors
all negatively impacted U.S. PRTs’ ability to maximize
team cooperation. However, such impediments
are not terminal. They can be resolved through the
implementation of the four recommendations made
earlier. Expending resources to solve the problems
that hamper PRT interagency cooperation may be
expensive; however, these costs are far less than those
incurred when the duties PRTs are expected to meet
are not performed correctly and the overall mission
fails to be completed.
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CHAPTER 6
THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS
IN RECONSTRUCTION
OF POST-WORLD WAR II JAPAN
Katherine Rogers
As a world superpower and arguably a global
hegemon, the United States has become increasingly
involved in nation-building efforts since the end
of the Cold War. In these efforts, U.S. forces have
encountered recurring problems, including destroyed
physical infrastructure, dysfunctional institutions, and
violent opposition. An inability to cope with these
problems would both prevent U.S. forces from gaining
an opportunity to leave “gracefully” (i.e., without
creating a failed state and without appearing to lose
the conflict) and cause a loss of legitimacy for any U.S.
occupation. To avoid this dilemma, successful statebuilding is imperative.1
The U.S. Government has successfully dealt with
the issues of nation-building in the past, most notably
in the case of post-World War II Japan. In 7 years, the
occupying force under General Douglas MacArthur
transformed a nation broken by over a decade of
militarism into an economically successful, peaceful
democracy. At least, it looks that way in retrospect.
This chapter looks at the entirety of the occupation
of Japan, examining both the achievements and the
complications that occurred.
The first section describes Japan’s condition
immediately following the war. The second section
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describes the creation of initial policy for Japan and the
interagency cooperation from which it emerged. The
third section examines the unique structure of Supreme
Commander of the Allied Powers’ General Headquarters (SCAP GHQ) and its function in executing policy,
while the fourth section describes the achievements
that resulted from SCAP’s policy execution. The fifth
section examines some complications that occurred
during the occupation, and the final section suggests
some lessons learned from the experience.
JAPAN’S CONDITION AFTER THE WAR
At the end of the war, Japan was utterly devastated.
Some 65 percent of Tokyo lay in ruins from American
firebombing, and only two million citizens remained
of the city’s original population of seven million.2
Nagasaki and Hiroshima had suffered massive
structural damage, loss of life, and debilitating radiation
sickness from the atomic bombs. The nation lay drained
of resources after 13 years of constant military action,
having gained little from such conflict and lost much.
Japan had lost the goodwill of its neighbors, while the
loss of the territories occupied during the 1930s had
cut off access to vital natural resources. Since Japanese
textile and food production supplied only a fraction of
the public demand, millions of people faced starvation.3
Nine million citizens were homeless as a result of
Allied bombing campaigns, and a further three million
were stranded overseas.4 Economic infrastructure was
crushed, with coal production one-half the wartime
production rate and steel production one-fourth the
rate of the wartime peak.5
As a result of the pitiful state of affairs in Japan at
the end of the war, the country found itself completely
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at the mercy of the Allied victors. The population was
thus willing to accept the long occupation necessary to
achieve stability and promote nation-building.6 For its
part, America saw the continued threat of communist
expansion in China and Korea as an incentive to invest
in a lengthy occupation. David Edelstein remarks that
occupation interests do not always include nationbuilding. However, in this case the Americans found
themselves with two distinct occupation responsibilities.
First, the international politics surrounding the
occupation dictated the demilitarization of Japan.
Second, the need for continued support from Japan,
which the Americans desired in anticipation of a future
conflict with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), dictated the requirements for nation-building
and democratization. These coincident needs provided
the time for the United States to succeed in the
reconstruction of Japan.
INITIAL OCCUPATION POLICY
The Allies laid out their official goals for Japan during the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. The resulting
document, known as the Potsdam Declaration,7 listed
five major steps the Japanese would have to accept as
part of their unconditional surrender: (1) disarmament
of the military and removal of militarists from power;
(2) return of occupied territories as specified in
the Cairo Declaration;8 (3) justice to war criminals;
(4) strengthening of democracy; and (5) economic
demilitarization.9 Additionally, Japan had to accept
military occupation by the Allied forces until it met all
conditions of the surrender.
The U.S. State and War Departments played large
roles in establishing these goals, both before and
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after the Potsdam Conference. The State Department
formulated the Interdivisional Area Committee on the
Far East in 1943 to analyze possible occupation solutions
in Japan. The Committee consisted of representatives
from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs and other
divisions with interests in the area, including the
new research division. They considered such issues
as the optimal composition of occupation forces, the
meaning of “unconditional surrender,” the postwar
objectives of the United States in Japan, and the role of
the Emperor in postwar Japan. By February 1944, the
War and Navy Departments began to consider these
policy questions as well, and asked the Department of
State for definitive policy statements regarding some
20 questions that required answers prior to Japan’s
surrender. These questions overlapped many of the
same issues the State Department had studied during
previous months.10
The War Department also conducted independent
studies on occupation policy issues. General John F.
Hilldring, Director of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division,
began preparing Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Directive
1380/15 as early as January 1944. On July 4, 1945,
Brigadier General George Lincoln ordered the Policy
Section of the War Department to prepare a study on
the post-defeat control of Japan and Japanese territory
for the Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. The study
was completed on July 9, just in time for the Potsdam
Conference.11
In November 1944, the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy agreed to appoint a committee to “coordinate the
views of the three Departments in matters of common
interest.”12 The following month, the State-WarNavy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) came into
existence. Subcommittees like the Pacific Far Eastern
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Subcommittee prepared and sent recommendation
papers requesting comment to the JCS, and then to
the Committee itself for approval. After approval,
the Joint Chiefs implemented the recommendations.13
Over the course of the reconstruction of Japan, the
SWNCC approved many documents instrumental in
the rebuilding process.
One recommendation paper, the “United States
Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan” (SWNCC150/4),
proved particularly useful. SWNCC150/4 reiterated
the goals laid out in the Potsdam Declaration and
detailed methods for achieving these goals. It was
the first document MacArthur received that gave him
guidelines for his role as the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers (SCAP). SWNCC 150/4 directed the
Supreme Commander to work toward two ultimate
U.S. objectives for the Japanese occupation: (1) to ensure
that Japan will not again become a menace to the United
States or to the peace and security of the world, and (2)
to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful
and responsible government which will respect the
rights of other states and will support the objectives of
the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States
desires that this government should conform as closely
as may be to principles of democratic self-government
but it is not the responsibility of the Allied Powers
to impose upon Japan any form of government not
supported by the freely expressed will of the people.14
In essence, SWNCC 150/4 construed the requirements of the Potsdam Declaration as means to these
ends rather than goals in and of themselves. The
document then gave the Supreme Commander more
specific instructions as to the extent of Allied authority
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for military occupation, relations with the Japanese
government, military disarmament, treatment of
war criminals, economic demilitarization, promotion
of democratic processes, resumption of peaceful
economic activity, and payment of reparations.15
Many of these instructions established specific
SCAP policies. These directions included orders
to dissolve “ultranationalistic or militaristic social,
political, professional, and commercial societies and
institutions,” to “favor a program for the dissolution of
the large industrial and banking combinations which
have exercised control of a great part of Japan’s trade
and industry,” and to make reparations “through the
transfer of such goods or existing capital equipment and
facilities as are not necessary for a peaceful Japanese
economy or the supplying of the occupying forces.”16
Further examination shows that SCAP followed these
directions to the letter in its operations.
Although the three military departments had
considerable clout in creating policy, one might argue
that the JCS had more influence in shaping actual
events as they unfolded in Japan. Within the military
chain of command, the Joint Chiefs were lodged
between the President and the Supreme Commander,
so that MacArthur took his marching orders from
them. Shortly after issuing SWNCC 150/4, the Joint
Chiefs issued a parallel document called the “Basic
Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in
Japan Proper” (JCS 1380/15). This top secret directive
informed MacArthur of “the authority which you
will possess and the policies which will guide you
in the occupation and control of Japan in the initial
period after surrender.”17 JCS 1380 fleshed out the
“recommendations” of SWNCC 150/4 in the same
way that SWNCC 150/4 had more fully developed the
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basic concepts expressed in the Potsdam Declaration.
For example, where SWNCC states that “Persons who
have been active exponents of militarism and militant
nationalism will be removed and excluded from
public office and from any other position of public
or substantial private responsibility,”18 JCS 1380/15
elaborates as follows:
5b. Except as indicated in paragraph 7c below, in no
circumstances will persons be allowed to hold public
office or any other positions of responsibility or influence
in public or important private enterprise who have been
active exponents of militant nationalism and aggression,
who have been influential members of any Japanese
ultra-nationalistic, terroristic, or secret patriotic society,
its agencies or affiliates, who have been influential in
the activities of the other organizations enumerated in
paragraph 5g below, or who manifest hostility to the
objectives of the military occupation.19

This degree of detail, as well as the direct address
of MacArthur in the second person (as opposed to
speaking indirectly of the “Supreme Commander”), may
have made the military commander more comfortably
secure since the wording resembled a set of orders
more closely than a policy recommendation. By 1946,
the SWNCC began filtering its “recommendations”
through the JCS, presumably to obviate such duplicate
effort.20
ORGANIZATION IN THEATER
Any examination of policy in theater must include
the role of the U.S. military. The military, and General
MacArthur in particular, dominated the operational
implementation of occupation policy. Initially, this
resulted from the necessity of having military forces
present to conduct the war against and later the
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occupation of Japan. However, in the first year of the
occupation, the State and War Departments solidified
the military approach with an agreement on the
division of labor in Japan. In a memo to President
Harry Truman, Secretary of State James Byrnes
suggested that the State Department bear primary
responsibility for the formulation of occupation policy,
including chairmanship of the SWNCC, while the
War Department take responsibility for execution and
administration. The memo also suggested requiring
all other agencies to assist the War Department in
finding “suitable civilian personnel to complete the
necessary field staff to discharge the War Department
responsibility for government in these Occupied Areas
by assignment of their existing personnel and facilities,
by assistance in recruiting specially qualified persons,
and in all other practicable action.”21 The President
approved this memo, encouraging other agencies to fall
in line. In part due to this memo, the reconstruction of
Japan remained a military mission for all 7 years of the
occupation, rather than transitioning to civil authorities.
This historical precedent directly contradicts current
opinions that the job of nation-building traditionally
belongs to civilians.
The main responsibility for managing the
occupation in theater fell to General MacArthur
as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.
MacArthur also headed the Far East Command of the
Army (also called Army Forces Pacific). To wear his
two hats efficiently, MacArthur ordered his Chief of
Staff, Lieutenant General Richard Sutherland, to draw
up a new organization plan. Owing to the dual mission
of occupying and reconstructing Japan, Sutherland
split off from the projected Civil Affairs section (G-5) a
separate SCAP General Headquarters (GHQ),22 while
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preserving the Far East Command (FEC) GHQ. Both
headquarters would be under MacArthur and the
same Chief of Staff, but would operate more or less
independently of one another. FEC GHQ would bear
responsibility for the bulk of military occupation and
security responsibilities. On the other side, SCAP GHQ
would manage the many processes associated with
nation-building. The majority of the regular Army
worked in FEC GHQ, while SCAP GHQ consisted
mostly of reserve officers with a civilian perspective.
This organizational structure largely removed the
career military from the process of democratization,
and eased the inherent tension between the necessary
autocracy of military culture and the requirements
of a budding democracy. SCAP GHQ initially
consisted of nine sections (Economic and Scientific,
Civil Information and Education, Natural Resources,
Public Health and Welfare, Government, Legal, Civil
Communications, Civil Intelligence, and Statistics and
Reports) and they were collectively responsible for
the overwhelming majority of accomplishments in
reforming and rebuilding Japan.23
POLICY IN THEATER
Francis Fukuyama describes successful American
nation-building as occurring in three phases. In the first
phase, the United States solves immediate problems of
physical infrastructure through the infusion of security
forces, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance in
restoring physical infrastructure (e.g., water, electricity,
sanitation, etc.). The second phase begins once a viable
level of stability is restored, and focuses on building
self-sustaining state institutions. Finally, in the third
phase, the United States helps the state institutions
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provide public services including public education and
protection of property rights. American values may
dictate the inclusion of civil liberties and democratic
processes in the newly developed institutions during
the final phase.24
We may recall the original five goals of the
occupation, stated in the Potsdam Declaration, as
follows: (1) disarmament of the military and removal of
militarists from power; (2) return of occupied territories
as specified in the Cairo Declaration; (3) justice to war
criminals; (4) strengthening of democracy; and (5)
economic demilitarization. Of these, the first three dealt
with the aftermath of World War II, and the latter two
encompassed the three steps described in Fukuyama’s
concept of nation-building.
Once deep into in the reconstruction process, SCAP
discovered that the disarmament of the military and
removal of militarists from power, although two means
to the same end, required vastly different approaches.
As a result, one branch of the organization dealt with
demobilization of the military and repatriation of
Japanese military and civilians from abroad, while
another branch dealt with the weeding out of aggressive
retrograde forces within the government under the
larger goal of strengthening democracy; similarly,
demilitarizing the economy became one of many
goals in the reorganization of economic institutions to
promote democracy.25
Disarming the Military.
SCAP delegated the initial demobilization of troops
to the Japanese War and Navy Ministries which, by
December 1, 1945, had completely demobilized the
2.2 million men on the main islands. After that point,
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the main task of demobilization was the repatriation
of approximately 6.5 million Japanese residing in the
former colonies, as well as the return of some 1.25
million foreign nationals found residing in Japan at
the end of the war. By early 1948, virtually all of the
Japanese expatriates had been returned to the home
islands, with the exception of some 765,000 Japanese
citizens in Soviet-controlled areas. By May 1949, Soviet
ships officially ceased returning such dispossessed
Japanese citizens to Japan, with Japanese records
today still unable to account for some 375,000 of
them. The loss of these Japanese, presumed dead,
represented a stark contrast between the performance
of the Americans and that of the Soviets in repatriation
efforts. Repatriation of foreign nationals back to their
homelands (predominantly Koreans) largely ended in
1947.26 A large portion of the Korean population chose
to remain in Japan, a fortunate decision as conditions
deteriorated on the Korean peninsula. However, the
large foreign national population later caused security
concerns for SCAP.27 By 1948, at least half of the Koreans in Japan were under leftist influence, mirroring
the political polarization on the Korean peninsula.28
Return of Occupied Territories.
Territorial changes occurred in accordance with the
Cairo Declaration, with all changes accomplished by
1947 except for certain small islands in the Pacific such
as the Ryukyus. Japan ceded Manchuria to China and
liberated Korea. The loss of these territories, although
sought by the Allies, deprived Japan of many of the
natural resources it had access to during the war and
severely handicapped the recovery of the Japanese
economy.29
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Map 1. Japanese Empire before and after Enactment
of Cairo Declaration30
Justice to War Criminals.
To try Japanese war criminals, the allied nations
chartered the War Tribunal for the Far East. The
Tribunal presided over the trial of 28 men on counts
of waging war against China and the allied nations;
ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane
treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs); creating or
executing a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression; and
deliberately and recklessly disregarding their duty to
take adequate steps to prevent atrocities. Defendants
included four former premiers, three former foreign
ministers, four former war ministers, two former navy
ministers, six former generals, two former ambassadors,
and three former economic and financial leaders, but
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did not include the Emperor or any members of the
Imperial family. The absence of the Emperor from this
list has been a cause of criticism on many fronts, but
the United States decided on a pragmatic basis that
preserving the legitimacy of the Imperial house would
serve the occupation better by garnering support for
U.S. measures than by hanging the royals from the
gallows. All of the putatively sane defendants who
survived the trial were sentenced to death or extended
prison terms. Of the seven men sentenced to death,
all bore responsibility for mass-scale atrocities, most
prominently the Rape of Nanking.31
In 1937, during the Japanese offensive against
Nanking, several prominent Nanking civilians
established a “safety zone” of neutrality which both
China and Japan agreed to respect so long as the
zone did not harbor soldiers of the opposing force.
However, despite their government’s acquiescence
in the agreement, Japanese troops entered the city
on December 13 of that year. Over the next 6 weeks,
Japanese soldiers murdered an estimated 200,000
Chinese civilians and POWs, many of whom were
taking refuge in the recognized safety zone.32 Tillman
Durdin reported to the New York Times that “all the
alleys and streets were filled with civilian bodies,
including women and children.”33
A contemporary account of the trials expressed
disappointment that they did not elicit widespread
feelings of shame or guilt in the Japanese population
for initiating the war.34 Moreover, the trials did not cast
a hoped-for shadow on the legitimacy of the former
regime. On the contrary, wartime Prime Minister Hideki
Tojo salvaged his reputation as a loyal Imperialist by
accepting full responsibility for the war, thus indirectly
absolving the Emperor.35 The Nuremburg Tribunals in
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Europe and the Far East Tribunals in Japan were some
of the first examples of international law enforcement
on the issue of wartime atrocities. The Allies conducted
the tribunals without judicial precedent, solely on the
conviction that some crimes were of such unspeakable
enormity, they could not in good conscience be allowed
to go unpunished36 As a deterrent or political lesson,
the trials may have failed to serve their purpose, but as
a precedent for enforcement of such international law
in the future, the trials succeeded admirably.
Strengthening Democracy.
SCAP made its greatest effort in strengthening
democracy through its revision of the Japanese
Constitution. The revised constitution, written by
Americans and forced through the Diet, made four
major changes to the Japanese government.37 First,
it changed the upper house of the Diet to an elected
body. Second, it moved executive power from the
Emperor to the cabinet, as designated by the Diet.
Third, it endowed Japanese citizens with civil rights,
similar to those granted to Americans in the Bill of
Rights. Finally, the constitution forswore the use of
war as a prerogative of the state.38 These revisions still
remain in the Japanese constitution. Of course, many
other programs contributed to the democratization of
Japan, since improving the democratic foundations of
Japan proved a multifaceted endeavor. In addition to
revising the constitution, the Allies focused their efforts
on educational reform, reorganization of economic
institutions, labor reform, and agrarian reform, and
certainly on removing the militarists from government
and positions of influence,effected through a carefully executed purge.
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Government Purge.
As laid down in SWNCC 150/4, many of the
reforms, including the purge, were instituted by
the Japanese government with SCAP oversight. The
Japanese government even established the procedures
for conducting the purge. Basically, the government
required any person to whom the purge might apply
to complete a 3-page questionnaire. A series of boards
then screened the 2,308,863 completed papers and
purged approximately 220,000 individuals.39 The purge
affected significantly more people than Washington
anticipated. Richard Finn attributes this surprise to
the inevitable communication errors that occur when
policymakers are not involved in policy execution. The
purge also resulted in the expulsion of 80 percent of
the Diet and half of Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara’s
cabinet, almost crippling the government.40
Educational Reform.
The purge also extended to the educational field,
where the removal of certain teachers complemented
an overall policy of eliminating all militaristic and
ultranationalistic influences on the education system.
As part of educational reform, SCAP also worked to
simplify the Japanese writing system and standardize
the education program nationwide. However, the
postwar recession limited the money the government
could spend on education, infringing to some extent
the degree to which reforms could be effected. Some
of these programs found resonance in the Japanese
government itself, such as institution of compulsory
education at the elementary and middle school levels.41
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Other reforms, like the attempt to create general
education programs at the university level, found little
support in the Japanese educational establishment.
Akihiro Itoh draws a distinction between voluntary,
piecemeal reforms and externally imposed reforms. He
notes that those of the former category tend to succeed,
while those of the latter tend to lag and create conflicts
within the system.42 In educational reform, as in other
areas, a lack of cultural understanding impaired the
extent to which the American occupation could make
an impact.
Economic Reorganization.
To democratize the economy, SCAP initiated a
number of measures aimed at disbanding the zaibatsu,
or large family-controlled banking and industrial conglomerates that monopolized large portions of the
Japanese economy. SCAP proceeded along four paths
to reach this goal: (1) dissolution of zaibatsu holding
companies; (2) dissolution or reorganization of companies whose relative size restricted competition;
(3) enactment and enforcement of anti-monopolistic
practices; and (4) decentralized distribution of securities
seized by the government from zaibatsu in enforcement
of anti-monopoly laws.43
These efforts might have achieved the desired goal
in a nation that truly desired a capitalist economy, but
conservative Japanese economists strongly supported
the zaibatsu.44 They saw the conglomerates as necessary for economic growth, much like proponents
of big business in the United States. It may surprise
Americans that liberals also supported the zaibatsu, but
wished to nationalize them in the manner of a socialist
government. As a result, in spite of American antimonopoly efforts, the zaibatsu effectively reappeared
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under the guise of keiretsu shortly after the occupation
ended.45
Labor Reform.
To promote labor reform, SCAP encouraged the
organization of unions and implemented protective
legislation. Initially, SCAP encouraged the expansion
of organized labor across the board. However, a series
of strikes in the fall of 1946 and the growing presence
of communist sympathizers in the upper ranks of
labor unions led to the creation of regulatory laws to
prevent organized labor from paralyzing the nation on
a repeated basis. Public safety employees were denied
union rights, and administrative employees in public
service were barred from striking.46
By 1948, the Japanese government had passed
legislation creating a comprehensive system of labor
standards. The Labor Standards Law established
“minimum standards for hours of work, rest periods,
vacations with pay, safety, and sanitation for all nonselfemployed industrial workers in Japan.”47 Another law
provided worker’s compensation to over six and a half
million laborers. These laws and the inspectors that
enforced them improved labor standards throughout
the country. It must be noted, however, that although
the improved standards promoted the egalitarian way
of life espoused by the American occupation, they also
put a serious strain on the already troubled Japanese
economy by increasing the cost of labor.48
Agrarian Reform.
SCAP policy for agrarian reform tried to promote
democracy by eliminating the feudal system commonly
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seen in Japanese agriculture. They effected this change
by buying land from large landowners and selling it
to the tenants that farmed the land. The government
also fixed cash rents at low levels, which encouraged
landowners to sell land rather than continuing to rent
it to tenants. As seen in Figure 1, the policy achieved
tremendous success, reducing the overall land tenancy
from nearly half of all cultivatable land before the
war to approximately 10 percent in 1950. Tsutomu
Ōuchi suggests that this trend quieted rural political
movements, which were largely supported by tenant
farmers concerned about losing land access. The
dissipation of this political force removed a support
base for socialist and communist movements in rural
society.49

Figure 1. Proportions of Owners and Tenants, and
Changes in the Tenancy Rate.50
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All of these actions, while promoting economic
and political democracy, impaired the recovery and
growth of the Japanese economy. Additionally, SCAP
used capital for many of Japan’s restitution payments
that was needed to underwrite heavy industries that
formerly enabled war. Needless to say, the diversion
of such capital further stunted Japan’s economic
recovery.
In addressing the concerns of the Potsdam
Declaration, SCAP provided a good measure of
stability within Japan. Similarly, the new constitution
went a long way toward building a self-sustaining
government, and the various reforms put the
government on the path to providing a range of public
services. However, SCAP addressed all of these issues
simultaneously, rather than sequentially, as Francis
Fukuyama has recommended. This methodology led
to several notable complications.
COMPLICATIONS
Although the Allied occupation of Japan serves in
many ways as a positive example of nation-building,
SCAP also encountered some serious difficulties during
its 7 years of reconstructing Japan. The difficulties SCAP
had to cope with include the influence of communists in
unions, the negative effects of pro-democratic policies
on the struggling economy, miscommunications and
disagreements between MacArthur and policymakers
in Washington, and the general problem of imposing
what might be termed a Western cultural applique on
a completely different society.
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Unions and Communists.
SCAP initiated all of the policies mentioned in the
previous section more or less simultaneously. As a
result, labor unions began to form in 1946, while the
economy was still recovering from the after-effects of
war and the shock of SCAP’s other reforms. In the fall
of 1946, with rampant inflation and unemployment,
labor unions negotiated wage increases in dozens of
industries. In retrospect, one can see the inevitability
that the communists in Japan would take advantage of
a dissatisfied proletariat. They did so with a vengeance,
organizing the diverse labor unions under a single
leader and turning their demands on the government.
Events escalated over the course of the fall and winter.
The Japanese government, deprived of its secret police
and fearing the labor unions meant to revolt, refused
to negotiate. The unions responded with a threat of
a general strike. Ultimately, MacArthur brokered an
agreement between the government and the unions, in
which the unions would refrain from striking, and the
government would raise the living wage by 42 percent.
All of this occurred by proxy, without MacArthur so
much as leaving his desk, and only the respect the
Japanese people had for him prevented disaster.51
Democracy vs. Stability.
In the 3 1/2 years following the war, MacArthur
accomplished all of the tasks laid out by the Potsdam
Declaration and gained the adoration of the Japanese
people. Shinto had been the state religion of Japan until
1945, and the Emperor was revered in that religion as
one of a pantheon of gods.52 Thus when the Emperor
deferred to MacArthur, the Japanese people logically
assumed that MacArthur was a god as well. MacArthur
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had experience with Eastern philosophy, having served
under his father in Tokyo during his early career
and having spent several years as the commanding
general in the Philippines. He meticulously played
the role of the aloof ruler he believed appealed to the
Japanese psyche.53 During MacArthur’s time in Japan,
the Emperor and the Prime Minister were the only
Japanese he saw in an official capacity. He refused to
leave Japan for the duration of his tenure as SCAP.
The Japanese responded by treating MacArthur with a
reverence previously reserved for the Imperial family
itself. MacArthur received almost 500,000 letters from
the Japanese public during the occupation, many of
which addressed him in the formal style of Japanese
previously used only for the Emperor.54
As the de facto ruler of Japan, MacArthur exhibited
tireless enthusiasm and dedication to the cause of
Japanese democracy. In the first 6 months of the
occupation, he ordered the removal of the censorship
system, the release of political prisoners, the installation
of women’s suffrage, and the abolition of child labor.55
Such dedication was very much in keeping with the
spirit of reconstruction at the time. The Potsdam
Declaration, SWNCC 150/4, and JCS 1380/15 each
emphasized democratic development in all areas of
life.
By the end of 1948, however, most of the programs
resolving issues from the war were complete, and
many of the programs for promoting democracy were
well entrenched. At this time, Washington began to
feel pressure to relieve the U.S. tax burden and make
Japan economically self-sufficient. Japanese production
and trade had recovered at disappointing rates
through 1949, while postwar inflation raised costs at a
staggering rate. During the period between September
1945 and August 1948, prices in Japan rose more than
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700 percent. To remedy this situation, Washington
appointed the Young Mission.
The Young Mission consisted of some half-dozen
economists from various government agencies,
including the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve Board, which prior to this point had
influenced reconstruction very little. The Mission
traveled to Japan in early 1949, spending 18 days
examining the economic situation in the country and
writing a report of their findings, all without the help
of SCAP economists stationed in Tokyo. The Mission
recommended a 180-degree change in economic policy,
one reflecting a change in azimuth from promoting
democracy in Japan to reducing the tax burden in the
United States. But the economists at SCAP convinced
MacArthur that the existing approach was showing
positive results. MacArthur backed them up, rejecting
the report entirely. Washington overruled MacArthur,
and ordered the change in policy.56 This event marked
the first serious divergence of interests of the United
States and Japan.
Accounts differ on whether the change of policy
improved the Japanese economy. Joseph Dodge,
President of the Detroit Bank, arrived in Japan to
oversee implementation of the new policy. He set a
fixed exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and
enforced Washington’s demand for a balanced budget.
This method might have improved the performance
of the Japanese economy, given the chance; however,
the start of the Korean War in June 1950 generated an
enormous new demand for military supplies to which
the Japanese eagerly catered. In the second half of
1950, Japan accumulated a surplus in its international
accounts for the first time in the occupation.57 The
Korean War saved the Japanese economy.
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The End of MacArthur.
MacArthur was to disagree with Washington
on other policy issues. Because of the economic
redirection, MacArthur largely lost control of the
reconstruction. As the de facto leader of Japan, he
was entitled to these disagreements, but as a military
officer, he could not legally carry disagreement to
the point of insubordination. He ventured two more
serious disagreements with Washington. One involved
the treatment of the Chinese government in exile on
Formosa, which he thought the United States should
support on principle in spite of countervailing political
considerations. The other involved the war in South
Korea, concerning which a congressman publicized
compromising correspondence with MacArthur after
a Presidential Directive had forbade MacArthur from
taking a public position at variance with official policy.
Historian D. James Clayton largely attributes the
escalation of the Truman-MacArthur controversy, as
it later became known, to “failures in communication
and coordination within the chain of command.”58
This failure resulted partially from the physical
distance between Truman and MacArthur. They met
face to face only once, at Wake Island on October 15,
1950. Consequently, rather than a warm relationship
built on close familiarity, trust, and acquaintanceship,
communication and relations between the two men
was marked by stereotypical preconceptions derived
from third-party information.59
The series of disagreements between MacArthur
and Washington finally led Truman to dismiss
MacArthur for insubordination. The dismissal came
while the Americans and the Japanese were in the midst
of negotiating the terms of agreement on the peace
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treaty, and the sudden departure of MacArthur came
close to breaking Japanese faith in the United States.
The dearth of communication between Washington
and Tokyo and the resulting lack of trust jeopardized
the success of the occupation.
Cultural Misunderstandings.
SCAP experienced cultural misunderstandings with
the Japanese throughout the course of the occupation.
Some of these misunderstandings had comical results,
while others proved seriously troublesome. Theodore
Cohen relates one such incident:
Not knowing the tastes of the Americans, the Japanese
devoted themselves to a serious study of them. At one
small party (small because of a tiny budget) given for four
of us by the two labor bureaus of the Welfare Ministry
in February 1946, three of the bureaucrats plied us with
whisky, beer, and sake while asking questions about our
hobbies and likes. Gradually, as the Japanese became
drunker, our responses became more imaginative.
When all but one of the Japanese were hors de combat,
apparently asleep under the table, we said our farewells
to the last surviving host. We had not gone more than a
hundred meters in our jeep when one of us discovered
he had forgotten his overseas cap. We turned around,
and he was back within minutes at the room we had left.
There were our “drunken” hosts, suddenly sober, sitting
around the low banquet table and comparing notes on
their departed guests. I don’t know who fooled whom
more that evening.60

Americans did not always put as much effort
into understanding their counterparts. In November
1946, the Hoover Mission made a series of
recommendations to liberalize and de-rigidify the
Japanese governmental bureaucracy. However, the
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Americans failed to comprehend the educational
elitism among government bureaucrats and the feudal
nature of supervisor-employee relationships in Japan,
attempting instead to install with no cultural filtering
such American concepts as “equal opportunity
for promotions” and the “nobility of service to the
public.” As a result, the Mission’s recommendations
were “almost totally irrelevant.”61 Cohen remarked,
“I sometimes thought that if the Mission had been
sent to the Arctic Circle instead, it would have come
up with the same prescription for the Eskimos, seals,
and seagulls.”62 Another mission, tasked with making
recommendations for reforming the Japanese education
system, generated a report which “sometimes offers
more insight into U.S. education than into Japanese.”63
This mirror-imaging, culturally illiterate approach to
recommendations and reforms appears repeatedly
throughout the occupation, frequently undermining
U.S. initiatives. The Americans attempted to minimize
such adverse effects by acting through the Japanese
government, using persuasion and influence rather
than by issuing directives. However, the inherent power
imbalance between the Americans and the Japanese
frequently rendered this approach ineffective.
Findings and Recommendations.
The case of Japan as described in the foregoing pages
has given rise to several significant findings that may
have relevance in other nation-building endeavors.
First, interagency cooperation in Washington creates
clear policy, but only cooperation between Washington
and the theater results in clear policy execution.
Second, efforts to create stability and democracy
simultaneously can interfere with each other. Third,
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extended occupations increase the probability of
success but are difficult to sustain. Fourth, although the
U.S. Government recognizes the importance of cultural
fluency and understanding in successful nationbuilding, it lacks the will to gather the intellectual
capital needed to provide that cultural understanding.
Finally, the expected role of the military in nationbuilding operations has varied over the course of the
last 60 years, but successful nation-building will always
require deep military involvement, and with it close
cooperation between civilian and military efforts.
Due to interagency cooperation in Washington, the
two major documents dictating initial policy, SWNCC
150/4 and JCS 1380/15, agreed with one another and
with the Potsdam Declaration on policy in Japan.
However, since none of the people in SCAP were privy
to the discussions and considerations that created
these documents, SCAP had to extrapolate from
Washington’s policy vision. In an ideal world, some
of the people intimately involved with formulating
policy would sit down with people coordinating the
execution effort and talk through the strategy and
philosophy behind the policy directives so that the
coordinator could execute policy within the frame of
reference policymakers originally intended. In the real
world, however, where policymakers and executors
seem inevitably to inhabit separate worlds, one can
achieve approximately the same results by sending
liaison teams to the theater to ensure consistency
between strategy, policy, and operations. Washington
did send liaisons to Japan, but their roles involved
offering technical expertise in economics, politics, or
agriculture rather than the broader interpretive role I
suggest. For this purpose, the military structure was
inadequate because a soldier expects his subordinates
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to take orders without question. Successful policy
execution, however, requires a unity of vision with the
policymakers, not just with the executor.
Another complication in the Japanese occupation
stemmed from attempting to achieve stability and
democracy simultaneously. As seen in the case of
the labor strikes, policies that promote democracy
can interfere with stability. Conversely, measures
to promote stability can stifle democratic growth.
Although it offends American sensibilities, stability
should precede democracy. The basic needs of humans
for security, food, water, medicine, and shelter
supersede liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
The creation and maintenance of stability and
democracy often require an extended occupation.
The occupation of Japan lasted 3-4 years longer than
originally anticipated. However, maintaining support
for an occupation that lasts the greater part of a decade
challenges the governments of both the occupied and
occupying nations. David Edelstein notes a paradox
in nation-building, namely, that it requires a lengthy
occupation to work, but that extended presence of
external influences often precipitates nationalist
movements against the foreign occupation.64 The
occupying government also has trouble rallying
domestic support for long occupations. After the initial
enthusiasm for national defense fades, wives want
their husbands back, mothers want their sons back,
and taxpayers want their money back. Governments
anticipating the need for an occupation should consider
this dilemma beforehand. Further, the political
interests that necessitated the occupation will probably
also lead to a semi-permanent posture necessitating
American troops on the ground even after occupation.
Some 65 years after the end of the occupation of Japan,
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U.S. forces are still stationed in Okinawa and Japan.
Similarly, South Korea has hosted American military
bases since the beginning of the Korean War in 1951,
though admittidly these troop presences are no longer
for the purpose of enforcing occupations. Instead
of looking for ways to minimize occupation time,
policymakers should focus efforts on maintaining
support for an occupation in both countries involved.
By rallying support, policymakers can better buy time
to create the stability necessary to minimize the need
for an indefinite foreign troop presence.
Some might question America’s ability to create
either stability or democracy in failed or defeated
states today. The use of atomic bombs against
Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly ended the war in
the Pacific decisively and demoralized the Japanese
people. These two results put the Americans in an
enviable situation at the beginning of the occupation.
However, revisionist studies argue that Japan may have
surrendered by the end of 1945 even if the Americans
did not use the atomic bombs.65 Under interrogation,
Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal,
stated, “Our decision to seek a way out of this war
was made in early June before any atomic bomb had
been dropped.”66 It is impossible to gauge the success
of an occupation in this hypothetical situation, but the
question merits consideration.
As to the elusive character of the Iraqi insurgency,
it could be that this resistance resulted from the
invasion’s lack of “legitimacy.”67 By way of contrast,
in Japan, the Emperor, a revered leader, accepted
American occupation. He had legitimacy not only as a
political leader, but as an object of religious veneration.
Public support for the Emperor translated into support
for the American occupation. In newer nation-states
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like Iraq, where the newly installed government has
less legitimacy than tribal relationships and patronage
networks, American occupations have far less chance of
enjoying public support. In such a situation, legitimacy
must come from other sources. Occupations can foster
legitimacy at the global level through multilateral
efforts or at the local level by gaining the support
of local leaders. Either way, policymakers need a
modicum of cultural understanding to anticipate the
beneficial effects that support from various factions
can have on the overall legitimacy of the occupation.
Cultural understanding is perhaps the most
important factor in occupation success, and the least
often taken into consideration. Ironically, policymakers
understood this necessity beforehand both in Japan and
in Iraq, but the resources simply were not available.68
In the 1940s, very few Americans had experience with
Japanese language and culture. Similarly, today very
few Americans have experience with Arabic, Dari, or
Pashtu. Until the U.S. Government decides to make
development of this intellectual capital a priority,
cultural barriers will continue to frustrate nationbuilding efforts.
Such barriers inhibit cooperation between civil
and military elements of occupation forces as well
as between occupation forces and local government.
The military in nation-building operations produces
important effects ranging from those by the generals on
high, down to those such as the cultural sophistication
of the foot soldier on the ground. Policymakers face
the temptation to use military forces for occupation
operations simply because the Army has the men on
the ground at the moment. But soldiers on the ground
are not reconstructors. In Japan, SCAP solved this
problem by utilizing civilian resources within a military
hierarchy.
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The themes seen throughout the occupation of
Japan resemble the headlines of newspapers in the
last 4 years. Conflict between creating stability and
implementing democracy, tension between the need
for a long occupation and the temptation to cut and
run, and efforts to increase cultural understanding
have all been hot topics during the war in Iraq.69 The
role of the military and the structure of interagency
communication have also required closer consideration
in recent years, especially with the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security and the consequent
rearrangement of the bureaucracy.
Our analysis of these themes leads to three critical
policy recommendations:
• Institute incentives for cultural fluency in the
government and military, and practical means
for those involved to achieve such fluency.
• Create liaisons between Washington and
the occupation authority in theater tasked
specifically with ensuring that in-theater
decisions coincide with national security policy
and underlying strategy.
• Focus on rallying public and multinational
support for extended occupations, not minimizing occupation duration.
These three recommendations should find application
in any nation-building endeavor, whether in a
completely subjugated country or in an environment
of limited warfare and counterinsurgency. The need
for interagency cooperation between Washington and
the theater and within the theater, the vital importance
of stability, and the perennial need for communication
are universal desiderata. Indeed, they are as applicable
today as they were 60 years ago.
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CHAPTER 7
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW:
SRI LANKA’S EXPERIENCE
WITH AN ENDURING INSURGENCY
Patrick B. Baetjer
The most obvious question for policymakers with
regard to Sri Lanka is: Why should the U.S. Government
look to that country for lessons in counterinsurgency
warfare? The author will argue that the Sri Lankan
experience holds a number of insights for the United
States on several levels. The Sri Lankan government
has battled a pernicious separatist insurgency in
the northern part of the country since the 1970s. The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or simply the
Tigers as they are commonly known, have claimed to
speak for the entire ethnic Tamil community and seek
the establishment of a distinct Tamil state.
The Sri Lankan experience is not one widely
studied by students of counterinsurgency warfare.
The U.S. campaigns in Vietnam and the Philippines
are sometimes looked at, but the British efforts
in Malaysia and the French efforts in Algeria are
considered the classic examples of counterinsurgency
operations.1 Indeed, the Pentagon reportedly has
taken to showing the documentary film Battle of Algiers
to a number of civilian staffers and military officers
charged with addressing problems within Iraq. This
focus on Algeria and Malaysia reveals two significant
points. First, the United States has a tendency to draw
counterinsurgency lessons from the experiences of
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other Western governments, seemingly ignoring the
lessons learned by non-Western governments. Given
that the United States has repeatedly stated that the
Iraqi insurgency will ultimately be defeated by Iraqis
themselves, it follows that the United States ought
to look for lessons from non-Western governments
who have had to fight insurgencies within their own
borders.
Second, the focus on past Western efforts, especially
those of the French in Algeria, misses one key point.
Rarely have Western efforts been successful over the
long term. In Algeria, the French were able to dismantle
much of the National Liberation Front only by turning
to tactics such as torture and mass intimidation that
ultimately undermined their own position and led
to their withdrawal. The French learned that certain
tactics that might be effective in the short term
ultimately alienated the population, thus causing them
to lose the larger and more significant battle, that for
“hearts and minds.” In a similar vein, analyses of the
U.S. occupation of Iraq have suggested that some U.S.
forces used tactics that may have alienated segments of
the Iraqi population.
To some extent, the French government and colonial
administrators did not fundamentally understand
Algerian culture. The colonial French sought to
turn everyone who lived beneath the Tricolor into a
Frenchman in both speech and outlook, with little
regard for the indigenous culture.2 While the United
States has not sought to impose American culture on
Iraq, it has revealed either an ignorance of Iraqi and
Arab culture or at best a shallow understanding of it.
This aspect is where looking at the Sri Lankan experience
will be of particular value. Though the Tamils and the
majority Sinhalese often claim distinct histories, they
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share enough of a mutual past to be instructive for the
various counterinsurgency campaigns elsewhere that
involve a common people.
Furthermore, Sri Lanka like Iraq is extraordinarily
complex, both ethnically and socially. There exist
multiple ethnic groups beside the Sinhalese and
Tamils, as well as several religions, from Buddhism
to Hinduism to Islam. Further complicating the social
structure is the continued existence of the caste system,
which provides a further divide beyond ethnicity and
religion. The Sri Lankan experience in addressing these
divides within the insurgency context thus provides
lessons for the United States, which is engaged in
nation-building, support and stability operations, and
counterinsurgency warfare in a number of places such
as Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In all such contexts,
we face a number of bewildering social, ethnic, and
religious divides. In Iraq alone, the United States has
encountered dichotomies between Shi’ites and Sunnis,
Arabs and Kurds, various tribes, and emerging political
forces, with different identities asserting primacy at
different points in time.
With regard to Iraq, there are other similarities to the
Sri Lankan experience that provide the United States
with fresh insights into its own counterinsurgency
efforts. Like the Sunni insurgency based primarily in al
Anbar Province, the Tamil Tigers are readily identifiable
with a particular geographical region of Sri Lanka,
but both the Sunni insurgents and the Tigers have the
capability to strike nationwide. Sunni insurgents have
successfully attacked in Baghdad, while Tigers have
carried out operations in the heart of Colombo.
Both the Tamil insurgency and the Sunni insurgency
have an international component, though it is veiled.
There is evidence that both the Tigers and the Sunni
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insurgents receive funding and weapons from abroad,
and that sympathetic populations in other countries
contribute a measure of support. There is some evidence
that both the Tigers and the Sunni insurgents may
receive funding from front companies or charities that
ostensibly advertise themselves as humanitarian relief
organizations when, in fact, some of their funds end up
supporting insurgent violence. Each insurgent group
also has well-developed networks abroad that serve to
disseminate information and may act as recruiters.
The counterinsurgency campaigns in both Iraq
and Sri Lanka have been characterized by intense
crackdowns interspersed among chummy efforts to
woo supporters away from the insurgency through
various development and aid initiatives. In Sri Lanka,
this pattern was seen following the disastrous December
26, 2004, tsunami, which largely devastated the Tamil
regions to the north. What started off as promising
cooperation between government authorities and
the Tamils eventually disintegrated back into armed
conflict. Given the intensive U.S. focus on providing
aid services and development projects in Iraq and
Afghanistan, these efforts hold important lessons.
Before these lessons can be distilled from the Sri
Lankan experience, however, it is necessary for us to
understand Sri Lankan society in a historical context as
well as the development of Tamil identity.
Sri Lanka: The Legacy of Colonialism.
Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, first
encountered Europeans in 1505 when the Portuguese
arrived. The native Ceylonese people had numerous
contacts with the Dutch and the Portuguese throughout
the 1700s. Originally heavily influenced by the
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Portuguese traders and explorers, Ceylon then became
a Dutch territory before it was taken over by the British
in 1796. It was technically made a British crown colony
in 1802 by the Treaty of Amiens but was not truly
colonized until 1815, when it was placed under the
control of the British East India Company. The British
government, however, forced a joint administration
of the colony upon the company in exchange for
a guaranteed monopoly of the island’s cinnamon
production.3
The year 1815 marked the beginning of a concerted
British effort to establish unchallenged control of
Ceylon. The kingdom of Kandy, both a region and
a people, had been co-opted by the British to some
degree in order to facilitate British commercial
interests in the island. The Kandyan chiefs went before
the British colonial administrators, asking to have the
king, a highly unpopular figure, replaced. The British
exploited this opportunity, convening a Kandyan
“Convention” in which the monarch was removed and
greater direct British control was assumed. This was
hardly what the Kandyan chiefs envisioned. Chaffing
under the control of the British, the Disawa of Uva, a
local ruler named Keppetipola, led a Kandyan rebellion
in Vellassa in 1818. While colonial rebellions were
hardly unique within the British Empire, the Kandyan
rebellion represented one of the few revolts that nearly
succeeded in beating British forces. The British were
able to recover enough leverage to impose martial law
and largely end the rebellion.4
The British instituted the plantation system in
Ceylon to exploit the island’s natural resources as
efficiently as possible, much as they did in their
other colonial possessions. The establishment of the
plantation system, however, disrupted the traditional
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societal structure. The different Ceylonese ethnic
groups stayed largely within their own regions, and
the informal allocation of land for agriculture was
concluded through oral agreements. The plantation
economy was extraordinarily labor intensive, forcing
plantation managers to attract labor from other parts
of the island. This led to a large influx of migrant Tamil
workers not only from other parts of Ceylon, but from
India as well.5
The plantation economy began to dissolve the
barriers dividing Ceylon’s ethnic groups, barriers
further weakened by the Royal Commission of 1833.
The British, as elsewhere, had exerted control over
the Ceylonese in part by playing one ethnic/cultural
group against another, e.g., the Sinhalese against the
Tamils. These divides existed prior to the arrival of
the British, with a long-standing dispute over which,
the Sinhalese or the Tamils, are actually the primeval
indigenous people of Sri Lanka. The dispute continues
to this day. The Tamils argue that the Sinhalese arrived
in the 3rd century B.C. as Buddhism was introduced.6
Sinhala history is largely based on the Pali Chronicles,
the Dipavamsa and Mahavamsa, recorded by Buddhist
monks in the 4th and 6th centuries. Despite the
ongoing debate over the degree to which the monks
intended the works as entertainment as opposed to
serious history, many Sinhalese regard the chronicles
as definitive in describing the Tamils as invaders and
bandits, not indigenous inhabitants.7 As early as 1799,
the British acknowledged the truly divided nature of
Ceylon. Sir Hugh Cleghorn, the 1st Colonial Secretary
of Ceylon, wrote:
Two different nations, from a very ancient period, have
divided between them the possession of the island: the
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Sinhalese inhabiting the interior in its Southern and
Western parts from the river Wallouve to that of Chillow,
and the Malabars [Tamils] who possess the Northern
and Eastern Districts. These two nations differ entirely
in their religions, language, and manners.8

In 1833, W. M. G. Colebrooke and C. H. Cameron
headed up a Royal Commission that examined the
British administration over the island. Colebrooke
and Cameron unexpectedly came to what were
regarded as fairly radical conclusions. Instead of
administering the colony along ethnic and cultural
lines, they divided Ceylon into five provinces. Further,
they suggested that the salient features of the colonial
system—mercantilism,
monopolistic
practices,
and discriminatory administrative procedures—be
eliminated. According to one historian, “Many of the
proposals were adopted and helped set a pattern of
administrative, economic, judicial, and educational
development into the next century.”9
Despite the adoption of a number of Colebrooke and
Cameron’s recommendations, British administration
of the island could hardly be considered progressive,
and the colonial administrators took a number of steps
to further consolidate control of Ceylon. Because of
the decline of cinnamon’s profitability, coffee rose to
become the dominant crop, with a profitable coffee
boom in Ceylon from 1839 to 1847. Once the British
recognized the lucrative nature of coffee, they moved
to bring larger tracts of land under their control.10 In
1840, colonial administrators passed Crown Land
Encroachment Ordinance No. 12 which, in effect,
claimed the Crown’s right to appropriate any land
the authorities deemed was being “wasted” or not
cultivated to its full capacity. In effect, this ordinance
rendered at a stroke thousands of Ceylonese people
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landless, as they had to prove, in official English terms
of reference, that they owned the land they tended. As
indicated earlier, ownership tended to be conveyed
by oral agreement. The Crown thus came into “legal”
possession of an additional 50,000 or so acres.11
Coffee would prove to be a transient boom. In 1869,
a leaf disease struck the Ceylonese coffee industry,
destroying it almost entirely over a 15-year period.
British entrepreneurs countered this setback by moving
to tea cultivation. Growing tea, however, requires even
greater amounts of labor. As improbable as it may
seem, tea cultivation led to a relative labor shortage, a
dilemma the British sought to resolve by encouraging
another large wave of Indian Tamil emigration. Indeed,
the 1911 census found that Indian Tamils comprised
some 12 percent of the Ceylonese population, or
roughly 500,000 people.12 The British saw the Indian
Tamils as somehow different from indigenous Tamils.
Significantly, however, the Tamils themselves, almost
all Hindus, did not draw the sharp distinction between
Indian and other Tamils as did the British, though they
were aware of differences within the greater Tamil
community.13
The plantation system had earlier created a vast
influx of migrant Tamil workers. The next wave of
Indian Tamil immigrant workers further swelled
the Tamil population, creating additional tensions
between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities, which
competed for the same employment. The Tamils
and Sinhalese apparently were grouped in separate,
ethnically homogeneous enclaves, maintaining the
historical ethnic divide that the British had capitalized
upon during the first years of colonization.14
Despite the influx of labor and Ordinance No. 12,
the British continued to seek greater amounts of land
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to cultivate tea. The colonial authorities now focused
on one of the few areas that still resisted assimilation—
Ceylon peasant agriculture. While Ordinance No. 12
allowed for land to be seized that was either not used
or, in the authorities’ view, underutilized, this had little
effect on cropland the Ceylonese used for themselves.
In the midst of the decline in profitability of coffee,
the British had imposed grain taxes on the Ceylonese
farmers’ worth between 1/14th and one-half of the
crop’s total value.15 Realizing its financial potential, a
number of the Ceylonese farmers then began to grow
coffee in addition to grain. As the coffee industry
collapsed, these farmers could no longer pay the grain
tax, enabling the British to seize even more land in the
1880s. Though the Ceylon elite successfully campaigned
to have the law repealed in 1892, the British had by that
time advanced their land consolidation program even
further.16
With the English hold on Ceylon tightening, the
British began to mandate the institution of British
laws in some areas of Ceylon life and to establish at
least the appearance of Ceylonese participation in the
administration of the colony. In a move that would
have significant repercussions later in the country’s
history, the British established the Charter of Justice in
1833 that enshrined English as the colony’s language.17
Patchworklike, the British kept some of the Tamil
laws, the Thesavalamai, but not others, such as those
of the Muslim Tamils in Puttalam. In some cases, the
supposedly enlightened British enforced laws that
were far more retrograde than the Ceylonese laws.
For instance, English law mandated women’s inferior
status in marriage and property rights, whereas Tamil
and Sinhala law recognized women as independent
and able to control their own property.18
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In an effort to give the colonial administration greater
representation among the indigenous population, the
colony’s ruling body, the Executive Council, appointed
the Legislative Council with the idea that it would act
as an advisory body. In 1833, three of the 15 council
members were native Ceylonese, representing the
low-country Sinhalese, the Burghers, and the Tamils.
The attempt to bring more Ceylonese into the colonial
administration accelerated in 1844 when the Ceylon
Civil Service was opened to all Ceylonese who had
acquired an English education.19 Nevertheless, higher
education remained forbidden to the Ceylonese, with
the notable exceptions of law and medicine, and these
attempts to co-opt Ceylonese elements into the colonial
status quo had little effect on eliminating the continued
existence of the caste system in indigenous society.20
As the 19th century came to a close, the British
colonial efforts had had several significant effects on
Ceylon society. First, the ability to speak English and
the possession of an English education were keys to elite
membership and to employment within the colonial
administration. This emphasis on English would later
play a significant role in the complaints of the Tamils.
Second, the plantation system ossified already existing
divides between ethnic groups, especially the Sinhalese
and the Tamils, which had been exacerbated by earlier
British divide-and-rule tactics. The cultivation of tea led
to waves of Indian Tamil immigration that would later
play a significant role in the Tamil claim that they were
not being appropriately represented. As one author
noted, “Rather than jelling identities, the lasting effect
of colonial rule in the 19th century was to propagate
the idea that identities were fixed and stable, and that
one could not jump from one to another.”21 Instead of
forming a unified nation, indigenous practices coupled
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with British colonial machinations created a number of
lasting disparate identities.
The Move Towards Independence, 1900 to 1948:
Societal Fissures Widen.
Though an overriding sense of Ceylonese
nationalism was noticeably absent among the
populace given the number of disparate identities,
the appointment of three Ceylonese members to the
Legislative Council was a nod to elite sentiment that
they should have some say in the colony’s affairs. In
1918, Sir William Manning was appointed the British
governor of Ceylon. Manning returned to the old
system of divide-and-rule, this time through political
manipulation. The British, and Manning in particular,
feared that the emergence of the Ceylon National
Congress political party might be the harbinger of
nationalist aspirations within the country. In order to
head off this perceived threat, Manning took steps to
form minority political identities among the Kandyan
Sinhalese and the Tamils, while seeking to split the
Ceylon elite. The British, ironically, ended up elevating
the Kandyan Sinhalese in the colonial administration
system, despite the fact that the low-country Sinhalese
were the ones who were Western educated.22
An even greater irony is that the Ceylon National
Congress was hardly a major political player and certainly not a source of national unification. The Congress largely represented the Ceylonese elite. Manning’s efforts to establish political identities as a way
for ethnic minorities to combat the Congress was not
only unnecessary, but, even more problematic, it established parties for ethnic groups that would claim the
right to influence and political power disproportionate
to the size of the Ceylonese populations they
represented.
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Eventually, the British shifted their support from
the Kandyan Sinhalese to the Westernized low-country
Sinhalese, and Manning’s efforts to foment political and
societal divisions by boosting ethnic minority parties
bore fruit. As early as 1905, the Tamils had formed what
would likely be considered a political action committee
today, the Jaffna Tamil Association, which was open to
all Tamils and pushed for greater political power for
Tamils.23 Yet Manning’s efforts contributed to the ethnic
minorities’ perception that they were somehow being
left out. The Ceylon Tamils, in complete contradiction
to what the British censuses showed, claimed until
the 1920s that the Tamil population was as large as
that of the low-country Sinhalese and the Kandyan
Sinhalese.24
Manning further sought to play on this ethnic
divide by overseeing a reformed Legislative Council in
1921 that increased the Sinhalese representation to 13
members while the Tamil representation remained at
three seats, leading to Tamil protestations.25 One Tamil,
Sir Ponnambalan Ramanathan, submitted a memo to
the colonial administrators on April 1, 1922, requesting
that minority views be heard and ethnic representation
be respected. This was exactly the vehicle that
Manning needed to entrench ethnic minorities within
the system as a check to the Sinhalese despite the fact
that the minorities represented so few people. The
governor backed Ramanathan’s memo, and in 1923 the
Legislative Council featured eight Tamil seats and 16
Sinhalese seats, even though the Sinhalese comprised
some 67 percent of the population and the Tamils
only 11 percent.26 Manning helped foster a political
culture that would endure, encouraging the oftentimes
unrealistic expectations and aspirations of the Tamil
community. One scholar noted:
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Although elites of all communities shared a common
outlook, from 1931 onwards tensions arose about the
safeguards and alleged discrimination in the distribution
of resources and language. The quest for entitlements
through representation, legislation, or violence shaped
the contours of identities in the years that preceded
violence.27

Despite Manning’s best efforts to maintain British
dominance over the politics and resources of Ceylon,
the damage that World War II wrought on the British
Empire weakened British control. The shock of the
fall of Singapore to the Japanese, as well as the anticolonial ferment that emerged from the conflict,
convinced the English they would have to give Ceylon
its independence. Yet Manning’s patronage of the
ethnic minority parties lingered on in the political
system the British left behind. The British hoped to
ensure the strength of the minority parties by allotting
seats through a combination of geography and
splitting constituencies. Furthermore, a key provision
in the constitution held that a two-thirds majority of
the Ceylonese “legislature” was required in order to
amend the constitution.28 The British were certain that
the Sinhalese could not muster that many votes, given
the prominence of the minority parties in the House.
In 1946, an English report concluded that English
would no longer be the official language of the
Ceylonese government and that instead the official
languages would be the Tamil and Sinhala languages.
While perhaps the British understood this as a move
towards decolonization, they did not understand the
unifying and integrative role the English language had
come to play in the nation. Understanding English was
key to attaining a government post—the Ceylonese
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elite spoke English and viewed the attempt to discard
the language as an attack on their status and privilege
within society.29 The elite continued to use English, but
the differential use of the language elsewhere would
have a significantly adverse impact on the relations
between the Tamils and the Sinhala majority population
on down the road. It was in the context of overly
influential ethnic minority political parties, a rigid
and inflexible set of social identities long reinforced
by the colonial experience, and a political culture that
viewed politics merely as a mechanism for distributing
national resources to narrow constituencies, that the
British granted Ceylon its independence on February
4, 1948.
Post-Colonial Flashpoints: Disenfranchisement,
Misrepresentation, and the Dominance of the
Sinhalese.
Though the resplendent independence celebrations
created a façade of unity among the Ceylonese initially,
the society remained divided. Fractures continued
between the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the various
other ethnic groups. As one historian argues:
The Sinhalese and Tamils are separate and distinct
nations. Because of their particular historical past, and
because of national-ethnic differences and the occupation
of separate homelands, each possesses separate and
distinct national consciousness and owes its loyalty first
to its own homeland, and then to Sri Lanka.30

Disagreements also arose among Hindu, Buddhist,
Christian, and Muslim believers, cutting across ethnic
communities. Furthermore, though elites no doubt
would have existed with or without the British presence,
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the colonial administration had created a Westernized
elite that favored the Sinhalese. One of the first acts
of independent Ceylon would cause further ruptures
within society.
In 1948, the government passed Ceylon Citizenship
Act No. 18, enumerating the ways that a person
in Ceylon could become a citizen with full rights.
The Ceylon Citizenship Act offered two tracks to
citizenship: either a person had to show proof that
he or she had descended from a family who had long
been established on Ceylon, or a person had to register
with the authorities. The difficulty was that both tracks
required documentation as well as literacy. With one
stroke, this immediately rendered thousands of Indian
Tamil workers noncitizens since most were unable to
read and write. Without citizenship, these workers
were unable to vote.31
Effectively, the law cemented within the political
game the rule that political parties would strive for
their own narrow ethnic goals to the exclusion of
the others. From the outset of independence, rather
than rejecting the ethnic politics that Governor
Manning had introduced, Ceylon wholeheartedly
embraced them. One historian noted, “The laws . . .
had ruptured the possibility of stronger interethnic
and class alliances by excluding the entire state Tamil
population from participating in the polity.”32 The two
dominant Sinhalese parties, the Sri Lankan Freedom
Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP),
strove to outdo one another through increasingly
inflammatory rhetoric. Ironically, by disenfranchising
so many Tamils, the Sinhalese inadvertently gave
some credence to the Tamils’ exaggerated claims of
discrimination and poor representation. At one point,
a Sinhala spokesman announced, “The Tamil people
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must accept the fact that the Sinhala majority will
no longer permit themselves to be cheated of their
rights.”33
Yet the Tamils were also let down by their own
supposedly representative bodies and officials. Two
trade unions, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC)
and the Democratic Workers’ Congress (DWC), often
spoke up for Tamil rights. With the establishment of
the two-track system for citizenship and thus voting
rights, the unions initially told the Tamil workers to
boycott the registration system as a form of protest.
Confusingly, however, the unions eventually backed
registration applications from upperclass Tamil
merchants.34 Thus, the working Tamils, primarily those
employed on the plantations, were disenfranchised to
a degree by heeding the advice of the trade unions who
were supposed to be representing them.
The adoption of the national flag in 1948, seemingly
a minor issue compared to the disenfranchisement of
Tamils, contributed further to their sense of alienation.
Tamil kings had often used the image of a bull to
represent their kingdom; Sinhalese kings utilized the
visage of a lion. The flag that was adopted, which looks
nearly the same as today’s flag, featured a lion placed
prominently at the center of the flag with two stripes on
the periphery. The two stripes represented the Muslim
and Tamil communities, a symbolic affirmation of
their secondary status within the dominant Sinhala
society.35
Some historians assert that Sinhala colonization of
traditionally Tamil homelands increased rapidly after
1948. There is evidence to suggest that some 200,000
Sinhalese families spread out over 3,000 square miles
of land in the primarily Tamil district of Batticaloa, thus
effecting a land grab. These historians allege that as
much as one-third of Batticaloa district was absorbed
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into the Amparai district, a largely Sinhalese area.36
The head of the Federalist Party, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, pushed for working class Tamil rights in
the late 1950s. Chelvanayakam’s campaign, however,
was short-lived. Even within the Tamil community,
there existed social and geographic cleavages.
Chelvanayakam was persuaded to drop his support
for working class Tamil rights in 1957 when the central
government agreed to several demands by the Jaffna
Tamils. The Tamil community within Jaffna had
asked that the central government recognize the Tamil
language, create regional governing councils, and
promise to forgo aggressive settlement by Sinhalese
and other ethnicities in traditionally Tamil areas. With
the recognition of these demands, Chelvanayakam
agreed to drop his campaign on behalf of working
Tamils.37
From the outset of independence, the Sinhalese
nationalists strove to assert Sinhala dominance and
to enshrine Buddhism and Sinhala authority within
the constitution. The various ethnic minorities sought
to block these efforts, and tension between the
communities boiled over into ethnic riots in 1956, 1958,
1977, 1983, and 1987. Despite the constitutional efforts
of the British to protect minorities and Manning’s legacy
of elevating ethnic minorities, the Sinhala nationalists
finally succeeded in achieving a number of their goals
with the 1972 constitution. The document, which
formally changed the nation’s name from Ceylon to Sri
Lanka, gave Buddhism a special place in Sri Lankan
life, and recognized the moral authority of the Sinhala
population.38
More importantly, the 1972 constitution established
the Sinhala language as the official language of Sri
Lanka. Despite the 1946 report suggesting that the
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official administrative language revert back to the
Tamil and Sinhala languages, English had continued
to be used by the elites and Sri Lankans in the civil
service.39 The constitution also created the parliament,
which the Sinhalese controlled and developed into the
supreme legislative and decisionmaking body in the
political system.
The measures in the 1972 constitution had a
dramatic effect on the Tamil population. The Tamils,
despite the large numbers of illiterate Indian Tamils
on the plantations, had been overrepresented within
the civil service due to their intense efforts to learn
the English language. No longer would knowledge
of English guarantee Tamil jobs and influence within
the civil service. Tamils in the civil service were given
3 years within which to learn Sinhala before facing
dismissal. One estimate puts the number of Tamils
employed by the government at 30 percent of the 82,000
government employees shortly after independence.
This number had shrunk to 6 percent of 225,000 state
employees by 1970.40 Further, when the parliament
became the supreme body, the Tamils felt marginalized
within the political system. The Sinhalese had finally
gained control of two-thirds of the seats in Parliament,
meaning that they no longer needed Tamil support to
legislate.41
The Sinhala government undertook three additional
measures that exacerbated tensions with the Tamil
community. Sri Lanka nationalized the numerous
plantations that were a source of employment for a
number of Tamils. Some within the Tamil community
believed that the nationalized plantations instituted
discriminatory hiring practices to the detriment of
the Tamils. Second, the Sri Lankan government, in an
agreement with India, undertook a program between
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1981 and 1984 to repatriate people that it did not consider
Sri Lankans. In a case of “ethnic cleansing,” 445,580
people, mostly Tamils, were forcibly repatriated to the
Indian state of Tamil Nadu.42 Following the outbreak
of ethnic riots in 1987, tens of thousands of additional
Tamils fled for Tamil Nadu and Western countries.
Third and last, it was alleged that in the late 1970s
and 1980s, Colombo instituted a weighted system for
admitting students into the universities. The Sinhalese
majority, in an effort to combat the overrepresentation
of Tamils within the civil service, established a system
by which Tamils had to score higher, sometimes
significantly higher, on university entrance exams
than their Sinhalese counterparts. A number of these
aggrieved students formed the precursor organization
that ultimately became the Tamil Tigers.43
In the wake of independence, the Sri Lankan
government, especially the majority Sinhalese,
possessed the opportunity to reach across religious
and ethnic lines to strengthen national unity. Given the
relatively peaceful manner in which British colonial
administrators handed political control over to the Sri
Lankan elite, a Sri Lankan national identity emerged
mostly among the elites, but not among the greater
populace.
Further, whether it was the historical separation
of ethnic communities along with the British colonial
legacy or the awakening of Sinhala nationalism, the
Sri Lankan government began to take noticeable
steps to marginalize the Tamil community. While it is
undeniable that the Tamils exercised undue influence
in the political system through the British constitutional
checks, over-representation in the civil service, and
Governor Manning’s efforts to split the phantom
Sinhala opposition to British rule, Sinhala actions
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went too far. The Ceylon Citizenship Act, the 1972
constitution, the nationalization of the plantations, and
the forced repatriation of thousands of Tamils deeply
alienated the Tamil community.
This sense of alienation led to violent opposition
from segments of the Tamil community as early as
the 1970s, particularly in the Jaffna region. The 1972
constitution and the 1977 election proved to be catalysts
for the formation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam that the Sri Lankan government has fought ever
since.
The Rise of the Tigers: The Growth
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
With the Tamil community extremely dissatisfied
with the 1972 constitution, Tamil politicians, especially
those associated with the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF), began agitating for the creation of a
separate Tamil state in the northern part of Sri Lanka.
Significantly, the exclusion of Tamils from the education
system helped to galvanize the TULF. One Sinhalese
Sri Lankan professor, C. R. de Silva, acknowledged:
The Tamils of Sri Lanka have developed feelings of
nationalism on their own and the question of educational
opportunity only aggravated the conflicts that had
arisen owing to questions of language and employment.
Nevertheless the question of University admissions
is clearly one which mobilized the youth in Jaffna and
prodded the [TULF] leadership to declare in favour of a
separatist state.44

In the 1977 general election, the TULF issued its
Vaddukoddai Resolution, declaring that the Front
would campaign on secession and on holding a
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referendum on the secession question among the Tamil
populace. TULF candidates won overwhelmingly
in Tamil areas and proclaimed a fait accompli. Thus,
instead of then pushing for some kind of referendum
on the question of secession, the TULF declared that
their electoral victory was in and of itself approval
of their secession platform. The official website of
the Tigers reads, “These elections were effectively a
referendum [in which] the Tamil-speaking people
voted overwhelmingly in favour of secession.”45 The
Sri Lankan government responded by requiring all
members of parliament to swear an oath that they
would not advocate secession.
The LTTE was formed on May 5, 1976, by Velupillai
Prabhakaran from the nucleus of the Tamil New Tigers
group he had founded in the early 1970s. The group
launched its first official attack in September 1978
with the bombing of an Air Ceylon passenger jet.46
Prabhakaran, reportedly a charismatic figure who
inspires near-worship among his followers, grew up
in the Tamil town of Velvettiturai, long regarded as a
smuggler’s haven. Prabhakaran added to his infamy by
personally carrying out a number of killings and bank
robberies, including the heist of 500,000 rupees and
jewelry estimated at 200,000 rupees from the People’s
Bank at Puttur in Jaffna in March 1979.47 The LTTE
engaged in particularly intense periods of fighting
from 1983 to 1989, in the mid-1990s, and from 2005 to
today.
In 1980, the Tigers published a Marxist-Leninist
document that sought to cast their struggle in terms
of class conflict as well as national liberation. The
document, “Towards a Socialist Eelam,” appears to
have had significance at the time, but since the end
of the Cold War, the LTTE has largely dropped all
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communist rhetoric or justifications for their actions in
favor of self-determination arguments.48
The Tigers also claim that Tamils were discriminated
against in the recruitment of the Sri Lankan security
services; that the Sinhalese government has undertaken
an intense and officially sponsored campaign of
colonization of Tamil areas much like the conservative
Israeli settlers movement in Palestinian areas; and that
beginning in the late 1970s large numbers of Tamil
youths were detained without legal representation and
tortured, all under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.49
LTTE arguments aside, the Prevention of Terrorism Act
has been heavily criticized by such groups as Amnesty
International and the International Commission of
Jurists.
The Tigers seek to establish a separate Tamil state
in the northern part of Sri Lanka and assert their
right to do so under the United Nations (UN) Charter
which guarantees the right of a people to political
independence. Vital to this claim is the assertion that
Tamils are a distinct people with a unique cultural
heritage and history that differentiate them from the
rest of Sri Lankans. The Tigers also claim the right
to secede under a concept known as reversion of
sovereignty in international law. They thus assert that
the British colonial administrators acknowledged until
1833 that the Tamil people were a separate nation and
that this can be seen in several British documents,
including the Cleghorn Minute of 1799 and the Arrow
Smith Map of 1802.50 The Tigers also point out that the
British retained aspects of Tamil law and instituted
measures to prevent discrimination against the Tamil
people in the constitution of 1948. To the Tigers, the
1972 constitution claimed legitimacy over the whole
of Sri Lanka, but violated all of the past precedents
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that acknowledged the distinctiveness of the Tamil
people, their laws, and their customs. In their view, the
government claim of sovereignty over all of Sri Lanka
was flawed from the outset.
The Tigers seek to bolster a Tamil sense of
nationalism and national pride—they can provide
a source of respect for Tamils who feel alienated by
the Sri Lankan government or who have experienced
heavy-handed tactics by government security services.
The organization seeks a Tamil eelam, or homeland, and
even features a constitution and manifesto.51 Like most
insurgents and terrorist groups, the LTTE claims that
its move toward violent armed struggle was necessary
because the government illegally prevented the Tigers
from achieving their goals within the political process
and because the government resorted to attacking the
Tamil community.
The Organization and Operation of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
It is widely acknowledged that Prabhakaran rules
the LTTE with an iron fist. He has forcibly suppressed
rival violent and nonviolent Tamil organizations that
have sprung up since the Tigers were founded. Prabhakaran has established strict discipline among the
Tiger ranks, brutally weeding out the uncommitted and
preventing the Sri Lankan government from exploiting
clandestine spies within the Tamil organization, greedy
fighters willing to become turncoats, or malcontents.
The LTTE has killed dissident Tamils in Canada and
France, and is not above intimidating a dissident’s
family within Sri Lanka. The leader maintains a highly
effective central intelligence organization which reports
regularly on the state and affairs of the organization’s
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members. It is believed that there are 8-10 thousand
LTTE members in Sri Lanka, of which approximately
3-6 thousand are trained in conventional or asymmetric
insurgent tactics.52
Though the Tigers’ website cites the TULF as
its ancestor, in reality the TULF was founded as an
organization for moderate Tamils in 1975 and differed
greatly in its refusal to use violence. Sensing a rivalry,
Prabhakaran launched several devastating attacks on
TULF, largely eliminating them. Today, the remnants
of the TULF are known as the Tamil National Alliance,
which gained 22 seats in parliament in 2006. The Tamil
National Alliance has little independence from the LTTE
and operates as its legislative proxy in parliament.53 The
Tigers have repeatedly devastated other rival Tamil
groups, including killing most of the 300 fighters of the
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) and their
supporters in 1986, as well as moderate Tamil groups.
Like most insurgent organizations, details on the
recruitment, indoctrination/training, equipment,
funding, public relations, and tactics of the Tigers are
scarce. Regarding recruitment, it does not appear that
the LTTE routinely drafts or dragoons young Tamils
as is the case in some African conflicts. In May 1999,
the Tigers attempted to establish a Universal People’s
Militia comprised of all Tamils over the age of 15 in
certain LTTE-held areas,54 but the unpopularity and
lack of success of the effort seems to have discouraged
further attempts at drafting Tamils. The Tigers are
adept at using mass gatherings or social events to
portray their struggle as just, capitalizing on group
dynamics to generate enthusiasm for their cause. The
group will hold Pongu Thamil festivals in an effort
to use the passions of frenzied crowds to recruit new
members.55
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The organization attracts Tamils from all walks
of life, but especially seeks to recruit young educated
Tamils. Recruits with specific skill sets are put to work
in areas where they fit best. For instance, one analyst
states that graphic artists have been put to work
making maps. University students, particularly those
in engineering, have been approached to modify or
improve existing military devices for future attacks.
Tigers not trained as fighters, however, often join the
armed units in the field in order to remove the dead
LTTE fighters or at least clothe them in civilian dress
to further undermine the reputation of the Sri Lanka
Army (SLA).56
Tamils as young as 14 have been recruited, but
generally those between the ages of 14 and 16 are
believed to be kept at logistical bases and do not fight
until 16-18.57 Nevertheless, a variety of human rights
organizations, as well as the Sri Lankan government,
accuses the Tigers of training a number of child soldiers.
At least one expert contends that a special unit, the
Leopard Brigade, is comprised entirely of children and
is among the more tenacious Tiger elements. Some
analysts assert that between 1995 and 1996, one-half
of the new Tamil recruits were between the ages of
12 and 16. According to an SLA intelligence report in
1998, 60 percent of Tiger recruits were younger than
18, and 60 percent of those killed since April 1995 were
child soldiers.58 Regardless of age, new recruits sign
the constitution and pledge loyalty to the LTTE above
family and all others.
The LTTE appears to be extraordinarily adept at
indoctrinating and training its members. It has taken on
the appearance of a professional military organization,
putting future fighters through a rigorous physical
training regimen and instructing recruits in the use of a
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variety of weapons. Tamil theorists instruct recruits in
the Tiger ideology and in the abuses of the Sri Lankan
government, especially the security services. These
sessions are supplemented by the use of a specific genre
of action movies, like the Rambo series and certain
Clint Eastwood movies, as one analyst notes, in order
to instill the belief that smaller forces can win against
all odds.59 Their training camps reportedly resemble
college campuses. Male and female members typically
wear cyanide capsules around their necks, not only as
a way to prevent their interrogation if captured, but as
an outward sign of their total devotion to the cause.
Curiously, female Tigers often carry two cyanide
capsules.60
Significantly, in the past the LTTE has received
training from a number of international and
transnational actors. From 1976 to 1986, a limited
number of Tigers received training in Tyre, Lebanon,
from the Palestinian groups Fatah and the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).61 India provided
weapons and training to a variety of Tamil groups,
including the LTTE, after the 1983 massacre of Tamils
in Colombo (to be discussed below). India, in an effort
to placate its own Tamil population, reacted to the antiTamil Sinhala violence by arming the Tamils until the
Indian-Sri Lankan agreement in 1987. India’s Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW) brought Tamil militants to
India for training in 32 Tamil Nadu camps, with the
Tigers training at Salem, Madurai, and perhaps some
at the high-level facility at Dehra Dun. Indeed, by 1985
the number of Indian-trained Tamils reached parity
with or exceeded the number of soldiers in the SLA.62
While this relationship with the Indian government
has ceased, the LTTE is believed to be in contact with
Sikh separatists, Kashmiri fighters, and some 20-plus
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separatist groups in Tamil Nadu, and it is quite possible
that training and weaponry are exchanged. In the 1990s,
the Tigers received global positioning system (GPS)
training in Sudan as well as political training in South
Africa by the African National Congress, and at least
one analyst suggests that Norwegian naval personnel
may have provided training in underwater sabotage
techniques in Thailand.63 Finally, one observer alleges
that the LTTE and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK)
have had a relationship, with the Tigers training the
PKK in suicide operations and the PKK allegedly
providing the LTTE with Stinger antiaircraft missiles.64
In terms of equipment, analysts conclude that the
LTTE has found weapons suppliers in South Africa,
Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam,
Thailand, Afghanistan, North Korea, Greece, Turkey,
Cyprus, and Lebanon, and that the plastic explosives
for its bombing and suicide bomber campaigns likely
come from the Ukraine.65 The Tigers have stolen
weaponry on several occasions, including 60 tons of
explosives destined for Bangladesh’s armed forces that
were provided by Ukraine, as well as some 324,000
mortar rounds in Mozambique that were supposed
to go to the South Lebanese Army in 1997.66 Thailand
assured the Sri Lankan government that it would crack
down on LTTE activity when it discovered in May
2000 that a Tamil sympathizer was involved in the
construction of a submarine at the Phuket shipyard,
destined for the Tamils.67 In late summer 2006, several
Tamils with close ties to the LTTE were arrested in
New York not only for trying to bribe U.S. officials into
removing the State Department’s designation of Tamil
Tigers as terrorists, but also for trying to buy a variety
of weapons, including missile launchers and surfaceto-air armaments.68
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One expert describes Prabhakaran as a managing
director of a corporate organization complete with
financial offices overseen by the equivalent of Chief
Financial Officer K. P. Kummaruppa in Thailand.
The official website of the LTTE, the Tamil Eelam
homepage, lists telephone numbers and addresses
in London, along with a number of ways parties can
contribute financially.
Sources of funding for the LTTE range from
legitimate to illegal. Legitimate business enterprises
include farming; cultivation of tea; operation of bus
companies, print shops, and photo studios; and
operating factories that produce jam, soap, soft drinks,
and a number of other items.69 Evidence suggests that
the LTTE has invested heavily in legitimate shipping
enterprises, with ships legally registered and insured.
Some analysts contend that these ships, in addition to
carrying legal items, act as transportation for contraband
to LTTE areas, frequently making unscheduled stops en
route to their destination. The Tigers reportedly receive
increasing amounts of funds from overseas, especially
from the Tamil diaspora.70 Large Tamil communities
exist in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada,
the Nordic countries, and Malaysia, though reports
suggest that some Tamil communities are subjected to
extortion and protection rackets from Tiger associates,
and are thus unwilling contributors. A RAND report
indicated that the LTTE may raise as much as $650,000
a month in Switzerland, $1 million a month in Canada,
and $350,000 a month in the UK. Prior to the Tigers’
designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,
there were several serious U.S.-based contributors,
including one California doctor who reportedly gave
up to $100,000 at a time.71 Analysts disagree over how
much of the LTTE’s funding comes from abroad, but
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the group has an estimated annual budget of $100
million, with somewhere between 60 and 90 percent
coming from overseas donors. What analysts do agree
on is that in the wake of the September 11, 2001 (9/11),
terrorist attacks in the United States, countries around
the globe were more willing to clamp down on LTTE
fundraising activities, making it more difficult for the
group to raise funds.
With regard to illegal sources of funding, the
Sri Lankan government claims that 75 percent of
Tamils carrying drugs do so on behalf of the Tigers.
In May 2003, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
intelligence chief Steven W. Casteel contradicted the
traditional U.S. line that Tamils were not involved in
the drug trade. Citing new evidence, Casteel asserted
that Tamils had been involved in narcotrafficking as
early as the 1980s. Reportedly, the Tigers sponsor two
Toronto-area gangs, VVT and AK Kannan, who act as
narcotics distributors and local muscle. There is some
evidence to suggest that the LTTE may be involved in
human smuggling, which can net up to $32,000 per
person. If the individuals cannot pay, they are often
forced to work for the LTTE wherever they have been
transported, often to Europe or Canada.72 Within Sri
Lanka, the LTTE robs banks to fund their operations,
and it imposes “taxes” on items like cigarettes imported
into their areas of control.
The LTTE public relations campaign is well honed
for foreign audiences. The Tamil Eelam website
shrewdly employs language like “self-determination”
and “human rights” in order to garner foreign
sympathy. They have created multiple webpages, most
likely in an effort to avoid being completely shut down
by Sri Lankan efforts and to convey an exaggerated
impression of popularity. The Tigers operate a domestic
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radio station, the Voice of the Tigers, as well as a
satellite television station. Within Sri Lanka, the Tigers
have, at times, been counterproductively dogmatic and
repressive in areas they control or have controlled. For
instance, when the LTTE controlled the city of Jaffna,
public outcry in the Tamil population led Prabhakaran
to establish special envoys not only to propagate the
LTTE’s message, but also to provide a means of redress
among Tamils for LTTE excesses in 2000. While the
Tigers have no scruples over utterly ruthless tactics in
Sinhala areas, in Tamil communities the LTTE visits
the families of Tamils killed by LTTE security services,
publishes obituaries, and provides compensation to
Tamils who have property confiscated by the LTTE.73
The Tigers have targeted the SLA, and especially the
officer corps, in some of their propaganda. Occasionally
the LTTE will distribute leaflets or bulletins that are
directly addressed to members of the SLA. One such
letter reads:
As we walk the path of national liberation, our death
will acquire dignity and meaning. But yours will become
insignificant. . . . Do not die labouring for the foul
campaigns of the ruling class. Do not lose your integrity
and your humanity, so that those who rule us may
prosper. It is only when you take up arms on the side
of the oppressed Sinhala workers and peasants against
the state of Sri Lanka that we could speak the language
of friendship.74

RAND interviews with the U.S. Embassy indicate that
the SLA suffers from a severe officer shortage, most
likely the result of a combination of LTTE propaganda
campaigns and targeted assassinations of officers.
Tiger tactics are varied and complex. They will
engage the Sri Lankan military conventionally, with

238

ground, air, or sea elements, when they are confident
of the outcome or are provoked. The sea element, called
the Sea Tigers, is believed to have some 3-4 thousand
members with six ships, primarily small, fast, attack
craft. It is believed that the air element, the Air Tigers,
was originally organized by a former Air Canada
employee, Vythilingam Sornalingam, now deceased,
with the intention of launching suicide operations
against buildings with microlight aircraft packed
with explosives, though they have yet to attempt such
attacks.75 The Air Tigers have exhibited a conventional
capability, raiding the Colombo airport with two
aircraft believed to have taken off from airstrips built
in the Mullaitivu jungle near Trincomalee.
In terms of asymmetric warfare, the LTTE engages
in shootings, bombings, and suicide operations across
the country, even in the capital city of Colombo.
The Black Tigers are the dedicated suicide bomber
contingent of the LTTE. Suicide bombings are an
integral component of Tiger campaigns, and future
bombers are revered among recruits and typically
recruited from populations that have been physically
harmed by the Sri Lankan security services.76 Evidence
indicates that the Tigers have relied heavily on female
suicide bombers who frequently face less scrutiny by
security services or who may pretend to be pregnant
so as to hide explosive devices on their persons.
Members of the Black Tigers who undertake attacks are
memorialized annually in the Maaveerar Thinam, or
Great Hero’s Day celebration. Notable assassinations
by the Black Tigers include Indian Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan Defense Minister Ranjan
Wijeratne, Naval commander Vice Admiral W. W. E.
C. Fernando, and Minister of Industries and Industrial
Development C. V. Gooneratne. Since July 1987, the
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Black Tigers have carried out an estimated 200 suicide
attacks in India and Sri Lanka, dwarfing the number
of attacks carried out by better-known groups such as
Hamas and Hezbollah.77
As one Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense Official
noted, “Attacking Colombo has rich dividends. It makes
leaders question the value of countering the LTTE. A
single blast in Colombo has more value psychologically
than full-scale conflict in the north and northeast.”78
The Tigers often scout targets for weeks and have
shown the capacity to mount complicated operations
using advanced communications equipment, mines,
and indirect fire.79
Major LTTE Attacks and Sri Lankan
Counterinsurgency Operations.
Almost all LTTE attacks and Sri Lankan government counterinsurgency operations can be generally
characterized as indiscriminate and brutal. The war
has killed an estimated 70,000 people, with thousands
of Sri Lankans internally displaced. According to
Human Rights Watch, the long-simmering conflict has
forced 800,000 Tamils to flee the country, dramatically
increasing the diaspora in Australia and the United
States, but especially in India, Canada, and the UK.80
The Tigers emerged as a serious insurgent or terrorist
group in 1983. In July, the LTTE killed 13 policemen
in Jaffna, spawning Sinhalese riots in Colombo. The
Sinhala marauders targeted Tamils, killing an estimated
1,000 people, while the government watched. Known as
“Black July” in the Tamil community, the riots enabled
the LTTE, previously relegated to the fringes, to play
a larger role and, more importantly, to attract recruits.
They received additional material support from India,
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whose population includes some 60 million Tamils,
many of whom reside in the state of Tamil Nadu, the
ancestral home for thousands of Sri Lanka’s Tamils.81
India, however, grew alarmed as the violence
intensified throughout the 1980s and reached a
particularly bloody point in 1987. India sent a
peacekeeping force (IPKF) to quell the violence and
compel the Sri Lankan government to offer some
kind of concession to the Tamils. Patrolling in mostly
Tamil areas, the Indian presence managed to wrangle
constitutional amendments from Colombo that offered
some Tamil autonomy. The Indian presence, however,
caused a great deal of friction within Sri Lankan
society, sparking an additional rebellion of Sinhalese
nationalists in the south of the country. The Indian
government thus faced a Sinhala nationalist rebellion
in the south and a separatist Tamil rebellion in the
north and east.
The IPKF found itself fighting the LTTE, one of
India’s former clients, instead of peacekeeping. While
the IPKF temporarily dislodged the LTTE from Jaffna,
depriving the Tigers of their headquarters, training
facilities, munitions factories, and weapon stores,
the Indians suffered considerable losses. Severely
undercapitalized, Indian communication gear and
guns were outclassed by the LTTE’s more modern
gear and AK-47s. Further, many Indian units were
undermanned by as much as 50 percent.82
IPKF soon discovered why the SLA had had so
many problems stamping out the Tigers. The LTTE
quickly adapted its tactics following the loss of its
base in Jaffna, striking the Indians whenever it proved
most profitable for the Tigers. For instance, the Indians
were forced to traverse the narrow Elephant Pass in
order to get from the nearby port to Jaffna City, thus
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providing the LTTE with an inviting target. When the
IPKF learned to identify and disable Tiger roadside or
semiconcealed improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
the LTTE buried high explosives beneath the blacktop,
making it nearly impossible to detect the makeshift
mines.83
Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa,
believing that the unpopular Indian intervention had
unwittingly unified Tamils and Sinhalese, asked the
IPKF to leave. When the Indians left, the LTTE filled the
power vacuum in the eastern regions and was actually
able to take control of some of the weaponry left by the
IPKF.84
Following the failed intervention, the Tigers mounted
some of their most successful operations, earning their
reputation as adept suicide bombers. In May 1991, an
LTTE suicide bomber killed the Indian Prime Minister
responsible for the intervention, Rajiv Gandhi. Two
years later, another suicide bomber killed President
Premadasa. His successor, Chandrika Kumaratunga,
unsuccessfully sought a negotiated settlement. When
the effort flagged, Kumaratunga shifted strategies,
still seeking a negotiated settlement with the Tamil
people while attacking the Tigers. Though the LTTE
succeeded in sinking two Sri Lankan Navy vessels
during the intensified fighting, the government was
able to reassert its control over Jaffna.85
Between 1996 and 1999, the Tigers launched a series
of attacks, both conventional and asymmetric. In early
1996, the LTTE bombed the Central Bank in Colombo,
causing hundreds of casualties. Another significant
bombing took place in February 1998 when the Tigers
hit the important Buddhist Temple of the Tooth in
Kandy. In 1999, a pivotal year, the LTTE killed a
moderate Tamil parliamentarian, tried to kill President
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Kumaratunga, and launched a massive conventional
attack that recaptured the all-important Elephant Pass,
killing an estimated 1,000 Sri Lankan soldiers. The
attack on the president, however, had the unintended
consequence of boosting her popularity, enabling her
to win the 1999 election.86
In 2001, the LTTE seized Sri Lanka’s international
airport, a particularly galling attack in the eyes of the Sri
Lankan government, given its proximity to Colombo.
The airport attack is regarded by some as the worst
act of terrorism in aviation history. The same month,
India’s External Affairs Minister Jeswant Singh pledged
a $100 million loan to Sri Lanka to offset somewhat the
economic impact of the unpopular conflict.87 Still, the
Sri Lankan president’s party failed to win the December
2001 elections, with the United National Party’s (UNP)
candidate, Ramil Wickeremesinghe, winning the post
of prime minister.
The new prime minister sought a ceasefire which
eventually went into effect on February 22, 2002, leaving the government in control of major towns while
the LTTE controlled rural areas in the east. The agreement, however, allowed the Tigers to open political
offices all around the country, a measure they
exploited to the fullest—they continued to recruit,
establish protection rackets, and kill moderate Tamils.
Furthermore, the agreement was heavily opposed by
Sinhala nationalists who believed that it was a step
on the road to granting Tamil independence—and
it failed to give President Kumaratunga a role in the
peace process.88
The ceasefire—overseen by the Sri Lanka
Monitoring Mission (SLMM) comprised of 60-70
representatives from Norway, Sweden, Denmark,
Finland, and Iceland—was able to halt major attacks
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until 2005. The peace talks, begun in Thailand in 2002,
and later continuing in Oslo, lasted six rounds, which
very early highlighted the unwillingness of both sides
to reach a compromise. The Tigers essentially wanted
to establish their rule over the north and east before
engaging in substantive talks. In addition, the LTTE
demanded that the government close down its high
security zones and allow free passage of Tamil ships.
Sri Lanka flatly refused to budge on these two issues.
The only substantive agreement reached by the two
sides was over human rights—neither wanted alleged
violations on both sides investigated.
Despite the underlying unwillingness of either side
to compromise, Prabhakaran indicated in late 2002 that
the Tigers might be willing to give up their goal of an
independent state. He stated:
We are prepared to consider favourably a political
framework that offers substantial regional autonomy
and self government in our homeland on the basis of our
right to internal self-determination…[but if our] demand
for regional self-rule is rejected we have no alternative
other than to secede and form an independent state.89

While the statement appears to look favorably on
some form of federalism, it was never clear that what
Prabhakaran envisioned would have been acceptable
to the central government, much less to the Sinhalese
nationalists. In any case, the LTTE pulled out of the talks
in 2003, demanding the establishment of an interim
administration it called the Interim Self-Governing
Administration (ISGA). The ISGA would have enabled
the Tigers to set up a quasi-government in the north
and east, with negotiations to resume after 5 years. This
proved more than the Sinhalese majority and President
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Kumaratunga could stomach. She accused Prime
Minister Wickremesinghe of endangering Sri Lanka’s
national security, dissolved parliament, seized control
of the defense and security apparatus, and called for
new elections.90
The Tigers were unable to capitalize on the disorder
within the government due to their own internal
problems. Long known for extreme internal discipline,
rivalry between LTTE intelligence head Pottu Amman
and an eastern commander, Colonel Karuna, led to
Karuna establishing his own Tamil group. Prabhakaran
resorted once more to force in trying to destroy Karuna,
pushing the colonel into the arms of the Sri Lankan
government in 2006. The loss proved to be a significant
one—Karuna provided extremely valuable intelligence
to his former enemy. Despite the turmoil in both camps,
an unexpected catastrophic event momentarily cooled
hostilities.
An Opening? The December 2004 Tsunami.
On December 26, 2004, a massive tsunami caused
by the subduction of a tectonic plate under the ocean
floor swept across Southeast Asian waters. The tsunami
inundated coastal areas, killing approximately 35,000
Sri Lankans and devastating Tamil areas. For arguably
the first time since independence, the government did
not stand idly by while the Tamil population suffered.
The Sri Lankan military played a large role in delivering
relief supplies to affected Tamil areas and undertook a
number of rescue missions as well.
Though the Tigers attempted to downplay the
government’s efforts and sought to control the flow of
all aid into their areas through the Tamil Rehabilitation
Organization (TRO), a cooperative body comprised of
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both Tamils and Sinhalese was created to oversee and
coordinate relief efforts. The Post-Tsunami Operational
Management Structure (P-TOMS) represented a real
opportunity for the government to work collectively
with the Tamil people. Joint committees consisting of
of government representatives, Muslims, Tamils, and
the LTTE would oversee the relief efforts and provide
feedback, oversight, and recommendations for priority
projects.91
This promising initiative was short-lived, however,
as the powerful Sinhalese nationalists once again served
as spoiler out of their concern that such cooperative
efforts ran the risk of establishing a de facto Tamil
state. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party quit
the coalition government with the UNP in June 2005
because of such fears. The Sri Lankan Supreme Court
sounded P-TOMS’ death knell by ruling that aspects
of the proposed administration were inconsistent with
the Sri Lankan constitution.92
The efforts of the Sinhalese nationalists and the
court ruling were poorly timed and unfortunate.
Had P-TOMS not been struck down, it would have
forced the Tigers’ hand. They would have faced an
organization with greater international legitimacy
than their own TRO and would have had to decide
whether to join it or possibly be marginalized. Further,
the joint administration envisioned by P-TOMS was
exactly the kind of cooperative effort that many within
the Tamil community wanted out of the government.
Eviscerating it before it even got off the ground likely
strengthened the position of the Tigers and eliminated
a cooperative effort that might have proven to be a
model for further reconciliatory initiatives.
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Major Attacks and Counterinsurgency Operations
after the Tsunami.
The election of Sri Lankan President Mahinda
Rajapakse on November 25, 2005, led some to believe
that a breakthrough in the peace process was possible.
The president seemed committed to bringing about an
end to the conflict in his campaign rhetoric. Yet Rajapakse owed his political success to Sinhala nationalists
in the city of Hambantota and to an understanding with
the ultranationalist Jatika Hele Urumaya (JHU) and
Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) parties.93 These forces
would not tolerate the kind of peace process the LTTE
would agree to, and it is likely that the combination
of Colonel Karuna’s defection and the devastation
wrought by the tsunami led these nationalist forces
to believe that the Tigers were vulnerable and that an
intensified campaign might finally quell them. Though
the two sides continued to talk throughout late 2005
and early 2006, the violence gradually escalated.
In December 2005, two LTTE activists were killed,
followed by the death of 14 government soldiers
and 16 sailors in separate attacks. Gunmen killed a
parliamentarian from the Tamil National Alliance
in Batticaloa and then five Tamil students in early
January 2006. In April, the LTTE bombed a market in
Trincomalee, and a female suicide bomber attacked the
army headquarters in Colombo, nearly killing the army
commander. Sinhalese riots broke out following the
Trincomalee, and the Sri Lankan government reverted
to its characteristic sluggish behavior in the face of
Sinhala violence. May saw a huge conventional battle
when the LTTE seized control of a water control point
in Mavil Aru. The government responded with massive
force, and the LTTE unsuccessfully counterattacked at
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Mutur. A massacre of all of the indigenous employees
of a French aid organization took place in Mutur, with
SLMM accusing the government of having perpetrated
the killings.94
The next significant conventional battle took place
in August 2006, when LTTE forces were able to defeat
government forces and retake Jaffna. An October
counterattack on Jaffna by the government failed
miserably—not only were the government forces
thrown back, they suffered 133 killed and some 200
wounded. The Tigers answered both unconventionally
and conventionally, with a suicide bomber hitting a bus
of naval personnel and LTTE ships firing on Sri Lankan
naval vessels in Galle Harbor. It is believed that since
mid-2006, some 1,000 LTTE fighters have been killed,
with an undetermined number of SLA casualties. The
Sri Lankan military estimated that defense spending in
2007 would reach $1.29 billion.95
In early 2007, hostilities continued to intensify. On
March 26, the Air Tigers utilized small aircraft to bomb
the Katunayake Air Force Base. The Sri Lankan Navy
engaged a component of the Sea Tigers on March 29,
allegedly sinking a number of their vessels. The LTTE
responded a day later with a mortar and artillery attack
on Batticaloa. On April 4, the Sri Lankan Air Force
bombed a Sea Tiger base in Puthukkudiyiruppu.
Problems with the Sri Lanka’s Counterinsurgency
Efforts.
As the events described above make quite clear, Sri
Lanka has been overly reliant on a military solution
to the LTTE insurgency. In its military operations, it
has often caused excessive civilian casualties, enabling
the LTTE to capitalize on the deaths by utilizing its
248

advanced and responsive public relations arm to
effectively tar the central government. In one incident
in November 2006, SLA artillery batteries hit a camp
for internally displaced people in the Batticaloa district,
killing 47 and injuring approximately 100.96 As a result,
such groups as the Asian Human Rights Commission
have repeatedly criticized the Sri Lankan government
for military and police operations that violate the
1994 Sri Lankan Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment Acts.97
Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists have criticized the Prevention
of Terrorism Act for leading to the mistreatment of
suspects and captured insurgents. Amnesty alleged
that Sri Lankan security services have beaten suspects,
suspended them upside down from the ceiling, forced
pins under detainees’ fingernails, and applied ants
and chilies to parts of the body.98 The International
Commission of Jurists released perhaps the harshest
condemnation, stating:
The provisions of the Sri Lankan Terrorism Act are not
only objectionable from the human rights point of view
but it is doubtful that the Act is effective in controlling
terrorism . . . since 1979, when the Act was adopted,
terrorism had not declined but rather increased in
the Northern Tamil area. Increased police and army
surveillance of the population have not curtailed violence
but seemingly stimulated it. This experience is similar
to that of some other countries which have attempted
to control terrorism by armed force rather than dealing
with the fundamental factors contributing to the recourse
to violence.99

Interviews of former and current Tamil insurgents
indicate that the indiscriminate brutality of the SLA does
as much to recruit for the LTTE as anything else. In some
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cases, fighters from former rival Tamil organizations
ended up fighting for the LTTE despite Prabhakaran’s
brutal destruction of these rival groups. One fighter,
only 22 years old, fought for the LTTE even though the
Tigers imprisoned him and brutally eradicated TELO,
the rival Tamil organization he originally belonged
to. When queried about why he joined the Tigers, he
responded, “The reason I fought for the LTTE was not
because of any love for the Tigers. In fact, I hate them.
But we—I and my friends—did not want Tamil people
to suffer at the hands of the SLA.”100
While large military operations and brutal
interrogations have negatively impacted the civilian
populace in the northern and eastern regions, the
everyday actions of the SLA do much to anger the Tamil
people and turn them against the central government.
Daily measures such as roadblocks exacerbate tensions
and contribute to the Tamil sense that the Sinhalese
government is besieging their community. As C.
Christine Fair, a RAND area expert, argues, “These
blunt instruments have proved counterproductive.
They have alienated the Tamils and have provided fuel
for the LTTE assertions that Colombo is anti-Tamil.
Moreover, in the view of [a Ministry of Defense official]
these actions have been so provocative that some Tamils
may have become anti-state as a consequence.”101
Some scholars and analysts point to the periods
of negotiation between the LTTE and the central
government as positive steps toward decreasing
the animosity between the Sinhala and Tamil
communities. Yet even these negotiations have proved
problematic. The Norwegian-led negotiations had the
unintended consequence of legitimizing the Tigers
as the representatives of the Tamil community to the
exclusion of other Tamil groups.102
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Periods of negotiation, particularly from 1989 to
1990 and 1994 to 1995, led to a mystifying relaxation
in security measures by the Sri Lankan government.
While the LTTE has often argued for the removal of
some measures during negotiations, the government
eased security measures to such a degree as to allow
LTTE infiltration throughout the southern portion
of the country, including Colombo. Once more,
whenever there is a lull in Tiger attacks, there is a
tendency on the part of the government to assume
that the capability of the LTTE has been degraded and
that the threat has been reduced.103 Thus, it appears
that the Sri Lankan counterinsurgency campaign
can swing wildly from one extreme to another, from
heavy-handed indiscriminate military operations to a
shockingly minimal security presence. As one analyst
noted, “Sri Lanka’s maladaptive response to the LTTE’s
guerrilla and terrorist campaign has contributed to
the strengthening of the LTTE both on the island and
overseas.”104
Even when the Sri Lankan government has offered
a measured response, Sri Lanka’s understanding of
security remains overly based on passive military
activities and presence as opposed to proactive and
adaptive procedures, tactics, and good intelligence.
As one observer notes, “In Sri Lanka, the notion of
security is highly correlated with the presence of men
with guns rather than enhanced security practices
and procedures.”105 More soldiers standing around a
potential target is viewed as an effective defense against
LTTE activity, despite the fact that this does little to
interdict Tiger operations and may present them with
an inviting target.
Furthermore, there is little evidence that the Tamils
trust the government either in the negotiations or in
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other efforts to integrate the Tamil community. As
Dr. Peter Chalk, another RAND expert on Sri Lanka,
observes, “There is still a large sense of grievance
amongst the Tamil community, and there’s still a
perception even amongst members of the Tamil groups
that have now made peace with the government that
the government’s really not sincere in what its doing
. . . to address . . . perceptions of alienation [and]
perceptions of discrimination.”106
This mistrustful perception of an anti-Tamil bias
within the government, coupled with past incidents
of military abuse or killing of Tamils, has created a
shortfall in the number of Tamils who are recruited
to the government security services. The SLA has had
little success in penetrating the LTTE or in recruiting
intelligence assets, in part due to this lack of Tamils
sympathetic to the central government.107
Much like the U.S. efforts in support and
stability operations, Sri Lanka is plagued by a lack
of coordination between the military and the civilian
components of the government in its fight against the
LTTE. Sri Lanka’s approach has often been described
as “ad hoc,” with one former Deputy Inspector
General of Colombo stressing the need for integrated
psychological operations and civil affairs teams in order
to combat the effective Tiger propaganda campaign
and to provide tangible economic development in
the local community. Overall, “there is a need for
multiinstitutional cooperation and coordination.”108
Similar to the United States, Sri Lanka has had
difficulties optimizing its intelligence operations and
providing the appropriate intelligence consumers with
what they need in a timely fashion. There is evidence
that the police and the military units in LTTE areas that
most require actionable intelligence often do not get
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what they need from the central agencies in Colombo.
The agencies appear reticent or incapable of providing
the field units with what they need quickly.109
International pressure is another important
component in the struggle against the LTTE. As has
been documented, the Tigers acquire much of their
funding and weaponry from abroad, and much of the
international efforts against the LTTE has focused on
cutting the inflow of both. Yet international actors have
ignored the underlying ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka,
failing to acknowledge that long-term peace will be
achieved only if the grievances of the Tamil community
are assuaged within the political system.110
Lessons for the U.S. in Support and Stability
Operations.
Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency efforts since the
1970s reveal at least three important lessons that
can be applied to U.S. interagency efforts in support
and stability operations: (1) the vital importance of
understanding the target nation’s history and culture;
(2) the need to implement joint administration of relief
and development efforts so as to build trust between
a central authority and minority populations; and (3)
the usefulness of engaging in security operations that
are based less on firepower and more on cementing
personal relationships between security forces and
local populations.111
With regard to the first lesson, understanding a
country, a region, a people’s culture and history can
do much to prevent missteps in support and stability
operations. The Sri Lankan case reveals how this can
occur even within a country. Despite being cohabitants
on the same island since the 3rd century B.C., the
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Sinhalese and Tamil communities subscribe to different
accounts of their shared history and are often ignorant
of one another’s culture. The 1972 constitution and
the national flag are but two examples of culturally
resonant measures implemented by the Sinhala
majority government that inevitably led to clashes
with the Tamil minority. While these policies, as well
as others cited not only by the Tamils but by minorities
like the Muslim community, were implemented by
extreme Sinhala nationalists intentionally to subvert
minority identity and culture, the policies required the
tacit or outright support of less extreme Sinhala parties
and members of parliament. Had these moderate
Sinhala elements had a better understanding of Tamil
history and culture, they may have curbed or blunted
the efforts of the extreme nationalists, minimizing or
eliminating the grievances that led to a violent Tamil
reaction.
The United States can see in retrospect the missteps
it has made in Iraq and Afghanistan ensuing from a lack
of understanding of culture and history. In Afghanistan,
certain tribes have proved willing to harbor the Taliban
and have frustrated U.S. and coalition efforts to build
widespread support of the Karzai government outside
of Kabul. Yet Afghan history shows that the central
government has usually exerted little if any control
on distant provinces, where warlords and strongmen
asserted their authority.
In Iraq, a number of U.S. military and civilian
missteps might have been avoided with a better
understanding of Iraqi culture and history. DeBa’athification by the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) went too far and too deep, forcing the firing of
thousands of bureaucrats who could have been used to
staff the retooled ministries. The policy removed many
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Sunnis, fueling the perception that the government was
biased in favor of the Shi’ites. A proper understanding
of the nation’s political history would have revealed
that belonging to the Ba’ath was often a requirement
for government employment and that thousands
joined simply to survive within Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq. The mass firings, coupled with little hope of
finding alternative employment, contributed to the
resentment within the Sunni community that led to the
rise of the insurgency. In terms of culture, the reliance
by the U.S. military on mass detentions and nighttime
raids on suspects’ homes, frequently resulting in the
males in a household being flexi-cuffed, searched, and
questioned in front of their families, showed a lack
of regard for the significance of honor within Arab
culture. Such activities humiliated an untold number
of Iraqi males, building resentment against the U.S.
presence and inducing an unknown number to join the
insurgency or Shi’ite militias. A better understanding
of Arab culture likely would have led to modified
tactics that bolstered the U.S. mission in Iraq instead of
undermining it.
This does not mean that every U.S. military
commander or agency official needs to seek a Ph.D. in
Afghan or Iraqi history. But they must at least acquire an
understanding of the major factors and cultural norms
that have a significant impact on the two societies.
Anecdotal stories suggest that some officials within
the civilian agencies and military have recommended
that their subordinates read T. E. Lawrence’s Seven
Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph as a means to gain a better
understanding of Iraqi culture. These subordinates
would be better served reading the works of subject
area experts and talking with Arabs and Afghans,
preferably prior to deployment. Such knowledge
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would allow officials, soldiers, and policymakers at all
levels to ensure that their day-to-day actions conciliate
rather than alienate the local population, and equip
themselves to question operations or programs that do
the opposite.
The second lesson for U.S. support and stability
operations is to realize the importance of joint relief
and development projects as a means to establish
trust between minority populations and the central
authority. In Sri Lanka, the Post-Tsunami Operational
Management System, P-TOMS, fashioned a role not
only for the Tamils, but also for the other minority
communities in overseeing relief efforts in conjunction
with Colombo following the December 2004 tsunami.
P-TOMS promised to empower members of the
Tamil community outside of the LTTE, undercut
the Tigers’ own relief organization that sought to
monopolize the distribution of aid in Tamil areas,
and give other minorities a voice, thereby building a
foundation of trust between the central government
and the minority communities. Unfortunately, the
short-sighted Sinhalese nationalists torpedoed what
would have been a significant challenge to the LTTE
by not supporting P-TOMS. Hearteningly, Sri Lanka’s
president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, may be grasping the
importance of joint relief and development projects—
in May 2007, he announced that 12,000 Sri Lankan
villages would receive massive allocations of funds
for development, with the program to be overseen by
Provincial Councils in coordination with the central
government.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the relief and
development projects have been undertaken by U.S.
military provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs),
by individual commanders utilizing Commander’s
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Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds, and
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) where
possible. In the short term, this is vital for establishing
credibility within the local populace for the efforts of
the international community and the Iraqi and Afghan
governments. In the mid to long term, if these efforts do
not gradually acquire an Iraqi or Afghan face, especially
following the much-lauded elections and transfer of
sovereignty, these efforts may actually undermine the
credibility of the central government. This is because
continued aid from outside sources usurps one of the
central roles of national government, thereby casting
doubt on its legitimacy and efficacy. Moreover, it casts
doubt on the longer-term goals of U.S. support and
stability operations.
The third lesson from the Sri Lankan experience
is the impact that personal relationships have
in counterinsurgency and support and stability
operations. Sri Lanka’s best efforts at countering the
LTTE were those that were less marked by military
violence, focusing instead on using the security services,
with a lower profile, to expend real effort in building
better relations with the local population. The former
Senior Deputy Inspector General of Colombo, Merril
Gunaratne, introduced vigilance committees (VCs)
during his tenure. Essentially, Gunaratne divided the
city into 75-100 household units and appointed a Sri
Lankan police unit as a liaison with these households.
The households formed a representative body,
somewhat reminiscent of a neighborhood watch,
which met with the police on a regular basis. Two to
three police units formed a subsector and reported to a
subsector chief. Several sectors made up a zone which
reported to the head of the zone. These zone heads
then reported directly to the Deputy Inspector.112
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Over time, the police units, which retained the
members and were not rotated out, and VCs developed
mutual trust. The households began to provide the police
with local intelligence and reported the appearance
of suspicious figures. Admittedly, the VC program
was plagued by problems, but these were largely the
result of police units receiving only rudimentary, if
any, training in such basic intelligence activities as
surveillance, as well as the central intelligence agencies
withholding intelligence from the police units. Overall,
in the words of Fair, “Sri Lanka’s brief experience with
integrating [the central intelligence agencies] as well
as with community policing (i.e. vigilance committees)
appeared to enhance Colombo’s ability to interdict
LTTE operations.”113 Sri Lanka restarted the vigilance
committees concept on January 8, 2007.
In U.S. support and stability operations, the
rotation systems in place in both the civilian agencies
and the military make establishing trust within the
local populations difficult. There are countless stories
in Iraq and Afghanistan of military leaders who
established good relations with the local loya jirga, that
is, village leaders or community elders, working with
the individuals and institutions who were more than
willing to report on insurgent movements and to bring
grievances forward that otherwise might fester. Yet,
when these agencies and units rotated out, in some
cases while the local populace pleaded that they stay,
these relationships were interrupted and frequently not
reestablished with new personnel. Formerly placated
areas became dangerous again. These relationships take
a long time to cement but are invaluable in pacifying an
area and gathering intelligence. Under the prevailing
system, civilians rotate out after 90 days, while military
personnel leave after anywhere from a couple of months
to a year, severing the bonds of trust with the local
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population and giving them little reason to work with
their replacements. Fair, commenting on VCs, wrote,
“[The success of vigilance committees] also requires
that officers not be transferred (transferring personnel
would forfeit the accumulated local intelligence and
undercut the entire effort).”114 The same can be said for
U.S. support and stability operations. Longer rotations
are certainly not popular, but if the United States is to be
successful in such operations, maintaining relationship
continuity between the civilian/military components
and the local population is essential.
Sri Lanka’s experience fighting the LTTE is typically
studied through the lens of counterterrorism instead of
counterinsurgency. Yet it is clear that there are a number
of lessons that can be applied to U.S. support and
stability operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond.
The United States, its allies, and the local governments
it attempts to rebuild must be cognizant of the history
and culture of the population, must seek to establish
joint relief and development projects, i.e., between the
central authority and minority populations so as to
establish trust and legitimacy, and must be willing to
deploy the same personnel for an extended period of
time to build trust in the local community. Such efforts
are difficult and cannot be successful overnight—but
they hold promise of increasing the effectiveness of
interagency efforts in support and stability operations
everywhere.
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CHAPTER 8
The Exquisite Problem of Victory:
Measuring Success in Unconventional
Operations
James J. Wirtz
One of the great ironies of the George W. Bush
administration’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 is
that international counterproliferation efforts had
largely shut down Saddam Hussein’s weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs by the late 1990s.
In the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the international
community, under United Nations (UN) auspices,
had put concerted diplomatic, economic, and military
pressure on the Ba’athist regime. Inspectors from
the United National Special Commission, often
referred to as UNSCOM, toured weapons facilities,
destroying weapons and equipment. They also
collected documents while monitoring the activities
of Iraqi scientists and officials. Admittedly, UNSCOM
inspections often raised more questions than they
resolved, but the pressure of inspectors on the ground
had curtailed any significant effort to restart chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons production. A decade of
international sanctions limited the resources Saddam
Hussein could devote to WMD. More importantly,
these sanctions demonstrated a degree of international
vigilance when it came to clandestine Iraqi efforts to
stockpile materials needed for its WMD programs.
Over a decade of continuous overflights, punctuated
by concerted counterproliferation strikes in Operation
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DESERT FOX, also helped to curtail Iraq’s WMD
program. As strange as it may sound, the fundamental
mistake made by the Bush administration on the eve
of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was its failure to
recognize that U.S. policy had succeeded. Iraq lacked a
significant WMD program.
This failure of net assessment on the part of
virtually the entire academic, intelligence, and policy
community highlights a significant issue when it
comes to the conduct of all sorts of foreign and defense
policies, including Stability, Security, Transition
and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. It is difficult
to measure progress in any type of unconventional
operation because observers lack the theoretical,
policy, or organizational benchmarks needed to assess
the success and failure of current policy. There is no
accepted theory of SSTR operations to guide policy or
to judge progress; moreover, these types of operations
usually attract attention only in the aftermath of a
crisis. Operations are often undertaken in an ad hoc
manner, while supporters and critics alike are left
wondering how best to judge progress or anticipate
looming failure.
This chapter will highlight the obstacles the U.S.
Government faces when it comes to devising measures of effectiveness for unconventional operations.
It explores the theoretical, policy-political, and
bureaucratic dimensions of this process of net
assessment, explaining why it is so difficult to generate
valid judgments about the impact of national policy
in ongoing strategic interactions. At the heart of the
issue lie the facts that the U.S. Government is not
well-equipped to undertake net assessment, and that
all types of unconventional operations receive only
sporadic attention. Knowledge exists, but there is no
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institutionalized way to harness this information in
a constructive manner. For better or worse, policy
assessment in these types of matters is largely a
political, not a military, policy, or academic issue.
The Theoretical Dimension.
The absence of an accepted and well-understood
theoretical paradigm usable to organize all types of
SSTR operations creates the fundamental challenge
for those attempting to assess the success or failure of
ongoing operations. In other words, it is hard to judge
progress without a compelling explanation of the
sources and appropriate remedies for instability. It is
difficult to determine if one is moving toward desired
objectives without some idea of how the achievement
of intermediate goals contributes to overall success.
Policy can only be as good as the theory behind it, and
the theory is not particularly good.
Several factors contribute to a lack of satisfactory
theory when it comes to SSTR operations. Scholarship
associated with efforts to restore stability to war-torn
areas tends to be inconsistent in purpose, responding at
times to either academic or political fashion, and often
to both. Sometimes it is academically fashionable and
politically acceptable for scholars to be associated with
supporting the war effort. In the 1950s, for instance,
the study of “political development” was an important
topic in the field of comparative politics as scholars
responded to the wave of decolonization that was
sweeping the globe. These studies became increasingly
politicized, however, as the Cold War migrated from
Central Europe to the “periphery.” For a while, the
threat of nuclear holocaust was overshadowed by the
actual “wars of national liberation” that swept Asia,
Africa, and Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s.
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The Vietnam debacle discredited the idea that the
U.S. Government was capable of fine-tuning diplomatic,
military, and economic instruments sufficiently to
undertake political development at the point of a
gun. The U.S. domestic social and political upheaval
produced by this failure inevitably undermined the
entire body of research associated with “nationbuilding.” Policies and the underpinning research
which were related to political development came to
be seen as synonymous with imperialism, cultural
hubris, and intellectual arrogance. Moreover, scholars
interested in the more practical issues related to force
and diplomacy were ostracized for a “nontheoretical”
approach to their work. For many so-called “gatekeepers” in academia, the study of practical political,
military, and economic issues was unseemly. Still
today, policy relevant research remains unlikely to be
appreciated by university tenure committees, which
are disposed to value more theoretical pursuits.
This abandonment of the study of political
development also was mirrored by the military,
which took a variety of steps to reorient its doctrine
and force structure following the fall of the regime in
Saigon to communist forces. A “never again” school
emerged, especially within the U.S. Army, which
identified counterinsurgency and nation-building
efforts as detrimental to the interests of the United
States in general and the U.S. military in particular.
Senior officers came to believe that counterinsurgency
operations placed their institutions at risk because
they tended to be open-ended and costly, and were not
supported by the American public. Several steps were
undertaken to detach the very support units useful
in SSTR operations—engineers, military police, civil
affairs personnel—from active duty forces. This
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reorganization would force Congress and the White
House to activate the Reserves or National Guard before
undertaking anything other than minor operations,
and left the active duty force virtually incapable of
carrying out anything but the most rudimentary
stability operation. The so-called Weinberger and
Powell doctrines placed these earlier personnel
and organizational decisions in a policy context by
identifying a set of stringent operational and strategic
requirements that should be met before the United
States employed military force.
Now that the United States is engaged in critical
SSTR operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and
occasional high profile relief operations (e.g., the relief
expedition launched in the aftermath of the December
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami), the pendulum has again
swung to a position favoring political and intellectual
stability operations. A host of national and service
policy documents now highlight the importance of
SSTR operations in U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, for
instance, states that “stability operations are a core
U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense
shall be prepared to conduct and support.”1 The 2006
Navy Concept of Operations also highlights the role
of stability operations that may “involve providing
humanitarian and civic assistance to the local
populace. . . . [A]ctivities may include the provision
of health care, construction of surface transportation
systems, well drilling, construction of basic sanitation
facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair
of public facilities.”2 Joint Doctrine has been created
to integrate the efforts of U.S. and allied units in the
conduct of stability operations and to integrate stability
operations into an overall campaign plan.3 Also, a
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recent Defense Science Board Study has identified a
host of organizational, management, planning, and
personnel reforms that could be undertaken to improve
the ability of U.S. forces to undertake SSTR operations.4
Stability operations are clearly now high on the U.S.
policy agenda.
Yet, that this new-found interest in SSTR operations
comes so late in the game—years after U.S. forces became
heavily engaged in critical stability campaigns—is prima
facie evidence of the lack of attention the topic often
receives from academics, strategists, and policymakers.
And without clear theoretical understanding of
stability operations (i.e., an explanation of how
diplomatic, military, economic, social, and political
initiatives can be harnessed to produce stability), it
is virtually impossible to assess ongoing operations.
This is so because, without a theoretically informed
strategy to guide SSTR operations, it is difficult to
generate meaningful benchmarks when it comes to
assessing progress toward restoring normalcy and
democracy in a region torn by violence or natural
disaster. Thus, the first stumbling block encountered
in the effort to undertake a net assessment of ongoing
stability operations is the simple fact that scholars,
soldiers, and policymakers alike lack a clear and
shared understanding of how stability operations
actually produce stability. Academic efforts at theory
construction related to SSTR strategies are spotty, and
they have not yet produced the basis for an accepted
and effective approach to stability operations.
The Policy-Political Dimension.
The absence of a theoretical understanding of and
a clear strategic approach to SSTR operations does not
274

alter the fact that policymakers will respond when
confronted with threats. They will “muddle through,”
so to speak, devising policies that address contemporary priorities or that match cultural biases and political demands of the moment. Amitai Etzioni, however, argues that this sort of muddling through often
leads to disaster, as policymakers adopt a shotgun
approach to security-building by attempting to
address a host of social, economic, and political issues
simultaneously. By contrast, Etzioni argues that
“security first” should be the guiding principle behind
any type of stability operation. According to him,
“security commands moral preeminence.” In his view,
the primary goal of stability operations should be to
restore law and order so as to allow people to live in
peace, with a reasonable expectation that their families
and property will be protected: “Not to be killed,
maimed, or tortured is the most basic of human rights.
Significantly life precedes both liberty and the pursuit of
happiness in the Declaration of Independence’s lineup
of the purposes for which government is instituted.”
Once security has been provided, in Etzioni’s view,
political, economic, and social reforms can proceed
apace.5 Putting nonsecurity objectives (e.g., democratic
reform) ahead of restoring some semblance of law
and order is likely to doom security efforts to failure.
Moreover, Etzioni suggests, there is little that is quick
or simple when it comes to stability operations.
Etzioni is highly critical of the U.S. policy that
rapidly eliminated the Ba’ath party from power after
U.S. forces occupied Iraq. Removing Ba’athists from
positions of power meant the elimination of much of
the social and governmental infrastructure of Iraq.
Over 100,000 Iraqi civil servants, doctors, and teachers
were fired from their positions, often because of their
relatively low-level membership in the Ba’ath Party.6
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Greatly worsening the situation was the U.S. decision
to disestablish the Iraqi Army, a decision that promptly
left over 400,000 officers and soldiers unemployed.7
This military talent served as a ready recruitment pool
for ethnic militias, criminal organizations, and terrorist
groups who benefited from the chaotic conditions
that quickly spread across several urban centers in
Iraq. From Etzioni’s philosophical and theoretical
perspective on stability operations, the Coalition’s
efforts in Iraq were more than unsuccessful. They
actually were counterproductive because they had the
net effect of reducing the security enjoyed by the Iraqi
people.
If one accepts, for the moment, Etzioni’s concept
for approaching stability operations, two critical
policy issues emerge that directly influence the
process of net assessment. The initial issue involves the
effort to reconcile any coherent approach to stability
operations with the domestic politics of intervention.
In other words, do policymakers have to minimize the
challenges of SSTR operations in order to foster public
support at home for the operations themselves, and
then go on to attempt a quick, simplistic solution to
what is an extraordinarily complex problem?
Theodore Lowi offered an important observation
nearly 40 years ago about this same pattern in
policymaking: threats and solutions to international
problems need to be oversold to gain any traction in
American politics.8 A paradox thus emerges when
it comes to the politics of stability operations in the
American political context. On the one hand, major
SSTR operations cannot be undertaken without political
support, but a realistic assessment of what is actually
involved in these operations, for example, Etzioni’s
approach, is unlikely to generate much political
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enthusiasm. On the other hand, if politicians do manage
to convince their constituents that intervention is
imperative and relatively straightforward, they might
not gain the political backing and patience to undertake
the complex, nuanced, and costly operations called for
by Etzioni. There does seem to be an inherent mismatch
between the relatively low level of political support for
major stability operations and the relatively high cost
of realistic plans to create stability in regions torn by
natural and man-made disasters.9
An additional issue raised by Etzioni’s analysis
regards assessing the impact of mistakes of omission
and commission while undertaking stability operations.
Are stability operations in Iraq doomed because of the
decision to destroy the Iraqi army and government
before having viable replacements available? Is the
deterioration in the situation irretrievable, or is it
possible to revitalize the new regime in Baghdad? Can
the successes of the surge be sustained? Once again, the
issue of what is politically possible and operationally
desirable comes into play. Politically, there remains a
good deal of pressure to simply withdraw from Iraq, a
predictable eventuality, especially as the expectations
of a “cake walk” fall victim to the realities of ethnic and
religious conflict.
But other options exist. Douglas Macdonald, for
example, has identified “bolstering” and “quid pro quo”
as strategies that can be used to strengthen beleaguered
governments.10 Macdonald favors the quid pro quo
strategy, that is, future economic and military support
would be tied to evidence of progress or meaningful
efforts at political reform and compromise on the part
of Iraq’s elected officials. But a good case can also be
made for the bolstering strategy, under which the
Iraqi government would be given all possible support
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and aid because their apparent lack of progress is
not due to a lack of will, but to a lack of capability.
Regardless of which policy is most appropriate in an
operational sense—“withdrawal,” “quid pro quo,” or
“bolstering”—it is clear that each requires a different
degree of political support.
Thus, the second stumbling block to an accurate
net assessment of SSTR operations is that they cannot
be treated as a simple matter of public policy. Instead,
they are a highly charged political issue. Their
overall success is likely to depend on more than just
the coherence of the strategic plan or the expertise
with which it is executed. The most important factor
governing success is likely to be the degree to which
political support is forthcoming, and how well elected
officials and military planners fine-tune military
operations to match political expectations.11 The U.S.
military learned this lesson on the battlefields of
Vietnam: tactical success on the battlefield could not
compensate for a lack of domestic political support for
the war effort. SSTR theory and strategy must not be
created in a political vacuum, but must be designed
with the requirement for gaining and retaining political
support in mind. Any net assessment of the effeciveness
of stability operations has to incorporate an estimate of
the political impact of military operations on the home
front.
Bureaucratic Politics.
Military organizations are highly selective when it
comes to the weapons they procure and the way they
fight. They are deeply influenced by their operational/
strategic “essence”—an agreed-upon body of concepts
that informs members about organizational culture
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and missions. Essence is a shared image of what the
organization is all about. Sometimes the essence, and
the culture that reflects if, is even embodied in a defining
battle—the Battle of Midway for the U.S. Navy, Little
Round Top for the U.S. Army, and the first Gulf War
for the U.S. Air Force. Organizations embrace missions
that reflect their organizational essence, defending
their roles, missions, and operational domain against
rivals. Organizations are unlikely to notice strategic
or technological developments that do not affect
their domains. U.S. Air Force officers, for instance,
are unlikely to care whether or not the U.S. Army or
the U.S. Marine Corps possesses a superior armored
vehicle.12
The notion of service culture is well-understood.
Nevertheless, little thought has been given to the way
organizational behavior and preferences can influence
efforts to evaluate progress in unconventional
operations. Organizations are likely to stick with their
preferred capabilities and doctrine regardless of the
particular demands created by the international crisis or
situation—this is the insight offered by Graham Allison
concerning the impact of bureaucratic SOPs on the
foreign and defense policies of states.13 Organizations
react thus because they actually prefer to employ
specific capabilities and doctrines and because they are
prepared to undertake only what really amounts to their
specialty operations. In a sense, any correspondence
between the needs of the moment and the capabilities
offered by the organization is largely a matter of
coincidence. Because the organization cannot (and
prefers not to) change capabilities quickly to meet an
emerging situation, honest evaluation of its strategies,
capabilities, and performance risks calling attention to
the fact that it is only marginally prepared to meet the
current exigencies. Organizations qua organizations
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have little interest in honest net assessments—
evaluations of how their preferred capabilities and
procedures address likely contingencies. If these kinds
of net assessments are deemed necessary, members
of the organization are always ready to reassure
inquisitive outsiders that the situation is well in hand.
In fact, from an organizational perspective, there
is little upside in terms of any effort to determine
effectiveness in current or potential contingencies.
If existing standard operating procedures and
procurement and personnel policies are found
wanting, calls for organizational change and reform
strike at the very “essence” of the organization itself
by threatening cherished missions or by allowing
outside organizations to poach on organizational
domains. Surprisingly, policy success can sometimes
rebound to the detriment of the organization. Without
exception, when asked what would happen if their
organization achieved a too-quick and too-easy success
in its acknowledged domain, experienced bureaucrats
universally respond the same way: “our budget would
be cut.” Spectacular success with little effort would
lead elected officials to believe that objectives could
have been achieved with fewer resources and that it
was therefore time to reallocate resources towards
more pressing objectives. Moreover, since officials
tend to judge progress based on trends and not final
results,14 which by definition are rarely known, a sharp
decline in budget would suggest to all concerned that
an organization is in decline, disfavor, or disarray.
In effect, the organizations charged with
undertaking SSTR operations have at best a limited
interest in evaluating progress in stability operations—
this is the third obstacle to effective net assessment.15
Honest appraisals of organizational performance
280

risk undermining political and financial support for
programs held dear by the organization. Perversely,
success is not particularly welcome either because it
carries with it the prospect of budgetary reductions. It
is unlikely that organizations will develop measures of
effectiveness that call into question the version of their
own identity to which they are obsessively attached.16
Conclusion: The Politics of Assessment.
Even if we were equipped with good theory, good
politically attuned strategy, and cooperative bureaucracies, the effort to evaluate progress in stability
operations would be greatly facilitated by a proper
institutional setting. In other words, one might expect
that net assessments and programmatic evaluations
would be undertaken by an independent agency. With
the possible exception of the Congressional Research
Service, which makes some effort at programmatic
evaluation, no such agency exists within the U.S.
Government to assess national strategies on a grand
scale. Although military officers, aided by a myriad of
quantitative measures, rarely leave a stone unturned
in searching for better tactics and operational doctrine,
there is no Department of Policy Evaluation. There is
no real effort to undertake overall net assessment when
it comes to current engagements.
This observation might produce some degree of
disbelief and consternation; in theory one might expect
that there should be some independent analytical cell
to evaluate public policy. The intelligence community
comes to mind, but Sherman Kent, who has studied
the U.S. strategic intelligence community, has ruled
out any likelihood of intelligence analysts evaluating
“blue team” policies or, for that matter, of deliberately
couching their estimates in the form of net assessments.17
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Academics can assess current policies, but their efforts
are limited by government secrecy and their own
political or intellectual agendas. One might also hope
that the news media would provide some important
assessments of the success and appropriateness of
ongoing policy and not simply pander for market
share by highlighting the latest escapades of obviously
inebriated or stoned Hollywood celebrities.
One is left with the distinct impression that
assessments of any public policy, but especially efforts
as complex as stability operations, are inherently
political judgments. Or, to put it another way, in
the absence of clear theory, strategy, and policy,
assessing SSTR operations remains largely within the
realm of politics. And, as a political issue, the nature,
practice, success, and failure of SSTR operations are
hotly disputed topics. Would members of opposition
political parties be willing to acknowledge previous
successes if they occurred while the other side was in
power? Would the George W. Bush administration
have been more willing to continue with the mere
containment of Saddam Hussein if containment had
been less associated with the previous Democratic
administration? Although there is much interest
in SSTR operations, little real effort is given to the
assessment of what actually constitutes progress in
virtually all types of stability operations.
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Chapter 9
The Failure of Incrementalism:
Interagency Coordination
Challenges and Responses
Scott R. Feil
Introduction.
A definition of insanity has been circulated
portraying it as a condition wherein an individual or
an organization continues to do the same thing over
and over again while expecting a different outcome.
Unfortunately, much the same can be said for U.S.
Government foreign and security operations after
1990. Changed conditions and different objectives have
been pursued using organizations and procedures left
over from the Cold War. More specifically, we see an
ossification of organizations and procedures emplaced
and modified since the National Security Act of 1947.
After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup
of the Soviet Union, interventions in the Balkans and
Somalia (and nonintervention in Rwanda), escalating
terror attacks before even September 11, 2001 (9/11),
the advent of globalization, etc., various studies and
commissions observed that the “world had changed,”
and the U.S. Government was changing to accommodate
the new realities. Contrary to these reports, however,
the government has continued to operate with core
processes and organizations designed in the 1950s. In
attempting to resolve interagency coordination issues
at the “seams” where those issues occur and where
momentum in current operations like the reconstruction
and stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq has been
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dissipated, recent initiatives (such as National Security
Presidential Directive [NSPD]-44, Department of
Defense Directive [DoDD] 3000.05, Transformational
Diplomacy, the establishment of the Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, and
the recent search for and selection of a National Security
Council Deputy to be the “war czar”) are bound to fail
without corresponding initiatives to transform the
foundations of U.S. foreign policy. Any new initiatives
must encompass a redesign of how foreign policy is
developed, how it is articulated and implemented by
the Executive Branch, and how it is understood and
supported by the Congress. The problems faced by
the current administration are simply the most recent
and visible manifestations of organization and process
deficiencies that have plagued the U.S. Government
for many years. Examination and characterization of
the challenges facing interagency coordination reveal
areas where improvements can be made.
Defining the Problem.
Lack of coordination between agencies as a
significant shortcoming and deficiency in government
operations has been identified in studies and analysis
addressing both national security and foreign
operations. These studies, after examining historical
cases and future requirements, recognized the changed
circumstances and future context within which the U.S.
Government would operate to achieve objectives and
secure U.S. interests. Some made recommendations
on restructuring the organizations, authorities, and
processes through which America developed and
implemented foreign policy. As holistic approaches
to foreign policy issues have become more prevalent,
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the government has moved forward in small steps to
redress shortcomings in interagency coordination.1
The most public of the early studies was the
Commission on National Security 21st Century,
popularly known as the Hart-Rudman Commission.2
Particularly remembered for its prescience regarding
terrorism, the commission sought to come to terms with
the changes in the world after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, and made recommendations stemming
from a recognition that the U.S. Government had been
organized (through the National Security Act of 1947
and subsequent revisions) to implement the policy of
containment articulated by George Kennan and adopted
in the late 1940s as a response to the Soviet Union and
the expansion of communism. The Structure and Process
Addendum to the study was a comprehensive review
of national security organizations and processes. Few
of the recommendations were adopted, as the nation
responded to fiscal pressures and strategic intellectual
arguments that militated against immediate or
comprehensive change.
The fiscal pressures on security spending were
evident in the form of calls for a “peace dividend,” that
is, to shift investment from the buildup in the Defense
Department to domestic programs.3 Moreover, there
were allegations that conditions obtaining subsequent
to the fall of the Soviet Union were going to persist
and that instead of a mere temporary halt to global
conflict, the triumph of liberal market economics and
representative government represented a successful
“end of history,” in the words of Francis Fukuyama.
In the face of altered priorities and lack of a sense
of urgency, the U.S. Government effectively adopted such attitudes as “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it,” or
“dance with the one that brought you.” In studies
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and commentary, the observation was made that
the United States could continue its preeminence,
if not dominance, in the international spheres of
politics, security, economics, and cultural influence.
Marxism-Leninism was discredited as an alternative
paradigm for analyzing or organizing global behavior
of states and populations. All that was needed were
some forays into areas of the world where market
capitalism and representative government had yet to
take root (the Balkans and the remnants of the Soviet
Union), and much of the transformation of the world
along lines commensurate with American principles,
organizations, and processes would be complete. The
“New World Order” described by President George
H. W. Bush at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 could
become a reality.4 In light of the bright future for the
United States predicted in the early 1990s, it was easy
to believe either that no change was necessary, or that
time was available for reflection and analysis of what
changes in U.S. interagency coordination processes
and organizations might be appropriate. The “strategic
pause” was brought to an abrupt end on 9/11.
While the Hart-Rudman Commission was not
successful in prompting deep change in American
structures and processes, the general observations and
estimates of future conflict were validated at least in
the short run by other analyses of the international
environment and the conduct of various international
and transnational actors.. Other actors and entities,
of course, still adhere to organizing principles that
pose a continuing threat to participatory government
and liberal market economics.5 Throughout history,
systems of international order, however organized
and operating, face countervailing theories of
organization and practice upon which nation-states
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and other organizations may base their behavior.
Radical terrorists operating under a veneer of religious
justification are only the most recent blip in the long
continuum of history. The Caliphate and the spread of
the umma represent a countervailing set of principles
upon which to base global organization and rules
for interaction. While Islamic radical terrorism is one
manifestation, recent developments in Latin America
illustrate that there continue to be movements
and ideologies (vestiges of communism and other
evolutions) that oppose the principles upon which
liberal government, market economics, and free social
organization are founded. The rise of China, a “peercompetitor,” forms a more traditional, symmetrical
potential challenge to the United States.6 Whether the
United States should prepare for the more traditional,
symmetric threats of the mid and far future, or focus
efforts for change on addressing more immediate
challenges, is an open question. The struggle against
radical Islamic terrorism has been characterized both
as a fundamentally different struggle in terms of
tactics, and as a conventional ideological struggle.7 The
possibility of alternative futures complicates the efforts
to achieve more effective and efficient interagency
coordination.8

Challenges to Improved Coordination:
Constituency, Culture, Resources.
In an environment of such ambiguity and dynamism, creating more effective, efficient, and measurable
government performance is an imperative if the United
States is to retain its ability to achieve national security
goals. In the subset of foreign operations encompassing
reconstruction and stabilization activities, however,
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the challenges to better interagency coordination arise
primarily from two interrelated domestic sources. First
are organizational culture differences, which manifest
themselves most clearly in the different approaches
taken by military and civilian agencies, but that is not
an exclusively Department of Defense (DoD) versus
“everybody else” distinction. Culture both reflects
and influences organizational processes and how the
organization sees itself, its members, and customers/
outside stakeholders. Cultural differences exist within
agencies between those responsible for emergency
assistance and those responsible for long-term
assistance, and between agencies based on their foreign
and domestic responsibilities. The challenge posed
by organizational culture can be overcome, however,
and there have been excellent examples of interagency
coordination between agencies on the “civilian side of
the Potomac.”
The second domestic source of failure to achieve
interagency coordination improvement is the increasing
disparity in resources between the military and civilian
departments. This influence distorts the application of
substantive expertise through differences in abilities to
generate the wherewithal and the mechanisms to apply
it. In a dynamic set of circumstances, the agencies that
have the most robust and flexible methods for applying
resources tend to get more, and their ability to expend
them with even a modicum of accountability compared
to their rivals tends to make “power accrue to power.”
“Those that have, get,” is an old saying that applies to
the disparity in resources for overseas reconstruction
and stabilization that exists between DoD and other
departments.9
The cultural and resource differences are mutually
dependent. Organizations with a foreign focus,
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operational capabilities, and detailed planning and
resource management systems that are adopted as a
result of culture often do well in making the case to
the Office of Management and Budget and to Congress
to gain resources. Those that receive larger and
larger resource allocations often develop the kind of
organizational culture that can apply those resources.
Organizations without a culture of direct management
and implementation of large programs, or those
that do not have robust overseas implementation
operations, are not in a position to interact effectively
in the planning or execution of reconstruction and
stabilization operations. These differences are illustrated in Table 1.
Robust Program
Management and
Implementation
Capability

Less Capable Program
Management and
Implementation
Capability

Primary
Overseas Policy
Responsibilities

Dept of Defense

Dept of State

Primary
Domestic Policy
Responsibilities

Dept of Homeland
Security and Other
Civilian Cabinet
Departments

Table 1. Responsibilities Focus and Management
Capabilities.
The concept of “constituency” underlies the
differences portrayed within this table. Where there
is a domestic constituency for operational capability,
it exists. DoD, with 1.2 million active duty personnel,
reserve components, local armories, and a significant
procurement and operations budget spread over
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hundreds of political jurisdictions, creates a domestic
constituency and fulfills overseas responsibilities.
Many of the civilian cabinet agencies with domestic
responsibilities have large budgets and also serve
millions of voting constituents. The Department
of State, however, has the primary overseas policy
responsibility coupled with a relatively minuscule
domestic constituency and a budget that is oftentimes
executed and implemented by others—such as DoD or
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
As examples, the Department of State determines
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing
(FMS/FMF), and International Military Education and
Training (IMET) priorities. This is appropriate, as those
programs are both builders and indicators of American
bilateral relationships; thus the department with lead
responsibilities to articulate American foreign policy
should determine those priorities. But DoD executes
those programs and spends the money to deliver the
goods, train the foreign personnel, provide the seats at
the War Colleges, etc.
Where there is no domestic constituency, Congress
has been slow to provide authorities and resources.
This is where a big difference exists between DoD and
the civilian departments, but that difference can be
reduced with renewed and refocused congressional
and executive branch oversight and cooperation. The
challenge is twofold—both resources and management
capacity are needed—and solutions should seek to
move more civilian departmental capability into
the top left cell in Table 1. Civilian agencies with a
domestic focus and culture need to recognize and
seize the opportunities to support foreign operations,
while the Department of State needs the wherewithal
(both resources and processes) to be able to execute
its responsibility as the lead department for foreign
policy.
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The organizational culture that results from and
reinforces a domestic vs. overseas focus constrains
agencies whose expertise is now in demand for
overseas reconstruction and stabilization operations.
Operating overseas has long conditioned the military
to develop the capability to deploy anything and
everything required for operations, from engineers
who build roads and bridges to veterinarians who
oversee food production, storage, and preparation, to
medical and power generation capabilities. While not
all these assets, comparable to everything necessary
to run a large city, are in the active component, the
military can access a wide range of capabilities within
the reserve. This system serves the military well, but
it tends to “crowd out” comparable civilian capability
in the early stages of reconstruction and stabilization,
when the environment may not be totally secure (even
when there may be some civilian capacity to support
operations).10
Domestic operations, which may be compared to
overseas reconstruction and stabilization, are disaster
relief and consequence management, as in the response
to the terror attacks on the United States and to
disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, wildfires, floods,
and tornadoes. Under these domestic situations, there
is much more interagency and intragovernmental
(federal, state, and local jurisdiction) interaction.
Much of this capability is based on the Stafford Act
that established the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the successive national response
plans (NRP) that have evolved as a result of that act
and the homeland security legislation that succeeded
9/11.11 The Emergency Support Functions in the
plan are assigned to cabinet level and other national
agencies for provision of resources and program/
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project implementation during domestic crises and
recovery. However, as shown in the difference between
the response to the attacks in New York, Washington,
and Pennsylvania in September 2001 and the response
to Katrina, resourcing these functions relies to a
certain extent on the support capability of current
infrastructure. The 9/11 attacks, while devastating,
were relatively localized, so that surrounding
infrastructure (communications and transportation
networks, hospitals, power generation, etc.) were able
to respond. When the infrastructure across a wide
area was unavailable (under water), only the military
(including the U.S. Coast Guard) had the types of
equipment necessary to provide basic requirements,
as in the case of the naval vessel providing potable
water.12 It was possible to marshal military resources
to support civilian requirements in a domestic setting.
The reverse relationship, where civilian agencies can
either support or lead a large operation overseas, is far
less certain.
For overseas reconstruction and stabilization,
there is no legislation and no plan comparable to the
domestically oriented Stafford Act that directs Federal
cabinet level departments to plan, prepare, and execute
implementing operations. NSPD 44 and DoDD 3000.05
attempt to direct coordinating efforts in this regard, but
do not have the stature or support from Congress to be
implemented to the same level of detail as the NRP.
To be fair, it did take approximately 17 years from the
passage of the Stafford Act to the adoption of the first
Federal Disaster Response Plan (FDRP).
The variability of constituency thus directly affects
which authorities and capabilities are available for
conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations.
Where a domestic constituency is concerned, there
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are few barriers to bringing government capabilities
to bear. Both military and civilian capabilities are
authorized and available for use, and their use is
guided by a detailed plan and practiced procedures for
integration of the effort. Where there is no domestic
constituency, one sees a significant gap in capabilities
that can be developed and brought to bear. One also
sees that due to the routine focus of the domestic
civilian agencies, there are no standing procedures for
accessing, deploying, and applying their significant
talent and resources to foreign reconstruction and
stabilization operations.
The resource disparity manifests itself in ways
that skew policy and program implementation.
Planning compatibility, coordination, and operational
implementation suffer because of the difference
in resources applied to any given function. Some
examples follow, which generally compare DoD to
the Department of State, the lead cabinet department
for foreign policy. This is not meant to disparage the
Department of State, but this comparison does illustrate
that it is at present woefully underresourced and lacks
the organizational culture and processes in place to be
able to fulfill its leadership role.
There are over one million personnel in the
uniformed services. Within the Pentagon, 23,000 people
work on what is essentially planning and strategy
development. DoD’s total obligation authority over
the past 3 years has risen to over $700 billion. Within
the Department of State, there are approximately 6,000
Foreign Service officers. USAID, part of the Department
of State that implements both emergency relief and
long-term development projects, has about 2,000
full-time government employees. The Department of
State and USAID budgets for foreign operations total
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approximately $25 billion. The Department of Justice,
an implementing partner with the Department of
State for programs in training and mentoring court
personnel, investigators, and police in its International
Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance
Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT), can
deploy several hundred government personnel on
long-term assignment and contractors on shorter-term
tasks.13 The labor pool available to civilian agencies to
deploy overseas therefore is significantly smaller, by
several orders of magnitude, than the military labor
pool.
One program that best illuminates the difference
in monetary resources available to the departments
(here using State and DoD) is the Commander’s
Emergency Response Fund. This fund is designed to
give military commanders on the ground the authority
and resources to fund high-impact projects at local
levels for the indigenous populace during military
operations. It cannot be used for garrison support,
military operations per se, operation and maintenance
of military equipment, etc. During FY2006 and FY2007,
the authorized limit for this fund for DoD was $500
million. In FY2005 it was $854 million.14 In disbursing
the funds for activities in Iraq and Afghanistan,
military commanders at the brigade and battalion
level were often given authority to fund single projects
at the $50,000 level and at $100,000 with additional
justification. The U.S. ambassador to a country, under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, has
the authority to disburse $50,000 in his country per
emergency. These authorities were used during the
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, which meant
that military commanders had significantly more funds
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at their immediate disposal than the ambassadors to
the affected countries. Congress eventually authorized
significant resources ($654 million for tsunami,
earthquake, and avian flu relief) to be managed by
the Department of State.15 But the differences are
stark. Military commanders, at a lower, decentralized
level, often have immediate access to significant
funds, while the U.S. ambassador has few dollars
immediately available, and often has to wait months
for supplemental appropriations.
A second resource issue illustrating that “power
accrues to power” is in the area of foreign military
assistance. It had been within the Department of
State’s purview to manage and set policy, while DoD
executed the bulk of the program, usually in terms of
education and training (IMET) and procurement of
military equipment and related material and training
(FMF and FMS). In pursuit of the objective of rapidly
enhancing the capabilities of partner militaries to
combat terrorism, $200 million was also given directly to
DoD for similar activities related directly to combating
terrorism. This funding is commonly referred to as
Section 1206 funding.16 Subsequently, DoD requested
that the authority be made permanent and that it be
authorized to ask for continued funding in subsequent
budget years.17 So what may exist in the future are
two funding streams, which may operate on different
priorities, that may complement each other, but will
surely lead to overlaps, competition, and mixed signals
to bilateral partners and added coordination burdens
between the two departments.
Finally, the ability of the Department of State
(taken as the most visible example of resources not
matching requirements) to meet agreed commitments
illustrates how resource constraints impact interagency
coordination. The new “surge” strategy for Iraq was
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predicated on establishing additional Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout the country,
with significant State Department personnel staffing to
provide leadership and subject matter expertise. This
program was agreed to by the Secretaries of State and
Defense. However, due to the lack of surge capacity at
the Department of State and USAID, DoD was asked
to fill 40 percent of the 300 positions on a temporary
basis, until contractors were identified and funding
provided. The military personnel selected were to
have skills such as city management and agriculture—
clearly not military core competencies.18
Within the executive branch, there have been two
general approaches to facilitating interagency coordination with respect to foreign operations. Without
the benefit of an interagency planning construct such
as the NRP, the executive branch has either relied on
a strong organization and/or personality in the role of
the national security advisor, or designated a cabinet
level lead agency and directed other departments to
support within a specific issue area.19
Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the National
Security Council (NCS) adopted an organization and
process model that unsurprisingly closely resembled
the military staff functions of plans and operations.
There was a Planning Board and an Operations Control
Board (OCB). The Planning Board developed issue
papers and positions for consideration by the statutory
NSC. Decisions were made by the President who
participated regularly in weekly meetings. The decisions
were then passed to the OCB, responsible for followup with the departments and agencies responsible
for implementing decisions. It should be noted that
the NSC for the first 13 years (under Presidents Harry
Truman and Eisenhower) was staffed with career civil
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servants. President John Kennedy shrank the staff,
made it more “intimate,” and chose to staff it with a
larger proportion of political appointees. Subsequent
strong NSCs existed under Presidents Richard Nixon
and Ronald Reagan, but relied on personality rather
than process to control the departments and agencies.
Under President Nixon, Secretary of State and NSA
Henry Kissinger was the undisputed leader of the
government foreign policy establishment, wielding
tremendous power. This de facto authority was evident
in the arrangement for a time in which Kissinger was
simultaneously the NSA and the Secretary of State. In
the Reagan administration, the NSC was powerful not
because of the personality or favored position of the
NSA, but because it was given operational control and
resources to run foreign policy from the White House.
The Iran-contra arrangements were one of the results
that led later administrations to avoid giving the NSC
operational missions or resources.
Contrary to the “strong NSC” method of
coordination, other presidents (most recently George
W. Bush) have relied on the NSC as a policy formulation
element responding to short- and mid-term challenges,
rather than a planning or operational coordination
body. Coordination responsibility has been delegated
largely to single cabinet departments or agencies to
lead in certain issue areas, with other departments in
support. This can result in bureaucratic turf battles and
confusion as DoD and State wrestle with foreign policy
and operations, while domestically the Departments of
Homeland Security and Justice try to work out their
jurisdictional and resource relationships.
The most visible example of this arrangement has
been the designation of DoD as the initial lead agent
for reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and
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Afghanistan. There is some merit to this approach,
as, in the absence of a functioning U.S. embassy in
the countries for a period of time, it made sense to
have DoD continue as the lead element, providing
“unity of command” or effort until the Department
of State could field a capable management team
within a functioning embassy. However, the resident
expertise in the Departments of State, USAID, Justice,
Treasury, etc., was not mobilized appropriately to
assist in the planning or execution of reconstruction
and stabilization operations in either country. Ad hoc
arrangements at the top levels of government led to
trial-and-error learning as well as ad hoc arrangements
at the operational, tactical, and local levels, where
interagency coordination nodes proliferated without
initial standards, processes, manning, or well-defined
responsibilities. Provincial Reconstruction Teams
(PRTs, the most visible example), Joint Interagency
Coordination Groups, and Joint Interagency Task Forces
illustrate by their varied performance and effectiveness
the point that the civilian agencies are not structured,
resourced, or manned to participate on a sustainable
basis with the military in overseas operations. Without
structured processes and organizations that are
culturally prepared for interagency coordination, ad
hoc arrangements are often doomed to failure for the
simplest of reasons, such as manning and training.20
Current Initiatives and the Need for Fundamental
Change.
Initiatives to redress the lack of interagency
coordination processes abound. Some are designed
to fix current shortfalls in policy development and
implementation, while others seek long-term fixes
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through education and personnel development.
The difficulty in gaining acceptance for substantive
and radical reform stems from bureaucratic and
organizational imperatives. Most of the steps taken
so far to improve interagency coordination suffer
from a lack of overall government perspective. Each
proposal emanating from an organization involved in
interagency policy development and implementation
seeks to fix “interagency coordination” from the
individual organization perspective, optimizing that
particular department’s capabilities to interact with
other departments. The combination of these efforts
replicates the original problem in that individual
organizations are seeking optimizing behavior, while
no authoritative entity exists that seeks to optimize the
overall government function. Such an authoritative
entity would, by definition, constrain and suboptimize
the individual cabinet level departments’ and other
agencies’ functions in order to achieve greater overall
effectiveness and efficiency. All agencies want the
interagency to work better—so long as the interagency
process optimizes their organizational priorities
and protects their prerogatives. This perspective is
illustrated by looking at the substance and the timing
of proposals and initiatives.
In 2004, in the wake of hearings on post-conflict
planning that began in 2002 and continued through
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee leadership introduced the first
version of a bill designed to improve both interagency
coordination and civilian agency capacity to engage in
reconstruction and stabilization operations. Called the
Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management
Act of 2004 (hereafter referred to as the Act), it was
introduced by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), then the
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committee chairman, on February 25, 2004.21 The Act
called for additional staffing, resources, policies, and
procedures that would give the Department of State
and other civilian departments the wherewithal to
engage in such operations, and prescribed authorities
and processes for establishing the civilian lead in such
operations. The Act was not passed, but repetitive
introduction in subsequent sessions led to an updated
version that was passed in the Senate in 2007.22
The Act gathered some momentum, but the
executive branch appeared to have sought, for
substantive, procedural, and political reasons (not
partisan, but institutional in the relationship between
Congress and the White House) to steal a march on
such an initiative. After meetings at the NSC, the
Department of State issued a memorandum in May
2004 that established the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with
approximately 38-45 personnel detailed from the
Department of State, USAID, DoD, and other agencies.
The memorandum and notation of the office acronym
specifically indicated that the Coordinator would
report directly to the Secretary of State.23 Emerging
concepts for coordinating U.S. Government actions in
reconstruction and stabilization paralleled the military
levels of effort at the strategic (national), regional
(combatant command or operational), and local
(military task force or tactical) levels. The national level
node, the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization
Group (CRSG), is organized as needed at the level of a
Policy Coordinating Committee and is to be chaired by
the Coordinator and the Assistant Secretary of State for
the regional bureau with jurisdiction over the country
in question. At the regional level, specifically to interact
with the military Regional Combatant Commanders, a
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Humanitarian, Reconstruction, and Stabilization Team
(HRST, now called an Interagency Planning Cell [IPC])
provides additional interagency substantive expertise
(in addition to the Joint Interagency Coordination
Group already at the headquarters) for planning and
operational coordination. Finally, at the local (country
and subcountry level) Advance Civil Teams (ACT)
supplement the embassy (if present) or act as a U.S.
Mission to coordinate all U.S. Government activities.
ACTs are established at the country level and at
subordinate regional/provincial levels within the
assisted country.
Subsequently, the department ran into difficulty
securing funding and authorizations for permanent
staffing growth to support the office. There is
resistance in the Congress to growth in the size of
the Department of State and other departments that
require additional staffing to meet reconstruction
and stabilization requirements, even on an infrequent
basis. Accordingly, civilian departments have to leave
functions vacant while personnel are deployed on these
operations, and all of those functions have domestic
constituents who demand services. To support
immediate start-up operations on a reconstruction
and stabilization mission, S/CRS requires funding
that is rapidly accessible and flexible in purpose.
Such funding is commonly referred to as contingency
funding, and Congress has been particularly reluctant
to provide such funding, preferring complex and
lengthy reprogramming and supplemental actions
which provide Congress opportunities for direction of
purpose, oversight, and accountability. This, of course,
constrains operational capability to meet dynamic
requirements for immediate and flexible funding in
reconstruction and stabilization operations.
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Procedurally, as the S/CRS staff made significant
progress in developing coordination concepts and
nodes at the national, regional, and local levels, it still
suffered from being positioned as an interagency node
within a cabinet level department with the authority
to coordinate activities among departments but not
to direct them. Most importantly, the office lacked
funding and had to secure a transfer of funds from
DoD to continue operations. Finally, the office’s efforts
to establish a civilian reserve response corps that could
provide robust interaction with other government,
international, and local partners, staff the ACTs, and
provide program and project management expertise
and implementation, has not been funded to date.
Without congressional authorization and appropriations, S/CRS found it difficult to cut through the
existing relationships and get participation from other
agencies. With respect to DoD, S/CRS found itself
engaged and often overwhelmed by DoD demands for
participation. Department requirements for periodic
and routine interaction; Combatant Command
exercises and experiments; concept development;
and expertise requests from Special Operations, Civil
Affairs, conventional units, etc., overload the ability of
S/CRS to establish priorities and respond to or initiate
coordination. One senior staff member in the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs informed the author in
2004 that the Pol-Mil Bureau receives requests for over
100 personnel to participate in military exercises every
quarter.24 S/CRS experiences proportional demands
for its staff time.
DoD did not sit still and wait for S/CRS or the
NSC to capture the agenda for reconstruction and
stabilization. U.S. Joint Forces Command established
a close working relationship with S/CRS, including
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and supporting them through a number of exercises
and experiments that contributed to their concepts and
process design efforts. DoD began working on revising
its reconstruction and stabilization operations doctrine.
In 2006 and 2007, S/CRS and JFCOM were able to reach
agreement on S/CRS leading a series of experiments
and exercises that will establish their capability to lead
the interagency members.
DoD developed internal guidance to redress
shortcomings in its ability to marshal resources and
develop expertise in reconstruction and stabilization
operations. In November 2005, DoD published Directive
3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.”
This directive placed stability, security, transition,
and reconstruction operations on a par with combat
operations. It directed the department, commands,
and military departments to develop capabilities and
training for such operations. While acknowledging that
civilian agencies are often best suited for such efforts,
under certain conditions (namely, dangerous security
environments) the military has a role to play in all
the activities necessary to start and then support such
operations. The directive recognized the importance
of military-civilian teams and charged the department
with continuing to develop the capabilities to “lead
and support” military-civilian teams.
Interestingly, the publication of DoD Directive
3000.05 in November 2005 preceded the White
House’s release of National Security Presidential
Directive-44 (NSPD-44), “Management of Interagency
Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,”
in December.25 This directive was the first official
document from the executive branch that codified
the U.S. Government (as opposed to individual
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department) approach to the subject matter. The NSPD
charged the Secretary of State and, through him or her,
the S/CRS Coordinator, with 12 important functions
including coordination of the execution of legal
responsibilities by several departments, development
of strategies for countries at risk and detailed policy
options for consideration by the NSC, development
of mechanisms for coordinating the efforts of the
entire U.S. Government, coordinating with DoD and
international partners, working with the Department
of the Treasury on financial and economic tools,
assembling lessons learned, and instituting a civilian
response capability.
Questions can legitimately be raised about the
way the various authorities were developed and
how cabinet level guidance would have to be revised
to accommodate presidential directives. Moreover,
despite public statements that S/CRS was critically
important and its function was central to improving
government capability, the administration did not
aggressively fight for funding for the office, and the
office was vacant for much of the spring of 2006. The
original Coordinator, Ambassador Carlos Pascual, left
the office in January 2006. After several months while the
Deputy Coordinator labored alone, Ambassador Tim
Carney served as an interim until the new Coordinator,
Ambassador John Herbst, reported for duty from his
previous post as Ambassador to Ukraine.
DoD and the Department of State have also initiated
programs to train more personnel in interagency
coordination, but without an established overarching
authoritative process, these training programs focus on
the capabilities of individual departments and current
ad hoc organizations and processes.26

306

Benchmarks and Models.
The situation can be remedied, however, with
appropriate top-level decisions, support from
Congress, and a rigorous effort to establish benchmarks
for measuring organizational success and whether
interagency coordination works. There are examples
within the government which can serve as models
for interagency coordination and which illustrate the
two cardinal prerequisites for effective and efficient
coordination—authority and resources.
The first example is the Joint Interagency Task
Force-East (JIATF-East), one of two involved in the
counterdrug effort.27 These task forces bring together
domestic and foreign policy agencies and departments
with various authorities, thus providing effective
counterdrug operations based on core competencies,
authorities, and resources of the respective agencies.
JIATF-East, for example, has members from DoD, the
U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Justice, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and others. Additionally, it enjoys cooperative support
from several nations, including naval support from
European nations with territorial possessions and longterm relationships with countries in the Caribbean. In
this organization, each participating agency is able
to rely on specific authorities and brings resources
(manning, aircraft, naval craft, field agents, etc.) to the
effort. The JIATF is commanded by a U.S. Coast Guard
officer who bridges the divide between DoD and the
Department of Homeland Security. In carrying out
interdiction operations, the personnel in the JIATF
take lead roles at certain stages of an operation based
on their organization’s authorities and the conditions.
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For example, military resources may be placed in
the service of civil law enforcement and interdiction
authorities under certain circumstances. Various
agencies’ representatives will then take charge of the
operation at specified times and under appropriate
rules until duly constituted civil legal authorities make
an apprehension or interdiction.
Another notable model for change is the National
Wildfire Coordination Group.28 This group is chartered
by two cabinet departments with seven different
Federal agencies that have firefighting responsibilities
on Federal land. These departments recognized that
coordinated operations were crucial. The Coordination
Group formed substantive working groups from all
agencies as collateral assignments. In the “off season,”
these working groups establish and revise procedures
for operations contained in the Fireline Guide Book,
which contains descriptions of standardized teams,
standard operating procedures, and planning
factors, and has a contact list including international
agreements with partner nations for coalition fire
fighting on public lands and disaster assistance. USAID
adapted the Fireline Guide Book as the basis for its
Foreign Operations Guide. The Fireline Guide Book
contains the operations procedures, standard team
descriptions, roles, and capabilities for the operational
organizations that are established to fight fires (base
camps, teams, etc). The Guide Book integrates a system
of job descriptions, training manuals, and programs so
that any of the 70,000 Federal firefighters can apply for
training to increase professional capabilities under the
Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS).
The IQCS links personnel, training, and status, and
records all the certifications of all the firefighters. The
IQCS is linked to a Resource Ordering and Support
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System (ROSS) that provides real time access to
standardized teams that can be notified and deployed
with equipment throughout the country on request.
The working groups established under the
National Wildfire Coordination Group charter work
continuously to update and revise procedures, training,
and logistics operations. Training is conducted on line
or in residence at one of ten regions established by the
departments, and is funded by the home agency. In other
words, someone from the Bureau of Land Management
in New Mexico might take training on line from a
regional center on the east coast. The training might be
conducted by the U.S. Forest Service. Additionally, the
system and guide set forth agency contact information
and general procedures, and the guide has an appendix
with the international agreements and organizations
that the U.S. Government may coordinate with when
fighting fires in areas where international coordination
is appropriate.
These two examples have some lessons for
interagency coordination in reconstruction and
stabilization operations. First, there must be authorities,
direction, and commitment from senior leaders. Second,
resources must be appropriated and allocated to the
effort, and personnel must be available for frequent
and routine training, predeployment training, and
operations. Third, only those elements that can bring
resources (people, funds, equipment) to the operation
are in the coordination process.
The examples offer insights and models for possible
adaptation for the reconstruction and stabilization challenge, but are not panaceas. Their mission set is much
more narrowly focused. The interagency reconstruction
and stabilization challenge is significantly more complex in manning, training, accessing, and coordinating
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the range of skills and venues necessary for effective and
efficient reconstruction and stabilization operations.
Change.
It is to be hoped that this volume and similar efforts
will help create the necessary momentum for change,
and that the United States will not wait until another
catastrophe occurs to undertake decisive action.
Changes must be made within the legislative and
executive branches that are focused on effectiveness and
efficiencies in policy development and implementation
on the ground. Streamlined authorities, available and
flexible funding, and trained and ready personnel are
the keys to better interagency coordination.
The National Security Strategy must drive cabinet
department budgets to provide funding for interagency
coordination, staffing, and activities. There must
be commensurate department level implementing
authorities and processes, with equivalent and
compatible planning and implementing processes and
organizations. There must also be a cadre of deployable
civilian experts resident within tasked departments
and agencies.
Policy development, tasking, accountability, and
management systems designed to optimize achievement across the government must be implemented,
even if they result in suboptimizing component
government organizations. This approach is significantly
different from the current system, where subordinate
organizations optimize their own capabilities at the
expense of the overall government mission.
The tasked government employees in the civilian
agencies must be subject to deployment and performance of implementation duties on site—not just coordin310

ation and program management from offices in
Washington. The gutting of USAID and the dissolution
of the U.S. Information Agency are cases in point. The
challenges are not insurmountable, but they require
top-down guidance, commitment, resources, and a
thorough restructuring of government service models
that are appropriate for 21st-century challenges. They
must replace the current organization and processes,
which originated in the Cold War 50 years ago and
were designed to fit a situation that no longer exists.
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CHAPTER 10
INTERAGENCY REFORM: AN IDEA WHOSE
TIME HAS COME
Robert B. Polk
I will offer a few thoughts from two perspectives
on changes we need to make to our National Security
System; first, my perspective from Iraq in 2003 as a
multiagency implementation planner working directly
for both Jay Garner in the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and Paul Bremer
in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); second,
my perspective from the last 2 years cultivating ideas
about wider U.S. Government reforms needed to
improve U.S. competency in national security matters
both at home and abroad. Except where specifically
noted, the ideas expressed here represent my own and
are not intended to reflect anyone else’s or that of any
institution with which I am presently affiliated.
My experience in Iraq, like that of many others,
was unexpected and short-noticed. I joined the first
civilian-led organization going in to rebuild Iraq only
3 weeks before it deployed. At the time, I was an active
duty Army officer in civilian clothes chosen for my
experience in planning. I was the most junior member
of the core team by far. After a quick self-assessment
upon arrival in ORHA, I asked that I be reassigned as
deputy to a more senior official because I suspected the
work would require more seniority than I had at the
time. My request was denied, and the rest, as they say,
is history.
The stories are many, and some quite interesting,
but if one has kept up even on the margins, he or she
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will probably have a good sense of the challenges we
faced and the mistakes we all made. At my level, I
knew many of the policymakers fairly well and had
routine contact with them, but I did not advise on or
orchestrate policies. My job, in which I was finally
successful once ORHA was replaced by the CPA and
we formed a proper planning office, was to bring all
the real experts together to form a workable whole-ofgovernment implementation plan for policies. After 10
months, we had such a working plan. I left Iraq with my
head held high a few days after I briefed the last major
changes to this plan to an assembled group consisting
of the entire Coalition leadership in the Green Zone.
My time in Iraq was full of the usual mood swings
typical of those in a combat zone, including the highest
of highs and the lowest of lows. Even though I was not
a front-line soldier this time around, I did experience
the sense of loss from losing close friends and the
survivor’s guilt over being alive after a close call where
others were not so fortunate. As powerful as those
experiences were at the time, in the end the greatest
value of my experience came later, in the afterglow of
calm reflection. During that reflection, I came to realize
that my time in Iraq had given rise to clearer insights
into certain important aspects of a national security
system that had failed us. Specifically, my thoughts
coalesced with regard to our effort to integrate ad
hoc interagency teams given great responsibilities but
little authority and almost no capacity to get the job
done. My retrospective conclusions stripped away
any pretensions I might have once held that our
government could quickly field a competent, coherent
national security bureaucracy. Here following are my
candid thoughts:
• As a government, we are awash in complex
solutions, but we do not yet understand all
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•

•

•

•

the roots of the problems we face in our own
country, let alone those in foreign countries
where we choose to intervene.
We have not yet fully validated our first
assumption in intervention philosophy
and management with our most important
constituent—the American people. The
assumption is that we will be doing more, not
less, of these and similar interventions in the
future.
We still persist in defining desired end states
in measurable and concrete terms rather than
accepting that simply changing from an old
process to a new process may be the best we
can hope for. We still persist in making bold
predictions of success. I believe in truth in
advertising. If regime change is itself the big
goal in the next intervention, then perhaps
all we should promise is regime change, not
stabilization and a democratic paradise. I am
not saying that delivering less is good, but if it
is the truth and it is all we’ve got to offer, then
perhaps we would make different decisions—
and promises—in the first place.
We unnecessarily couple our national prestige
and honor with lofty and unobtainable goals
such as democratization, even when the situation
demands a fresh perspective and a change
in course. In other words, we are rigid in our
approach to change in a regional environment
that is mostly fluid and largely beyond our
power to shape.
We do not yet have a U.S. Government selfimage or sense of identity as a true interagency
team functioning together at the capital, regional,
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and country/field levels as one. We do not yet
have the will to match sufficient resources with
problem-solvers in the field.
• We do not yet, as Americans, embrace prevention
of foreseeable problems. We are much more
prone to take risky, spectacular action to get the
horse back in the barn (crisis response) than to
maintain the patient, enlightened vigilance to
keep him from escaping in the first place. We
are not yet concerned enough as a society to
demand that our elected officials underwrite a
more balanced set of tools, both soft and hard.
As a result, our presidents have limited options
to choose from when facing sticky situations
abroad.
• We do not yet realize the atrophying effect of
the exponential growth of the Department of
Defense (DoD) over the past 50 years on the
rest of the interagency, and we certainly do not
know what to do about it. We do not yet have
an acceptable forum and methodology to bring
about the necessary and comprehensive changes
to the system.
• Finally, we do not yet realize that change
usually does not come from within. It usually
takes external agents to make things happen.
Moreover, we do not yet realize that change will
be measured in terms of decades, not months or
even years.
The foregoing are only a few of my thoughts as
channeled from my experiences in Iraq. They really
stirred me up. After considering what to do about all
this, I decided to retire from my 20-year career in the
military and throw all my efforts behind an effort to
reform the civilian-led interagency. I was encouraged by
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the atmosphere of reform and the ongoing efforts inside
the public and private sectors both in Washington, DC,
and in other capitals of our most active international
partners. I was not, however, convinced that any of
these efforts would ever get beyond addressing parts
of an unassailable whole.
I have since come to the view, however, that there
may indeed be a realistic vehicle for achieving an
authentic holistic approach to multiagency endeavors.
That vehicle is the Project on National Security Reform
(PNSR). A little over a year ago, I met and am now
fortunate to consider myself a senior advisor to Jim
Locher, who as a former Assistant Secretary of Defense
was the chief architect of the Goldwater/Nichols Act
of 1986. This Act unified the five military services into
a single DoD team. Locher has a history of bringing
about large organizational change successfully and
against all odds. He and I found ourselves to be fellow
travelers and have since created, along with a few other
key and committed colleagues, the PNSR.
The PNSR is an independent, nonpartisan,
whole-of-government project designed to study the
underlying problems preventing the U.S. Government
from formulating and executing a coherent national
security system. Its recommendations are intended
to be enshrined in a new National Security Act to
replace the last one dating back to 1947. Its findings
will focus on mechanisms, not policy, at the level of
government between, but not including, the President
and the Cabinet departments. Both the legislative
and executive branches will share equally in this
reform. If successful, we hope that it will continue in
a future phase to lead reforms inside the constituent
departments themselves.
The Project has attracted the support of the
office of the Senate Majority Leader and office of the
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Speaker of the House, as well as the interest of one
Republican House leader. Other notable congressional
members, both Republican and Democrat, have joined
a bicameral effort to fully fund the PNSR by the end of
2007. Additionally, some members of Congress have
expressed interest in holding hearings to help begin
the processes of attention-getting, familiarization, and
education on the key issues and obstacles to reform.
The Project has maintained an active dialogue with the
National Security Council (NSC) staff. We have key
officials, such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, ready
to support fully our efforts once the NSC determines
the proper roles for the Joint Chiefs to play. We have 13
working teams, with a combined strength of over 160
pro bono experts from a number of the most prominent
think tanks and universities already working on issues
for the study. Finally, we have a stalwart group of
senior advisors like Brent Scowcroft, Wesley Clark,
Norman Augustine, and Newt Gingrich to keep us
straight and offer guidance as needed.
Our effort is in dead earnest, and the possibilities
for success, including the chief objective of writing into
law a new National Security Act, are very real. But the
scene is Washington, and we will need all the help we
can get. I hope those reading this chapter will consider
the possibility of encouraging their U.S. Senators and
Representatives to support our cause.
The PNSR was borne of necessity. Hear it from Jim
Locher himself:
The U.S. national security system is broken and we have
compelling evidence from 9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Hurricane Katrina that this is true. Yet, the problem has
been longstanding, occurring almost imperceptibly over
the past 40-50 years. It has not been a problem of any
one administration, political party, or set of leaders and
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the problem has defied solutions for decades. A number
of projects have tried to reform various aspects of the
problem and have fallen short. What is different today is
that the magnitude of recent setbacks has created great
urgency and a broad consensus in the national security
community to make the needed fixes.
You may ask what is the problem exactly. There are
two problems really: First—Our departments in the
executive branch are unable to look horizontally across
the interagency to act as a team. More complex, rapidlypaced national security missions now require more
timely and effective integration of the expertise and
capabilities of many departments at once. Today, these
departments and agencies remain too stove-piped, with
strong barriers to integration including a lack of common
procedures and limited shared education and training,
all leading to the creation of ad hoc organizations and
planning during crisis. For example, we can observe
that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is being
handled in the Departments of Justice, State, Defense,
Treasury, and Homeland Security, plus many elements
of the Intelligence Community, to name only a few.
Yet even today, we cannot work across departments to
produce unity of effort in policy formulation, planning,
and execution on this important issue. Consequently,
we see departments increasingly more concerned with
inputs to reinforce their own cultural biases and less
concerned on measuring the success of their outputs to
the greater good. In the end, the U.S. government must
begin to think like an interagency and not like separate
departments.
Let me cite some of the major problems that are
undermining just the reconstruction and stabilization
aspects of our national security system: there has been no
formal shifting of resources to permit civilian departments
and agencies to develop the required capacities; the lead
agency concept has repeatedly proven to be ineffective;
each department continues to pursue its own agenda;
differing agency cultures and mistrust dominate and
thwart incentives for a more integrated approach;
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there are no organizational or personnel incentives to
serve in reconstruction and stabilization operations;
Congress continues to send mixed signals on funding
such new capabilities; no single, tangible congressional
constituency exits for transagency reconstruction and
stabilization issues; and poor cross-agency information
sharing persists.
The second general problem in need of radical reform
is the inequity of funding distribution amongst the
departments and agencies. Let me offer one astonishing
anecdote to make this point. There are 6,000 Foreign
Service officers in the entire DoS while there are over
11,000 lawyers alone in the DoD. What does this say
about the need to rebalance our budgeting priorities?
These same inequities have led to the creation of weak
expeditionary cultures incapable of effectively deploying
and performing implementation missions abroad. One
great example some of you may have heard of recently
was the State Department’s inability to man Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The DoS has, instead, requested that the DoD fill in the
missing bodies with military personnel. This, on the
dawn of our 5th year in Iraq.

So what to do about it? Every long journey begins
with the first step, and our first step will have to be
taken in both mind and spirit. We will need to get our
heads and hearts fully into the idea of radical change
first, and this begins with admitting that there is a
problem of significant proportions. If, for argument’s
sake, one buys into Locher’s statement that there is
such a problem, then the next step is to internalize
the mandate for change. Readers can determine for
themselves whether what they have heard and seen
recently in America, and indeed around the world,
infuses them with any sense of urgency. Next, we need
to build a coalition of supporters and advocates who
share a compelling and attractive vision of where we
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need to go. We will speak of this vision later, but first I
want to speak of the advocates.
The most important advocates for radical change
reside within the U.S. Congress, but they do not all
know it yet. As the legislative heart of this democracy,
the Congress is, in my opinion, actually more than an
equal partner to the executive branch when it comes to
reforming our government. The U.S. Constitution gives
Congress its authorities and responsibilities in Article
I, while the Presidency is described subsequently in
Article II. Moreover, it is the Capitol building that
occupies the place of honor at the head of the National
Mall. I believe the Founding Fathers designed this
scheme deliberately and so charged the Congress
literally and figuratively with the chief responsibility
for ensuring effective national governance across its
breadth and depth and providing oversight as it deems
necessary. The power of the people’s purse remains
the true catalyst for change. Moreover, long-term
changes should not be subjected to backing and filling
at the whims of revolving administrations and political
personalities. Consequently, it is law, complemented
by executive policy, that must instigate and perpetuate
new and radical government modification.
It is thus safe to say that the Congress must be
the centerpiece for any radical reform of the U.S.
Government. In spite of tremendous efforts, however,
Congress has increasingly less time or institutional
capacity to devote adequate attention to the myriad of
high-priority issues on its plate, let alone to tackle such
sweeping requirements as large-scale governmental
reforms. It is therefore equally clear that for Congress
to even begin to grasp the full extent of the task that
lies before it, it must be educated on the nature of such
reforms. The PNSR has begun this process informally
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and hopes to continue during full congressional
hearings in the near future.
It is important to acknowledge that in this effort to
educate on government reform, Washington is already
inundated in recommendations from key institutions
and individuals in the form of testimony, books,
reports, blogs, articles, studies, and the like. Yet none
of these efforts alone has provided the kind of broad
education, consensus-building, in-depth analysis, or
political inducement that will be necessary for radical
change. In most cases, these efforts lacked enough
buy-in within the wider U.S. Government interagency
team in Washington, let alone within the American
citizenry, to bring about anything more than piecemeal
tinkering. This result has led to what I call an era of
micro-reforms, a little bit here and there originating
from narrow stove-piped interests.
Educating Congress and the wider interagency
community also includes building agreement on the
fundamental problems truly lying, at the heart of the
matter. Many so-called “important” problems of today
are, in fact, only symptoms of those authentically
earth-shaking problems lying down below the tectonic
plates. Even more vital, we have to identify and clearly
describe the root causes of these deeper problems.
The education of Congress as our primary change
agent will also require articulating a new understanding of many aspects of the current world in which
we live. Getting a sense of this new world, I believe,
begins with acceptance that ours is now, for better or
for worse, a world of interconnectedness. We, as part
of that world, are simply one system in a system of
systems. When one begins to look at a problem such as
civil-military Stability and Reconstruction Operations
(S&R) in venues around the globe, or at national security
326

within the international arena, one quickly realizes
that it may be impossible to change one part of this
connected system without addressing changes to other
parts of other systems. In other words, the environment
is interconnected in more ways than immediately meet
the eye, and we must deal with all relevant connections
to effect lasting and coherent reforms.
With the Department of State (DoS) and the DoD
struggling to make progress on these and other issues,
one might think that the NSC would step in with
added clout to ensure that a competent and functioning
interagency is ready to respond to the President’s
wishes. However, that isn’t the case. With a few notable
exceptions, the NSC has chosen over the past decades
to act as the President’s advisory council rather than to
oversee the management of the interagency. As a result,
the departments are bereft of a team concept, and have
little interdepartmental consensus on problems, causes,
or the systems environment. Left to their own devices,
the departments struggle to make meaningful progress
on policy but are utterly incapable of producing lasting
cross-departmental reforms.
The appointment of a War Czar is just the latest
symptom of an unworkable system bursting at the
seams. In all fairness, with the executive branch’s
good-faith attempts to reform from within, to include
creation of the Homeland Security and Intelligence
Departments along with several other lesser known
reorganizations, the NSC’s passivity with regard to
integrating the interagency may have reflected its
conclusion that the final solutions would need to come
from even broader approaches led from the outside.
It is unlikely, however, that this very tired NSC will
have the stomach for any such outside approaches at
the close of the Bush tenure.
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Making matters even more difficult, the supposed
apostles of the Chief Executive’s political will, the
3,000-plus Presidential political appointees spread
throughout Washington, are rarely allowed to think
in terms of long-term change or systems thinking
awareness. They are instead expected to run things
today, period. The typical measure of success for a
political appointee is often how responsively he or
she manages the immediate priorities of the President.
Moreover, many of our cabinet secretaries have
historically been former chief executive officers (CEOs)
whose very natures are to be competitive rather than
collaborative. Perhaps a new model for a cabinet
secretary might usefully be contemplated.
In addition to Congress, the Presidential candidates
themselves deserve special attention as potentially
powerful advocates in this coming season of change,
so that they too need to be educated. As both the future
head of government and the heir apparent to ownership
of the principal “bully pulpit,” the next President
should have much to say about these proposed reforms.
Through campaign debates and jousts with the news
media, the process of education has already begun. It
is hoped that through their campaign statements to the
electorate, these candidates will help build momentum
at the grass roots level for radical change.
The challenges of educating and recruiting our
coalition of change and overcoming the inertial forces
embedded in the current political system overall are
daunting but surmountable. The next challenge—
creating a compelling vision of where we want to
go—may be just as important and difficult. We begin
the visioning process by reviewing the character and
content of that venerable phrase and namesake of the
entire effort—“National Security.”
328

What is National Security exactly? We certainly
cannot reform it if we can’t define it. National Security
ranks right up there with Democracy and Freedom
as America’s sacred touchstone values, and we are
coming up with some interesting new approaches
to how to think about it. For example, if one were to
think of all the national security issues as being held
in a single basket, one could see that this basket might
be filled with an incredible number of issues ranging
from terrorism to the education of our children. But if
we were to separate those issues into different baskets
according to some criterion for prioritizing, then we
might begin to think more creatively about a system
for addressing each of these different baskets with a
properly discriminating degree of emphasis instead of
treating every single security need as if the sky will fall
if it is not lavishly funded.
If those baskets were to be arranged in some order
of importance from least to most, one could then start
to see a distinction forming between those issues for
which the U.S. Government should be most organized
to handle and those that might not deserve the same
amount of attention. For example, if we assume that
one of the prioritizing criteria is the frequency of a
particular National Security challenge, then one might
think about arranging our more permanent national
security structures, budgets, personnel programs,
planning capabilities, etc., to address these most
persistent issues. We might also think of arranging
less permanent or more nimble structures, budgets,
personnel programs, and planning capabilities for
dealing with the less frequently recurring issues.
Such an arrangement of dedicated organizational
structures to address the most persistent concerns
while maintaining more versatile structures for the
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shifting involvements of a more transient nature exists
today within parts of the government and the private
sector. In the military, this concept is called Modularity,
and the Marines are a living testament to its value. In
the corporate world, it is called Mass Customization,
and no one does it better than Toyota. No matter
what you call it, Modularity or Mass Customization,
it is a worthy transformational idea but one whose
ramifications would be seen as highly threatening by
today’s entrenched government bureaucracies.
Let me stir the pot a bit more with my next
visioning idea. I want to move from structuring
organizations and institutions to the subject of people
and leadership. I believe that non-DoD government
civilian leadership with corresponding authority to
make decisions and vector resources on behalf of the
entire U.S. Government in the field has waned in recent
crises almost to the point of extinction. If one buys
into the idea that the field is where we create in the
hearts and minds of foreigners the first and perhaps
most lasting impression of ourselves as Americans,
then he/she can see that the conspicuous absence of
civilian leaders is crucial. There are many reasons for
their absence, not least of which is the decades-long
ascendancy of the professional military as the chief
widget in our Presidents’ national security tool box.
For a number of well-intended reasons, the DoD has
created a presence that pervades foreign interventions
with a capacity far outstripping that of any other U.S.
department or agency.
This particular issue is very important. It has
resulted in a steady decline in non-DoD civilian
leadership as measured by who makes the decisions
and who has and can apply or distribute resources. As
a result, we must reexamine this leadership challenge
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to develop new roles and authorities for civilians in
crisis environments. Reinvigorating the government’s
civilian roles would also, in my estimation, reconnect
the American people more unambiguously to their
civilian policymakers and policies in the field in more
tangible and accountable ways. Because of the major
impact of leadership on all future systems, without
this one change and all the benefits that would flow
therefrom, interagency reform in the National Security
arena may never be fully realized.
Consequently, in the reformed milieu, empowered
civilian leaders must emerge capable of prosecuting to
the fullest extent their responsibility to represent what
is best about America, regardless of the risks involved.
It is the civilian who is the chief custodian of everything
free citizens hold dear. Yet, even the venerable
Ambassador has found it hard to maintain his/her
presence at the table. This has created the unintended
consequence of reinforcing a DoD juggernaut while
undermining the confidence of the U.S. Government
civil servant to take on these missions and lead in a
way the military is willing to follow. In sum, the roles
and responsibilities of civilians must be at the center of
our reform efforts.
It is true that few positive U.S. examples of what
I am suggesting exist. However, this lack should not
preclude a presumption of new possibilities. There
are sound principles upon which we could build such
a new cadre of civilian leaders. We need to discover
these principles and their underlying values and then
determine the appropriate strategies for implementing
such a new American vision for its civil servants.
Another unintended consequence of this lack of
civilian leadership is the creation of the myriad and
ambiguous so-called “transition points” during foreign
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engagements at which control is to be handed off from
the military to civilians. These are points that civilians
should never have relinquished to the military in the first
place. Eliminating such transition or hand-off points
by retaining responsibilities firmly and continuously
in the hands of civilians would be a major triumph of
efficiency and a development welcome to a redefined
and refocused interagency machine.
To support this emerging civilian cadre, new
civilian and military cultures will have to take root.
For example, the primacy that the military places
on “doing” is a powerful element of its culture, and
the U.S. Government civilian will have to develop a
similar capability. A “doing” culture possesses aspects
of organizational energy at all levels from strategic to
tactical, but it boils down to ensuring that the sum total
of those processes and actions will achieve direct effects
on its intended recipients in the field whether foreign or
domestic.
Make no mistake, the notion of a more robust civilian
authority in the field where it counts would have ripple
effects backwards and forwards throughout the whole
of government in Washington. The creation of new
career paths, promotions schemes in the interagency
community, and reform of purposes and structures
throughout the national agencies themselves are but a
few of these potential effects. It will also take a paradigm
shift in the way we fund our national security team. Yet,
even a modest percent of the DoD budget reallocated
to other key departments and agencies, perhaps the
cost of one carrier group, would provide a thousandfold increase in the current application of other U.S.
Government instruments of peace and security.
Another vision of the kind we have in mind with
the PNSR can be shown by example. This particular
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hypothetical example is most often used by Jim Locher
to illustrate the tremendous breadth of the study effort.
The private sector learned years ago how to organize
and manage its resources in order to stay competitive. It
learned that problems often present themselves in ways
that demand a team approach rather than one based
on stovepiped, or independent, subordinate elements.
Yet, instead of doing away with the stovepipes, e.g., the
traditional human resources, operations, and finance
offices, altogether, they simply added horizontal
teams to their organization. These teams might align
to a specific function of, say, customer satisfaction or
product quality control. This new horizontal team
concept was so-named because it provided a place for
members from across the other stovepipes to come
together horizontally and participate in solving a
common problem together.
The DoD used some of the same reasoning to
create its horizontal teams called the Combatant
Commanders. The military had observed that the
five services were increasingly stressed by coming
together time and again in ad hoc ways to respond to
world problems. It came to realize that a permanent
institutionalized team concept was required. And
just as the private sector did, instead of eliminating
the stovepipe services, it simply added the horizontal
team. The Regional Combatant Commanders became
the locus where the DoD stovepipes came together
from across the five services to address world problems
such as relief efforts, stabilization missions, and war
itself, as a team.
In the business world and in the DoD, formalizing
the horizontal team approach also changed the
long-standing power and influence of the venerable
stovepipes. The horizontal chiefs became more
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influential than the stovepipe chiefs because the
stovepipes served only to train and equip the horizontal teams. The horizontal teams became the new doers
and the favorite sons of the grreater organization.
For example, during a crisis, the President directs all
military actions around the globe by speaking directly
to the Combatant Commanders rather than through
each of the five service chiefs, even though they all
wear four stars on their shoulders. The five service
chiefs became the supporting elements, not the leading
elements of this arrangement.
This has been a positive development in
organizational design for both the DoD and the
international business community. One may now see
a possible extrapolation from this concept into the
wider U.S. national security system. For example, one
can now imagine a government wherein the cabinet
secretaries act simply as the resource providers while
newly created horizontal team chiefs become the new
doers responsible directly to the President in time of
crisis. In fact, it is hard to imagine a huge government
in a world full of untidy concerns such as GWOT,
nonproliferation, counterdrug trafficking, pandemic
health relief, and stability operations that lacks a
horizontal team approach to solve these problems.
The stovepipes simply cannot keep up anymore,
and new leadership alone cannot make up the
difference. The time is now at hand for the U.S.
Government to consider a more wholesale adaptation
of the horizontal team approach to its national security
system. As always, this will require an equal adjustment
in the congressional oversight and funding functions,
but nothing short of this will ever allow the emergence
of a bureaucracy capable of bringing full coherency to
national security strategies of future Presidents.
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Of course, election season is upon us, with an
administration tired and on the ropes. However, as
reported by my colleague who has been working the
Hill for us on these and other issues, several members
from both parties believe that the timing may be exactly
right for the following reasons: (1) the White House and
the Congress are of different parties, setting the stage
for a resolution where no party agenda completely
dominates. The soil is thus fertile for change, with
everything now on the table; (2) for the first time in
50 years, neither the president nor the vice president
is running for office, thus leaving party members in
the Congress free to take a more independent path on
issues such as reform; (3) many members of Congress
are running for President, and seeking an issue ripe
with promise for giving them a distinctive edge; and
(4) the threats to national security are urgent and
palpable in the minds of the American people now,
with expectations high that future attacks are likely.
Of course, as always, one alternative is to do
nothing. If that occurs, here is the likely scenario. A
new administration takes office and within 3-6 months
will consider the previous administration’s blunders
to have been mostly about leadership. It will convince
itself that the new leadership can remedy the problems,
or at least should be given that chance. At about the 2-3
year mark, it will begin to realize that the problem is
systemic and that it will take more than just leadership
to solve it. Accordingly, the administration will use the
only tool it has at hand, issuing Presidential Directives
to the Executive Departments to make small piecemeal
adjustments.
History tells us that these future political appointees
heading departments will learn, as scores of their
predecessors learned, that the Presidential Directive is
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often virtually nugatory because it lacks the power of
the purse behind it. Departments thus ultimately bow to
their budgetary masters in Congress. History also tells
us that few, if any, Presidential Directives ever survive
beyond the term of that President. At about the 5-6
year mark, if the administration is still in office, it will
finally come to the realization that the problems are of
a nature such that they exceed the healing capabilities
of the Presidential Directive and will begin to consider
external assistance to bring about the radical systemic
changes necessary for the system of systems to get on
track. By this time, however, it departs office, leaving
the next administration to start the whole stultifying
process over again.
And so the seasons for potential change in both
the Legislative and the Executive Branches come and
go like comets in their distant orbits. Fortunately,
however, we now understand the larger issue so that
a resolution lies in mustering the will to act upon what
we know. There is much to be done, and we must
never allow our national adversaries’ fanatical sense
of urgency to dampen our own sense of urgency for
doing the necessaries. We must act now. That is why
the Project on National Security Reform must succeed.
I hope that readers will join us in this vital cause.
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CHAPTER 11
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION:
INTERAGENCY RHETORIC AND CONSISTENT
INTERPRETATION
Amanda Smith
The importance of civil-military communication
and coordination is widely acknowledged and
vigorously pursued. But is it effective and functioning
as intended? The new counterinsurgency (COIN) field
manual, FM 3-24, states, “[T]he integration of civilian
and military efforts is crucial, and calls for ‘a formal
command and control system’.”1 However, is the
rhetoric that outlines the systems for such integration
articulated in a clear manner and calculated to ensure
compliance?
In the past 15 years, the U.S. Government has had
the opportunity to test its answers to these questions
on several occasions. Conflicts of a dynamic nature
such as those in Somalia and the current conflict in Iraq
have demanded that prompt and adaptive strategies be
communicated from the interagency to the military in
an effective and consistent manner. Policy directives,
such as Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56)
and National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD44), have attempted to lay out the procedures for
meeting this need, but have proven to be reactive and,
at times, ambiguous and contradictory. The present
analysis examines leadership theory and practice by
assessing theories of communication and assessment,
as well as the government experiences with conflict
that have influenced the formation of these two key
documents. The purpose of this research is to achieve
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understanding of communications theory and practice;
review relevant case studies of lessons learned; and
offer recommendations for improving interagency
effectiveness. As one senior U.S. Government official
stated, “Good interagency won’t save bad strategy.”2
The present analysis suggests, however, that no matter
how good or bad the strategy, there is no hope for
successful implementation if the strategy and policy are
not clearly communicated. Clear statements of policy
are essential for an effective interagency process.
Effective interagency coordination and cooperation
are a sine qua non for successful governmentwide involvement in stability operations.
The
multidimensional nature of support and stability
operations (SASO) demonstrates what is referred to
as “marble-cake governance.” According to authors
Robert Klitgaard and Gregory Treverton, the U.S.
Government is experiencing a transition “from layercake governance, where different tasks are taken
on separately by different sectors (public, private,
nonprofit), to marble-cake governance, with new
forms of partnerships across sectors at all levels.”3
This transition has not been seamless, however, and
the challenges are manifested in the current tensions
between the Departments of Defense and State.4 The
demands of SASO require that interagency rhetoric and
communication clearly advance the coordination lying
at the heart of successful interagency policymaking
processes.
Theory In Action.
It is not surprising that Washington policymakers
often lack the time to analyze the theoretical basis for
rhetoric and policy. Nevertheless, a large body of
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literature that addresses the theories of communication, coordination, and networking is available to guide
policymakers. Organizational, rhetorical, and communications theory offer the opportunity to examine
political communications processes at a fundamental
level. Bureaucracy and interagency politics usually
influence the communication and coordination
processes, which are outlined in official documents.
However, for analytical purposes, it is valuable to
distinguish these influences from what the theories
themselves have to offer. We can then see more
clearly how official rhetoric for communication and
coordination can best be implemented to achieve
effective results.
For instance, complexity theory provides a fresh
way to look at how an organization conducts selfassessments. The strength of the theory, when applied
to government organizations, is that it takes into account
the inevitable change and adaptation that are necessary
to characterize government organizations. According
to Philip Salem, “complexity theory describes the
interactive and evolutionary processes of organizational
development.”5 While the theory addresses change
within an organization, it does so without making
the subjective determination of whether the change is
good or bad.6 When applied to a dynamic interagency
process, this theory allows an organization to install
the mechanisms for institutionalizing the process of
future change. The aim is to arrive at a culture that
welcomes constructive change rather than fears it.7
While complexity theory stands apart from other
theories due to its focus on change, it also builds
upon other forms of assessment which may be used
in an organization. Structural assessment assumes
that analysis within an organization can be done at a
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point in time and will produce recurring and repeating
assessments by means of formal feedback loops that are
built into the permanent structure of the organization.
Functional assessment ties activity to outcome in a
manner linking communication with its psychological
impact. Functional assessment does not take into
account variables such as quality or quantity, only
psychological impacts and perception. Finally, process
assessment is based on information gathered over time
and may include analysis of structural and functional
areas, but often strongly prioritizes stability.8
While these theories address key elements of
assessment, Salem feels that they do not adequately
account for the dynamic nature characterizing
organizations of today.9 The undeniable dynamic
nature of SASO and the complexity of the interagency
process demand a theory that can be applied in times of
change and adaptation. The assessment today may be
dramatically different tomorrow. Therefore, Salem’s
complexity model posits that change and adaptation
are no longer exceptions or events which dramatically
change the manner in which an organization assesses
itself. Rather, change is a norm addressed in a cyclical
fashion representing only “points in the flow.”10
Essentially, change becomes a repeated and anticipated
by-product of the organization’s activity. The change is
expressed in an endless stream of small shuffles rather
than rare and broadly spaced giant bounds.
In Salem’s complexity model, differences in perception
and assessment are embraced. No two evaluations of
the situation are the same. Therefore, evaluations are
used only as a tool with which to further assess the
point at which events occur, because these points are
more useful for understanding than the event itself.
Noting the point at which the change occurred allows
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for assessment in communication from a top-down
and bottom-up manner because change can occur at
anytime and at any point in the hierarchy.11
Salem’s theory is useful for understanding
interagency communication and coordination because
it addresses two key elements of governmental
coordination: change and adaptation. These two
elements are the norm, not the exception, and events
occur at different levels of the hierarchy. The rhetoric
of U.S. Government official documents needs to
embody a flexibility reflecting the evolving nature of
member organizations and addressing the demand
for flexibility at all levels, not just in Washington and
not just in the field. Whether or not current official
documents recognize this need will be addressed
later.
While adaptive assessment is necessary in SASO, it
is not sufficient simply to tailor communications in a
manner that adapts itself to change. Communication
must also be used in a manner which takes into
account the people addressed. Institutional policy and
procedure often make it difficult for an organization
to do so—the policies and procedures result in
faulty rhetoric that fails to take account of the needs
of an audience. More specifically, “the traditional
communication texts rely on social psychology to the
neglect of cognitive psychology, and they emphasize
matters of style and format over considerations of
audience, context, purpose (particularly when there
are multiple or tacit objectives for a given document)”
and seek to reach an audience that is “influenced,
manipulated, or informed according to design.”12
In government agencies, bureaucratic policy
and procedure often dictate the rhetorical form and
manner. Style and format are, of course, useful and
necessary, but should not be given priority over
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careful contemplation of the time and the audience.13
Communication should be tailored not in an effort
to conform to rules and guidelines, but rather in an
attempt to be transmissible effectively, accurately, and
deliberately. These requirements necessitate a different
approach to rhetoric that take into account the concept
of social knowledge.
Social knowledge refers to a “zone of relevance”
which addresses the fact that different groups will
react to rhetoric in different manners based upon the
experiences and knowledge of the specific group.14
This principle can be applied to the interagency process
where it is important to ensure that communication
and rhetoric are designed in a manner which takes into
account the varying social knowledge and cultures
of the agencies involved. If interpretation within
an organization can vary, it most certainly can vary
between agencies with different missions and social
knowledge.
Interagency Communication and Decision
Processes.
Building upon communication and assessment
theory addresses the intricacies of communication and
coordination within the interagency itself. They reflect
an understanding of the dynamics at work within
the government and seek to address communication
issues and challenges without taking a specific event or
issue into consideration. No value judgment is made
regarding the quality of the strategy or policy.
Although shared interpretation between agencies
arguably improves over time, there are still challenges
to interpreting mission and objectives,15 given the
inherently different cultures and social knowledge
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of the agencies. When interagency officials gather—
whether it be to discuss the drafting of policy
documents or strategy--gaining consensus, across the
board participation, and understanding is often quite
difficult. Also, each agency brings to the table different
views, perceptions, and understanding which render
problematic the development of rhetoric that creates
common interpretation.
Varying social knowledge among agencies hinders
coordination efforts.16 Social knowledge manifests
itself in preferences, interpretations, and strategic
outlooks. Despite communication patterns that “tend
to change over the life cycle of a crisis, becoming more
structured over time as formalized, issue-specific
chains of command (within both [State and Defense]
departments) are clarified,”17 the goal should be to
construct command documents for the interagency
team as efficiently as possible from the beginning.
The first, and perhaps most important, issue arising
from differing social knowledge is that of differing
terminological interpretation. Rhetoric varies among
agencies, creating a situation in which meanings vary
due to variations in organizational culture.18 Such
variation can potentially create a climate in which the
wording of a prescriptive document is agreed upon but
interpreted differently. For example, the Department of
Defense (DoD) may interpret the phrase “by all means
necessary” differently from the State Department.
Varying social knowledge is a symptom of the
inherent difference between agency missions in
a common endeavor: “To overcome significant
differences . . . collaborating agencies must have a
clear and compelling rationale to work together.”19
Manifestly, the State Department and DoD have very
different individual missions which translate into
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different approaches to rhetoric formation. Even if
strategic goals are understood, agreement upon the
rhetoric articulating that strategy may not be possible.
Vicki Rask points out this disconnect in recalling the
“State Department’s and the NSC [National Security
Council] Staff’s implicit demand for ambiguity and
flexibility [which] clashes with Defense’s explicit drive
for clarity and precision” in orders issued to soldiers on
the ground.20 This functional difference leads Defense
officials to express outrage at the perceived vagueness
of the State Department’s call for DoD assistance,
and frustration on the part of the State Department at
Defense’s demand for precision and its “unyielding”
attitude.21 Disagreements such as these lead to
disgruntlement and thwart constructive debate.
The struggle between the cultures of the State
Department and DoD is not confined to Washington.
As the President’s personal representative, the intheater ambassador is responsible for “exercise[ing]
full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and
supervision of all executive branch officers in [the
country], except for personnel under the command of
a U.S. area military commander. . . .”22 Coordination
efforts between agencies in the field require
understanding the objective and mission as well as the
culture of the other organizations. An adaptation of a
chart included by Dr. Gabriel Marcella in the U.S. Army
War College Guide to National Security Policy, which
highlights some of these key differences and how they
affect the military and civil agencies’ perceptions of the
other, is shown in Figure 1.
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Military Officers

Foreign Service Officers

Physical action more
important than written word

Written word essential for
diplomacy

Doctrine is important

Doctrine is not important

Focus on end states, plans,
and courses of action

Focus on the process without a
specific end state expected

Core functions conducted
Core functions conducted by
by lower level officials (i.e.
officers
enlisted personnel and NCOs)
Dislike of ambiguity

Ambiguity is ok

Leadership is composed of
career military officials

Leadership is a mixture of
career F.S. officers, politicians,
academics, etc.

Diverse aspects of SASO are
of growing importance

Diverse aspects of SASO are of
growing importance

Focus on training

Training is not the focus

Officers oversee large
numbers of personnel

Officers oversee others in
their core area (i.e. political,
economic, etc.)

Figure 1. Comparing Military Officers and Foreign
Service Officers.23
When agencies are wary of what they take to be the
misguided traits and outlooks inherent in another’s
culture, not only will debate be jaundiced from the start,
but unhealthy work-arounds may be implemented
which impede the flow of correct information. The
Iraq Study Group Report recognized the need for a
free flow of information and opinions, calling for “an
environment in which the senior military feel free
to offer independent advice not only to the civilian
leadership in the Pentagon but also to the President
and the National Security Counsel, as envisioned in
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation.”24 When practices
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such as these are not encouraged and adhered to, then
there arises hoarding of information where “expertise
[or dialogue] is traded for secrecy.” 25 It becomes more
tempting to reason that other agency representatives
lack the need to know.
These practices can lead to seriously incomplete
information which, in turn, causes breakdowns when
it comes time to put strategy and rhetoric into action.
A senior DoD official has stated, “[The] key is for all
the principals to have the perspective across the board
and to understand the whole issue.”26 This is easier
said than done. If there is a lack of coordination at the
principal level, then leaders cannot understand the
whole issue, and communication with lower ranks
becomes impossible. And if it is impossible for leaders
to communicate clearly within their own organizations,
there is certainly no hope of clear communication at
the operational level among organizations. A lack of
clear communication will destroy the coordination
objectives and missions of SASO.
A final challenge to interagency cooperation is
the memory of “how it’s always been done.” A State
Department official said, “For everyone who wishes to
walk through the gates of the future, the path is blocked
by 10,000 guardians of the past.”27 The U.S. Government
is urgently trying to adjust to the demands of SASO
but finds itself struggling. Since combat operations are
historically run by the military, it is easy to default to
the military when combat is a possibility. But the very
nature of DoD’s mission in counterinsurgency warfare
makes the military ill-equipped to handle all of the
challenges of SASO.
The interagency must constantly battle the
temptation to default to military plans and simply
“adapt” old plans to fit new challenges. This temptation
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is destructive to the needs of SASO as there is a tendency
to rely upon the military “because they’ve done this
before,” while at the same time acknowledging that
what has been done in SASO before has not always
been effective.
In a results-oriented agency like the military,
contingency plans abound and may often be deferred
to in time of crisis simply due to their existence and
apparent applicability. Such a default preempts
any effort to develop firm coordination based upon
a commonly understood strategy and to develop
clear rhetoric which will allow those strategies to be
implemented at the operational level.
Before moving on to an analysis of the current
official documents stipulating the methods by which
the interagency must function and communicate in
SASO, let us examine key historical cases which have
helped to bring the interagency process to where it is
today.
The United States in Support and Stability
Operations: A Historical Perspective.
After World War II, the United States began its
involvement in what is widely considered its first truly
large-scale attempt at SASO when it occupied and
rebuilt Germany and Japan. Since 1945, there have been
55 “peace operations,” 41 of which began after the end
of the Cold War.28 These conflicts, or operations, have
been called many things, including peace operations,
nation-building, and support and stability operations.
U.S. participation has been a constant and will likely
continue to be so for this nation for many years to come.
In fact, according to James Dobbins, “nation-building
. . . is the inescapable responsibility of the world’s only
superpower.”29
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In post-World War II Germany, the United States
assumed the role of “stabilizer” and “rebuilder.”
Historical documents reflect the challenges of this role
from the start. The Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-5, established on April 1, 1946, was tasked with
a variety of coordination and oversight functions.30
Soon after, the office came to a fuller realization of
the complexity of its task. In response to shifting
organizational frameworks, the G-5 acknowledged
on August 29, 1945, that the dynamics of the situation
in Germany were new and challenging for a conflictfocused military. Specifically, it noted that “certain
matters will continue to require combined coordination
by some other agency. . . . Displaced Persons operations
should not be considered as a peculiarly Military
Government function.”31
In an organization which had spent the previous
several years focused on military victory, the new
objective of stability through rebuilding, providing
humanitarian assistance, and reestablishing governments proved immensely challenging. In fact, a working paper prepared during the Clinton administration
acknowledged, “No civilian organization, however,
could match the Army’s ability to organize and impose
stability in an environment as desperate as that of
postwar Germany.”32 The United States realized that
it was involved in a new type of operation, one which
demanded coordination and clear communication
among agencies to achieve the common objective
of stability. Despite great efforts over the years, the
process by which the interagency coordinates still
remains relevant, as evinced by the many SASO
operations since World War II and the current conflict
in Iraq.
Postwar Germany demonstrated the challenges of
interagency coordination in its infancy. However, this
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model varies from many of the operations in which the
United States has since participated, in that the Allies
were the occupiers and temporary government in
Germany. Subsequently, the United States has had to
operate as an outside force with a shorter-term mission.
Somalia is an example of such a situation, which
provides a more representative case for understanding
the challenges posed by SASO and which must
be overcome for success. Somalia was a learning
experience because it occurred prior to the issuance of
Presidential Decision Directive-56, the document that
attempted to establish the lines of communication and
control to be used by the interagency in future support
operations. Let us glance at Somalia in greater depth.
Civilian/Military Communication Prior to PDD-56:
Lessons from Somalia.
Somalia was an eye-opening experience for the
United States and the world.33 The United States was
forced to move beyond its battle-driven strategies of
the past and confront a new kind of conflict head-on.
What it learned and experienced in Somalia in those
early years of the 1990s has deeply impacted the manner
in which the U.S. Government looks at conflict. The
various phases of the conflict demonstrated repeated
attempts to “get it right” and “wrap it up” as quickly
as possible. The failure of this attempt is enshrined in
the minds of many Americans with the brutal images
appearing in the film and book, Black Hawk Down.
Somalia taught the United States the potential dangers
of “peacekeeping,” which in turn created a narrow
window of tolerance by the American people for
SASO. This sentiment further created a demand that if
the United States gets in, it must get it done right and
get out.
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In 1991, competition for power erupted into conflict
in the African nation of Somalia. Major General
Muhammad Said Barre was overthrown as national
leader, resulting in a struggle for power among the
clans. In the midst of the chaos and conflict, two
prominent figures rose to the top and competed for
power: General Mohamed Farah and Ali Mahdi
Mohamed.34
Food and water shortages compounded the
suffering created by the conflict itself. Somalia typically
receives less than 20 inches of rain annually. However,
abnormally low levels of rainfall for many years had
created a drought in much of East Africa in the early
1990s. This drought plagued Somalia, leaving the
nation with little food and water. In fact, in some areas
these basic necessities were not obtainable at all.35 By
the early months of 1992, some 500,000 Somalis had
died from starvation, and hundreds of thousands more
were in danger of the same.36
In April of 1992, the world responded to the
humanitarian crisis in East Africa. The United Nations
(UN) Security Council approved Resolution 751, which
authorized the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM
I).37 Fifty observers and 500 light infantry soldiers
were sent to Somalia to lend assistance, but failed to
stave off famine. In response, President George H. W.
Bush ordered the U.S. military to support UNOSOM
I’s mission through Operation PROVIDE RELIEF
which commenced on August 15, 1992. This Central
Command (CENTCOM)-organized response was
commanded by Brigadier General Frank Libutti, U.S.
Marine Corps, with the mission to “provide military
assistance in support of emergency humanitarian
relief to Kenya and Somalia.” Its objectives were to
“deploy a Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team
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(HAST) to assess relief requirements in Kenya and
Somalia; activate a Joint Task Force (JTF) to conduct
an emergency airlift of food and supplies into Somalia
and Northern Kenya; and deploy four C-141 aircraft
and eight C-130 aircraft to Mombasa and Wajir, Kenya,
to provide daily relief sorties into Somalia to locations
that provided a permissive and safe environment.”38 It
was an expansive mission from the start.
UNOSOM I and Operation PROVIDE RELIEF
failed, and on December 4, 1992, with the mandate of
UN Security Council Resolution 794, President George
H. W. Bush announced the beginning of Operation
RESTORE HOPE under the command of Lieutenant
General Robert B. Johnston, USMC. The U.S. role
in the conflict expanded dramatically at this point,
as it would now lead and provide military support
to the multilateral United Task Force (UNITAF).39
While the overall strategic objectives of this new
operation remained humanitarian and stabilizational,
the CENTCOM mission statement was revised and
expanded to read:
When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will
conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia
to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations
and food distribution points, to provide open and free
passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys
and relief organization operations, and assist UN/
NGOs [nongovernment organizations] in providing
humanitarian relief under UN auspices.
Upon
establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted
relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers
relief operations to UN peacekeeping forces.40

The operation proved to be relatively successful as
the 38,000 troops, of which 28,000 were American
forces, were able to increase stability and security and
mitigate starvation in many areas.41 However, despite
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the continued U.S. emphasis on the importance of
fulfilling the operational mission, which included the
handoff of the effort from U.S. command to UN-led
peacekeeping forces,42 the initiation of what came to
be known as UNOSOM II was repeatedly postponed.
Opposition from UN Secretary General BoutrosGhali, who desired a complete demilitarization of the
rival clans operating in the area and a “from the top
down” rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure prior
to transition from a U.S. to UN-led operation, slowed
the progress of the transition.43
Many of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s concerns
were addressed in the third phase of combat which
commenced on March 26, 1993, with UN Security
Council Resolution 814. UNOSOM II’s mandate
expanded again to include many of the objectives that
Boutros-Ghali wanted for the U.S.-led UNITAF to
address. Under UNOSOM II, the objectives included,
“[T]he requirement . . . to disarm the Somali clans; . . .
rehabilitating the political institutions and economy of
a member state; and . . . building a secure environment
throughout the country.”44 Also, whereas UNITAF
focused on the southern region of Somalia, UNOSOM
II was focused on the entire country.45
Most importantly, the expanded objectives included
many that the international community had wanted
the United States to lead in the previous phase. The
United States, however, was not the lead nation in
the third phase. A UN peacekeeping structure under
U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe, who functioned
as the representative of the Secretary General, was
established in Somalia, and the United States provided
only logistical support.46 According to Lawrence
Yates, “Combat operations of a limited or irregular
nature may be necessary at some point after stability
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operations are well under way.”47 This proved to be
true, as threatened warlords responded to coalition
efforts with attacks. The deaths of 24 Pakistani soldiers
on June 5, 1993, and the deaths of 18 American soldiers
on October 3, 1993, weakened U.S. resolve, leading to
President Clinton’s decision to remove U.S. forces in
Somalia by March 31, 1994.48
Communication was a severe problem in the
Somalia conflict. In fact, one senior official referred to
the conflict simply as one big strategic communication
problem.49 The conflict was pivotal in altering U.S.
attitudes toward SASO. Jennifer Taw states, “U.S.
military commanders have . . . attempted since
Operation RESTORE HOPE to limit the extent of their
involvement in such activities [humanitarian and civic
action] to the absolute minimum.”50 Clearly Somalia
was a learning experience for the agencies involved.
The brief summary above illustrates that Somalia
was indeed a “learn as you go” situation. Toward the
end of the U.S.-led UNITAF mission, the interagency
representatives had the opportunity to assess the
situation and determine the way ahead. When BoutrosGhali pushed for the United States to disarm the violent
clans and begin infrastructure reconstruction, the
interagency was wary of attempting to do so. The United
States recognized the potentially volatile situation and
the disastrous outcome that could ensue should unity
of command be lost. The interagency players needed
to find an acceptable way to inform the UN that the
United States was already accomplishing the mission
of UNITAF, though not without difficulty, and that
a hasty escalation to knocking clan leaders’ heads
together could be courting disaster. By subsequently
allowing UNOSOM II to be undertaken, the United
States forfeited both the progress that was being made
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and compounded the difficulties of the situation by
allowing the mandate to be unrealistically expanded.
If the situation were already tenuous, it certainly was
not stable enough to radically expand the mission.
This decision highlights a common problem.
Jennifer Taw states, “[C]ivil-military and civic action
operations are often considered implied tasks, required
for establishing a stable and secure environment as well
as valuable for force protection.”51 Under UNITAF/
Operation RESTORE HOPE, the U.S. military was only
to provide a secure environment and assist UN/NGOs
in humanitarian efforts. The control provisions of the
mission itself were confusing, stating that direction
would come from NCA and USCINCENT, but that
assistance in humanitarian efforts would be conducted
“under UN auspices.”52 Did this language imply that the
U.S. forces were to provide security while assisting the
UN/NGOs with the help of the UN? It is very unclear
who was helping whom. The military naturally wants
to do what it does best: pereform combat, provide
security, etc. In the case of Somalia, there was a very
fuzzy line between where the U.S. contribution was
to end, and the UN and other external humanitarian
assistance was to begin.
As the objectives were met, the U.S. military
undoubtedly began to feel the pressure of the UN to
expand its mission to state-building and other activities
outside of its mandate (“mission creep”). Lacking
further instructions, the U.S. Army was left with a disconnect concerning what exactly it was to provide. It
appears that in the case of Operation RESTORE HOPE,
the issue was that of ambiguous language and a lack of
direct instructions from the U.S. Government.
If the U.S. military is to lead, its mission needs
to be clearly communicated to the field commander.
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This problem appears to be widespread. One UN
Commander said, “None of the political leadership can
tell me what they want me to accomplish. That fact,
however, does not stop them from continually asking
me when I will be done.”53 As Taw observes, “For the
Army, this tension between short-term and long-term
goals is mirrored in the internal debate over how much
humanitarian assistance the Army should provide.”54
In multilateral efforts, the U.S. Government needs to
clearly state what missions and tasks are expected of the
U.S. military. U.S. civil-military communication must
be maximized when cooperating with other nations
because outside input and coordination will serve only
to further obfuscate an already cloudy U.S. strategic
picture. Clear delineation of responsibility is essential,
presenting another challenge for the interagency
process. However, even if lines of responsibility are
drawn, ambiguous rhetoric can seriously impede clear
and correct interpretation of strategy and responsibility.
Just as the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia was unclear
due to nebulous instructions, U.S. forces today face the
same challenges in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
Ambiguous and unclear rhetoric can be a challenge
at all levels and in all situations. Most importantly,
reform must start at the top. In Washington, where toplevel officials are involved in interagency coordination,
the effort for clear understanding must be a priority.
After Somalia and subsequent conflicts like Haiti and
Kosovo, the U.S. Government came to realize the
need for a comprehensive document that outlined
the manner in which support and stability operations
would be conducted. This document, Presidential
Decision Directive-56, and its successor, National
Security Presidential Directive-44, provide prime
examples of how rhetoric and poorly coordinated
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language can produce varying interpretations and
consequently varying approaches to the conduct of an
operation.
In large bureaucratic endeavors such as those
involved in interagency coordination, documents must
be especially clear and easily understood in order to
achieve the intended effect, i.e., effective coordination
and communication within the interagency in support
and stability operations. Perhaps the inspiration
for PDD-56 was merely a rare and sudden flash of
bureaucratic insight, or perhaps it was the cummulative
frustrations of Somalia;55 nevertheless, PDD-56 would
attempt to meet this challenge and repair the many
communication challenges that had plagued the U.S.
Government up to that point.
The Drafting of PDD-56.
According to the Interagency Management of Complex
Crisis Operations Handbook, “‘Success’ in complex foreign
crises requires that the interagency simultaneously
address all aspects of a crisis--diplomatic, political,
military, humanitarian, and social--in a coordinated
fashion.”56 Intricate coordination such as this demands
that all agencies involved have an understanding of
the strategic objective. Official documents for communication are perhaps the most central and tangible
representation of that understanding.
PDD-56, issued in May 1997, attempted to establish
clear lines of interagency coordination, supervision,
and communication for the new type of conflict in the
post-Cold War security environment.57 It represented
an attempt to explain “key elements of the Clinton
Administration’s policy on managing contingency
operations.”58 It was PDD-56 that first attempted to
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institutionalize many of the promising policies and
procedures and incorporate lessons learned from
within Washington and from the field.59
Several key assumptions affect the interpretation
of PDD-56. First, the document assumes that complex
contingency operations will continue in the future.
The document, however, was drawn up as a reaction
to the experiences of recent conflicts such as Somalia.
Nevertheless, the document tries to strike a balance
between the past and the future with a second goal that
future operations will be conducted in coalitions if at all
possible.60 By definition alone, this assumption requires
a heightened level of diplomatic involvement.
Considering the stinging experience of Somalia, it
is not surprising to see the attention PDD-56 devotes
to limiting military involvement. PDD-56 notes that
“in many complex emergencies the appropriate U.S.
Government response will incur the involvement of
only nonmilitary assets,” and that “U.S. forces should
not be deployed in an operation indefinitely.”61 These
statements taken together seem appealing to both the
civilian and military. The first statement demonstrates
a clear plan-oriented goal, which appeals to the
planning needs of the military. The second statement
acknowledges the process aspects which are welcomed
by the State Department.
While the policy may be relatively clear, the
connotations of words such as “response” can be very
different, e.g., they may be taken to mean operations by
the military and negotiations by the State Department.
Such a dual interpretation can lead to an unintended
reliance upon the military during crisis when time is
limited, because the military is often more likely to have
contingency plans prepared for a variety of situations.
However, the document appears to acknowledge
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this tendency with its effort to “reduce pressure on
the military to expand its involvement in unplanned
ways.”62
The document thus attempts to limit military
involvement in complex contingency operations
whenever possible; nevertheless, it likewise
acknowledges the importance of integration and
coordination during the planning processes of the
conflict.
Integration helps “identify appropriate
missions and tasks, . . . develop strategies for early
resolution of crises, . . . accelerate planning and
implementation of the civilian aspects of the operation,
[and] integrate all components of a U.S. response
(civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and
facilitate the creation of coordination mechanisms at
the operational level.”63 Toward the latter part of the
document, usage of military terms such as “operations”
and “mission” become more prevalent, almost to the
point of losing the dual interpretation found at the
beginning of the document. This creates an unclear
and inconsistent meaning.
But the ambiguity of terms is once again corrected
when the document addresses the role of functional
management. PDD-56 establishes the role of Executive
Committees (ExComms). An ExComm is formed from
members of the Deputies Committee, but may include
more organizations that are not typically included
in the NSC structure. ExComm, in turn, acts as
functional managers for specific elements of the U.S.
Government response (e.g., refugees, demobilization,
elections, economic assistance, police reform, public
information, etc.).64 While the document calls for this
concept of functional management to be used in future
operations, it is difficult to discern what method will be
used in the delegation process. PDD-56 requires that
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the Deputies Committee make these assignments, but
does not discuss how these determinations are made.
This adds an element of confusion to political-military
(pol-mil) planning.
Pol-Mil Implementation Plan and Rehearsal.
PDD-56 calls for a pol-mil plan to be developed
through an integrated process. The goal of the plan
is “to centralize planning and decentralize execution
during the operation.”65 The plan is to first designate
the functional roles of ExComm (through a process
undefined), which will, in turn, develop specific
parts or sections of the plan. The sections will then
be analyzed and coordinated “among all relevant
agencies” and then integrated into a final product.66
Although there are many requirements of the pol-mil
plan, the basic concept of delegation, then decentralized
drafts followed by coordinated discussions, and finally
decentralized execution enables each agency to focus
on its functional role.
This method has benefits and shortcomings.
The greatest potential benefit is that each agency, if
delegated to perform agency-appropriate tasks, is
able to develop its section of the plan in a language
that reflects the social knowledge and culture of that
specific agency. However, the shortcoming is that
much of the detailed understanding runs the risk
of being lost in debate and later reflected in unclear
language. Conversely, the fruitfulness of the debate
may be minimized due to a perception of rigid
ownership of “areas of specialization.” If one agency
has been delegated the task of forming the plan for a
certain area, then the perception is that it must be the
inviolate authority on that topic area.67
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After the plan is developed, PDD-56 calls for a
plan rehearsal. The goal of the rehearsal period is
“simultaneously rehearsal/reviewing [of] all elements
of the plan.”68 The ExComm is to present the various
elements of the plan before the operation is launched
or as soon as possible after its initiation, “before
subsequent critical phase[s] during the operation,
as major changes in the mission occur, prior to an
operation’s termination.” Following the operation,
there is to be an after-action review.69 While this
incremental review process is conceptually beneficial
in theory, it becomes unrealistic during support and
stability operations, which may occur with little or no
prior notice.
Training.
Emphasis on training is a key strength of PDD56. The document calls for yearly training (if not
more frequently) of mid-level managers. During the
training, the officials are given the opportunity to better
understand the process of pol-mil plan development,
plan implementation, and relevant past experiences.70
Training properly includes forums for open discussion
and reflection, and for clarification of the “intentions”
regarding missions, tasks, coordination, delegation,
responsibilities, and accountability. Also, there is
provision for continuity and progression in training if
at all possible. The goal of the training is to continually
build a foundation of managers who are wellequipped and knowledgeable of the plan’s intentions.
If different managers are trained each year, the project
runs the risk of losing its key strengths of consistency
and development. The process should ensure that
trained leaders are continually “brought up to speed”
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and retrained on the strategies and intentions of the
ExComm, while also introducing new mid-level
leaders to the training process. This process would
help to ensure consistency of understanding which is
absolutely critical in SASO.
Expected/Intended Outcomes of PDD-56.
As a comprehensive document, PDD-56 faced
many challenges. The Clinton administration needed
to institutionalize key policies that would take account
of the challenges encountered in conflicts like Somalia.
As a “first shot” at developing methods for assessing
and responding to conflicts, the document was
commendable. Ambiguous terms such as “response,”
“mission,” and “operation” had value because they
appealed to the different agencies by presenting
phraseology conducive to the different social climates
of the organizations; however, it also presented an
ambiguous intention. Moreover, while the allocation
of elements of the plan to different agencies allowed
for specialization, it could also stifle debate. Overall,
the key strengths of PDD-56 were also its greatest
weaknesses; diversity allowed for broad appeal but
diminished consistent understanding. In any event,
PDD-56 was never truly implemented as written.71
Thus with a new administration came another attempt
at remedying the communication challenges which
still plagued the U.S. Government. The development
of NSPD-44 was an attempt to modify PDD-56 through
a new approach to the seemingly intractable problems
posted by SASO.
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NSPD-44: Transformation of Communication.
PDD-56 represented the U.S. Government’s first
attempt to manage and coordinate the efforts of
various government agencies in support and stability
operations through a policy directive. Admittedly, the
world in which NSPD-44 was drafted (2005) was far
different from the pre-September 11, 2001 (9/11), world
in which PDD-56 (1997) came into being. The time
difference perhaps reflects the key distinctions evident
when comparing the two documents: NSPD-44 focused
on security, while PDD-56 focused on managing
conflict. Under NSPD-44, the U.S. Government not
only had to address the challenges of support and
stability operations, but also had to confront new
thrreats to U.S. security. However, the scrapping of
PDD-56 in favor of a new document may simply reflect
the political reality that each new administration
comes into office with a new broom to sweep clean
the “mess” left by the previous regime. Nevertheless,
NSPD-44 was a renewed attempt to streamline strategic
communication and coordination between the agencies
of the government. Unfortunately, it failed to remedy
many of the rhetorical ambiguities that had plagued
PDD-56.
PDD 56 versus NSPD 44: A Comparison.
NSPD-44 is very different from PDD-56 on many
levels. The first difference is the later document’s focus
on security: “The purpose of this Directive is to promote
the security of the United States through improved
coordination, planning, and implementation for
reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign
states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from
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conflict or civil strife.”72 While the intention of PDD56 was ultimately to enhance U.S. security, it did not
expressly make such a declaration. The second key
difference is NSPD-44’s focus on preemption. Whereas
PDD-56 states that the document is expressly for
“interagency planning of future complex contingency
operations,”73 NSPD-44 speaks of the need “to
anticipate state failure, avoid it whenever possible, and
respond quickly and effectively when necessary and
appropriate to promote peace, security, development,
democratic practices, market economies, and the rule
of law.”74 This difference expands the policy mandate
of the interagency to include potentially any type of
conflict.
A final key difference between the two documents
is NSPD-44’s designation of the Secretary of State
(with the option of assistance by the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization) as the “focal point”
of these types of efforts.75 While this appears on the
surface to be a clear mandate, a moment’s analysis
reveals that “focal point,” far from delineating
responsibility for control, is actually a metaphor drawn
from the physical science of optics, where it refers to the
site at which lensed rays converge (or deviate). As we
shall note below, such wording, and the elaboration on
it, does not settle matters. Moreover, one can see that
the policy guidance of the document creates a much
broader mandate for action while at the same time
blurring the lines of responsibility between the State
and Defense Departments.
NSPD-44 calls for the Secretary of State to
“coordinate and lead integrated United States
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments
and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction
activities.”76 Again, while this may seem clear at
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first, one must consider that the document addresses
an extended collection of conflicts which may or
may not include a heavy military component. This
inevitably carries a potentially large responsibility
for the military. The authors of the document appear
to recognize that fact midway through, stating, “The
Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the
Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any
planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the
spectrum of conflict.”77 Once this guidance comes into
play, however, any centralized coordination by the
Secretary of State as the “focal point” is compromised,
and an ambiguous line of authority again prevails.
Allowing unclear lines of authority and communication are mistakes easily repeated, as seen in the
case of Somalia. The U.S. military’s relative success
during Operation RESTORE HOPE prompted the UN
to hastily expand the mandate of the operation while
concurrently shifting the authority and centrality of
the operation away from the military. This proved
disastrous. The unclear designations of authority
within NSPD-44 risk repeating this failure. While the
document may rightly place authority for support and
stability operations in the hands of civilians, it does
so half-heartedly while simultaneously expanding
the scope of operations which may fall under civilian
authority. History has shown that simultaneous
unclear transition of authority and expansion of
mission produce ambiguity which in turn inhibits clear
strategic communication and coordination.
Key Language.
The language used and the policies presented within
NSPD-44 are very different than those presented in
PDD-56. This is because PDD-56 focused on detailed
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process, while NSPD-44 focuses on harmonization and
preemptive planning. Despite the document’s mandate
for the Secretary of State to be the “focal point,” which
has already been discussed, the document also states
that coordination between the civilian and military
actors is “to ensure harmonization with any planned or
ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum
of conflict.”78 Because NSPD-44 is a policy document
meant to give direction to separate members of the
interagency process, one must assume that members
of these various organizations will not be poring over
the document in the same room together at all times.
Therefore, interpretation of the rhetoric is necessary
to receive the message. For instance, if the document
reads that the State Department is in charge, but must
harmonize its efforts with planned or ongoing DoD
operations, it is highly likely that someone at the State
Department would take away a different message
than someone at DoD. In this particular case, the word
“harmonization” is in question. What does this really
mean? Essentially, it depends upon who is reading it.
The nature of bureaucracies is to claim authority
over whatever occurs within its jurisdiction or turf.
When reading NSPD-44, it is highly likely that an
official in DoD may understand the reference to
“harmonization” as an indication that the State
Department must reconcile its plans with what the
military already has planned. In other words, while
the State Department may be the “focal point,” it will
always be placed in a position where it must adapt its
plans to mesh with the existing military plans, such as
in the conventional phases in the war in Iraq. In such
a case where there is substantial if not preponderant
military involvement, it could be concluded that the
State Department must always defer to the military
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because it is the military’s job to have operational and
contingency plans in place for virtually all parts of the
world and every situation. Conversely, a State Department official reading NSPD-44 may read the word
“harmonize” to mean that DoD must tailor its plans to
accord with the diplomatic design of the Secretary of
State. One can see how a dual interpretation of a single
term can produce entirely different interpretations of
the same passage.
The drafters of NSPD-44 may well have envisioned
the problems that the language could create. Such a
realization may have sparked the designation of the
Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). Whereas
PDD-56’s ExComm members were to be explicitly
tasked with individual responsibilities, NSPD-44
designates only the Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization as the chair of the PCC. Beyond that,
no clear divisions of labor are established.
Some may argue that all it takes is a clear
understanding among senior officials to remedy the
problem of multiple interpretations. That may, in
fact, be the intended function of the PCC. However,
NSPD-44 does not make that clear. It may be the point
of this document to provide a concrete written policy
directive to be used throughout the interagency as
supplemented by verbal understandings at the highest
levels. However, in large bureaucracies such as those
within the U.S. Government, a senior cabinet or agency
leader cannot ensure that the entire organization has
the same understanding of a document as that of the
person at the top. Therefore, reliance upon the written
word is an integral part of successful operations. And,
as has been shown, the written word of these documents
thus far has often been insufficient to produce uniform
interpretation among the agencies.
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Expected/Intended Outcomes of NSPD-44.
When drafting NSPD-44, the Bush administration
was already deep into the Iraq War and had gained
a better understanding of the complex nature that
this “new” type of conflict presented. However, the
perception that the conflict was “new” may have
hindered the intended outcome of the policy document.
In an effort to acknowledge the need for civilian support,
the military being unable to meet all the challenges that
the conflict posed, the authors of NSPD-44 attempted
to provide a “bridge” for transition. They intended to
place authority in the hands of the civilians to begin
the process of a civilian takeover of aspects of the
conflict. However, the document was not able to start
that process because it did not clarify how the ongoing
action would be coordinated. Since NSPD-44 failed to
designate a way to establish the transition of authority
to the civilian agencies, it is now caught in a holding
pattern in which the military must retain increased
authority in SASO due to the “hot” wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Perhaps NSPD-44 will find more success in future
support and stability operations. If the directive is
implemented from the beginning of the conflict with
the State Department as the “focal point,” there may be
a greater likelihood that the processes are interpreted
in the intended manner. However, if a conflict is
ongoing, the directive has little chance of success owing
to unclear rhetoric and perceived contradictions.
A final interpretive difference that may influence
the future impact of the document is how the State
Department and DoD interpret language dealing
with preemption. Civil contingency planning and
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military contingency planning are very different in
nature. As has been previously discussed in Gabriel
Marcella’s cultural comparison, the State Department
prefers flexibility and open options while DoD dislikes
ambiguity and uncertain end states. Therefore, the
contingency plans that the two organizations develop
are going to be very different in nature. If a developing
conflict becomes a crisis with a suddenness that
catches officials by surprise, as is typically the case,
it will be natural for the U.S. Government to defer
to military plans owing to the likelihood that they
will be more complete, thought-out, and, above all,
resourced. No other federal agency has the military’s
capacity and supporting culture for planning in
terms of organization, people, resources, education,
training, and experience. One thing that the military
and policymakers have in common is their constant
quest for certainty. It is reasonable to expect that for
the immediate future military contingency planning
will offer a higher degree of certainty than will the
Department of State.
NSPD-44 and DODD 3000.05.
Only a few days before NSPD-44 was formalized,
DoD issued Directive 3000.05. While the present
analysis in no way posits that the DoD document was
intended to override or contradict NSPD-44, it does
appear to have its own problematic interpretive aspects.
The present analysis will examine the possibility that
DoDD 3000.05 may have formalized its interpretation of
NSPD-44 in an effort to preempt future interpretational
difficulties with the interagency.
DoDD 3000.05 begins by establishing some key
definitions. Stability operations are “military and
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civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from
peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States
and regions.” Military support in this context is defined
as “Department of Defense activities that support
U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security,
reconstruction, and transition (SSTR) operations,
which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S.
interests.” A key declaration in the document is that
stability operations “shall be given priority comparable
to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and
integrated across all DoD activities.” Another is that
“many stability operations tasks are best performed
by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.
Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to
perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain
order when civilians cannot do so.”79
While the major part of the document deals with the
responsibilities of the various DoD Under Secretaries,
the document does stipulate that “assistance and advice
shall be provided to and sought from the Department
of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies,
as appropriate, for developing stability operations
capabilities.”80 Interestingly, despite the fact that DoDD
3000.05 and NSPD-44 were released at practically the
same time, they address the issue of coordination from
seemingly contradictory standpoints. While this does
not appear to be an overt attempt to be deviant or
contrary, it does reveal an unclear understanding of the
policy presented in NSPD-44 by creating rhetoric that
happens to match the natural inclinations of DoD itself.
When interagency-wide directives fail to provide clear
language to dictate the policies and communication
patterns which should be institutionalized within
each organization, what are the individual agencies
to do? The answer is that they conjure individual
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“clarifications” intended to be objectively accurate but
which are inevitably colored by their own subconscious
solipsism.
Summing Up.
The value of the written word is indisputable. It
serves as the medium in which to ensure consistency
of thought and concrete visual representation of a
government’s policy decisions. However, consistency
of thought often does not translate into consistency
of interpretation. The United States Government
consists of scores of organizations and departments
possessing uniquely different missions and cultures.
This makes the efforts of the interagency process
comprehensive and richly heterogeneous, while at the
same time creating potential impediments which, if
unacknowledged, can degrade effectiveness.
The past 60 years have demonstrated that the United
States, as a world superpower, is in a unique position.
Instability within foreign nations, weak leaders, and
cultural conflicts have generated a need for a new type
of combat, one with a dynamic nature demanding
expertise from the full range of U.S. agencies. The
culture of the military alone or the culture of the
State Department alone is not sufficient to provide
a pathway to success. Somalia demonstrated the
delicate balance needed between military might and
civil humanitarian efforts. The failures of Somalia also
dramatized the need for clear strategic communication
and coordination. Without a clear understanding of
who will do what and who is in charge of what, the
agencies are left responding to dynamic crises on
their own, rather than joining in a truly unified and
integrated team effort.
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As discussed, to develop a plan for executing support
and stability operations, the Clinton administration
issued PDD-56. The exhaustive nature of the plan
provided the kind of detail that the military craves. It
also acknowledged the need for the civilian agencies to
step up and take over in many areas that had previously
been occupied by the military. However, the directive
also used rhetoric that proved to be ambiguous and
unclear, which may account for the plan’s incomplete
implemintation despite several SASO operations in
countries such as Kosovo.
In the wake of 9/11, the invasion of Afghanistan
and Iraq, and a realization that the current interagency
processes were not achieving the U.S. Government’s
strategic objectives, the Bush administration also
attempted to put interagency communication and
coordination on a sounder footing, with NSPD44. However, because the Iraqi and Afghanistan
conflicts were already in progress, the language of the
document proved to be unclear and at times almost
self-contradictory. Agencies were left to their own
interpretation, suggesting that DoDD 3000.05 may
have been a partial attempt to institutionalize national
policy in a coherent manner though appealing mainly
to the military culture.
Clearly, inadequate rhetoric is a problem in
interagency efforts. Theories of communication and
of interagency dynamics indicate that the struggle to
keep debate fresh and alive, and the ability to clearly
communicate intention, are not easy feats. However, if
the U.S. Government is to be more effective in support
and stability operations, it must take advantage of all
of the strengths the interagency has to offer. To do
so, it must present a united front. And, in order to
present a united front, it must operate from a common
understanding of policy.
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A Way Forward.
Under current directives, coordination and communication patterns will probably not improve.
The present analysis, however, has laid the basis for
recommendations concerning development of future
directives that coordinate the interagency process for
support and stability operations effectively, and for
development of phraseology to assure that rhetoric is
interpreted as intended. This analysis will also offer
a way forward, that is, suggestions for understanding
and resolving problems that continue to arise in
implementing policy under the current NSPD-44.
The interagency must develop an awareness of the
varying organizational cultures that each agency brings
to the table. These cultures affect interpretation. The
term interagency in and of itself carries an implication
of the necessity for understanding multiple principals
and agents. Just as it is important for the United States
to understand the culture of the other nation when
communicating or negotiating, it is important for
the various U.S. agencies to understand the differing
cultures each brings to the interagency process.
Understanding differing communications patterns is
critical to arriving at a truly comprehensive approach
and should not be unthinkingly devalued or overlooked
in the rush to issue guidance, even in crisis situations.
When agencies seek to coordinate the rhetoric of a
document in a manner appealing to all, the interagency
must question how each stakeholder is interpreting the
rhetoric. Again, the use of the term “response” can be
interpreted very differently among, for example, the
State Department, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and DoD. Therefore, merely
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selecting words which appeal to all is not sufficient,
because words can have different denotations and
certainly different connotations.
The interagency must assure that all relevant
stakeholders understand the implementation patterns
of the various agencies. If the interagency process
determines that a certain strategy demands that
Objective X be attained, leaders must realize that the
manner in which the various organizations will go
about attaining that objective are very different. For
example, if the objective is securing a particular village
in Iraq, the agency leaders must realize that their
approaches are inevitably going to vary, given their
differing organizational cultures. While it may seem
obvious to say that the objective of “security” may be
achieved in a different manner by the military than by
USAID or State, the issue is much more complicated
than that. Timelines and the willingness to accept
flexibility and satisfactory end states are likely to be
very different. There must be an understanding of
these interpretational issues prior to embarking on
a joint effort or there will inevitably be confusion,
frustration, and less effective results.
Officials of the various agencies must take
the time to establish a common understanding of
strategy and objectives at the highest levels. If the
officials in Washington are able to create a climate
of common interpretation, then they will be more
likely to disseminate consistent interpretations to
their respective organizations, thus creating a climate
of enhanced coordination both operationally and
tactically.
Since it is highly likely that the United States
will continue to be involved in support and stability
operations, the agencies must develop a policy for co373

ordination and communication that clearly establishes
a commonly interpreted process for carrying out policy
and strategy. A new directive should be formulated
that approaches support and stability operations from
two perspectives: one that addresses specifically
how to proceed in the current conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and one that addresses more generally
how SASO should be approached in the future.
NSPD-44 has demonstrated the challenges that arise
when a directive is drafted in the middle of a conflict.
It is difficult to make the shift of authority when a new
organization is put in authority while the old one is
in the midst of completing the very operations that
will inevitably be affected by such a shift. It is equally
important for the civilian agencies to have a role in
this type of conflict. Therefore, any new directive
must acknowledge these necessities and problems by
catering to the needs of each agency while improving
the process overall.
Any new directive outlining the policies for coordination and communication in the interagency must
address necessary rhetorical and policy-development
structural changes. It must include clearer rhetoric. By
implementing the theoretical concepts of complexity
theory, a new document should embrace the idea that,
to a certain extent, different interpretations are natural
and can be a good thing (so long as they are resolved)
and that change in inevitable. A new policy directive
must have built into it provision for adaptation. As
complexity theory acknowledges, change is inevitable
and should be included as a characteristic of the
situation at hand rather than an interruption. Also,
change can occur at any level, making it necessary for
clear yet dynamic lines of communication to be in place
for both top-down and bottom-up communication.
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This realization will fundamentally change the rhetoric
used in a new directive.
Paradoxically, a new directive must be able to
embody a line of communication that is consistent and
flexible. For example, while the role of civilian agencies
is critical in support and stability operations, something
may change in Iraq all of a sudden at the tactical level
demanding that the military re-take temporary control
over the execution of a “civilian” operation. If change is
feared, the result will be chaos. However, if provision
for change is built into the directive, then it will be
clearer as to when the military should be in authority
and when it should relinquish command back to the
civilians. A 2005 Government Accountability Office
report states, “Collaborating agencies should work
together to define and agree on their respective roles
and responsibilities, including how the collaborative
effort will be led.”81 While it may be desirable for
interagency documents to be short and succinct, clarity
and thoroughness must not be sacrificed in the name of
brevity. More clearly established lines of authority and
coordination will require that terms such as “response”
and “harmonization” be more thoroughly fleshed out
rather than assuming that in times of crisis a common
understanding will miraculously emerge.
In a perfect world, the bureaucracy of the U.S.
Government would allow for a situation in which
every officer of each department would be able to
meet personally with the Secretary or head official of
that organization to discuss the goals, objectives, and
intent of an operation. Of course, that is not possible in
the world we have. Therefore, the agencies must rely
upon the written word to convey these messages. But
how are the many organizations as outlined in NSPD182 to develop a common rhetoric which appeals to the
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organizational culture of their various agencies? While
it may be possible for the leaders of these organizations
to come to a common understanding while meeting
together face to face, it may very well be impossible
to find language that will mean the same thing to an
Army general as it does to an Ambassador.
The structure of policy development for SASO should
be changed. The rhetorical purposes of documents
must come to be shaped “by contingencies specific to
the organization in question.”83 Moreover, technical
writers within agencies must remain “conscious of and
accommodate the idiosyncratic constraints imposed
by their organizations in the production of technical
documents, as well as the expected constraints of
subject matter.”84 The leaders of the interagency
organizations gather together to discuss policy
issues precisely because they each bring a different
expertise to the discussion. It is vital that this expertise
and organizational cultural understanding not be
dissipated as the various agencies try to “harmonize”
and “coordinate” the rhetoric to be used in policy.
Of course, harmonization and coordination are
indeed essential, and debate to achieve them should
not be neglected. However, the entire purpose of
these activities in Washington is to set the stage for
coordination in the field where strategy is put to work.
In an effort to make coordination “seamless,” the
upper levels of the interagency must not “harmonize”
the language of these policy documents to such an
extent that they no longer hold interpretive value for
the individual organizations.
The U.S. Government should return to a system
in which the organizational climate and expertise of
the various agencies are validated and articulated.
By focusing on what each organization brings to
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the effort at the highest levels, the agencies have a
better chance of seeing true coordination in the field.
Organizational climate can be enhanced and utilized
to the fullest by allowing each organization to draft
a version of the policy directive using language
which will be commonly interpreted by the people
of that organization. This does not mean that each
organization drafts its own policy and operates without
the knowledge and coordination of the others. Rather,
it takes advantage of the expertise of the agency heads
and their understanding of their organization’s culture
and uses that knowledge to draft phraseology which
will be understood clearly and consistently.
The agencies must take advantage of committees
such as the PCC and ExComm, so that they all sing
from the same sheet of music. For example, Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense
Robert M. Gates should be able to sit in the same room,
speak, debate, and reach an understanding of the
policy objectives for the interagency. In turn, they can
then draft a specialized directive which uses language
conveying that message to their organizations without
diluting coordination at the highest levels. Conversely,
if they come to a verbal understanding and try to
compromise on language and draft a document in the
hope that it will be commonly interpreted, their chances
of maintaining that high level of understanding sharply
decline.
The U.S. Government should rely upon the creativity
of its leaders, allowing them to exercise their cultural
knowledge and experience. Written instructions and
policies are critical, but must be drafted in a way that
allows for proper interpretation and implementation.
This may not be possible when tens of authors are
present, all trying to agree upon a single word that will
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mean the same thing to all of their organizations. By
relying upon differing organizational expertise at the
highest levels in Washington, the agencies’ hopes for
successful communication and coordination (from topto-bottom and bottom-to-top) will actually increase in
the field.
In brief summary, the recommendations of this
analysis are broken down into those that should be
implemented under NSPD-44 and those that should
be considered when a new interagency coordination
directive is drafted. Under NSPD-44:
• The agencies must develop an awareness of
the varying organizational cultures which each
agency brings to the table and how each culture
affects interpretation.
• The agencies must develop an understanding of
how organizational culture affects implementation patterns by the various agencies.
Considerations for the future:
• A new directive for interagency coordination in
support and stability operations must include
clearer rhetoric.
• Clear rhetoric is established by relying upon
organizational expertise at the highest levels.
Each agency should develop an implementing
directive containing rhetoric commonly
interpreted by that specific agency rather than
one common document containing vague and
ambiguous language.
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Conclusion.
Support and stability operations do not appear to
be a transient phenomenon. This type of conflict will
likely plague the United States for many years to come.
Past conflicts, such as Somalia, have demonstrated
the need for interagency coordination and for U.S.
and international military and civilian agencies to be
involved in the effort. Additionally, conflicts such
as Somalia have demonstrated how difficult it is
to communicate clearly and coordinate effectively
among high-level organizations in Washington and
New York and implementers in the field. Theories
such as complexity theory by Philip Salem and the
governmental interaction theories that Vicki Rast
addresses, allow us to look at these types of conflicts
in an objective manner by separating ourselves from
the discussions of whether a certain strategy is good
or bad. These theories also allow us to understand the
obstacles to cooperation that are inherent in organizations, in light of the differing cultures, missions,
and preferences. Disagreements are unavoidable and
can actually benefit the interagency process since it
is absolutely critical that the U.S. Government have a
variety of strong inputs to rely upon when resolving
the demands of complex civil-military operations.
Given the challenges that Somalia and other conflicts
have posed, the past two administrations have issued
directives that institutionalize a process by which
interagency coordination and communication are
conducted. However, the rhetoric of these documents
has proven to be inadequate or contradictory. Unclear
language has allowed for multiple interpretations
and failed to acknowledge that the interagency is
composed of very different elements, each with its
own organizational culture.
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For U.S. Government policies and strategies in
support and stability operations to be successful in
the future, the processes that underpin interagency
interactions must be improved. Drawing upon the
expertise of the organizations and treating their
differences as strengths rather than weaknesses will
create a climate more conducive to the drafting of
policy that meets the immediate needs of the situation.
Interpretation determines whether rhetoric is clear or
not. The National Command Authorities, by ensuring
that directives are interpreted as intended, correctly
and from the beginning, provide a far better chance
for the interagency to implement national strategy
successfully. Clarity must begin at the top.
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CHAPTER 12
Bridging the Gap:
Integrating Civilian-Military
Capabilities in Security and
Reconstruction Operations
Robert H. Dorff
Introduction.
We begin with some simple observations and
assumptions. First, in complex interagency operations
such as contemporary Security, Stability, Transition,
and Reconstruction (SSRT) operations, the quality of the
people involved and their ability to lead will make the
difference between success and failure. The leadership
skills required will come most often from indirect rather
than direct skills. The ability to build understanding
and support will grow out of clear expression, logic,
and persuasion; rarely will the ability to command be
possible or desirable. Second, in contemplating SSTR
operations, we must be able to identify the capabilities
we need in any specific situation and then identify
where those capabilities in fact reside (not where they
should reside). That means we must understand the full
range of requirements for constructing an appropriate
response, from the immediate short-term efforts
involved in crisis intervention to the most long-term
requirements of building security and stability. Third,
we must have both the organizational framework and
the leadership to coordinate and focus those capabilities
in a strategic way to accomplish strategic objectives.
Since those capabilities should and will reside in a
diverse combination of agencies, organizations, and
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even countries, we must develop leaders who can work
effectively in a joint civilian-military, and multinational
realm. Yet these are hardly simple and easy-to-meet
requirements. Later in this chapter we will return to
this issue of how we go about developing the kinds of
leaders likely to be needed in the future. We turn now
to a discussion of the nature of the problem and our
recent experiences.
Background.
Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the strategic
environment was transforming, coming to confront the
United States specifically and the West generally with
a set of security challenges different from those we
had faced during the Cold War. The National Security
Act of 1947, itself a product of a then-newly emerging
strategic environment, had provided an architectural
framework that generally proved successful in
helping us steer through the postwar period. But as
the Cold War ended, followed by the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, new challenges from failing states,
international organized crime, and terrorism, as well as
several natural and humanitarian disasters, generated
a growing need for kinds of responses different than
those traditionally employed under the existing
architecture and strategic framework. Incident to what
were initially called “peace operations,” a relatively
new range of capabilities (means and the ways to use
them) came into the security lexicon. Today, under
the rubric SSTR, these capabilities are becoming as
much a part of the core competencies required in
security and defense policy as the TRIAD and mutual
assured destruction (MAD) were under the strategy of
containment. What are the implications?
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One of the first implications was that policy guidance
had to be developed for the new types of operations and
the capabilities that would be needed. In late 2005 two
documents were issued that now comprise the essential
policy guidance for SSTR operations. The Department
of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 “Military Support
for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
(SSTR) Operations,” issued on November 28, 2005,
and National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning
Reconstruction and Stabilization,” issued on December 7, 2005, provide the official policy guidance for
the military role in SSTR and the interagency efforts
to coordinate across all elements of national power.
Consequently, the guidance and concepts contained
in these two documents must be understood and
applied.
In addition to these foundational documents, the
U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), through its
Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) and in collaboration
with the Department of State (DoS) Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/
CRS), published “U.S. Government Draft Planning
Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and
Conflict Transformation,” a conceptual document
laying out a draft interagency planning process for
SSTR operations. Further, according to reports that
began appearing in 2006, DoD and State Department
officials were supposedly seeking funds for a new
entity (“Center for Complex Operations”) charged
with synchronizing military and civilian efforts to
rebuild troubled states and fight unconventional
wars. As if all this weren’t enough, nearly 3 years
into the war in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) recommended that S/
CRS be designated as the “primary point of authority
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within the U.S. government”; that DoD “develop
complementary plans and programs pursuant to
DoDD 3000.05 [coordinating] military responses with
S/CRS”; and that such plans and programs “integrate
S/CRS personnel and initiatives into exercises.”1
This last point drawn from the SIGIR “lessons
learned” in Iraq is especially important for the subject
addressed in this anthology, namely, the implications
of these kinds of operations for the interagency process.
Obviously, it is important to work on better organization
and coordination within the U.S. interagency process
at the national level. This chapter argues, however,
that the more critical need is to get beyond the facile
notion that interagency integration per se should be the
predominant focus. Rather, we must recognize that it
is real-world, on-the-ground integration of capabilities
that must occur. To address such ongoing 21st-century
security challenges, we need jointly (meaning civilian
and military) developed concepts, doctrine, training,
and execution. We also need organizations that can
work in this stabilization space specifically as agents
to help “bridge the gap” between the capabilities
that can and should reside primarily within military
organizations, and those that can and should reside
primarily within civilian organizations (civilian
agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the like).
To date, especially in the United States but in other
countries as well, the military has taken on more of
the responsibilities and generated the capabilities to
provide what is needed on the ground.2
While it is a good thing that the military has been
willing and able to step up, the broader point here is that
such ad hoc approaches to developing capabilities and
applying them represent a fundamental flaw in overall
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security strategy, a flaw that must be addressed by both
organizational reform and a more complete resourcing
of the comprehensive strategy that is required. As the
military has moved out front in responding to the needs
generated by these new kinds of security challenges,
civilian actors have, in fact, fallen behind. And it is
this growing divergence that generates the title of this
chapter, “Bridging the Gap.”
Recent Experience.
Much has been learned since the initial phases of
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), but nowhere has
that learning been more rich and robust than in the area
of SSTR operations. That learning has also been very
painful, in no small part because we have largely had
to make it up as we went. In the period immediately
following the early phases, it became apparent that
no effective process existed for dealing with SSTR
in fragile states and postconflict or postdisaster
environments such as Iraq. This was due at least in part
to the fact that while the documents identified above
provide policy guidance at the national level, a gap
has emerged between such strategic-level guidance
and operations in the field. Deciding who should be
participating in Washington, DC, interagency meetings
is important, but the real challenges always occur on
the ground. Although there has been a significant
overall improvement in our understanding of the need
for jointly coordinated and executed civilian-military
SSTR operations, much of what we do in this area
continues to be ad hoc, improvising as we go.
The dangers inherent in such an approach can be
illustrated in one example drawn from the early stages
of the Iraq conflict and reconstruction efforts.3 Faced
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with the reality of a large number of then unemployed
Iraqis and mounting piles of trash in neighborhoods,
coalition forces hired Iraqi civilians to pick up and
remove the trash. On the surface this seemed like a
good thing to do for all the obvious reasons (the trash
needed to be picked up, and it put the civilians to
work, which also allowed them to earn some money).
But the lack of experience with and knowledge of such
operations by the military, coupled with the absence
of effective coordination with civilian agencies and
personnel who had that experience and knowledge,
led to what could have been an avoidable set of
mistakes. First, little thought was given to what the
pay scale should be, and whether there were any local
“providers” who could help organize the effort. Second,
no systematic assessment of the local power structures
and informal leadership networks was conducted.
Third, the coalition forces became as a consequence
the de facto “local power.” While this may not at first
appear problematic, it is a prime illustration of what
happens when the military and civilian components
of SSTR operations are not effectively coordinated.
Had the funds been distributed through the networks
previously identified as having the past record and
future potential to serve as effective, stable, local
power bases (political, economic, and informational),
the distribution of funds to complete the trash removal
could have been linked to legitimizing these local
leaders and capabilities in the eyes of the local citizens.
Moreover, those local leaders would have known,
and in collaboration with U.S. civilian advisors could
have established, pay scales that reflected realities on
the ground. Overpayment undermined local market
forces, and the haste to “put Iraqis back to work” led
to an important opportunity being lost (or at least
394

delayed) to rebuild indigenous capacity. The point is
that, from an overall strategic perspective, inadequate
attention was paid to how the need to remove the trash
presented opportunities to use military funds available
to align the goals of (1) building local political capacity;
(2)producing an immediate and longer-term positive
economic effect; (3) contributing to security goals by
addressing the “idle hands” problem of unemployed
locals; (4) sending a strong positive public relations
signal that could promote good will; and (5) building
local network infrastructure (not to mention just
cleaning up the neighborhoods).4
This example is not intended to place blame on
the military forces and their commanders. Rather,
it is intended to point out that good intentions are
not enough. Knowledge and experience across the
entire range of means and ways to employ them are
fundamental to achieving stated ends or objectives.
We can also find many examples of civilian actions
making the work of the military much more difficult
and dangerous than it needed to be. The bottom line
is that we have to figure out how to integrate and
coordinate civilian and military capabilities, not just
at the interagency level in Washington, but even more
importantly on the ground at the local level where
it matters most—and where it can have the greatest
impact.
The 21st Century Strategic Environment.
I have argued elsewhere that the strategic imperative
for the 21st century is the “good governance deficit.”5
In my view, the most likely, though not exclusive,
source of threats and challenges to our security will
emanate from those states and regions in which the
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absence or weakness of legitimate governance prevails.
The behavior of those states and the individuals and
groups who nominally govern them, especially those
nonstate actors who can exploit the weakness or near
absence of effective governance, are where we will find
the ongoing security challenges of this next strategic
moment. And in the tasks related to promoting
effective legitimate governance, we will also find
the opportunities for shaping the future strategic
environment. Unfortunately, when viewed from this
perspective, the serious problems of the moment do
not go away even with the establishment of relative
security and stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead,
the near future is likely to hold more of the same kinds
of “small uncomfortable wars” that many tend to see
as aberrations. In my view, they are the new norm.
The most important implication of this view and its
relationship to SSTR is the need to recognize our true
long-term and over-arching strategic objective, i.e.,
“promoting good governance.”6
Unless we wish to continue to play in perpetuity
an inevitably losing game of “whack-a-mole,” we
must figure out how to address the broadest problems
that generate threats to our security such as terrorism,
organized criminal activity, and insurgencies.
Addressing these threats effectively will no doubt
continue to require the United States to maintain a
robust military capability. But because the underlying
sources of these threats are not purely military in
nature, our responses must engage the full spectrum
of elements of power in a coordinated, strategic
application of resources. We must also be able to exploit
opportunities to shape the strategic environment
and address underlying issues before they become
threats and challenges. At a minimum, these mandates
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necessitate figuring out how to identify the right
kinds of needed capabilities; discovering where they
reside or where they should reside in the event we
must geneerate them; developing those capabilities to
the levels required; organizing those capabilities in a
coherent and cohesive way; and applying them in the
field effectively and efficiently. If that is what we need
to do strategically, what are the potential challenges
and impediments to strategic success? Unfortunately,
but not surprisingly, there are many. But for the
purposes of this chapter, I will in the pages that follow
concentrate on the three broad problem areas that pose
the greatest challenges.
Challenge No. 1: Analyzing the Causes of Threats
and the Capabilities Needed to Address Them.
First, we have yet to cast a broad enough net when
it comes to searching out the underlying causes of the
threats we face and hence the types of capabilities we
need to address them. We know we need to fight and
kill terrorists that intend to do us harm. But how do
we perform the intermediate tasks such as reducing
the number of terrorists and limiting their freedom of
operation? In short, if we can systematically increase
the scope and reach of effective and legitimate
governance in the target state, we will accomplish
both of these intermediate tasks—we will reduce the
number of terrorists, and we will also empower more
effective antiterrorism mechanisms (e.g., people who
do not want terrorists operating next door to them).
This means we must find ways to engage all strategic
actors, not just the military, in the overall effort. And
it means mustering the will to resource those actors
and the capabilities they possess. For example, we can
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talk all we like about having a “civilian reserve corps”
that can deploy in this SSTR world, but it will remain
only talk until the country decides to put the resources
into the effort to identify, recruit, train, and maintain
this corps, which won’t be easy. At the moment, there
is little indication that the will exists to pay the tab.
Similarly, we need to think about the numbers of people
and the new kinds of skills that are needed in the State
Department, USAID, the intelligence community, and
so on. Internationally, the United States must come to
grips with the stark realities that we need allies across
the globe to engage with us, and that this will be a
herculean challenge to our powers of persuasion, given
the current conditions and prevailing international
sentiment toward the United States.
Challenge No. 2: Repairing our Organizational
Deficiencies.
The second challenge we face is restoring
organizational coherency. At one level, perhaps the
easiest one to deal with, we must find new ways to
organize the capabilities we have and how they are
employed. For example, we need to figure out how
to effectively mesh the military and nonmilitary
components, especially when it comes to operating
in nonpermissive or even permissive but still very
dangerous environments. This may require developing
concepts and doctrine for integrated and coordinated
military-civilian operations; ideally, such integration
and coordination would occur through the detailed
and thorough training and exercising together of both
civilian and military personnel once the concepts
and doctrine are developed. In fact, some of that is
occurring today with the Provincial Reconstruction
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Teams.7 However, because of constraints in manpower
and time, it is unlikely that the U.S. Government will
achieve either the “civilian reserve corps” that the SIGIR
recommends or the additional military personnel at
anywhere near the needed levels to support lengthy,
in-depth, joint training deployments. Clearly, the
next best thing is to develop the concepts, prepare the
doctrine, and then train jointly in conformance with
that doctrine in the next best way—exercises that occur
prior to and concurrently with deployment to an area
of responsibility (AOR), and which can be conducted
through web-based or other distributed learning
techniques. This would allow both the civilian and the
military participants to learn more about each other
and how they think and operate, and about the critical
interactive effects and necessary integration and
coordination required for achieving strategic success.
Also needed is a new kind of civilian organization,
most likely and necessarily drawn from the NGO
community: the “gap bridging” NGO. The “gap
bridging” NGO is one with the personnel possessing
the knowledge, expertise, and willingness to work
closely with the military, government, and other
civilian participants in these complex operations.
Moreover, it means working in the two “spaces” that
typically define the SSTR environment: the “battlefield
space” and the “humanitarian space.”8 The battlefield
space is generally the domain of the military, for
obvious reasons. But in these modern 21st-century
conflicts, even that space has become more complex,
and the role there for nonmilitary expertise and actors
has also grown. Similarly, the traditional conception
of the humanitarian space has had nonmilitary actors
playing the dominant role. But here, too, complex
SSTR operations have brought a blurring of the former
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sharp line and hence of the distinction between roles/
missions for civilian and military actors. But certain
distinctions remain—in organizational culture, in how
the different actors perceive the problems and the
potential solutions, and in how they work. For example,
some humanitarian actors would sacrifice their own
security and effectiveness were they perceived by the
local people to be working too closely with the military,
so they must retain their sharply delineated identity.
As for the military, it continues to train primarily,
though no longer exclusively, for operations involving
the threat or use of force, generally lethal in nature, in
nonpermissive environments. Although the military
has taken on a much broader set of responsibilities and
adapted to many of them quite well, it is questionable
at best whether this is a desirable and sustainable
approach to dealing with these new hybrid realities
on the ground. It seems more appropriate to identify
and develop the skills in a specialized NGO whose
personnel are comfortable working in both spaces,
dealing with the dominant actors in each, and helping to
bring about cooperation, coordination, and ultimately
integration of efforts across them. Military personnel
will need to continue to broaden their skill sets and
leadership abilities, but so too will civilian personnel,
perhaps even more so than their military counterparts.
For it is in the area where the two spaces overlap that
the most critical determinants of strategic success or
failure in SSTR, will reside.
A final point on the organizational front: the most
challenging of all requirements is the very likely need for
a completely revamped national security architectural
framework. Time and space do not allow for elaboration
here, but the time has almost certainly come for a
radical review of the way our defense establishment
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broadly construed is organized to conduct national
security in the 21st century. The current architecture,
originated with the National Security Act of 1947 as
a response to the then-emerging Cold War strategic
environment, and now reflecting 18 years of post-Cold
War improvisations and ad hoc adaptations, is simply
not responsive to the fundamentally changed strategic
environment prevailing today.9
Some contend that the Goldwater-Nichols reforms
and the creation of a Department of Homeland Security
represent the successful adaptation of organizational
structure to a changing strategic environment. In reality,
however, we have adopted the procrustean expedient
of contorting 21st-century security threats, challenges,
and opportunities to make them fit into 20th-century
organizational boxes. Thus, here in year 2007 we still
haven’t identified the capabilities we need, determined
where they do or should reside, and organized them
in our strategic thought and in our operational modus
operandi to address the new strategic situation. How
then can we ever expect to succeed while clinging to
the same obsolete organization (and structural bias)
that produced our present analytical and conceptual
deficiencies in the first place? An objectively executed
top-to-bottom and zero-based organizational review
may determine that, in fact, we have the organizational
architecture more right than wrong, though I would be
more than a little surprised at such a finding. But it seems
undeniable that the need to conduct such a review and
assessment is growing every day. How we organize
(whether in business, the military, sports, or national
security) should be a reflection of the assessment we
have conducted of the strategic environment, since that
is what strategy demands. A determination to “march
on” with the old architecture simply because that is
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what we have has been a formula for strategic failure
in all of those same arenas.10
Challenge No. 3: Developing Leadership for a New
Strategic Environment.
The third great challenge we face lies in the realm
of leadership. The only glue that will hold all our
designs together—or the absence of which promises
continued failure no matter how well we do in
analysis and organization—is the presence of strong
leaders at all levels. Fundamentally, we need people
with the intellectual, experiential, and interpersonal
skills to work across the “gap” between the military
and civilian actors and their capabilities. They must
be people who can provide such all-important
leadership less by the direct than by the indirect
means so commonly associated with the interagency
process generally. This is a truly joint world (military
and civilian, not just militarily joint), and our strategic
efforts must reflect that world. They must also be
multinational and coalitional. Our civilian agencies,
including the NGO and IGO communities as well as
traditional governmental actors, and our military will
need to develop both internal and external leadership
skills. With respect to the external,leaders must be able
to bridge the various gaps externally to achieve the
kind of operational effectiveness and unity of effort
that contributes to strategic success. The nature of
the assignments our personnel receive, the bases for
promotion and advancement, the truly joint exercising
and training mentioned earlier, and the ability to
deploy as joint, integrated, capabilities-based teams
are surely central to the kinds of leaders we need to
develop in the years ahead. We need to align all of these
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developmental steps, and our professional education
systems, to produce this very special leadership for the
not-so-distant future. Whether we can do that remains
to be seen. What is apparent is that in the absence of
effectively addressing the three great challenges treated
above—astute analysis, organization, and especially
leadership—it is highly unlikely that as a nation we
will adequately adapt to the security requirements of
the 21st century.
Conclusions.
We conclude where we began with the observation
that SSTR operations require different kinds of
capabilities, integrated in ways different from the
traditional national security protocol, and hence
different kinds of leaders who can bridge the various
military-civilian gaps identified in this chapter. We must
seriously rethink and develop the kinds of capabilities
we need and then provide the full resources necessary
for fielding them. We must develop the concepts,
doctrine, and joint predeployment training that are
required. And we should incorporate them into our
professional education curricula while simultaneously
working to enhance the military and civilian interaction
in those curricula. An idea whose time may have come
in this regard is that of a Civil-Military Training and
Reserve Center.11
It is perhaps simplistic, though probably not
inaccurate, to suggest that 21st-century security
threats, challenges, and opportunities, and hence our
responses and actions, will be much like the interagency
process writ large. We must come to grips more fully
with the requirements to integrate rather than stovepipe, to develop operators with multidimensional skill
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sets that cut across the semiautonomous, narrowly
functional agencies that dot the organizational
landscape. We must develop and move to the front
the kinds of leaders who are not only comfortable but
effective in such operations. And we must engage the
broader international community. In the absence of
such reforms, the interagency process will continue to
resemble a symphony with each musician playing his/
her own arrangement. In such a case, the 21st-century
security environment is likely be even less forgiving
than in the recent past. This is because our adversaries,
growing daily more sophisticated in conjuring effective
asymmetric responses to our power, will certainly
discover a way to exploit our interagency disarray.
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Capital Management,” Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction, January 2006, p. 46, available at www.sigir.mil/
reports/pdf/Lessons_Learned_Feb16.pdf.
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3. The outlines of this example are taken from a 2006 interview
with a former senior USAID official who served in Iraq.
4. I understand that the money was provided through the
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later in this chapter.
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11. To become an effective reality, such a Center would require the
physical space for the joint training to occur. Moreover, participating
departments and agencies would require an increase in personnel,
especially on the civilian side, to staff the center and allow for people to
rotate out of field assignments and into professional education training
assignments. Those requirements would hardly be easy to meet.
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CHAPTER 13
Training, Education, and Leader
Development for the National
Security Interagency
James M. Smith
Introduction.

The strategic dimensions of military operations
have been broadening for many years, and the
potential for actions with strategic effects has also been
migrating steadily down the rank structure of the U.S.
military. President John F. Kennedy, in the wake of the
Cuban missile crisis, gave explicit voice to the strategic
requirements of officers down to unit-level operational
field commanders and ship captains in his remarks to
the 1963 graduates of the U.S. Air Force Academy.
Your major responsibilities, of course, will relate to the
obligations of military command. Yet, as last October’s
crisis in the Caribbean so aptly demonstrated, military
policy and power cannot and must not be separated
from political and diplomatic decisions. . . . We needed
in October--and we shall need in the future--military
commanders who are conscious of the enormous
stakes involved in every move they make--who are
aware of the fact that there is no point where a purely
political problem becomes a purely military problem-who know the difference between vital interests and
peripheral interests--who can maneuver military forces
with judgment and precision as well as courage and
determination--and who can foresee the effects of military
moves on the whole fabric of international power.1
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Just as President Kennedy identified the broadened
requirements for leadership and officership at the
unit/ship command level in the multidisciplinary
security environment of the Cold War, General John
Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, called
for the development of a strategic perspective in the
junior officer ranks in the late Cold War and across the
transition into the post-Cold War international security
environment.
We need strategists. In the Army and throughout
the services. At all levels. We need senior generals
and admirals who can provide solid military
advice to our political leadership, and we need
young officers who can provide solid military
advice--options, details, the results of analysis-to the generals and admirals. We need military
strategists, officers, all up and down the line,
because it takes a junior strategist to implement
what the senior strategist wants done, and it
(usually) takes the input of juniors to help a
senior strategist arrive at his conclusions.2

If the era that General Galvin directly foresaw—
the experience of Operation DESERT STORM and
peace operations from Africa to the Balkans—marked
the advent of the “strategic lieutenant,” then today’s
experience of extended asymmetrical conflict and
the concomitant stability and support operations
in Afghanistan and in Iraq has brought the age of
the “strategic corporal.” The complexity of today’s
conflicts, the expanded arena of joint and coalition
operations, and the blending of traditional and
nontraditional requirements of multiagency and
nongovernmental partnerships mark new challenges
for professionals across the full range of national
security organizations.
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This transition and its changing requirements
for leadership on the military side were recognized
in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. Pursuant to this Act, both
specific education on the context and content of joint
operations and specific experience by assignment to
a joint billet became prerequisite to any position of
senior leadership in the military services. Guidance
from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff laid
down minimum curriculum requirements for military
officer education from precommissioning to the flagrank capstone level. Concurrently, both service and
joint doctrine development, which form the foundation
of training, exercises, and planning, expanded
the emphasis on joint operations. Both skills and
knowledge were covered, and the results during the
ensuing 2 decades have been striking. Joint attitudes
and operations have indeed markedly advanced.
In light of the expanded focus on interagency
operations specifically exemplified in contemporary
stability and support operations, and from the
Goldwater-Nichols model, studies have suggested an
interagency education system, individual interagency
education courses, interagency exchange assignments,
and a range of related activities. These impulses
have come together in the May 17, 2007, “Executive
Order: National Security Professional Development”
calling for the establishment of a cadre of national
security professionals from across the Executive
Branch of government, via a program to be defined in
a “National Strategy for the Development of Security
Professionals.”3
In line with that program, this chapter selectively
summarizes the author’s experiences with U.S. Air
Force (USAF) leader development and with homeland
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defense and security workforce development that
seem particularly relevant to generating skills,
knowledge, and strategic leadership for the national
security interagency. It addresses skills—specific
actions and tasks comprising the skill set required for
certain categories of operations—that form the basis
for training, preparing and testing doctrine, and actual
field operations. These skills are especially vital in
stability and support operations involving multiple
government (and nongovernment) agency team efforts.
The chapter then moves from specified skills sets to
the development of more general areas of knowledge,
competency, and perspective required to plan and
manage stability and support operations. This latter
area of developmental concern comprises the core of
educational efforts for the interagency setting. Finally,
the chapter briefly addresses military approaches to
senior and strategic leadership development—entailing
knowledge and perspective in scope, depth, time,
and structure—as a potential source of ideas for the
interagency’s own structures for developing strategic
fluency among interagency senior leaders.
Skills, Knowledge, Perspective, and the Interagency.
The identification of stability and support operations skill sets is a relatively straightforward, if
extensive, task. This task can be (and is) accomplished
primarily in two ways. The first is to rely on experienced
individuals to determine the individual skills, the level
of competence required for each, and the preferred mix
of training and experience required for certification.
This is the “master/expert inventory” approach,
involving stipulation of a formal mix of training and
supervised experience leading to certification. The
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second way is the “after-action report/end-of-tour
interview” approach used across the military services
to build skill matrices for planning and training, and
for operational doctrine development. Both of these
methods address the “what do we do, and how do we
best do it” questions.
One example of the master/expert inventory
approach occurred in the first phase of the U.S. Air
Force “Developing Aerospace Leaders” review of
officer career development in 1999. A committee of
mid-ranking officers, drawn from a range of functional
specialties, sequestered themselves and developed
an extensive list of tasks (in the hundreds) that they
saw as best corresponding to an ideal contemporary
USAF officer skill set. The lessons-learned approach
can accomplish the same outcome, but from the
compilation of multiple individual inputs rather than
the product of committee collaboration. It should be
noted that these inventories will most likely generate
lists of tasks rather than skills, and must therefore be
translated further for direct application in designing
training programs.
These two approaches are very useful in scoping
out changing operational requirements, manpower
needs, and planning and training requirements within
a particular agency conducting the skills inventory.
However, they do not normally address cross-agency
inputs or specifically address interagency issues or
dimensions. At a minimum, existing inventory methods
should be amended to seek data on cross-functional
and interagency skill requirements. For now, given the
limits of data already gathered, only a meta-study of
multiple individual agency inventories and review by
an interagency expert panel could disclose the relevant
inputs for interagency stability and support operations
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skill set requirements. If such a mid-level interagency
expert panel is established, it should also inventory
the focus and content of the individual agency training
programs for cross referencing. Areas of commonality,
uniqueness, and essential interdependence can then
be specified and addressed in training, education, and
other areas of interagency workforce development.
As useful as such inventories can be for operational
planning and for training, the effectiveness of the
interagency process, interagency operations, and
particularly the management and leadership of these
efforts can be effectively enhanced only through
education and experience on the part of those
involved. Training provides the skills and improves
the performance of tasks, i.e., doing, but education
and experience provide context and perspective, i.e.,
understanding and valuing. Overall direction of the
multiple tasks and incorporation of the results in an
orchestrated program require much background,
context, and foundational understanding. The cognitive context for understanding stability and support
operations should be geographical—global, regional,
and national—and also political, historical, and
cultural. It should also highlight organizational context
and culture, including the structures and dynamics of
the interagency and international processes.
The training/education program should be designed
around the central competency sets that characterize
stability and support operations. An interagency review
of tasks and skills, and certainly of the interaction of
organizational efforts in realizing those tasks and skills,
must aggregate them into a much smaller and focused
set of essential competencies for stability and support
operations, including competencies in understanding,
managing, and leading interorganization efforts.
412

There is no magic number of competencies or unique
structural framework required, but the systematization
must be logical, and must be manageable by curriculum
designers. A few examples drawn from personal
experience will clarify this point.
In the Developing Aerospace Leaders case, taking
the list of literally hundreds of tasks/skills that the
committee of experts had isolated, I attempted to
adapt it into a document manageable for educational
purposes. After a frustrating attempt at educationally
useful aggregating, however, I restarted from scratch,
finally coming up with six categories of essential officer
knowledge. I then broke out each of the six into several
core competencies that would characterize a fully
qualified air and space professional in the 21st century.4
The result was a list of approximately 40 competencies.
The tasks and skills—now titled components in this
three-tiered construct—became relevant subunits of
these competencies. Arrayed in an extensive matrix,
the taxonomy described above could then be used
to structure and guide training based on grouped
components as well as an education program design
around categories and competencies. The matrix could
also be scaled in terms of relative degree of desired
expertise for any given component or competency based
on military rank or level of participation in the process
(entry, junior, mid-level, senior). Finally, the matrix
could show which competencies and components, at
a given level of expertise, could be attained through
training, through education, or through specific
experience. In short, it offered a complete template for
force development.
A somewhat similar template was developed in that
same time frame (1998-2001) by the USAF committee
coordinating commissioning education qualifications
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for the entire National Guard officer training system,
which embraced the USAF Officer Training School, the
Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the U.S. Air Force
Academy, in order to establish a common set of core
competencies. Still another such template was the Air
University’s Master Plan to coordinate professional
military education curricula content for the junior, midcareer, and senior officer programs. Finally, a similar
template was crafted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Officer
Professional Military Education Program guidelines
for joint education programs in all the services. These
were all rank-scaled and program-scaled templates
that ensured educational attention to specified essential
competencies, skills, and knowledge.
Today in the homeland security arena, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and elements
of the Homeland Security and Defense Education
Consortium (HSDEC) are creating similar competency
sets as guides for education. In 2005, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, a veteran emergency management
official reissued a paper, based on his experience,
identifying the “Top Ten Competencies for Professional
Emergency Management” to guide post-secondary
education program design efforts.5 A related initiative,
this one inventorying existing emergency management
courses to determine common/best practices and
materials, has been undertaken under auspices of the
FEMA Higher Education Project.6 Experience and
common education practice can provide useful inputs
to development of education and training programs,
but must be examined continuously for applicability
in light of changing operational characteristics and
interagency dynamics.
HSDEC efforts in the spring of 2007 focused on
assembling faculty experts from existing homeland
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defense education programs at the community
college (first responder education), undergraduate
(operational-level manager education), and graduate
(program leadership) levels for review and analysis.
As of this writing, a community college workshop has
been held at which quality standards for five areas of
core curricula were identified, instructor qualification
standards were discussed, and a list of 11 common
curriculum outcomes (competency areas) was
developed.7 A similar workshop was held to address
undergraduate curriculum development. It undertook
development of consensus on target skill sets and
outcomes, and it also developed a list of 10 curriculum
outcomes or competency sets.8 Common outcome
lists/competency sets are very useful in designing
compatible education programs across the interagency,
and should be adapted to provide specific focus on
interagency coordination and cross-organizational
management.
Strategic Leader Development for the Interagency.
Training provides the requisite skill sets to accomplish the tasks needed for operational effectiveness in
stability and support operations. Establishing task and
skill requirements and developing training programs
that address those requirements within the context
of interagency applications will greatly advance the
effectiveness of interagency operations in the field.
Expert analysis of those requirements, of common
and best practices in interagency operations, and of
training programs across the agencies involved, are all
vitally important. They contribute to the specification
of competency sets that systematize task and skill sets
within their larger operational and strategic contexts
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and guide curricular development for education
programs and for targeted experience that will enhance
interagency program management and leadership.
Such workforce development efforts together provide
the “doers” for effective operations and junior to midlevel management. This cadre of able and experienced
workers and managers also provides the “bench” from
which enhanced interagency leadership can be selected
and developed.
Senior leadership development programs both
within the Department of Defense (DoD) and outside
of DoD but attended by DoD leaders have formed
a foundation for the transition from operational
application and oversight to strategic direction and
management within the U.S. military. The senior
service and joint staff colleges, as well as senior
leader development programs at the Kennedy School,
Maxwell School, and elsewhere, all contribute to
an enriched knowledge base and context, as well as
establishing cross-service and interagency networks
of similarly placed senior officials. However, they
do not automatically nor on their own provide for a
developmental leap from senior management to true
strategic leadership.
Acquiring competency in strategic leadership
for the interagency—that is, for operationally and
organizationally complex, often ill-defined missions
within multiple and shifting contexts, all as part of a
dynamic strategic security environment—transcends
any one course, school, experience, or assignment.
Strategic leadership extends well beyond simply senior
leadership. The award of senior rank and status does
not automatically convey the breadth of perspective and
depth of vision requisite of strategic leadership. Strategic
leadership embraces a way of thinking, not a position
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or office. It involves the attainment of deep functional
expertise across the range of task sets involved in the
interagency enterprise, insightful interorganizational
and multiple contextual understanding, and nuanced
ability to relate to others in a way that inspires loyalty
and motivates functional effort.9
Senior leader education, of course, plays an
important role in strategic leader development,
particularly capstone experiences which provide “the
icing on the cake” for this process. Such education
must put a premium on cross-functional and crossorganizational content, must address interagency
operations in broad scope and time, and must provide
opportunity to polish one’s capacity for critical
rethinking and entertaining broadened perspectives.
It must address a brand of leadership comfortable
with broad national security strategic planning and
strategic applications. Acquiring skills and capacities
of such elevation requires a continuum of rising-level
experience across years of development, far predating
the assumption of senior rank. As General Galvin put
it:
We need to agree that strategy is not an “elective” of the
later years of an officer’s career—that work in this field
needs to begin early. The lieutenant does not have to be a
strategist, but he must be aware that what he is absorbing
will contribute to a knowledge of tactics and operational
art constituting milestones on the way to ability in the
field of strategy.10

We need to provide framework knowledge and
perspective from early in the career so that experiences
and advanced knowledge can meaningfully be
processed into deeper insight and can begin to establish
interagency perspective and vision.
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Three “models” of successful strategic leadership
development, drawn from U.S. military practice, are
representative of this development. First, and perhaps
the most continuously successful and visible model,
is the Lincoln model. U.S. Army Brigadier General
George “Abe” Lincoln established the knowledge and
experience of assignment to the faculty of West Point’s
Department of Social Sciences (affectionately known
as “Sosh”) as his favored launching pad for strategic
leader development. (Of course, the Sosh route is
not the sole route—General Gavin taught in the
English Department, General Norman Schwarzkopf
in the Mechanics Department—but the principles of
selection are the same.) Army leaders nominate their
best young officers for USMA faculty assignment
upon completion of company command. After a
highly competitive review, the “cream” of this group
are selected to join the faculty after graduate study in
rigorous and prestigious civilian graduate programs.
For selected and particularly promising participants,
this experience can go beyond the master’s degree and
bring the officer to the faculty in “all but dissertation”
status. General David Petraeus, for example, who
taught Sosh, later completed his Ph.D. at Princeton.
Given the universities at which they study, these
young officers also establish early networks with rising
leaders from across American society. Upon arrival
at West Point, they teach an undergraduate course in
their discipline, sharpening their applied knowledge of
their field. They also serve as faculty advisors to cadet
activities ranging from debate to Model United Nations,
as well as to cadet summer programs that span the globe,
broadening their perspectives and gaining applied and
varied leadership experience as well. Moreover, they
have ample opportunity to research and write, through
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individual or service programs, departmental research
institutes, or formal fellowships.11 Upon completion
of the faculty tour, these officers are well prepared to
gain further insight through continued professional
education (intermediate service school or equivalent)
or to apply their advanced knowledge and skill through
assignments leading to command or significant staff
experience. A wide cross-section of strategic leaders
of the Army, government, and businss started their
journeys as part of the “Lincoln Brigade.”
In contrast to General Lincoln’s focus on officers at
the junior captain level, USAF Major General Robert
Linhard directed his attention to officers beginning
in the mid ranks (generally major), paving their way
to strategic leadership with extensive mentoring and
experience. General Linhard held important positions
at Strategic Air Command Headquarters, the Air Staff
and Joint Staff, and the National Security Council
staff. He actively screened, selected, challenged, and
mentored officers through assignment to his staff and
then with malice aforethought stretched them well
beyond their comfort zones. In selecting from among
those with the best career records and commander
recommendations, he sought four qualities: (1) ability
to engage the “other” (particularly suited to the
interagency), (2) integrity, (3) adaptability, and (4) zest
for knowledge. He actively sought “organizational
deviants” who were not afraid to push the envelope
or think outside the box. He engaged them in research
and staffing on the toughest and most ill-defined
strategic issues of the day. He also worked through
his senior staff to “protect the kids,” making sure they
did not suffer career damage for daring to challenge
institutional orthodoxy. “Linhard’s kids” have been
represented in the highest and most visionary strategic
leadership posts of the Air Force.12
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Of course, senior service leaders have long handselected and mentored their bright, promising
subordinates. However, USAF General Bill Creech
made this practice a science. His model involved
careful selection, mentoring, and grooming of rising
strategic leaders up through fairly senior command.
For General Creech, selection was more than screening
performance reports. He demanded a detailed analysis
of potential even for senior commanders, and he
consulted long, hard, and penetratingly with his
subordinate commanders prior to his decision on their
nominees for entry into his “program.” Within the
entire competitively selected pool, active mentoring
was practiced as if the commander were planting seeds
from which excellence and expansive vision could
grow. This mentoring, however, was also a further
screening device, as only a very few were then selected
for the final grooming via command at the colonel level.
Success there would then launch these leaders toward
the highest service strategic leader opportunities, this
during the critical period of transformation following
Vietnam.13
Training, education, and leader development
for the interagency is not unlike the same processes
designed to enhance effective jointness in DoD.
Building leadership for complex interagency stability
and support operations is also not unlike building
integrated effectiveness in homeland security. These
processes as outlined above have worked and are
working in those two establishments, and they can
work for the interagency as well. In this chapter, I have
proposed career “cradle-to-grave” attention to building
deep and broad knowledge of the interagency and
stability and support contexts and cultures. From such
a foundation, a true interagency perspective can begin
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to emerge. The “strategic corporals and lieutenants”
today may thus become the visionary trainers and
leaders of tomorrow, the “bench” of experience and
knowledge underwriting our nation’s security.
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CHAPTER 14
LEADERSHIP EDUCATION AND TRAINING
FOR THE INTERAGENCY
Brian Polley
The nature of the international security environment
has radically changed over the past 15 years. No longer
is the United States threatened directly by a large
traditional military armed with strategic missiles, and
no longer is the primary danger posed by nation-states
and their leaders. Instead, we currently face enemies
who have no home country, respect no international
borders, and disregard traditional rules of warfare.
Because the threats to national security have changed,
it is self-evident that our strategies and preparations
for dealing with them must change accordingly.
The need for change is reflected clearly in military
doctrine and official government policy, from Army
field manuals all the way up to the President’s National
Security Strategy. These documents and others
recognize that today’s conflicts call for a renewed
focus on nontraditional operations, especially support
and stability operations.1 Because of the nature of the
enemy and the asymmetric warfare tactics he uses, the
type of conflicts the United States is now engaged in
requires a different government structure, a different
military strategy, and a different type of leadership.
One of the most important goals laid out in the
National Security Strategy, and one that is necessary
if Americans are to live in a secure international
environment, is promoting democracy in countries
where authoritarian governments persecute their
own peoples. Democracy promotion, and building a
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state institutional structure such that democracy can
be sustained, requires a stable environment relatively
free of internal violence and foreign conflict. Support
and stability operations are those in which the United
States and its allies engage to provide that stable
environment and allow the citizens of target states to
build democratic institutions and establish the rule of
law.
The boundaries between the roles of the military
and civil society have become blurred in support and
stability operations. Success in present conflict and
contemporary post-conflict environments along with
those of the future requires close cooperation between
military and civilian agencies. Support and stability
operations are necessarily interagency in nature—
they cannot be successful using military means alone.
One of the most challenging aspects of coordinating
interagency efforts in these operations is the leadership,
that is, how men and women direct others effectively
in post-conflict environments. A number of important
questions relate specifically to leadership issues:
• How is leadership defined in military and
civilian contexts?
• How should various agencies communicate
with each other in conflict and post-conflict
environments?
• How should the agencies and stakeholders
involved decide who is in charge of a task or
operation?
• How can we prepare men and women to fill
leadership roles and solve difficult problems in
dangerous environments?
• How can various agencies improve the way
they educate and train leaders to align goals
and work together?
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In order to successfully create a stable and lasting
peace in support and stability operations, it is imperative
that the United States do several things better. Most
importantly, it needs a set of standard, coherent
leadership training programs to equip interagency
officials with the tools necessary to function in complex,
dangerous environments in which a number of different
organizations are represented and have a stake in the
outcome. Coordination and teamwork in these kinds
of operations are too often ad hoc and reactive; the U.S.
Government should make interagency teamwork part
of its preparation for post-conflict reconstruction and
peacekeeping.
To describe the functions and responsibilities
of leaders in interagency support and stability
operations, I will first discuss relevant interpretations
of leadership, and in particular how it is generally
defined by the U.S. Government in military and civilian
contexts. Second, I will summarize various programs
and practices currently used by U.S. Government
agencies to develop leaders and prepare them to
work on interagency teams. Next, I will critique these
programs and describe what tends to make some of
them more successful than others, and what aspects
of them remain worthwhile. Finally, I will discuss my
overall findings and outline several recommendations
for implementing successful practices in leadership
development. By following this progression, we can
better understand the roles and responsibilities of
leadership in coordinating interagency teams in conflict
and post-conflict environments.
Defining Leadership.
An analysis of roles and functions of leadership in
interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare
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must begin with a discussion of the various definitions
of leadership in military and civilian contexts, and
a brief history of leadership theory’s development.
Human beings have always been interested in
understanding leaders and the qualities that enable
effective leadership. According to political scientist
James MacGregor Burns, leadership is “one of the most
observed and least understood phenomena on earth.”2
Thousands of years ago, Confucius sought to define
the nature of the relationship between leader and
follower. Plato considered leadership at the highest
levels, idealizing the “philosopher-king” as the model
for a perfect republican system of government. Later,
Plato and his followers established the Paidea in early
Greece, a school and forum for discussing leadership
and how best to develop it. In the 16th century, the
Italian Niccolo Machiavelli wrote his famous discourse
on the more practical aspects of leading kingdoms and
principalities. These are only a few of the hundreds of
influential thinkers across human history who have
considered leadership to be an important concept and
have contributed to the intellectual discourse on the
topic.
For many of these influential thinkers, leaders are
understood to be a select few individuals who have the
good fortune to be born with characteristics required
to inspire and motivate. According to this “great man”
theory of leadership popularized in the 19th century
and still somewhat prevalent today, “there are only a
few, very rare, individuals in any society at any time
with the unique characteristics to shape or express
history.”3 The great man theory, while worthy of
consideration, cannot be used to create leaders and
therefore has little use as a scientific theory.
The modern scientific study of leadership can
be traced to German and French psychologists and
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sociologists in the latter half of the 19th century.4
Psychology and sociology have been leading fields in
the development of leadership theory, but disciplines
as varied as political science, history, military
science, education, philosophy, management, public
administration, anthropology, and biology have made
significant contributions as well.5 Over the past century,
the study of leadership has become increasingly
scientific and quantitative, especially beginning with
the emergence of Frederick Taylor’s “management
science” concept around the turn of the 20th century.6
Taylor disputed the commonly held assumption that
fundamental interests of employers and employees are
necessarily at odds with one another, arguing instead
that the interests of the two groups are actually one
and the same—that prosperity cannot exist for the
employer unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the
employee, and vice versa.7 Often applying his analysis
to sports as well as “soldiering,” Taylor believed it
meant that both workers and management should
train and develop each employee in the organization,
regardless of rank, to reach that employee’s full
potential. His scientific framework directly challenged
the great man theory, since it entailed a system in
which leaders are trained to organize workers for
efficient production, rather than a system in which
exceptional leaders are sought out from among those
someone else has trained.8 Furthermore, he applied
scientific management principles to all different
kinds of human activities, from the simplest tasks to
complex endeavors in large organizations. Military
scientists have been influenced by Taylor’s scientific
management principles for decades, finding that his
framework has much to offer in preparing leaders to
cooperate in support and stability operations.
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The mid-to-late 20th century saw a proliferation of
leadership theories, when many distinct interpretations
arose to complement or compete with great man and
scientific management theories. For example, Philip
Selznick and others taking a sociological approach to
leadership define it as a specific type of work or function
within an organization, not as something special or
glorified. Leadership is defined by the demands of
a social situation, and who should become a leader
depends on the requirements of an organizational
task. Leadership is a relation existing between people
in social situations, and therefore we can expect to
see different leaders emerge in different situations.9
The sociological approach also holds that leadership
is not necessarily performed by those in high places
or positions of authority, and that leadership is
dispensable and unnecessary in some situations.
The “business approach” to leadership exemplified
by John Kotter echoes the sociological approach’s tenet
that leadership is nothing mystical or mysterious, but
rather is a system of actions largely about coping with
change, as opposed to coping with complexity.10 Since
today’s business environment is more dynamic and
more volatile than ever before, the quickened pace
of change has demanded a corresponding increase in
leadership agility. While Kotter argues that leadership
and management are distinct concepts, he points out
that they are complementary and that both are required
in a successful business.11 The business approach to
leadership, while not obviously applicable to interagency
cooperation in counterinsurgency warfare, provides
a useful addition to other frameworks of analysis we
will consider.
Perhaps the most relevant for our purposes is the
political science approach as represented by its most
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prominent theorist, James MacGregor Burns. According
to this approach, leadership is best understood as
a relationship between leaders and followers; it is
exercised when someone uses “institutional, political,
psychological, and other resources so as to arouse,
engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”12 To
proponents of this approach, an important distinction
exists between true leaders and mere power wielders:
power wielders exercise their authority and demand
obedience, disregarding any desires or goals of their
respondents. Leaders, on the other hand, work to
motivate others to realize goals mutually held by
both leaders and followers. Like power, leadership is
relational and purposeful, but a leader is a particular
kind of power holder—the kind who induces followers
to willingly act for certain goals, needs, and aspirations
shared among themselves and their leader. It is this
approach to understanding leadership that adds the
most value to an examination of how to prepare men
and women to cooperate effectively in dangerous
conflict and post-conflict environments, especially on
interagency teams where different values and goals
may be represented.
These theoretical approaches vary in the degree of
emphasis placed on personal attributes of individuals
versus situational factors in determining the quality
of leadership. They also vary in the degree to which
they consider ethical decisionmaking to be a defining
feature of good leadership, a distinction important
to an analysis of leadership in support and stability
operations. This distinction enters most prominently in
the debate over the relative merits of transactional versus
transformational leadership, the two categories many
theorists agree are the fundamental leadership styles
that all leaders display to some degree, but tend to use
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more of one or the other in their “defining moments.”13
Transactional leadership generally involves contingent
reinforcement, where followers are usually motivated
by leaders’ promises, praise, and rewards and are
corrected by negative feedback, threats, or disciplinary
action. Essentially, leaders react to whether or not their
followers carry out what leaders and followers have
“transacted” to do. Thus, transactional leadership can
be understood as execution of a sort of contract between
leaders and followers; it is a somewhat impersonal and
formal relation grounded in a worldview of self-interest.
Telling the truth, keeping promises, distributing what is
due to others, and using valid incentives and sanctions
are all important aspects of transactional leadership.14
Transformational leadership, on the other hand, is
based on more than self-interest. It tends to inspire a
more realistic concept of the self—one that is connected
to others whose welfare may be more important than
one’s own. This concern for others’ welfare is a key
component of government service. In transformational
leadership, moral obligations are grounded in a
broader understanding of cultural and social norms
and beliefs.15 Lying within the political science school
of leadership, transformational leadership enjoys as its
most prominent theorist our familiar James MacGregor
Burns, who argues that leadership is best when it is
both transactional and transformational—it is based
on a set of agreements or bargains, under conditions
where both leaders and followers are transformed. To
be transformational, a leader must be morally uplifting;
he raises himself and his followers to higher levels of
morality through leadership.
Transformational leadership contains four main
components, each being important for leaders who
wish to elevate themselves and their followers to
higher standards:16
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1. Charisma, or idealized influence—transformational leadership is envisioning, confident, and sets
high standards for emulation.
2. Inspirational motivation—transformational leaders provide followers with meaning and challenges for
sharing commitments to goals.
3. Intellectual stimulation—transformational leaders encourage followers to think critically, and allow
them to question assumptions and generate new and
creative solutions to problems.
4. Individualized consideration—transformational
leaders treat each follower as an individual and as an
end in him/herself, never as a means to an end. The
leader provides coaching, mentoring, and growth
opportunities, always working to develop followers
into leaders. Transactional leaders tend to worry only
about their followers’ dependence. The bottom line of
transformational leadership is that followers identify
with their leaders and their leaders’ goals. Rather than
simply obeying orders, followers want to emulate their
leaders and grow into leaders themselves.
A final distinction bears mentioning—that between
authentic transformational leadership and inauthentic
or “pseudo-transformational” leadership. All aspects
of leadership (both transactional and transformational)
have ethical dimensions, and whether the behavior of
leaders is authentic or inauthentic is of critical importance. Organizations need authentic transformational
leaders who raise the organization’s ethical standards;
who are persuasive, not manipulative; who capitalize
on elements of both transactional and transformational
leadership to increase the effectiveness of both.17
All of these theoretical frameworks have played a
role in shaping the literature on leadership in military
and civilian government organizations. Since our focus
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is on interagency cooperation in support and stability
operations, our analysis must consider the history and
development of military doctrine on leadership and
where these frameworks fit.
The U.S. Army first became acutely aware of
leadership as it worked to shift from the small
professional army of the interwar era to the expanded
structure required in World War II.18 There have
of course been leadership training and instruction
programs in the U.S. military throughout its history,
but they were greatly expanded during this time.19 The
Army and other branches began enlisting help from the
civilian academic community, especially psychologists,
to identify and develop junior leaders. In the academic
community, the 1940s saw a shift from management
science to an emphasis on human relations, producing
a corresponding shift in emphasis within the military
community.20 For the Army, leadership and ethics
historically have been topics that go hand in hand. The
years during and after World War II saw an enormous
proliferation of books, journal articles, and classroom
instruction on these topics. The rapid growth in
literature and instruction on ethics and leadership
continued in the 30 years between the late 1960s and
1990s: by 1998, the U.S. Army War College Library
holdings reflected 1,670 titles in these two fields.21
The perceived crisis in leadership during the
Vietnam War led to still another resurgence of emphasis
on developing ethical leaders. Of the three presidents
most closely associated with the war, one commanderin-chief was assassinated, another chose not to run
for reelection, and another was forced to resign. This
pattern, coupled with seismic shocks like the 1968 My
Lai massacre, encouraged a wholesale reevaluation
of military leaders and leadership development
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techniques, the Professionalism Study commissioned
by General William Westmoreland in 1970 being a
prime example.22 The efforts were a success, stimulating
a dramatic growth in military professionalism and the
trust engendered in the U.S. Army as an institution—
probably more so than in any other army in the world
during the period between the end of the Vietnam
War and the end of the Cold War.23 The most obvious
evidence of the rise of military professionalism and
the corresponding rise in public approval of the
military can be observed in the tremendous respect
and trust shown by the American people (as well as
other peoples) for the U.S. military during and after
Operation DESERT STORM in 1990-91. Confidence in
the existence of high ethical standards and effective
leadership in the military may have been at an all-time
high after that first conflict in the Persian Gulf.24
Several crises in the 1990s struck a blow at this
restored confidence in ethical military leadership,
including sexual misconduct in the Navy; violence at
Fort Bragg; and numerous charges of racism, sexism,
and homophobia.25 The response to these incidents, led
by then-Army Chief of Staff Dennis Reimer, eventually
became known as “Character Development XXI.”
It sought to reexamine military leadership training
policies and eliminate some of the biggest weaknesses.
At the same time, an effort was underway at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, to revise Field Manual (FM) 6-22,
the Army’s main leadership manual. The primary goal
was to have a set of leadership ideals that also included
an iteration of core values for the military.26 FM 6-22 is
a model for similar documents in other branches of the
armed service and thus deserves consideration in its
own right.
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The most recent revision of FM 6-22, published in
October 2006, was written under the direction of thenArmy Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker. The document
applies to Army personnel at all levels, its main
functions being threefold: (1) to define what leadership
means in the Army; (2) to outline leadership roles and
requirements; and (3) to provide a general description
of how to develop leadership within the Army.
According to FM 6-22, there are three levels of
leadership, each with its own set of challenges and
competencies: direct leadership, organizational leadership, and strategic leadership. Common to all three
levels, however, is the Army’s “warrior ethos,” an
attitude integral to the life of a soldier. An ideal Army
leader at any level has a strong intellect, a commanding
physical presence, professional competence, high
moral character, and serves as a role model to others.27
Finally, part of being a good leader in the Army is also
being a good follower.
FM 6-22 describes Army leaders in a three-part
framework, based on what leaders should BE, what
they should KNOW, and what they should DO. In
other words, leaders’ behavior (what they do) emerges
from who they are (be) and what they have learned
(know).28 The BE aspect of leadership comprises the
values and attributes that shape one’s character, i.e.,
the internal and defining qualities that are intrinsic
and thus present at all times. As defined by FM
6-22, an Army leader is “anyone who by virtue of
assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires
and influences people to accomplish organizational
goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and
outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus
thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of
the organization.”29 The KNOW aspect of leadership
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refers to the knowledge that leaders should use based
on personal experience and formal instruction. Army
leaders should have a general knowledge of military
tactics, technical systems, organizations, management
of resources, and the tendencies and needs of people.
Character and knowledge are not enough for
effective Army leadership. The DO aspect of leadership
refers to leader actions and is directly related to a
leader’s influence. The act of leadership, according
to FM 6-22, is “the process of influencing people
by providing purpose, direction, and motivation
while operating to accomplish the mission and
improving the organization.” This definition mirrors
the political science approach, including specifically
transformational leadership, since leadership is
seen as a relationship between people that improves
leaders, followers, and the organization as a whole.
What leaders should do can be broken down into three
constituent parts.30
• Influencing—getting people, including Army
soldiers, civilians, and multinational partners,
to do what is necessary. Influencing is about
providing purpose, vision, direction, and
motivation.
• Operating—actions taken to influence others
to accomplish missions and to set the stage for
future operations.
• Improving—capturing and acting on important
lessons of ongoing and completed projects and
missions. Improving includes developmental
counseling, stressing team effort, and focused
learning.
It is important to note that FM 6-22 and similar
documents on military leadership doctrine divide
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leadership into three functional levels: direct,
operational, and strategic. Strategic-level leadership,
in particular, parallels conceptually some of the
theoretical frameworks mentioned earlier and
should be addressed separately. Strategic leadership
essentially means leadership “at the highest echelons
of organizations”;31 it is concerned with the big picture
and overall organizational goals. Examples of strategic
leaders are easy to find in both military and civilian
organizations: General George Marshall, Henry Ford,
and Lee Iacocca are a few of the better-known strategic
leaders.32 Case studies of these men and other people
like them raise the question of whether strategic leaders
are born or made; to join their ranks, must one be born
with exceptional leadership potential, or is leadership
something that can be acquired through learning? This
is an old debate that juxtaposes the “great man” theory
of leadership, which holds that leaders are exceptional
people by birth, against the sociological and political
science approaches, which hold that leadership is
contextual and learnable. Most leadership experts and
psychologists agree that there is a dynamic interplay
between innate ability and external factors across
every person’s life, and that leadership, like most
other human traits, can be learned and developed.
A fundamental assumption of FM 6-22 and military
leadership theorists rests on this claim that there are
learnable competencies essential for being an effective
strategic-level leader.33 Civilian government agencies
generally share this assumption, and it is to their
leadership development programs that I now turn.
Just as military organizations have programs
for identifying and developing potential leaders,
so do civilian government agencies. Government
organizations—including the Department of State,
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U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—all have their own
protocol for finding and training those men and women
within their ranks who have the most leadership
potential. OPM is historically something of a lead
agency in defining leadership in the U.S. Government,
and thus will be my primary focus.
OPM sees itself as the government leader in
designing and delivering educational and leadership
development courses and programs.34 It has three
locations across the country offering formal inresidence leadership education, and it also custom
designs leadership training programs based on the
needs of particular client organizations. Aside from
formal leadership education, OPM also offers the
Presidential Management Fellows program designed to
identify and recruit talented individuals with master’s
degrees and doctorates. Another OPM initiative is the
“Leadership and Knowledge Management System,”
which focuses on identifying and addressing an
agency’s leadership competencies so that continuity
of leadership is ensured, the knowledge is shared
throughout, and an environment of continuous
learning is created. The custom-designed training and
consulting services OPM offers, tailored to individual
needs of client organizations, include succession
planning and development, management development
and certification programs, development of strategic
collaborative partnerships, and consulting services
that fit other agencies’ needs.
In assessing potential leaders and identifying those
who might meet government agencies’ prerequisites
for advancement, OPM’s main assessment tool is called
OPM Leadership 360.35 Leadership 360 focuses on six
437

Executive Core Qualifications:
1. Fundamental Competencies—interpersonal
skills, written and oral communication, integrity/honesty, continual learning, and public service motivation.
2. Leading Change—creativity and innovation,
external awareness, flexibility, resilience, strategic
thinking, and vision.
3. Leading People—conflict management, leveraging diversity, developing others, and team building.
4. Results Driven—accountability, customer service, decisiveness, entrepreneurship, and technical
credibility.
5. Business Acumen—financial management, human capital management, and technology management.
6. Building Coalitions and Communication—partnering, political savvy, and influencing/negotiating.
USAID also has literature on effective leadership
and development programs, particularly in the
context of coordinating interagency efforts abroad.36 It
has created formal instruction and other programs to
help train men and women to be effective community
leaders in poverty-stricken and post-conflict areas all
over the world. For example, USAID representatives
provided nation-building training for town council
members in Sierra Leone, imparting knowledge about
leadership, public service, accountability, acceptance,
and teamwork.37 USAID has coordinated similar
leadership training programs in Guatemala, Vietnam,
and other countries, involving Americans as well
as foreign nationals. Programs like those of USAID
and OPM offer valuable lessons to all organizations
involved in interagency efforts, particularly those in
dangerous environments and support and stability
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operations. Civilian agencies are often successful in
identifying and selecting those men and women who
have the potential to lead others in novel, challenging
situations.
Although many parallels exist between civilian and
military leadership needs, there are a few important
differences that bear mentioning. These differences
suggest that caution is necessary in comparing
military and civilian leaders. First, civilian leaders,
in most cases, do not have the “unlimited liability
contract”38 that military officers have; while civilian
jobs in post-conflict environments and support and
stability operations are certainly dangerous, military
leaders are the ones most often targeted by enemies
and are therefore in near constant mortal danger. A
second difference to consider is the general officer
personality factor, meaning significant personality
differences between the typical military leader and the
typical civilian leader. For example, military officers
are often described as the “aggressive adventurer”
type. Compared with the typical civilian manager,
they also tend to have a higher need for control,
stronger manifestations of dominance, greater comfort
with data than with intuition, and higher scores on
an “achievement through conformity” scale.39 All of
these characteristics can be very positive in certain
contexts, but some evidence suggests that they can all
have drawbacks as a leader moves from the tactical/
operational to the strategic level.
A final important difference between military
and civilian leadership demands is the necessary but
sometimes troublesome “warrior ethos” mentioned
earlier. The warrior ethic of authoritarian rule and
unquestioning loyalty can serve to “rationalize leader
behaviors that are situationally inappropriate.”40
439

One example may occur when a leader’s style and
preference for centralized control result in poor
decisionmaking because he or she cannot gain
access to all relevant information. The issue military
leaders face is maintaining the warrior spirit while
simultaneously allowing for change, agility, creativity,
and self-awareness—the very characteristics required
of an army engaged in counterinsurgency warfare and
support and stability operations.41
Armed with all this knowledge, both theoretical and
practical, the various agencies in the U.S. Government
that are involved in support and stability operations
face the challenge of designing a practical and efficient
system to identify potential leaders, place them in
positions to gain experience, formally train them to
lead others, and work closely with leaders from other
agencies who often do not share all the same goals,
values, or competencies. This is a difficult task, one
various agencies have struggled with for years.
Training Leaders for Interagency Cooperation.
In support and stability operations, there is
traditionally a common tendency to place too much
emphasis on the military aspects of securing victory.
The U.S. Army, in particular, often shoulders the
lion’s share of the burden for maintaining a secure
environment and allowing reconstruction and capacity
building after a major conflict. The problem, though, is
that the Army is only one aspect of American power
that should complement and support other elements of
national power in order to achieve desired objectives.42
In other words, military effort is only one factor in
the equation, while support and stability operations,
necessarily interagency in nature, require all the factors
and actors. Thus the military must be able to work
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with civilian agencies to achieve a broad spectrum of
goals. Working with civilian agencies in these kinds of
conflicts requires more than just coordinated action—
it requires synchronization and a pervasive unity of
effort across the political, military, economic, and
psychological spectrum.43 In low-intensity conflicts and
counterinsurgency operations, nonmilitary resources
often play a far greater role in achieving victory than do
military resources. This is true at all levels, from overall
strategy down to ground-level tactical decisions. This
reality poses challenges to even the best military leaders
since it requires an understanding and appreciation
for the elements of national power other than military,
which are generally not the military’s main areas of
expertise. The bottom line is that the military aspects
of low-intensity conflict cannot be separated from the
political, social, and psychological.44
Of all the challenges leaders face when training to
work on interagency teams, several are particularly
noteworthy because they are especially difficult to
overcome. First, the lack of a common lexicon hampers
communication in theater and in coordination of
training efforts.45 The fact is that representatives of
different government agencies do not always mean
the same thing when using the same terminology.
For example, the word “counterinsurgency” does not
necessarily mean the same thing to a Foreign Service
officer as it does to an Army officer. The same applies
to commonly used terms like “nation-building,”
“security,” “policing,” “democracy promotion,” and
“regime change.” Even the word “terrorism,” used
frequently in the news media as well as in support
and stability operations and leadership training, is
defined differently by various agencies of the U.S.
Government.
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A second important problem in training leaders
for interagency cooperation is even more obvious: the
lack of a common vision and shared strategic goals.
Agencies often train leaders differently because they
seek different ends once in theater in post-conflict
environments.46 All agencies have their own defining
interests (especially political interests), and these
interests are not always shared by all members of an
interagency team. The result is too often a kind of turf
battle, or a tug-of-war, to decide which piece of the
operation is for which agency, who answers to whom,
and who has ultimate authority to make decisions.
While this kind of struggle can involve representatives
of many government agencies, it tends to happen the
most often between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense (DoD).47 Personalities can
end up playing a large role in determining who takes
responsibility for various operational aspects, and
this is not necessarily the wisest or most efficient way
of deciding who is to exercise responsibility. Besides
pure personality factors, other considerations, such
as which agency has the highest-ranking member
participating on an interagency team, can determine
leadership roles. Whichever agency’s representative is
closest to the President may take charge; one’s clout on
an interagency team tends to diminish with increasing
relative distance from the President. Though this is
how leadership positions are usually determined on
interagency teams in post-conflict environments,
strong evidence suggests that the process does not have
to work this way. During the many interagency efforts
in the Clinton years, these kinds of teams often showed
deference to field experience rather than proximity
to the President in a number of cases.48 In Bosnia, for
example, U.S. Army and other military personnel often
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followed the advice of or delegated responsibility for
important decisions to American civilians or United
Nations (UN) officials. This experience holds lessons
for present-day U.S. Government interagency teams
and leadership selection/development.
A final important problem interagency teams face
when delegating tasks and setting priorities is the lack
of shared training or educational experience of many
team members.49 Interagency teams are often created ad
hoc, with agency representatives perhaps sharing little
or no common training or related experience. Contrast
this with the general practice of the military services,
where the practice is to form teams with lengthy
postings and coordinate the mission before deployment.
Throughout the interagency process, personnel and
thus perspectives are far more foreshortened as Foreign
Service officers, USAID personnel, and others may have
briefer individual postings and rotate assignments
more frequently. In the State Department, for example,
personnel posted to difficult locations (especially
those in post-conflict or reconstruction environments)
rotate in and out after periods sometimes as short as 3
to 6 months. When one Foreign Service officer finally
begins to understand a team’s dynamics and mission
goals, he or she might be replaced with someone brand
new. Leadership is especially challenging when the
team membership is in constant flux and incorporating
new faces commonplace. A better model would have
interagency teams assembled and trained together
before deployment.
In today’s efforts at interagency cooperation in
support and stability operations, there are two main
types of training and education programs: institutional
education, and interagency participation in military
training programs. The institutional education
443

comes in curricula at the service academies, in ROTC
programs at colleges and universities around the
country, and in classroom instruction at places like
the Federal Executive Institute and the Management
Development Centers run by OPM. Curricula at the
service academies and ROTC programs are often
designed with the interagency process in mind, and
the men and women in them are trained from the
beginning for possible work on interagency teams.
Noncommissioned officers (NCOs) receive similar
training for interagency work in their own academies
and schools.50 OPM’s Management Development
Centers offer a broad range of formal instruction and
course work for civilian government leaders, covering
such topics as Bridging Organizational Cultures,
Collaborating Across Organizational Boundaries,
Developing High-Performing Teams, and a number of
specially-tailored leadership seminars.51
Interagency participation in military training
programs is another way government organizations
prepare leaders for the unique interagency challenges
of support and stability operations. This kind of less
formal educational instruction happens at a number of
military training centers and reserve bases, for example,
at the Joint Readiness Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana,
and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. These programs
actually partner military units with other government
agencies to train them together, and they operate here
in the United States as well as in theater. An example
of this kind of program might be an FBI criminal
forensics expert visiting a combat training center to
help train military police in forensic science before
deployment. These interagency training programs
are almost exclusively governed and coordinated by
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DoD—other agencies rarely do anything similar on a
comparable scale. A partial explanation for DoD’s near
monopoly on informal interagency leadership training
is that it simply has the resources and funding to make
the programs possible—other agencies often cannot
afford them.52
Model Practices in Leadership Development.
Decades of research and theory have created a
large body of literature on the topic of leadership
development and education. This literature reflects a
variety of philosophical backgrounds and academic
disciplines, but a large portion of it applies directly
to development programs for civilian and military
government organizations involved in interagency
operations. Army regulations and military doctrine, for
example, have proven very useful in providing lessons
on how to lead teams and how to develop capable
leaders, and these lessons usually apply to nonmilitary
organizations as well. In general, military leadership
development is considered a career-long process that
involves “professional experience; formal professional
training and education; and self-study, assessment,
and reflection.”53 The military generally operates from
the assumptions that effective leaders are made, not
born, that leadership is a skill set that can be developed
over time, and that specific competencies exist that are
essential for effective strategic leadership.54 Based on
these assumptions, the U.S. Army and other military
branches have created and revised doctrine that
outlines a number of specific institutional requirements
for maximizing leadership potential of officers and
NCOs. These are as follows:
• Give aspiring leaders early opportunities for varied
responsibilities. Specialization is important,
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but the best leaders will be trained to lead
comfortably in a number of different situations
and roles. The U.S. Army does this as well or
better than most large organizations.
• Have clearly communicated standards for what it
means to be a good leader. This is about having
practical guidelines and a well-developed and
actively-implemented system of monitoring. The
U.S. military tends to do this well, but not in all
cases. The corporate world seems to understand
this principle better, in terms of being serious
about setting management standards and
establishing appropriate style, mentoring, and
measurement of results.55
• Provide feedback often and create a formal mentoring
system. The corporate world tends to do this
better than the military, by formally pairing
junior and senior leaders in mentor/mentored
relationships. It takes a great effort to reduce
institutional discomfort with providing and
accepting feedback. It might be worthwhile
for military organizations to institute a formal
mentoring system—though mentoring and
coaching have been part of the Army’s strategy
for some time, their use tends to be uneven and
localized.
• Have a system in place that measures organizational
attitudes and climate. This means having a
formal system for recording morale, mission
focus, clarity of procedures and expectations,
effectiveness of communication, trust in
leaders, perceived level of discipline, support
for initiative and innovation, and fair treatment
of all personnel.56 This is essentially an easy and
inexpensive way to monitor employee feelings
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and attitudes and alert leaders to issues before
they become problems. According to many
retired and active military officers, the military
falls short on this approach compared to the
business world.57
• Train leaders in assessment methods, or in how
to judge the effectiveness of other individuals and
groups. Neither the Army nor large corporations
seem to do this very well. Too often, top
management assumes that leaders know how
to evaluate performance of others when this
is not actually the case. This is a more difficult
measure to implement, but it is not impossible:
the Office of Strategic Services made extensive
use of assessment methodology during and after
World War II, and today there is an extensive
literature on assessing leadership capabilities in
personality psychology and related academic
disciplines.58
• Use many sources of input for promotion decisions.
The corporate world is far ahead of the U.S.
military in implementing this principle.
Essentially, it means that the decision for
promoting or passing over an officer should
not be based exclusively on his supervisor’s
assessment—peers and subordinates at all
levels should have input as well. In other words,
use “360-degree” input as well as the standard
top-down assessment for promotion decisions.
Personality and leadership assessments agree
that some leadership traits or characteristics
cannot be reliably observed from above;
specifically, many aspects of transformational
leadership, discussed earlier, are difficult
to assess from higher in the organizational
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hierarchy. Examples of such aspects include
articulating a motivational vision, inspiring
teamwork, providing intellectual challenge,
treating subordinates as individuals, being
open to new ideas, modeling moral behavior,
and demonstrating a willingness to subordinate
oneself to the mission.59
• Formalize a system that promotes continuous learning. This practice is one of the most important:
too many organizations and government agencies provide initial training and then leave personnel to suffer the consequences of time and memory loss on the important educational aspects of
that training. The military and the U.S. Army in
particular tend to be better about this practice
than most large organizations, including those
in the corporate world. The Army expresses
and then demonstrates a commitment to
encouraging education throughout an officer’s
military career. Understanding this principle
of continuous learning allows an organization
to “marshal [its] intellectual and operational
resources to facilitate learning from [its]
individual and collective experience.”60
In many ways, the U.S. military is actually ahead of
other public agencies and private sector corporations in
terms of developing human resource potential, which
is partially explained by the fact that the military has at
its disposal larger access to the full range of behavioral,
cognitive, and social sciences. Knowledge of these
disciplines in the military is somewhat scattered, but
vast. To build on these already existing competencies,
U.S. military organizations should bear in mind
institutional commitments to growing individuals
out of compassion as well as concern for operational
competence.61
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Support and stability operations, and any operations
in post-conflict environments, necessarily involve the
various civilian agencies and not just the military.
Developing leaders is a task not limited to the Army,
but instead is a goal that must be shared across the
spectrum of U.S. Government agencies. To be sure, the
Army must be involved in the process of defining the
nature of the peace; diplomats, aid workers, and other
government civilians must therefore have an awareness
and understanding of the military capabilities in any
post-conflict situation.62 This is an extremely important
requirement, but not always adhered to; soon after the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took over in the
early part of the post-conflict phase in Iraq, for example,
one senior CPA official observed that “the civilians in
the Coalition generally had no knowledge of military
organization, and thus no idea of which parts of the
military might either assist them or need to know what
they were planning. The civilians didn’t know whom
to call.”63
In order for all to be effective together, civilian
government workers must have an understanding of
military capabilities beyond the pure application of
force. Leadership development programs in civilian
agencies should consider how best to integrate political
and economic goals with those goals the military
works toward, so that all aspects of national power are
aligned and moving in the same direction. Legislation
like that proposed in March 2007 by Senator Daniel
Akaka of Hawaii is an excellent example of a step
toward coordinating interagency training and efforts
in theater. If it becomes law, Senator Akaka’s bill would
encourage management and supervisory training for
all government agencies, training which today varies
across organizations and is inconsistently implemented.
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The bill would require agencies to provide training
during a manager’s initial year on the job and mandatory follow-up training every 3 years after that.64 It would
give public sector managers a clearer understanding
of leadership roles and responsibilities and re-focus
leaders on institutional goals shared across the U.S.
Government. Furthermore, coordinating leadership
training across civilian government agencies would
provide excellent opportunities to integrate leaders
into joint training programs with military units and
other interagency teams. Lawmakers proposed similar
legislation in the past, but it foundered in committee—
passing the current bill would be a step in the right
direction, providing an impetus for integrating goals
in Washington and in post-conflict environments
abroad.
While the military is ahead of other large
organizations in implementing some important
principles of leadership development, certain
nonmilitary government agencies have their own welldeveloped competencies that offer lessons to their
counterparts in other areas of government. For example,
the intelligence community generally communicates
best from Washington to the field, and also seems to
be most prepared to work closely with interagency
teams.65 This strength of intelligence agencies is telling,
since gathering good intelligence is one of the single
most important (and most difficult) aspects of fighting
counterinsurgencies or low-intensity conflicts. With
the challenges they face, intelligence services’ success
could provide important lessons for other government
agencies that are less effective in sharing information.
The Department of State has developed its own
set of core competencies that might be useful for other
organizations to learn from. While Foreign Service
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officers from the State Department are often stretched
thin and lack sufficient numbers in theater, they
frequently have regional or functional expertise in
particular areas. Other government agency personnel,
both military and nonmilitary, could improve
performance by recognizing the expertise of their
State Department counterparts and trying to combine
knowledge to further overall operational goals, both
in training programs and in the active operational
environment.
Given these model practices in leadership
development, all U.S. Government organizations
participating on interagency teams have opportunities
to improve on core competencies and achieve a more
positive impact in support and stability operations
environments. Considering the knowledge accumulated in the body of literature on leadership theory,
the experiential knowledge of various government
agencies, and the problems that the interagency
process has experienced in recent years, a number of
important steps are possible that could streamline that
process and improve the overall functioning of the U.S.
Government in Washington and abroad.
Applying Leadership Knowledge to the Interagency
Process.
First, the interagency process would be significantly
strengthened if the U.S. Government sought to develop
a common lexicon or vocabulary on the topic of support
and stability operations. Government agencies should
collectively decide on some formal definitions for
key terms, including interagency, counterinsurgency,
support and stability, interoperability, nation-building
(and state-building), and terrorism.
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This common lexicon should be developed with
participation from the whole spectrum of government
agencies involved in overseas operations. It should
then be formalized, published, and made available to
everyone. There are a number of workable alternatives
regarding who should take responsibility for creating
such a formalized shared vocabulary. One possibility
is a stronger National Security Council (NSC) with a
new mandate to coordinate this project. This does not
mean the NSC would become an operational entity,
only that it would have a new and slightly broadened
mandate. Another possibility is giving responsibility
to a new interagency task force or policy team created
in Washington. It would be given the authority to
develop a formalized “dictionary” or list of terms that
would ultimately be used by all agencies participating
in support and stability operations, however defined.
Either of these options falls short of creating something
entirely new or hiring a set of new people—they simply
shift resources slightly to reflect changing priorities.
Either would be more effective with active support
from the president.
A second change the U.S. Government should make
to improve the interagency is to increase the frequency and
number of joint training exercises with both military and
civilian participants present. There are far too many
people in government today who have never heard
anything about training people for work on interagency
teams; the dearth of interagency training opportunities
results in a fundamental lack of knowledge of how one
can traverse a professional atmosphere in which he/
she must represent the interests of an agency as well as
the mission of the U.S. Government writ large.66 There
are certain programs existing today that patch together
interagency protocols, but they are created almost
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entirely on an ad hoc basis—after problems arise and
quick action is necessary—and in theater instead of
in the United States. “Institutionalized ad hockery”67
will not meet today’s security challenges; we need
interagency teams that are assembled, trained, and
practiced together before deploying overseas. These
teams should include representatives from the whole
spectrum of government agencies—not just DoD, State
Department, and USAID, but also CIA, Department of
Commerce, Department of Agriculture, and the U.S.
Information Service. All of these agencies have different
areas of expertise that can strengthen interagency teams
when they face challenging situations. Other agencies
should be represented on the teams as necessary.
The training programs that assembled interagency
teams experience together must simulate as closely
as possible the actual environment that may be
encountered in the field, especially when they will be
sent to a country with an ongoing counterinsurgency
campaign. Simulations are necessary in order for
team members to experience something akin to what
the military calls “reinforcement of competence,” or
to the learning process that takes place in an officer’s
mind during his peacetime training followed by the
period of active service. Realistic simulations make the
transition to actual dangerous scenarios easier; once in
theater, personnel take the step from being a leader in
peacetime to a leader in war, experiencing a “renewal
of competence.”68 Military and civilian training that
simulates the actual reality in theater makes the step
from the training situation to the combat (or postcombat) environment as small as possible. It is important
to offer good training opportunities to all who serve
abroad, but it is especially important for those who
will serve as leaders and commanders because not
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only do they have to know and understand their own
tasks, but they also must safely command and control
the actions of subordinates. These training simulations
are also opportunities for the best leaders to practice
some of the leadership competencies discussed earlier,
for example, the transformational leadership style
within the Army’s “Be-Do-Know” framework.
A recent example of interagency training
insufficiency occurred in the U.S. experience
using Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan, especially from 2003 to 2005.69 There
was usually no team building for groups except in
theater, and there was no standard implemented
training regimen for operating in the interagency
environment. PRT staffing was sometimes haphazard
and did not necessarily match the needs of individual
teams. Team members often shared no common
understanding of the main goals and challenges of
their missions. Some other countries have used a more
successful model in Afghanistan. Specifically, German
and British PRTs were usually assembled and trained
before being deployed to Afghanistan—sometimes as
much as 6 months in advance. Once in theater, these
interagency teams were able to draw on common
training experience to coordinate tasking and work
cooperatively to accomplish their missions.70
It should be noted that while more joint training is
very important, it is also usually desirable to have one
agency (or even one person) with ultimate authority
to make the final call on tough decisions; joint training
for interagency teams does not necessarily suggest
that all agencies have equal decisionmaking power. To
illustrate, one of the main problems with peacekeeping
operations (which, like support and stability
operations, necessarily involve the interagency) is that
more people show up than can contribute to the effort
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efficiently. In Bosnia in the mid-1990s, for example,
UN peacekeepers were joined by a group of American
civilians who wanted to teach the Bosnians Spanish
as part of the peacekeeping effort.71 Initially, the UN
soldiers allowed them to stay and help, even though
there is simply no reason for Bosnians—whether
Muslim, Serb, or Croat—to learn Spanish. This was
basically a failure of leadership: some headquarters or
organization should have used its authority to say no
to this group in order to keep the mission focused.
In some ways, the recommendation for increased
joint military-civilian training implies “militarizing the
interagency,” an idea first suggested by Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD)-56 in 1997.72 However, it
does not imply that the military should take complete
charge of interagency operations; rather, it means
that the structures and functions of interagency teams
should operate more like the military, with a clear chain
of command and someone in ultimate command who
delineates which agency is responsible for each task
in accomplishing the broader mission. It also means
creating clearer lines of communication and eliminating
structural obstacles to information sharing.
A third recommendation for improving leadership
in the interagency is for the U.S. Government to create
a formal, centralized knowledge management system. The
problem addressed by this recommendation is that
every new presidential administration—at least every
8 years in other words—appears to come into office
thinking that it faces totally unique challenges and
that it is somehow the first administration to ever deal
with many of the problems that require interagency
cooperation. In other words, the new administration
comes in thinking it must reinvent the wheel. There is
almost never any sense of exploiting lessons learned
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from the past, or looking to previously documented
knowledge and literature; each administration tries to
“carve its own trail” in counterinsurgency and other
interagency challenges.73 This adversely affects U.S.
support and stability operations as well as peacekeeping
operations that the United States participates in.
Ironically, there is a body of knowledge out there
on things the United States tends to do well, for
example, recruiting international police as it did in
Bosnia and Haiti, and on things that other countries we
could partner with do well.74 There is also information
available that outlines strengths of particular agencies
and how their personnel might be used most effectively
in particular operations. The problem is that this
information is never consolidated or organized in any
coherent and meaningful way, never systematically filed
and stored, and never advertised, so that government
officials arriving on the scene may never know it exists
or how to access it. For them, such information might
as well not even exist, for there is no formal proactive
institutional memory with which to train new leaders.
This is a problem some have labeled “institutional
memory loss,” meaning the U.S. Government collectively
forgets that it has engaged in similar operations in
the past and has sometimes been successful. Even if
the American government has not been successful,
oftentimes some other government (or other agency, or
other army) has been successful in the past. Ane even if
past efforts were not a succss, such information should
be made available to newcomers so they can avoid
the mistakes of the past or avoid adopting ill-advised
measures to make them work. The challenge is to
organize and institutionalize this knowledge base and
experience so that it can be tapped in future operations
and used in future leadership education programs.
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Conclusion.
In current and future low-intensity conflicts, or
counterinsurgency warfare, the United States will
be successful only if it is able to utilize all political,
economic, and psychological options at its disposal.
The challenges of these operations are unique,
requiring interagency cooperation from the level of
small teams in theater all the way up to the highest
levels in Washington. The role of the military must
be defined based on how the United States can best
apply its military capability in synchronization with
other elements of national power—we need to build
capacity in the military as well as civilian agencies.75 So
far, we seem to have been most successful at increasing
the capabilities solely of the military; soon after the
invasion of Afghanistan, “99.9 percent of the resources
in country were controlled by the Department of
Defense.”76 Adequately funding the military is essential,
but since “the humanitarian space and the battle space
overlap,”77 overall mission goals are best served by
funding civilian agencies as well. Military leaders
must coordinate with the country team in order to
achieve synchronization of military and political will,
especially when it comes to planning and resourcing.
Faulty planning in support and stability operations is
a national problem, with civilian agencies including
State Department and USAID needing to be better
funded in order to meet the challenges they are sure to
face.
To implement these changes successfully, the
United States needs bright, thoughtful, well-trained
leaders who understand leadership theory and are
motivated to cooperate with representatives of other
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government agencies so as to bring the full hard and
soft power of the United States to bear. In today’s
counterinsurgency operations, there is something
lacking in the interagency process—that thing is very
likely effective leadership. To better prepare leaders
of interagency teams, the United States needs a set of
standard, coherent leadership training programs and
evaluation methods that address three main problems:
the lack of a common lexicon across the spectrum of
government agencies; insufficient joint training with
both military and civilian agencies present; and the lack
of a formal knowledge-management and knowledgesharing system.
By implementing these changes and coordinating
planning and resource allocation, the United States
can enjoy greater success in future counterinsurgency
and support and stability operations. Some of the most
important reforms have to do with leadership—how
we train and educate people and how we equip them
to align civilian and military goals determine how
successful we can be in furthering U.S. interests in
strategically important areas of the world.
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CHAPTER 15
THE INFLUENCE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS
ON THE ARMY PROFESSION AND PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT
Chris Cline
The Army bears the brunt of stability operations on
the ground. This is so despite a deeply rooted cultural
bias against such operations within the Army profession
as embodied in the Army’s officer corps. According to
this cultural bias, traditional combat operations are the
Army’s premier mission while stability operations are
the responsibility of civilian agencies or specialized
units such as civil affairs, military police, and special
operations forces. National Security Presidential
Directive–44 (NSPD-44) and Department of Defense
(DoD)
Directive-3000.05
(DoDD-3000.5)
have
challenged this traditional mindset, forcing the Army
profession to confront how it will incorporate stability
operations into its repertoire as a core mission.
There is of course the related—and possibly more
difficult—question of how to adapt the Army culture
as a whole to this new operational dimension. Stability
operations are complex, with a large interagency
aspect. While the Army plays a vital role, many aspects
of stability operations cannot occur without the
integration of civilian government agency support. It
is the responsibility of civilian agency leaders, or more
specifically public managers in government, to develop
and carry out a multitude of programs within stability
operations. Recent events in Iraq have demonstrated
that U.S. Government officials, as public managers,
need to reevaluate their methods and practices in
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light of resource and capability shortfalls. Achieving
success in stability operations may require both the
Army officer and public manager to examine what
knowledge and skills are necessary along with what
changes, if any, both groups must make to cultural
attitudes, beliefs, and practices.
Understanding what knowledge and skills are
essential to operational success requires an examination
of the elements comprising the Army profession and
public management as well as possible challenges both
cultures face. This chapter attempts to examine these
aspects in five broad thematic areas. The first deals with
the practices linking the Army profession and public
management in counterinsurgency and nation-building.
Their respective cultures are also examined. The second
looks at the importance of NSPD-44 and DoDD-3000.5
for establishing stability operations as a U.S. national
security concern and for creating knowledge and skill
requirements for the Army profession and public
managers. The third focuses on the manner in which
the Army profession and public management have
approached, or should approach, stability operations,
including necessary knowledge and skill sets. Insights
from highly respected authorities on the Army
profession and public management are also included.
The fourth highlights areas of concern and interest for
both the Army profession and public management
regarding approaches to stability operations, along
with knowledge and skill development. Finally, the
fifth thematic area is devoted to presents findings,
recommendations, and conclusions.
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The Army Profession.
The Army’s officer corps consists of the practitioners of what is known as the Army profession.
Unfortunately, for those outside the Army and even
for many officers, the notion of the Army profession
is often misunderstood. What makes the officer corps’
work a profession, and what impact does this have on
the role and expertise of the Army officer? To develop
proficiency in the necessary skill sets required for
stability operations, the Army’s officer corps must first
understand what it means to be a professional.
Dr. Don Snider, a retired Army colonel and
civilian professor at the U.S. Military Academy,
has spearheaded many of the latest studies on the
Army profession. According to Snider, the Army
can be viewed as a large bureaucratic organization
and a profession. He notes that at times the Army’s
bureaucratic nature overshadows its commitment
to military professionalism. This overshadowing of
professionalism is the result of decades of organizational and bureaucratic tendencies gaining precedence
and priority over the purely professional. This
phenomenon has produced an organization focused
on efficiency rather than effectiveness, he argues. He
advocates return to an Army where professionalism
dominates elements of bureaucracy. To achieve that
goal, the officer corps must first understand what
makes them part of a profession.
In the classic work, The System of Professions, Andrew
Abbott outlines four characteristics inherent to a
profession: knowledge, tasks, control, and jurisdiction.
Knowledge, or more specifically the academic knowledge system of a profession, provides for legitimation,
research, instruction, and timely innovation.1 Tasks,
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defined in the profession’s cultural work, are any
problems open to expert service. Professional controls
include schools to train professionals, examinations
to test them, licenses that identify them, and a code of
ethics to assure that professionals practice their craft
up to standards.2 A profession must also claim or
assert its dominance over a jurisdiction, the boundaries
of knowledge and expertise of the profession. This
claim requires professions to ask society to recognize
its cognitive structure through exclusive rights with
social acceptance and forms of legitimating responses
from society.3 Abbott refers to jurisdiction as the link
between a profession and its work, an entity with a
culture and social structure.4
Army Professionalism Defined.
A set of established tasks is essential in considering
the Army as a profession. Those tasks can be seen in the
components of the Army’s operational concept of fullspectrum operations: offense, defense, stability, and
civil support.5 This operational concept provides the
foundation for all Army doctrine. Based on Abbott’s
theory, Snider and his research team drafted what
they considered to be the negotiated jurisdictions of
the U.S. military professional (Figure 1). External and
internal jurisdictions exist, with the external primarily
serving the Army’s client, American society, and
internal jurisdictions serving the profession itself. The
four external jurisdictions consist of major combat
operations, stability operations, strategic deterrence,
and homeland security. The Army has competition
within these jurisdictions from such outside professions
as the other military services, other government
agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
and private contractors.6
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Figure 1. Negotiated Jurisdictions of American
Military Professions.7
Developing expert knowledge itself, and developing
Army professionals with that expert knowledge and
expertise, comprise the two internal jurisdictions.
There are four subsets of expert knowledge: militarytechnical, moral-ethical, political-cultural, and human
development.8 Figure 1 shows how these clusters of
expert knowledge correspond to the four identities
of the Army officer: warrior, leader of character,
member of profession, and servant of country. Expert
knowledge and expertise are credentials that sources
outside the Army try to develop as well. As a result,
the Army encounters competition within the internal
jurisdictions from such sources as Army retirees and
private corporations hired for contracting work.9
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The 2003 Army Training and Leader Development
Panel (ATLDP) Officer Study Report.
In 2003, the Army released the findings of the Army
Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP)
Officer Study Report. The original mission of the
ATLDP was to focus on contributing to the Army’s
transformation campaign. However, as over 13,500
officers began to provide their input, it became evident
that a major focus on Army leaders themselves was
needed. The findings demonstrated that officers failed
to understand fully the Army service ethic and concepts
of officership and professionalism. These findings
echoed Snider’s findings. While officers demonstrated
strong support for the foundations of the Army service
ethic—pride in their profession, commitment to the
Army and its values, and belief in the essential purposes
of the military—the full implications of what it means
to be a member of the Army profession proved esoteric
in the minds of respondents, lacking clear definition
and reinforcement throughout an officer’s career.10
Perhaps an even more important finding was that
the requisite leader competencies must thrive “in a
complex environment marked by the challenge of
high-intensity combat and the ambiguities inherent in
stability operations and support operations.”11 Backed
by voluminous officer comments, the study found that
the Army’s educational experience failed to provide
officers with the knowledge and skill sets needed
for proficiency in today’s operating environment.
The changing operational environment, with the
increased requirement for proficiency in full-spectrum
operations, reflected a number of inadequacies in the
officer education system (OES). Officers perceived that
the OES was failing them. The study found that OES
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did a good job teaching branch technical and tactical
skills, but did not sufficiently teach combat support
and combat service support officers the basic combat
skills necessary for leading and protecting units in fullspectrum operations. The study concluded that while
there was increased emphasis on battle command
within the education system, the Army needed to add
stability and support operations to the OES.12
The Role of the Public Manager.
Just as many officers are unaware of their
responsibilities as members of the Army profession,
public managers and interagency officials involved in
stability operations also need to understand their roles
and responsibilities. The redefinition and clarification
of Army missions and the requirement for interagency
involvement call not only for the Army profession to
understand what knowledge and skills are expected
from them, but also for public managers to understand
their own roles. Public managers play an important role
in the government bureaucracy and the interagency
process as a whole. Unfortunately, many in society
look upon the bureaucracy with disdain, failing to
realize that bureaucracies are essential and inevitable.
Examining the traits of an effective manager will
shed light on the professionalism needed within the
bureaucracy to improve individual and organizational
performance in stability operations as a whole.
An effective public manager, regardless of his or
her particular position or responsibility, must possess
the temperament and skills to organize, motivate, and
direct the actions of others in and out of government
towards accomplishing public purposes. Additionally,
like managers in the private sector, public managers
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direct the allocation of scarce resources for achieving
specific goals. Being a successful public manager
involves comprehending exactly what public
management is just as membership in the Army’s
officer corps involves understanding what makes the
military profession a profession. Public management
has three dimensions. Laurence Lynn, a public
management professor at Texas A&M University with
extensive experience in government and academia,
describes these three dimensions as structure, craft,
and institution, which translate to “management,”
“manager,” and “responsible practice.”13
Public management was originally conceived
as a structure of governance to provide a means for
limiting and overseeing the exercise of state authority
in agencies and departments. In terms of structure,
public management exhibits the elements of lawful
delegation of authority and external control over the
exercise of delegated authority. It is the means of
striking a balance between capacity and control, which
is a controversial aspect of public management. Failing
to create this balance often results in tensions in the
field of public seervice and in failure to achieve needed
public management reform. Finding the ideal balance in
such requirements as formal controls over managerial
discretion, “letting managers manage,” holding public
managers accountable for their performance, degree
of adherence to formal rules and procedures, etc., are
always problematic.14
In recent decades the focus on public management
as a craft involving behavioral skills and intellectual
ability has intensified. Public management literature
often characterizes successful public managers as
understanding and able to master problems; having
imagination; being skilled at working effectively with
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interest groups, legislators, and members of the agency;
possessing the ability to make effective arguments; and
being inclined to act. The idea of craft postulates that
public management will be only as effective as public
managers are able to master their craft.15
The concept of responsibility is integral to identifying
public management as a self-regulated institution. As
an institution, public management provides guidance
to public managers and allows them to understand the
need to practice their craft under a regime of values
and ideals. In essence, public institutions establish
standards of professionalism.
Managerial Responsibility.
Aside from being well-versed in the established
directives and governing documents of the current
administration, public managers should be students
of the U.S. Constitution as well. Unfortunately,
many within government are not truly conversant
with the fundamental strictures of the Constitution.
Understanding the Constitution and the role that
public management plays in government helps the
public manager understand his/her responsibility to
government.
What constitutes responsibility in the sphere of
public management? In the book Madison’s Managers,
Anthony Bertelli and Laurence Lynn set down what
they consider to be the four axioms of responsibility
as derived from constitutional values and seen in the
classical literature of public administration: judgment,
balance, rationality, and accountability. These axioms
help the public manager operate within the context
of the separation of powers, allowing the legislative,
executive, and judicial to properly share powers.
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According to Bertelli and Lynn, these axioms are not
a classification of managerial functions like planning,
organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting,
budgeting, etc. Nor do they purport to be qualities of
action such as efficiency, effectiveness, professionalism,
responsiveness, flexibility, consistency, stability,
leadership, probity, candor, competence, efficacy,
prudence, due process, etc.16 The difference is that
judgment, balance, rationality, and accountability are
fundamental to constitutional governance through
adhering to James Madison’s ideal of administrative
discretion. See Figure 2.
Dimensions of Public Management
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Figure 2. Dimensions of Public Management and
Axioms of Responsibility from Bertelli and Lynn.
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Judgment, synonymous with autonomy and discretion, is considered fundamental to a constitutional
scheme in which important authorities are delegated
to the executive. Public managers must exercise their
discretion wisely since it often determines the level
of action taken on a matter of public concern. Public
managers must also exhibit balance and prudence
in their decisions in order to avoid corrupting the
constitutional process through acting on behalf of their
own self-interests or the interests of particular groups
or ideologies. Instead, their goal is to identify and
resolve inevitable conflicts among interests. In terms of
rationality, Bertelli and Lynn contend that the default
position for public managers motivated to fulfill the
constitutional scheme should be reasonableness in their
actions and decisions. Finally, balanced and rational
judgment leads to accountability and responsibility,
the “entire purpose of public management as an
institution among the separate powers.”17
Implications of DoDD-3000-5 and NSPD-44.
In December 2005, the White House issued
NSPD-44 to address the management of interagency
efforts in reconstruction and stabilization. In NSPD-44,
the President designated the Department of State to be
the lead department in such efforts, acting specifically
through the Coordinator for Stabilization and
Reconstruction. That office serves as overall coordinator
of stability operations and establishes workable
relations with all relevant U.S. agencies to “prepare,
plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction
activities.”18 The Secretary of State is also required
to coordinate stabilization efforts with the Secretary
of Defense so as “to ensure harmonization with any
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planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the
spectrum of conflict.”19 Perhaps the most significant
element of NSPD-44 is that it acknowledges, legitimizes,
and institutionalizes stabilization and reconstruction
activities as being integral to U.S. national security.
The issuance of DoDD-3000.05 in November 2005
was also significant in that, along with NSPD-44, it
affirms stability operations as a significant element of
our total defense posture. Dr. Douglas Johnson believes
that so far as national security is concerned, this directive
could “be one of the most important documents of
this decade.”20 Stability operations, defined by DoD as
“military and civilian activities conducted across the
spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain
order in States,” is now considered to be a core U.S.
military mission that requires the same priority as combat
operations.21
Given these policy directives, Army professionals
and department/agency managers must come to
understand the importance of stability operations
and their role in establishing the peace that ultimately
represents victory in war. Part of this understanding
includes new expectations and assigned tasks.
DoDD-3000.05 states that stability operations “are
conducted to help establish order that advances U.S.
interests and values.” As part of the immediate goal,
establishing this order entails providing the local
populace with security, restoring essential services,
and meeting the necessary humanitarian needs. The
long-term goal of stability operations is helping the
target government develop a capacity for providing
essential services, a viable market economy, the rule
of law, democratic governmental institutions, and a
robust civil society.22
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To achieve the immediate and long-term goals, the
directive assigns three major tasks:
• Rebuilding “indigenous institutions including
various types of security forces, correctional
facilities, and judicial systems necessary to
secure and stabilize the environment”;23
• Reviving or building the private sector, “including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up
economic activity and constructing necessary
infrastructure;”24 and,
• Developing governmental institutions representative of the people.25
While DoDD-3000.05 acknowledges that many tasks
that fall under stability operations are best performed
by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals, it
makes clear that the U.S. military must be prepared to
perform all necessary tasks in the event that civilians
are unable to do so. The question then becomes: What
skill sets do Army professionals need to develop to
become proficient in stability operations, particularly
if the military has to perform them alone, and what
skill sets do public managers need to develop for
application when the security situation and/or agency
availability permit entry to the theater?
The Army Profession and Stability Operations.
Traditionally, the U.S. military has regarded
conventional warfighting as its premier mission.
However, the Army’s most recent experiences have
demonstrated the need for the profession to embrace
stability operations as a core mission. DoDD-3000.05
is a landmark document in that it firmly emplaces
stability operations within the military’s core missions.
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No longer are the tasks associated with “Phase IV”
(post-conflict stability operations) the unqualified
responsibility of other government agencies and
NGOs. The military can no longer concern itself solely
with winning the war, but with winning the peace as
well. But as important as stability missions are and
despite the explicit assignment of such missions as a
core Army mission by the Army’s civilian masters, the
concept may be a difficult task for many in the Army
profession to accept and come to terms with.
Dr. Lawrence Yates, a former specialist in stability
operations at the Combat Studies Institute, notes that
despite the Army’s participation in more stabilitytype operations than conventional wars since 1789, the
institutional Army has still continued to maintain its
emphasis on warfighting until very late in the game.26
As an example, Yates refers to the opening paragraph
of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (2001), in which
it declared, “Fighting and winning the nation’s wars
[are] the foundation of Army service—the Army’s
nonnegotiable contract with the American people and
its enduring obligation to the nation.”27 He also notes a
prevailing attitude that follow-on stability operations
are seen to be “someone else’s job,” either that of civilian
agencies or specialized military personnel such as civil
affairs, military police, engineers, medics, lawyers, and
special operations forces.28
While maintaining the ability to discriminatively
destroy the enemy’s military capabilities remains
crucial and should not be questioned, many officers
debate what exactly falls within the boundaries of
warfighting and ultimately war-winning. Army
participation in post-combat stability operations is
common when instability prevents the immediate
withdrawal of military forces; however, many Army
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professionals are reluctant to accept and fully embrace
stability operations as a core mission. Some of these
traditionalists argue that combat troops would sacrifice
warfighting skills and their warrior ethos if stability
operations became a core mission.29 Any general
officer or civilian leader who seeks to make stability
operations a core mission of the military in deed as well
as word will have to overcome and transform a deepseated, traditional mindset as to the Army’s proper
role, according to Yates.30
Yates and Snider agree that the Army’s officer corps
should accept stability operations as a core mission
and not question whether or not it has a place in the
Army’s jurisdiction. That sentiment is now shared by
the institutional Army as evinced in emerging doctrine
and publications. Post-conflict stability operations
are and always have been a part of the profession’s
expert knowledge. As Snider chides, “Shame on
us [the Army’s officer corps] for not knowing it.”31
History contains innumerable examples of the Army
conducting stability operations: building and securing
the frontier’s infrastructure , pacification campaigns in
the Philippines, establishing stability in Mexico and the
secessionist South after the Mexican and Civil Wars,
respectively, and in post-conflict Germany, Japan,
and South Korea.32 Snider believes it is the cultural
bias Yates describes that allowed counterinsurgency
doctrine to wither and our civil affairs capabilities to
atrophy.
Even if the officer corps wholeheartedly comes to
accept stability operations as a core mission, there will
still be questions concerning the Army’s role. Should
the Army be completely responsible for operations
or subordinate to another agency or interagency task
force? More than likely, the military will indeed stay and
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bear the brunt of stability operations because there is a
tendency for other agencies, which lack the necessary
resources, not to get involved. Michele Flournoy,
former senior advisor in the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) International Security
Program, explains that when the military is asked “to
undertake these kinds of missions without adequate
civilian partners, they get stuck with mission creep
and no exit strategy. . . . [But] in the short term, they
have to step into the breach.”33 According to Snider, if
the Army considers itself a profession, then it should
be willing to step up and take the lead. Snider believes
that DoD is the only agency funded well enough to
carry out operational missions abroad.
Despite the views of Snider and others that the
Army profession should be responsible overall, there
exists a competing view that the State Department
should take responsibility for a significant part of
stability operations. NSPD-44 supports this view in
granting the State Department oversight of stability
operations. Snider contends, however, that the State
Department is responsible for manning embassies
and, like other government agencies, is not funded
for or capable of leading or taking part in support and
stability operations (SASO). While the State Department
may supply knowledgeable experts on the ground
to assist with the political and diplomatic aspects of
operations, they should not be expected to carry out
the operational aspects of such missions or bear the
overall responsibility. NGOs and intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs), however, will always be involved
since they have the ability to do operational work.34
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The Public Manager and Stability Operations.
Stability operations affect the missions and
tasks public managers are going to have to face.
As the lessons learned from Iraq indicate, public
managers play a significant role in the planning and
implementation of personnel management, overall
operations, contracting, auditing, and various
reconstruction programs to include institutionbuilding. Unfortunately, many public management
miscues have been receiving a disproportionate share
of the attention. Examples include staffing issues such
as those reported in the Washington Post on February
24, 2007. The U.S. Government contracted the job of
promoting democracy in Diyala, a province northeast
of Baghdad, with a Pakistani citizen wholly unfamiliar
with democratic procedures. Further, the U.S. officials
put Diyala’s Border Patrol commander in charge of
the management of reconstruction projects despite his
having no reconstruction experience.35
Laurence Lynn has stated, “The best thing to do for
stability operations is to believe in stability.”36 These
words reinforce the need for public managers not only
to do their job as it pertains to stability operations, but
also to believe in the necessity of post-conflict stability
itself. This belief in the mission and its importance is
the first step to ensuring successful operations. An
administration, department, or agency that does not
take seriously the role of post-conflict stability will
very likely fail. Once government officials, as public
managers, come to believe in their mission and tasks,
they will begin approaching operations with the
appropriate management skills and make the right
things happen.
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Required Knowledge and Skills.
Conducting stability operations, whose distinguishing trait is complexity, is not an easy task. It
involves issues ranging from politics, to networking,
to communications, to name only a few. The Army
professional has to consider all the elements involved
in stability operations which are not normally
considered part of the traditional military repertoire—
political, financial, social, economic, and humanitarian
challenges. Professionals have to educate themselves
on what is required to effectively carry out the roles
and responsibilities expected in such a complex core
mission. No longer can military professionals concern
themselves only with combat effectiveness; they must
be concerned with the means of achieving stability
in a region. In short, the professional needs to learn
to think and act in ways that authentically reflect the
profession’s expertise in stability operations.
Thinking Like a Strategic Leader.
The path to gaining the required expert knowledge
for the Army professional is to begin thinking like a
strategic leader.37 Professionals need to begin by asking
themselves, “What requisite knowledge and skills do
I not have?”38 They need to understand the map of
expert knowledge and its jurisdictions as they pertain
to the profession.39 Ultimately, it is the responsibility
of the profession to develop this required knowledge.
Moreover, the Army’s mission and requirements
necessitate strategic leaders who can work across
political, agency, ethnic, religious, cultural, and
national boundaries. Fortunately, one can learn how
to work across boundaries through self-development
and institutional development.40 See Figure 3.
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Stability Operations Considerations
Doctrine:

How should doctrine address the distinctions between stability operations
conducted during war as opposed to similar operations conducted during
peacetime? What principles should apply? How and when should interagency
participation be integrated? How should planners integrate available allied
forces, peacekeepers, or international police units? What is the best way to
incorporate lessons learned from emerging experience and expertise?

Organization:
How should the Army organize itself to best fulfill the tasks associated
with stability operations? Is there a possibility for the creation of
specialized units? Would multi-tasking existing organizations to
perform stability operations in conjunction with combat operations
and other tasks prove too much to handle? Should the same command
carrying out combat operations be responsible for stability operations?
At what organizational level should planning for stability and combat
operations take place and should the same or different organizations
be responsible? Are soldiers who have just completed combat
operations best suited for initial stability operations and providing for
public security until the creation of a local police force can take over
responsibility? How should other government agencies and service
providers such as NGOs, allied forces, and international organizations
be factored into planning and execution?
Training, Leadership, and Education:
What additions or modifications must be made to training and leader
development systems to produce Army professionals adept at stability
operations? Is the training provided at the pre-commissioning and
basic training levels adequate for subjecting new soldiers to the realities
of both stability operations and warfighting? Are the tasks required
for proficiency in stability operations addressed throughout a leader’s
career? Are realistic stability operations scenarios played out in the
Army’s combat training centers?
Material:
What are the material demands for stability operations? Within the
zone of conflict, what are the sources for supplying the basic needs of
the population? Which materials provided for unit sustainment can be
used to aid stability operations? What local assets will most likely be
available to assist? Given the requirement for Army units to exercise
restraint and discrimination in potentially hostile environments,
arethere any material or technological solutions which could provide
assistance in such conditions? Can the Army preposition material
required for stability operations in theaters of operations? Is there a
need for deploying additional support units such as transportation
and medical to handle civilian requirements post-conflict?
(Continued on next page)
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Personnel
Do Army personnel systems meet the flexibility and fidelity
requirements for identification and assignment of personnel and
units needed for stability operations? Is the right mix of individual
specialties available to the Army? Do the active forces possess enough
personnel ready for immediate deployment? Are specialists in the
Reserves such as civil affairs and military police readily available in
sufficient numbers for deployment and sustainability over multiple
deployments? Does the personnel system track stability operations
skills among reserve members along with relevant civilian specialties
such as an infantryman with police, local government, and construction
experience?

Figure 3. Five Considerations for Stability Operations
by Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement.43
Public managers play a crucial role in the planning
phases of operations and must thus demonstrate
creativity and the ability to conceptualize. Public
managers need to think of every potential scenario
and contingency in an attempt to control events after
the train has been set in motion. Although Lynn refers
to this as “common sense public management,” it is
sometimes overlooked. Lynn cites an instance when
he was a member of the National Security Council
(NSC) Staff during the Vietnam War. Henry Kissinger
handed him the war plan for a projected invasion of
Cambodia, telling him, “I want to know everything
that can go wrong; I want to know everything that has
not been thought about or is not being thought about in
that plan; I want to know everything you can think of
that I [Kissinger] should be able to possibly anticipate
and help the President anticipate.”44
While he considers that situation a “pretty smallscale effort,” Lynn and his staff spent several days going
over the plan to think of every possible scenario, such
as refugees, intervention from the North Vietnamese
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side, reactions from the Cambodians, and reactions
from Cambodian allies. Questioning all assumptions
in this manner is essential. Any public manager taking
part in or contemplating any operation or campaign
remotely similar needs to prepare for eventualities,
unintended consequences, and far-out ripple effects.
The public manager also needs to prepare for worstcase scenarios and risks flowing from the enemy side,
and also consider scenarios that might be generated by
friendly outside agencies or sources. Such preparedness
becomes even more crucial as the degree of danger and
uncertainty rises.45
Building a Tool Kit.
A useful public management tool in stability
operations is the ability to identify personnel who
possess skills and expertise requisite for success in a
particular operation. While the Army usually has such
specialists at its disposal, civil affairs being a good
example, most other government agencies such as the
State Department do not. Consider the Diyala region
in Iraq. While having overall responsibility for stability
operations and reconstruction teams in that area, the
State Department has no agronomists, engineers, police
officers, or technicians at its disposal.46 As Secretary
of State Condoleezza Rice has remarked, “No foreign
service in the world has those people.”47
The lack of qualified personnel and experts within
civilian government agencies opens up the possibility
of establishing a new public management strategy of
reserve capabilities like the one the Bush administration
has proposed and the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended.48 The
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question then becomes, “Where does this capability
come from and how do we identify such personnel?”
Are they part of a permanent establishment dedicated
to stability operation missions or do they serve in a
call-up status?49 These are not unlike the personnel
questions that Schadlow, Barry, and Lacquement
address concerning the Army profession. Identification
of appropriate personnel, according to Lynn, must
occur through professional public management.50
The ability to identify and manage personnel is
important because personnel management can have
a major impact on how operations are carried out.
Staffing and manning procedures must place the
highest priority on acquiring qualified applicants. For
stability operations, applicants must have appropriate
language skills, experience in post-conflict operations,
or expertise in stability-related fields. In addition, there
must be a sufficient number of personnel available to
carry out the duties and tasks associated with ongoing
operations. Such staffing problems are evident in the
rebuilding of Iraq where there is a dearth of qualified
personnel to carry out the reconstruction efforts.51
In the critique titled Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons
Learned in Human Capital Management, the Special
Inspector General declares that personnel management
and planning must “clearly identify current and
future human capital needs, the number of personnel
required to accomplish a specific mission, the specific
competencies necessary, and the sources from which
skilled personnel can be drawn.”52 Public managers
must ensure that such information is acquired. An
interesting parallel to the need for public managers
to believe in the mission of stability emerges from
the following question: Should public managers also
be willing to execute their tasks and missions in the
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environment or theater for which they are planning?
Noteworthily, part of the lack of qualified personnel
in Iraq is attributable to a lack of desire on the part of
agency employees to deploy to a combat zone.53
Another important element of stability operations
is the need to establish human service programs for the
local populace. While primarily a public management
task, the Army profession and all interagency officials
would benefit from understanding the considerations
involved in human service programs. Gordon Chase
provides what he considers a framework for thinking
about implementation difficulties in establishing
these programs. Though this framework was
intended mostly for programs in the United States, all
interagency officials involved in stability operations
should be aware of its elements, especially since they
are applicable elsewhere.
According to Chase, the three general sources of
implementation difficulties include the operational
demands implied by a particular program concept, the
nature and availability of the resources required to run
the program, and the program manager’s need to share
his authority with other bureaucratic and political
actors or at least retain their support, while assembling
the necessary resources and managing the program.54
Careful and thorough examination of these three
sources of difficulties may help the public manager
identify all or most of the problems related to various
program implementations. The added dimensions
of interagency involvement and potentially hostile
operational environments demonstrate why public
managers must plan, coordinate, and implement their
management programs with far more than routine
care.
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The Importance of Language and Cross-cultural
Savvy.
Thus far, it appears that the Army has not been able
to adequately “provide post-conflict stability sufficient
for strategic success in the type of wars it seems destined
to face in the coming decades.”55 If one could narrow
the requisites for success in stability operations to two
essential skills, what would they be? Snider strongly
answers that all officers should possess language
proficiency and cross-cultural savvy. These two skills,
he believes, would do most to help the Army profession
achieve success in the world of stability operations
and interagency involvement. Lynn believes these two
skills are vital to public managers as well.56
Cross-cultural savvy is the ability to work across
boundaries and understand other peoples’ mode of
living. It includes not only the ability to work with
non-U.S. militaries, but also the ability to understand
cultures beyond one’s organizational, economic,
religious, societal, geographical, and political
boundaries.57 Cross-cultural savvy enables members of
the Army profession to interact with a variety of actors
such as Congress, the news media, tribal warlords,
the diplomatic corps, and NGOs. It allows the officer
to work outside of his/her traditional comfort zone
and to do so effectively while being grounded in the
values of his/her organization. Cross-cultural savvy is
a particularly essential skill for an officer to possess as
interagency involvement increases along with foreign
interaction resulting from globalization.
The development of cross-cultural savvy can begin
as early as the precommissioning phase. College
courses in international relations, foreign language,
and regional studies, coupled with internships with
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other agencies and study abroad, help expand one’s
worldview and cultural awareness. Institutional
schools can provide instruction in interagency issues
along with education on specific geographical regions.
During the early mid-point of one’s career, a general
understanding and awareness of other cultures
can be further enhanced by experience on joint or
multinational staffs. Additionally, congressional
internships, graduate school education, overseas tours,
training with industry assignments, and fellowships
can help produce culturally savvy officers.58
Going hand in hand with possessing cross-cultural
savvy, an officer needs to be able to communicate
with the local populace in their language. Few human
interactions engender mutual trust better than the
ability to speak the other person’s language. Achieving
success in stability operations means the Army
professional must gain the local populace’s trust in
what they are being told. It is not enough simply to
have the ability to say a few key words and phrases in
the local’s native language. It is not solely a matter of
verbal understanding. It is also a matter of emotional
and psychological understanding. It is about speaking
and listening in a language with enough proficiency to
establish an element of trust between the Army on the
ground and the local populace. It is about understanding local concerns. Therefore, foreign language skills
are essential to the Army professional.59
Perhaps the best way to establish an officer corps
that is proficient in the necessary language skills is to
require them for commissioning. Snider believes that
language is such an important skill that an officer
candidate should not receive his commission until he
demonstrates at least Level 3 proficiency in a foreign
language. The language the officer is proficient in may
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not be the right language for particular operations;
however, that first language provides the foundation
for the study of a second, more applicable language.
Snider admits that a language requirement for
commissioning would produce fewer officers, but in his
view it is far more important to produce officers with
the ability to communicate in a trustworthy manner
than to produce a greater number with the inability to
effectively communicate with target populations.60
Possessing language proficiency and cross-cultural
savvy as the foundation of expert knowledge for
stability operations proves highly beneficial to the
junior officer. Speaking at a conference on the impact of
stability operations upon the armed forces, rear Admiral
Richard Cobbold of the Royal United Services Institute
remarked that the demands for comprehensive training
are higher for stability operations than for warfighting.
Unfortunately, no military training regimen can address
every skill requirement for personnel participating in
stability operations. This lack of spelled-out instruction
for every situation, in Cobbold’s view, encourages
junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs)
to draw upon inculcated values gained through prior
education rather than procedures and tactics learned
in training. This is where a solid foundation of cultural
awareness and communication skills gained prior
to entry in the service becomes worth its weight in
gold.61
Additionally, public managers need to develop a
sense of cross-cultural savvy and language proficiency
parallel to that of the Army profession. One of the SIGIR
recommendations regarding program management in
Iraqi reconstruction efforts includes having program
managers integrate local populations at all levels of
planning and execution.62 The SIGIR found that the
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most successful reconstruction managers in Iraq took
the time to understand the local customs and practices.
The ability to cross cultural boundaries in the target
country can have a significant impact on project
and program success. Of course, obtaining cultural
knowledge of a target country prior to deployment is
optimal.
Cross-cultural savvy is beneficial in interagency
environments as well. As public managers work
with other agencies to accomplish mission tasks, they
increasingly need to work outside the boundaries and
cultural settings of their resident agencies. Feeling
comfortable in and operating within unfamiliar
environments enable the manager to be more effective
and establish a better communications base with
other agencies. There is perhaps a greater need for
public managers to possess cross-cultural savvy in
the interagency sense than for Army officers because
of the nature of the public manager’s tasks in general,
particularly at the higher levels of government
policymaking and operations.
Implications of Stability Operations for Officer
Education and Commissioning Sources.
As we have seen, Snider and Lynn agree that two
crucial skills for operating in a foreign environment
are language proficiency and a high level of cultural
awareness or cross-cultural savvy. While proposed
ways of developing these skills in officers include
increased language study at the precommissioning
level as well as instruction in the social sciences,
comprehensive development of these skills ultimately
involves the commissioning sources themselves.
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One aspect of commissioning sources requiring
assessment is the baccalaureate curriculum. Any
proposed curriculum reforms, however, must face
several questions. Do the three commissioning sources
(Reserve Officer Training Corps [ROTC], U.S. Military
Academy [USMA], and Officer Candidate School
[OCS]) have the capacity to establish a curriculum
sufficient to meet reasonable language and cultural
awareness requirements within the timelines of their
programs? Should there be an established academic
program of study for the Army profession similar to
that of other professions such as doctors and lawyers?
Would an established academic program reduce
diversity of backgrounds and knowledge among the
officer corps? Should only select academic majors
be considered for commission? Would additional
requirements be needed for commissioning through
OCS? Could future cadets and officer candidates
entering a commissioning program be preselected for
a particular specialized track or branch, taking into
account preexisting academic knowledge and skills
based on a foreign language spoken in the home, high
school study, or work experience? Would an increase in
commissioning requirements have the effect of posing
additional barriers to entry into the profession?
The location and character of ROTC programs and
schools need to be examined as well. Following the
Vietnam era, several ROTC programs at elite colleges
and universities in the northeast were discontinued.
However, many new programs were established at
schools in the south where 49 percent of Army, 41
percent of Air Force, and 41 percent of Navy ROTC
programs are located.63 Many of the new programs
in the south were established at state colleges where
it is more likely that participants come from the
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corresponding state or region. The result, as Michael
Desch contends, is a predominantly Southern cadet
pool.64 How does an officer candidate pool composed
of a significant number of cadets with a particular
regional background affect the cultural awareness of
those future officers? Does limited interaction with
students from other regions and backgrounds at
schools have a significant impact on the cultivation
of cross-cultural savvy? Would internships or study
abroad provide sufficient outside exposure for students
at such schools?
Redefining a Culture?
Is there a need for public managers to adopt
something akin to a “warrior ethos” or redefine the
notion of “selfless service” regarding operations in
hazardous war-torn regions? Is this too much to ask of
civilians? The inability of some agencies to require its
managers and experts to take part in overseas operations
has created shortages of personnel equipped to provide
crucial stability-related services. Simply put, not many
civilian agency officials are quick to volunteer for
lengthy tours in the areas where stability operations
take place.65 However, their knowledge and expertise
are critical to success. An agency ethos entailing a
greater willingness to make personal sacrifices would
be helpful to operations.
If we may continue along the same line of questions,
do public managers need greater operational
experience? Should public managers be expected not
only to develop cross-cultural savvy and language
proficiency, but also spend their early years in
operational jobs? Greater operational experience early
in a manager’s career may provide greater appreciation
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for the managerial planning involved in operations.
Should there be a separate class of public managers
who possess these skills and operational experience
who specialize in stability operations and interagency
involvement? These are all relevant questions for
public management to consider.
Contractor Involvement.
One threat to both the Army profession and
public management which may arise from stability
operations is dependence on contractors and civilianowned companies. The skills and resources that
contractors and outside agencies bring to stability
operations are those that the Army profession and
public managers must control. There will always be
a need for contactors to provide expertise in narrow
niches of functional expertise, but wholesale reliance
on contracted knowledge that is traditionally an
Army monopoly or resident in government itself is
quite a different matter. The Army profession and
public managers must ask themselves, “If contractor
involvement ceases altogether, would we still have the
knowledge and expertise to complete the mission?”
If the answer is no, then new organic capacities must
be created. However, if contractors must be used, it is
best to establish contracts with local, i.e., indigenous,
vendors, as the SIGIR recommends.
As we’ve noted repeatedly, a factor prompting
the use of civilian contractors in stability operations is
the unavailability and undeployabilty of government
agency personnel. The SIGIR report on human capital
management cites the conclusions of a United States
Institute of Peace report which made the following
observation concerning the Coalition Provisional
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Authority (CPA) experience in Iraq: “Even if planners
had correctly anticipated the difficulty of establishing
stability and governance in post-war Iraq, there is
simply no capacity in U.S. civilian government agencies
to mobilize large numbers of the right people quickly.”66
Public managers must find a method for overcoming
the manning challenge, or the use of contractors will
likely increase. Again, a reserve capacity may be the
answer, but only if deployabilty concerns are resolved.
By default,it may very well turn out to be the case that
the Army remains the go-to actor.
Length of Tours and Performance Continuity.
The desirability of maintaining performance
continuity in the target country is another issue
the Army profession and public managers need to
examine. As a stability operation continues for a
period of several years, overly brief tour lengths,
as well as gaps between incumbent departure and
replacement arrival, particularly among key players,
can have a significantly adverse impact on maintaining
performance continuity. The recurrent turnover of key
personnel proved to be a debilitating factor in the Iraq
reconstruction program, according to the SIGIR.67 This
problem relates mostly to civilian agencies, which lack
standard deployment protocols stipulating adequate
tour lengths. It was not unusual for tour lengths to be
as short as 2-3 months, so that incumbents departed
just when they were getting their feet on the ground.
Active-duty Army units in Afghanistan and Iraq
now serve 15-month tours, while key Army personnel
can serve even longer. However, tour lengths of other
military services vary, with 6 months typical for the
Navy, 4 months for the Air Force, and 7 months for
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the Marines. The disparate military and civilian tour
lengths present coordination problems along with
creating difficulties in forming lasting and trustworthy
working relationships. An across-the-board minimum
tour length should be considered. Both groups need
to anticipate this adverse factor in their planning and
develop a means to resolve it.
NSPD-44 and Army Expertise.
Through NSPD-44, the President authorized the
Department of State to coordinate all stabilization and
reconstruction efforts overseas. How will an Army
profession that considers itself expert in stability
operations coexist with the new State Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)? If the Army
profession establishes itself as the exclusive expert in
stability operations, then some challenge to the State
Department’s authority could easily result. At the
very least, significant tension could emerge between
the Department of State and DoD, particularly during
planning and execution phases. How should S/
CRS personnel be integrated into military plans and
organization? Does the inability of the State Department
to provide an adequate number of qualified personnel
to regions such as Iraq bolster an Army profession’s
argument for primacy in stability operations? How
would the situation change if S/CRS were adequately
funded to carry out its missions? In the end, the agency
with the greatest resources available and ability to
provide trained experts will likely become the de facto
leader.
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The Army Taking the Lead?
If government agencies lack the ability to adequately conduct stability operations because of personnel,
logistical, or budgetary constraints, then what is the
best method to ensure unity of command and overall
effectiveness? Would the Army as lead element in
stability operations provide a better alternative than
the State Department? This alternative would certainly
be practical because the Army has made the cultivation
of expert knowledge in stability operations a priority.
Also, the Army is far better equipped and organized
to handle such operations than other government
agencies in terms of personnel, deployabilty, funding,
planning capacity, and overall operational experience.
Not only would Army primacy assure a smoother
transition from combat to stability operations, but it
would also aid in basic coordination, continuity, and
management given the Army’s longer tour lengths
and ability to assign Army professionals to a particular
region based on skills and experience.
Of course, the Army profession lacks the range of
expert knowledge of stability operations necessary to
do the whole job all by itself. Expert knowledge and
capabilities from outside agencies are essential and
should be promoted. This is where true interagency
involvement is required, with subject matter experts
and teams from agencies and organizations available
to work with the Army and to integrate all aspects
of training, planning, and execution. The Army
acting alone is incapable of handling the multitude of
managerial tasks as well. The knowledge and skills
of public managers are required and always will be
required. Public managers must thus ensure that they
are prepared for stability operations and interagency
involvement.
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Unless other agencies reorient their organizational
cultures towards embracing stability operations,
to include making the sacrifices that participation
in such operations entails—working in hazardous
environments, lengthy tours, and frequent deployments—then in all likelihood the Army will continue
to shoulder the lion’s share of the effort. DoDD-3000.05
already establishes that the military will be prepared
to handle such operations whether or not support
from other agencies is available. However, there is still
the matter of NSPD-44, which grants the Department
of State authority to coordinate all matters related to
stability operations.
Findings, Recommendations, and Conclusion.
Stability operations have always been and continue
to be part of America’s wartime and peacetime
responsibilities. The delicate and complex nature
of stability operations requires personnel with
extraordinary skills and expertise to be successful.
Realizing this, Army officers and public managers must
develop the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct
successful operations. Stability operations are going
to be a part of military and government operations
whether military and government actors like it or not.
Together, Army officers and public managers are going
to play vital roles in planning, executing, and learning
from stability operations.
In terms of the knowledge and skills most applicable
to both the Army profession and public managers, three
areas should be examined. Although representing two
different cultures, the Army profession and public
management can both benefit greatly from thinking
like a strategic leader (determining what knowledge
and skills are missing, finding means to supply them,
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and considering all possible outcomes during planning);
cross-cultural savvy (not just a sense of cultural
awareness but the ability to work across boundaries and
understand other cultures); and language proficiency
(not simply speaking and having others understand
the words, but having the ability to communicate and
engender trust with the local populace). The need for
these three skills becomes apparent throughout the
various literature on the Army profession as well as in
lessons learned from management experiences in Iraq.
Snider and Lynn identify these three skills in some
form or another as essential to both Army officers and
public managers.
Obtaining these skills, or at least the foundations of
these skills, should best begin early in careers, during
the precommissioning phase of Army officer careers
and during the first few years of a public manager’s
career. In terms of developing cross-cultural savvy, the
most feasible means of accomplishing this within the
officer corps is to provide exposure to other cultures
through cultural immersion programs, overseas
internships, and instruction in languages, world and
diplomatic, history, and the social sciences. A common
curriculum is probably not the best approach. A menu
of relevant electives in addition to precommissioning
military science courses would probably be better.
Cross-cultural savvy within public management
may best be achieved through selective assignments
for public managers in which they are exposed to
operational environments and working with other
agencies through internships or various interagency
missions with incentives for overseas assignments. Selfdevelopment and self-study should be encouraged as
a means for broadening one’s boundaries and gaining
an understanding of various cultures.
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For Army officers and public managers to better
internalize the importance of language ability, it
should be tied to career progression and advancement.
Higher levels of language proficiency should increase
the potential for advancement and promotion. This
requirement would be similar to joint experience as a
requirement for advancement among senior military
officers. Higher-level public management positions,
particularly those with substantial interagency
involvement, should also have language proficiency
as a prerequisite. This requirement would provide
the incentive necessary for Army officers and public
managers not only to learn a language but also to take
the necessary steps to develop and maintain their
language speaking and reading ability.
Army officers and public managers must work not
simply on their ability to think like a strategic leader,
their cross-cultural savvy, or their language proficiency.
They need to first grasp the importance of and their
role in stability operations. The best thing for stability
operations is for their executors to believe in stability.
For Army officers, this is particularly important since
it means overcoming a deep-rooted cultural bias which
regards stability operations as “someone else’s job.”
Many in the Army continue to believe that
conventional warfighting is the Army’s premier
mission. However, the Army’s most recent experiences
have demonstrated the need for the profession
to embrace stability operations as a core mission,
particularly with the publication of DoDD-3000.05 and
NSPD-44. If the Army’s officer corps considers itself a
profession, then stability operations become part of the
Army profession’s expert knowledge and fall within
its professional jurisdiction.
The officer corps must be mindful, however, not
to become so overwhelmingly focused on stability
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operations that members lose sight of the importance
of winning wars. Warfighting is the Army’s
responsibility, and it must never forget it. While
stability operations need to be accepted as equally
important in terms of winning the war, the ability to
defeat the nation’s enemies militarily should never be
questioned. Maintaining the warrior ethos is a vital
part of this responsibility.
Unlike their effects on the Army profession, stability
operations are unlikely to produce profound changes
within public management in terms of developing
knowledge and changing a deep-rooted mindset (with
the exception, of course, of accepting deployments
to dangerous overseas theaters). Interagency public
managers need the ability to adapt to changing
environments and instability, but the fundamental
aspects of public management do not change. Public
managers will need to properly and effectively manage
the systems in place, ensuring that they prepare for
and address every possible outcome and contingency.
As in the case of an effective personnel management
tool for identifying personnel with desired skills and
assigning them where they will be most effective,
public managers must continue to be creative and
forward-thinking. In addition, the nature of stability
operations and the possible involvement of other
agencies will require public managers to develop
their own sense of cross-cultural savvy and become
comfortable not only with their own environment, but
with external and international environments as well.
For public management officials, other questions
require further study. As we have noted, there have
been several cases, particularly in Iraq, in which public
managers simply did not want to take part in operations
within a dangerous environment. This revealed several
staffing and manning concerns as outlined in the SIGIR
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reports. In addition, civilian agencies have difficulty
inducing employees to work in such environments,
and in most cases there are no incentives for a worker
to do so. This is an area where cultural change may
be necessary. Public managers might well examine the
possibility of adopting something akin to a soldier’s
ethos or reexamine their notion of selfless service.
Another possibility may be for agencies to place a
greater emphasis on having public managers work at
the operational level early in their careers, making it a
requirement for advancement.
An important factor in the success of stability
operations is unity of command.68 Having the Army
take the lead in stability operations with the integration
of expertise available from outside services and
agencies may be the best means of establishing that
unity of command. If the Army profession manages
to establish itself as the premier expert in stability
operations, while other agencies continue to lack the
requisite skills, experience, resources, and operational
ability, then the Army profession has no choice but to
step forward as leader in such operations. The Army
is already taking steps to become more proficient in
stability operations. Such impetus is lacking in several
civilian agencies such as the State Department.
Stability operations require an Army profession
and public managers who not only understand the
importance of stability operations but also understand
their roles and responsibilities within those operations.
Education and training programs will require
adjustments. Cultural attitudes and beliefs will require
examination. In the end, the Army profession and
public managers will need to establish long-term
development programs tailored to new definitions of
warfare and security missions where multiple, diverse
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players coexist and cooperate. Together, officers and
public managers can make a significant impact on
America’s success in winning the complete war.
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CHAPTER 16
Counterinsurgency Doctrine FM 3-24
and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM:
A Bottom-Up Review
Tyson Voelkel
Do not take the first step without considering the last.
				
Carl Von Clausewitz

This chapter reviews the tactical outlines of
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in the light of current
counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine as set forth in Field
Manual (FM) 3-24.1 Drawing on two vignettes, I will
compare and contrast the prescriptive solutions from
COIN doctrine with actions I actually experienced in
Iraq from March 2003 to February 2004.2
The U.S. military is the most capable force in the
history of warfare, but is it flexible enough to adapt
to the paradigm shift in warfighting as occasioned by
asymmetric conflict? If so, what is the best method
of implementing change, and does FM 3-24 provide
the guidance necessary for such change? Does the
document provide solutions for soldiers conducting
counterinsurgency in Iraq, especially when “the
guerrilla wins if he does not lose?”3 Many strategists,
politicians, and scholars believe continuation of
current policies in Iraq may overstretch our military
and decrease American influence on the stability of
Iraq and the Middle East. The range of options for
improving our military capabilities in support of COIN
is considerable, but success hinges on the political will
of American policymakers and our military forces’
ability to achieve tactical-level success.4
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Overview of American Military Strategy
and Counterinsurgency Warfare.
America today stands alone as the world’s strongest
economic and military power. The values that made for
America’s success in the 20th century are unchanged:
liberty, capitalism, and economic liberalism drove
America to find innovative solutions during the 20th
century for the betterment of humankind as well as
development of the most destructive weapons in
history. Nation-states were the key players in the 20th
century, with most of the period dedicated to a bipolar
balancing act between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Strategies for success focused on robust
military strength, nuclear stockpiles, and economic aid
packages to countries sympathetic to democracy.
Coups against the governments of recalcitrant
states, organized, funded, and often led by U.S. covert
operatives, were common and seen as necessary in
the fight against the communist foe. The United States
outlasted Soviet Union, and at the end of the Cold
War it seemed the world would be safer with the
benevolent United States as the Top Gun dominating
world affairs.
Fast forward to the 1990s. Terrorism and rogue
regimes replaced communism as the most serious
threat to the United States. Humanitarian intervention
dominated public discourse as the United States
committed troops to Somalia and organized a
multinational force to address problems in Bosnia
and Kosovo.5 In the meantime, ethnic civil wars were
erupting in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Myanmar, Kashmir,
Sri Lanka, and Croatia. U.S. policy options for intervention in the 1990s ranged from Chaim Kaufmann’s
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nuanced embrace of external intervention in all ethnic
wars, on one hand, to Barry Posen’s prescriptions
based on internal solutions.6 Policymakers struggled
with what role the United States would play in these
conflicts and in one case stood idly by during the
slaughter of 800,000 Rwandans—raising questions
about American commitment and benevolence.7
Issues of intervention were based on American
interests. Genocide but not civil war became the litmus
test for U.S. intervention. But then why send troops
to the Balkans and not to Rwanda? Various theories
of ethnic war pervaded scholarly discussion—some
even made it to policymakers’ desks, providing the
intellectual fuel for the military’s Stability and Support
Operations (SASO) doctrine of the mid-1990s.
Slowly, U.S. policy documents revised strategic
priorities for defense. Such documents include the
1997 Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDR), 2002 National
Security Strategy (NSS), and most recently the 2005
NSS.8 In these documents, terrorism, state failure,
transnational crime, rogue states, and irregular threats
replaced the Cold War threats as the main critical areas
of concern for American strategy.
Ironically, however, no contemporary COIN
document existed for those who would be the “boots on
the ground” in these new and more prevalent irregular
conflicts. Even more disturbing was the absence of any
national strategy for COIN. There was a doctrinal gap in
the literature and education within federal government
agencies, bureaus, and leadership that spanned almost
25 years. The current COIN manual was published in
December 2006, meaning the Army had no clear doctrine
in the wars they were fighting before that time.9 As a
result of this educational void, very few systems were
in place at the strategic, operational, or tactical level
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to provide leaders in the federal government with the
tools to conduct complex post-combat operations. The
1990s seemed to confirm the need for a transformation
in the military to a more agile and expeditionary force,
yet leaders failed to appreciate the enormous change in
the international order caused by the fall of the Soviet
Union. U.S. forces continued to train on Soviet-style
doctrine and designed weapon systems and strategy to
defeat Soviet-style threats. The Stability and Support
Operations conducted in Kosovo and Bosnia were
viewed as peripheral, not the central focus of the U.S.
military planning.
In 1999, I was a young Opposing Forces (OPFOR)
platoon leader in Germany. Our mission was to
replicate Soviet maneuver warfare against U.S. forces
(BLUFORCE) training in Germany. I maneuvered 12
M-113 vehicles rigged to look like Soviet Bronevaya
Maschina Piekhota (BMPs) fighting vehicles.10 Rotations
at the Combat Maneuver Center (CMTC) focused on
High Intensity Conflict (HIC), with very few days
dedicated to SASO. Our Soviet-replicated OPFOR
vehicles and knowledge of the terrain rarely allowed
the American forces to win a battle. Danish and
German units fared no better against our U.S. OPFOR.
The focus for the Germans and Danish military was
also on HIC. Military forces were destined to remain
mired in Cold War doctrine and training techniques,
while rogue regimes and terrorist organizations were
increasing their capabilities and global reach.
Finally, in 2000 the U.S. military started its transition
to a full 4-day irregular warfare exercise at the CMTC
with a focus on civilians on the battlefield (COB) and
the involvement of news media and Special Forces.11
Exercises were also developed to train and evaluate
corps, division, and brigade systems designed by the
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Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). One
example was the Urgent Victory Exercise, created as
part of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).
The program, headquartered at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, is designed to train and evaluate senior
leaders and staffs across the Army on key missionessential tasks. In 2000, V Corps conducted the largest
and most ambitious training exercise of its kind. New
technology, communications platforms, and command
and control systems were tested. Over 10,000 soldiers,
3,000 contractors, and 25 brigade-sized headquarters
participated in simulations through long-distance
linkages or were actually brought to Germany for the
exercise. The focus was primarily on command and
control during conventional warfare—there was no
training on insurgency or guerrilla operations—but
the training exercise was hailed as a success.
In 2001 and 2002, the exercise continued with a
focus on command and control systems—but again
no training was conducted on establishing measures
of effectiveness for fighting irregular forces, despite
planning at the corps level in late 2002 for a possible
invasion of Iraq. Conventional operations dominated
military thinking in large part because it was the core
competency of senior leaders who had experienced
the euphoria of destroying the Iraqi military during
the 1990-91 Gulf War. War was about destroying
tanks and enemy command and control systems—not
about insurgencies or nation-building. Slowly, SASO
and irregular warfare became more prominent in
discussions at senior leader education programs across
the nation and at the maneuver training sites. Training
Centers in California, Louisiana, and Germany
increasingly employed performance measures of
SASO operations. COIN development was the natural
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next step in the development of military capabilities,
with the catalyst for that development being Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM itself, not an earlier manifestation of
vision on the part of some prescient Army thinker.
FM 3-24 Development.
Doctrinal literature for COIN operations is not
new to the armed forces. The 1950s saw a serious
effort focussed on developing COIN doctrine for the
Army. The Combat Development Group, United
States Continental Army Command, the Command
and General Staff College, and Combat Developments
Command were all organized to develop doctrine to
better prepare the armed forces for conflicts.12 Prior
to September 11, 2001 (9/11), the military allocated
resources primarily to improving conventional warfighting capabilities. The Cold War and Gulf War
became the templates for success, while Vietnam COIN
lessons were not retained and institutionalized.
Since 9/11, the operational priority has changed
from purely force-on-force conventional engagements
to a Global War on Terror (GWOT).13 The U.S. war
against al-Qai’da prompted Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM in Afghanistan. This operation relied
heavily on Special Forces operations with impressive
initial results. Both conflicts prompted strategists
to reconsider what warfare would entail in the
21st century. Many authors and practitioners with
experience in conducting operations in Iraq made
the claim that insurgency operations would be the
predominant form of military operations in the 21st
century, thus highlighting the need for improved
interagency operations and military training.14
In March 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was
launched with the stated goal of regime change. This
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operation, like Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,
began with impressive conventional victories and an
apparent validation of the American way of war.15
Insurgency was an afterthought in the invasion
planning; at the brigade and battalion level, the goal
remained the destruction of the Iraqi Army and militia
forces. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was a conventional
campaign with conventional goals until post-combat
operations were declared.
Units such as III Corps developed exercises prior
to deploying to Iraq, spurring After Action Reviews
(AARs) for improving U.S. Army capabilities in Iraq.
In January 2004, the COIN shortcomings identified in
III Corps exercises were consolidated and compiled for
analysis. Next was a directive from the Commanding
General of the Combined Arms Center at Fort
Leavenworth to prepare a new COIN field manual.
In October 2004 the interim Field Manual 3-34 was
published for use in training and leader development
courses.16 From November 2004 to November 2005,
extensive interviews and research were conducted
on Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI
FREEDOM in an attempt to extract the most relevant
data and lessons for inclusion in the final publication.
Simultaneously, key reviewers were selected under
the direction of Dr. Conrad Crane. In February 2006, a
COIN conference served as the “final” vetting venue
prior to publication.17 But the document continued to
undergo revision and analysis until June 2006, when
a draft was distributed to the force, and in December
2006 COIN FM 3-24 was finally published—3 years
after the invasion of Iraq.
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COIN FM 3-24 contains salient prescriptions for
the conduct of such operations. Taken as a whole, the
manual boils the complex COIN endeavor into five
imperatives, eight principles, and nine paradoxical
caveats for successful execution of COIN (see Figure
1).18 Understanding the imperatives, principles, and
paradoxes offered in FM 3-24 ensures that military
planners will have the requisite framework to view the
problems encountered in irregular warfare. However,
executing operations based on this framework has
proved to be problematic in Iraq, and the approach
continues to foment domestic political debates and
fuel discussions within the Department of Defense
(DoD) regarding what course of action will lead to
strategic victory in the prosecution of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, and indeed whether strategic victory can
ever be achieved.
Combat operations in Iraq began on March 19,
2003, with FM 3-24 not appearing until December 2006.
It is difficult not to assume that some of the current
difficulties in Iraq can be attributed to the lack of an
updated COIN doctrine for strategic and operational
planners from the beginning. It is also reasonable to
assume that there was not a national strategy for
combating insurgency at the outset of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM.
Would FM 3-24 have provided the military with the
proper framework to prevent the seemingly intractable
situation facing the United States in Iraq today? The
following firsthand account of operations in Iraq from
March 2003 to February 2004 aims to provide insights
into the usefulness of the doctrine and its proper
implementation in DoD training and learning centers.
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Imperatives
•Manage information and expectations.
•Use measured force and discriminate actions.
•Learn and adapt.
•Empower the lowest levels.
•Support the host nation.
Principles
•Legitimacy as the main objective.
•Unity of effort.
•Political primacy.
•Understanding the environment.
•Intelligence as the driver for operations.
•Isolation of insurgents from their cause and support.
•Security under the rule of law.
•Long-term commitment.
COIN Paradoxes
•The more you protect your force, the less secure units
may be.
•Doing nothing in some cases may be the best response to
insurgent actions.
•The best COIN weapons are ones that don’t shoot.
•Tactical success guarantees nothing.
•A tactic may work in one province but not the next.

Figure 1. FM 3-24—Counterinsurgency, December
2006.
Operation CLEAN SWEEP, Growing pains, and the
Beginning of Insurgency.
	  The 82nd Airborne Division is renowned for its
ability to deploy rapidly worldwide within 18 hours of
notification to neutralize a threat. Our brigade combat
team (BCT) consisting of 3,430 paratroopers conducted
a ground assault, convoy, and simultaneous tactical
air insertion into Iraq on March 23, 2003. From that
date until May 1, 2003, the 2nd Brigade of the 82nd
Airborne Division conducted combat operations from
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Samawa to Falluja. During fierce fighting, the brigade
neutralized at least 700 fedayeen, Royal Republican
Guard, and militia soldiers in the battle for Samawa
alone. Conventional joint operations as well as
combined arms operations were second nature to the
paratroopers of the 2/82nd. Losing a battle was not
an option, and every minute of training and discipline
were required to survive the extreme temperatures
and battles with the fedayeen. Conventionally, the
2/82nd was well trained, equipped, and utilized. The
brigade conducted joint operations with the Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, Special Forces, and the Central
Intelligence Agency to neutralize the enemy threats and
facilitate the regime change mission of the invasion.
Every mission was conducted within the five-phase
framework of the strategic Operations Plan (OPLAN)
1003V.19 From February 3, 2003, to May 4, 2003, the
2/82nd conducted combat operations over 600 miles
through nine Iraqi cities before reaching Baghdad.
Morale was high. Mission success was paramount,
and the brigade leadership made every effort to
recognize the efforts of the unit’s brave paratroopers.
They were trained for direct-action conventional
combat operations, and they were professionals.
Every paratrooper had completed rigorous training
and certifications on critical warfighting tasks at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, and the National Training
Center (NTC) prior to the deployment—there was
no certification, however, on conducting guerrilla
operations.20
On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared
an end to major combat operations in Iraq, signaling
the move to Phase IV of OPLAN 1003V. The brigade
moved to Southern Baghdad for SASO. Our ability
to adapt from HIC to low-intensity combat (LIC)
operations within hours was critical to our success.
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None of the paratroopers in our brigade envisioned
conducting SASO/LIC operations prior to deployment.
Attention at Ft. Bragg had been on conventional skill
sets and conducting a parachute assault into enemy
territory and neutralizing the enemy. COIN operations
were not even mentioned during the development of
OPLAN 1003V or introduced into our brigade lexicon
during our first 3 months in Iraq. To complicate
matters, civilian leadership in Iraq was transferred
from retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, then
deputy at CENTCOM for reconstruction in Iraq, to
Ambassador Paul Bremer. Authority shifted from
CENTCOM to Ambassador Bremer for reconstruction
in Iraq—to include security forces. The Iraqi Army was
disbanded, and the Iraqi police force stripped of all
high-ranking, experienced officers out of fear of Ba’ath
Party resurgence. This single action changed our role
of liberation force to one of occupation—an occupation
that immediately took on the responsibility of policing
Iraqi streets.
My role as a brigade staff officer during this period
was simple: assist in the planning of tactical operations
in Southern Baghdad to ensure the Ba’ath Party leaders
and Saddam loyalists were captured or killed. This was
a typical task for an infantry captain on brigade staff,
especially since I had been in the job for over 13 months
and had the experience of two short-notice brigade
deployments. The focus of my job changed drastically
when a Civil-Military Operations Cell (CMOC)
was created by the artillery battalion commander
(Lieutenant Colonel Smith). The CMOC consisted of
volunteers from each of the primary organizations
in the brigade combat team: artillery, air defense,
intelligence, medical, legal, logistical personnel, and
civil affairs representatives were all part of the new
group. The group met daily to develop methods to
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spur economic growth, rebuilding, and infrastructure
repair/creation—tasks no one in our unit was trained
to do and, frankly, not ones we thought we were
responsible for. A common attitude during this period
was expressed by paratroopers: “Sir, we did our job . . .
we killed the enemy, and Saddam is not in power, now
let’s go home. I didn’t join the 82nd to build sewage
lines or get shot at while I help build a school.”21
The CMOC group was entirely ad hoc, and only
a few had prior SASO training other than Lieutenant
Colonel Smith. I was responsible for coordinating all
of the CMOC operations, as well as the unit’s tactical
operations. Bath showers were optional, and 24-hour
days were the norm during the initial days as we drove
ourselves into the ground trying to understand our
new purpose.
The first CMOC meeting lasted 5 hours in a
cinderblock room in 115 degree heat. Each of the
members walked away from the event stupefied
at the Herculean task ahead. Lieutenant Colonel
Smith expected us to catalog every sewage pumping
station, electric power station, school, mosque, church,
and gas station by the end of the week. Despite our
misgivings, we saluted with our brigade motto—“All
the way—let’s go!”—and accomplished the tasks over
the next week. During that period, the CMOC group
spent countless hours driving the streets and alleys
of Southern Baghdad. Most times we were greeted by
smiling Iraqis, proud of their new freedom and excited
at what lay ahead for their families. Children swarmed
our Hummers trying to get a glimpse of our faces and
especially our eyes. Elderly Iraqis often cried with
gratitude. In all cases, the Iraqis I encountered wanted
to be proud of their country and its enormous potential.
It occurred to me that these men, women, and children
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were very similar to those in my hometown—people
who wanted to work for a living and care for their
families. They wanted to be proud of where and how
they lived.
The problems the newly liberated Iraqis faced
were immense. Unlike in my hometown, there was no
government in place to provide basic necessities for the
citizens. No sewage plan, no garbage collection plan, no
electricity plan, limited job opportunities, and—worst
of all—no police to enforce law and order. Corruption
was rampant, and looting government buildings was
viewed as a right for the poorest Iraqis. The lack of
infrastructural systems was a problem that would not
be corrected quickly and would require more than just
money or security. The Iraqis needed a paradigm shift
in how to live and govern their lives. Sanctions against
Iraq following the first Gulf War had left the country
firmly at the mercy of Saddam and his regime. Because
of Saddam’s rule, most Iraqis I spoke to had no memory
of national initiative or self-reliance.
Over the preceeding 30 years, they had no hope
unless they pledged their unyielding support to Saddam
and his regime; now, they could break free from these
chains and live freely—but it would not be simple.
Problems lay around every corner, and it seemed that
no corrective actions the coalition took were fast enough
or understood. The coalition wanted to fix everything
right away—as did the Iraqis—however, the reality
of the situation precluded anything from happening
quickly. The gulf between the State Department and
the military seemed wide, but not nearly as wide as
the perception by the Iraqis of what America could do
versus what America was in fact capable of doing.
One problem seems to stand out in my mind as a
symbol of the massive change needed in Baghdad—the
523

mountainous piles of garbage that accumulated from
years of no sanitation measures. Saddam’s garbage
collectors were paid poorly by the government, and
drivers earned more from tips from wealthy Iraqis than
the government salary of one dollar a day. Naturally,
the poor sectors of Baghdad had no means of tipping,
so the garbage trucks never made stops there. This
filth left no room for children to play sports, but plenty
of room for disease, crime, and poverty—perfect
recruiting grounds for insurgents.
A sight I will never forget is that of children wading
through sewage to pick up remnants of plastic bottles
so they could use them to collect water. Looting was
also rampant in the wealthier areas of our sector. The
Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) gave strict orders for U.S.
personnel to remain uninvolved in the presence of
looters. This mandate left many of our paratroopers
looking on in disbelief as Iraqis ripped the very cables
out of government buildings to sell in the markets.
Everything that could be stripped from walls and
windows was taken during the looting, as coalition
forces were ordered to stand by and “let the Iraqis
police themselves”—a policy we would all come to
regret in the coming months.
Witnessing these activities and the plight of many
Iraqis gave our CMOC the will to continue working
toward some solution in our sector. I knew we could
make an impact if we could find a way to clean up the
major trash areas adjacent to living quarters. The more
pride the natives had in their homes, the less chance
for the enemy to seek refuge or foment hatred in our
sector. The main problem our units and Iraqi allies
faced was scarce resources. Our brigade did not have a
direct link to the other agencies operating in our sector
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other than through unofficial ad hoc relationships
generated by highly motivated civil affairs personnel
and paratroopers. Our brigade was equipped with
the requisite equipment to kill insurgents, but not to
educate, train, and rebuild. The only tool we had at
our disposal was our desire to accomplish the mission
we were assigned. We attempted to teach democracy,
train security forces, and rebuild by scrounging and
improvising. We certainly were not equipped to
undertake a large trash cleanup project in sector.22
To do this job, I needed money and expertise. I
received the go-ahead on the trash project from our
brigade commander along with permission to use
his military police detachment and Hummers. The
brigade commander fully understood what activities
his paratroopers should engage in during the day—
rebuilding and legitimacy operations. He reiterated
to commanders, “Without legitimacy, our mission
will fail; go out there and shake hands, don’t break
promises, and work 24/7 to figure out who the bad
guys are. . . . If you don’t know who the key players are
in your sector, you aren’t doing your damn job.”23
As the operations officer for the CMOC, I had the
freedom to stay in the relative safety of the compound
or travel the streets of Baghdad. I chose to travel the
streets and seek out the interagency personnel who
could help our brigade with the mission of trash
cleanup in the al-Risala and al-Shurta sectors. Within
2 days, I had located the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) office in the Organization for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)
headquarters in the Green Zone. Amazingly, there was
no directory of office locations or even a list of who was
working in the Green Zone at this time, so finding key
agency personnel to help solve problems was a matter
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of chance and determination. I met with the USAID
Chief of Station, and he agreed to send a team into our
sector to see what could be done.
Within a week, USAID had established a Direct
Assistance Reconstruction Team (DART) to assist in
the project. DART teams from USAID consisted of a
small handful of experts in waste management, water,
logistics, medical services, and contract vetting.24 A
warm-up project we collaborated on included the
delivery of thousands of medical aid kits to clinics
in the 2/82nd sector. The DART team members
were professionals and understood the importance
of building credibility with the locals. They wasted
little time in getting the medical and dental supplies
delivered. For the trash project, we envisioned 5,000
Iraqis working to clean up trash in their local areas.
USAID insisted that the idea for a cleanup come from
Iraqi city council members in the sector rather than as
an order from coalition troops. The 2/82nd preference
was to take control of the entire operation from start to
finish. We decided to try the USAID method.
The following week we held numerous meetings as
the Iraqi city council members mulled over the ideas
USAID presented. Eventually the council members
decided they needed a project to keep the young men
off the streets. This project had the potential to provide
jobs and a purpose for thousands of the citizens in our
sector. Providing jobs would enhance the legitimacy of
the council and coalition as well as discourage potential
insurgent recruiting.
After a 5-hour session with one of the USAID
representatives, the council determined that it could
hire 12,000 young men for the job. The estimate was far
more ambitious than the USAID DART leader or I had
envisioned, and we were ecstatic. The council members
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would take care of advertising, hiring, documentation,
and pay for each of the 12,000.25 The only requirement
for U.S. forces was security at various checkpoints and
along the perimeter of the trash cleanup area to protect
the workers. USAID agreed to ante up money for the
Iraqi Council members to pay the 12,000 workers. I left
the meeting with a feeling of pride and accomplishment.
This was democracy at work—a group of Iraqis had
freely solved a problem for themselves, and all they
needed was a bit of prodding and hope. The council
members immediately held a press conference.
Reporters took notes on ragged tablets with stubs
of pencils while the council announced the project.
Singing and chanting could be heard for blocks. It was
a good day for the coalition and the Iraqi leaders.
It was during this meeting that I learned that the
most powerful weapon in SASO was offering hope and
legitimacy to the Iraqis. Hope was the most powerful
inducement these people had: hope for their families
and for the future of their country. I was humbled by
the effort the USAID representatives put into coaching
the fledgling city council. Our paratroopers came to
see the Iraqis in a different light and also learned about
the importance of liberty and freedom. It was a great
day—everyone walked away from the meeting feeling
as though we accomplished something extraordinary.
 	 One week later, we began Operation CLEAN
SWEEP. The first day, 9,780 workers showed up and
were paid that afternoon. The next day, we had close to
11,000 workers. The men came by foot, car, and donkey;
some carried brooms, some carried handmade shovels,
and some brought only bare hands and feet. They were
paid two dollars a day. They sang and danced as they
cleaned one neighborhood after another. Various news
media outlets covered the success story, and word
spread throughout other Baghdad neighborhoods
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of the project. USAID was pleased, and decided to
replicate the project on a larger scale in Sadr City in
Northeast Baghdad. I made a trip to that sector to meet
with coalition members, describe the success we had
in Southern Baghdad, and pass on my lessons learned.
USAID then implemented the project in Sadr City with
tens of thousands of workers.
In the meantime, B Company of the 3d Battalion
of the 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment (3-325) took
the lead on Operation CLEAN SWEEP in Southern
Baghdad while C Company 325th assumed B Company’s offensive operational mission in sector. The
commanders saw the positive aspects of the project.26
Attacks decreased in sector, and the city council was
pleased with the number of jobs they were able to create,
giving them more credibility with their constituents.
For many Iraqis, it was the first time they had clean
fields for soccer games and other sports. Hope was
increasing in direct proportion to our legitimacy and
the credibility of the city council members. It seemed
as though we had found a solution to SASO in Iraq.
 	 Our unit was still conducting tactical operations at
night while working on civil-military operations during
the day. The tempo was fast, and it was rare for our
paratroopers to sleep more than 4 hours in a 24-hour
period. At this point, we still had no air conditioner
units, ice, or consolidated forward operating bases
(FOBs). Infantry companies were operating out of their
own FOBs in our sector. We were looking forward to
our pre-planned redeployment on July 4, 2003. As
the date for our redeployment drew near, however, it
dawned on us that we would be ordered to stay for
a longer tour. The Third Infantry Division (3ID) had
been extended, and now we knew that it was going
to be a long, miserable summer—but none of us knew
how miserable.
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In early June at the brigade headquarters, we had
just eaten lunch and were working on operational
orders for future missions. The temperature inside
the building was well over 100 degrees, and the
temperature outside in the sun felt like an open flame.
No one was working directly in the sun, and the Iraqis
stayed indoors during the hottest parts of the day.
Our soldiers at the Operation CLEAN SWEEP site
were taking breaks in an air-conditioned bus as they
guarded the perimeter of the cleanup operation. Two
soldiers, Specialist Gibbs and Private First Class Burns,
were taking their turn cooling off in the bus when two
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) ripped into the bus,
killing Gibbs instantly and severing Burns’ legs and a
portion of his right arm.
The report of the attack crackled across my radio.
My heart sank, and my lunch began to work its
way back up. My first thought was one of guilt for
establishing the trash project, since the soldiers would
not have been in that position if I had not set it up.
I was sick to my stomach and outraged at the Iraqis
for what they had done. Our unit reaction followed
standard operating procedure: we established a
cordon around the immediate neighborhood, searched
every home in the vicinity, placed the area under strict
curfew, established checkpoints, and conducted field
interrogations of suspicious individuals. The morale of
our unit was now low, and emotions ran high. Iraqi
council members shared our disgust and did their best
to calm the company commanders in the sector. USAID
and other agencies stopped daily visits and came only
to drop off large duffle bags of money to pay the Iraqi
workers. Our paratroopers’ consternation over the
dangerous, perplexing environment grew with each
passing sunrise.
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Our 2-month deployment had now lasted 6 months,
our mission had turned to civil-military operations
rather than combat, and our minds and bodies
were exhausted. The attack at the trash site affected
everyone. Paratroopers felt disgust; State Department,
USAID, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and
other agencies no longer wanted to drive into our
sector unless they had armed escorts. My trips into
the Green Zone were increasingly viewed as jumping
the chain of command in order to get work done.
Agencies felt increasing concern over safety, and they
were privileged to remain in the protected hallways
of their palace headquarters while my men suffered
the wrath of disgruntled Iraqis and uncompromising
work schedules.
To further complicate matters, many of the NGOs
and Department of State officials refused to meet oneon-one with Iraqis unless our soldiers searched the
buildings and checked the Iraqi individuals prior to
meetings. The solution was then to bring the Iraqis to
the Green Zone for meetings. Insurgents needed only to
document Iraqis who entered and left the Green Zone in
order to target them later. Interpreters started to receive
death threats, as did members of the city councils. The
common assumption made at the embassy and military
intelligence units was that Ba’ath Party members had
gone underground to incite violence. A new term was
coined for this group—Saddam loyalists.
Thus came new missions to locate, kill, or capture
the Saddam loyalists in sector. A purge of Ba’ath
Party members began anew. Under ORHA and later
the CPA, Ba’athists were automatically considered
untrustworthy and were removed from any meaningful
decisionmaking roles. Coordination became more
difficult, operations became more complex, and
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reconstruction slowed to a snail’s pace in the sector.
The first improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were
being used in Baghdad, and our brigade had only
four armored Hummers. I would spend hours on the
highway daily in a Hummer with no doors, traversing
roadblocks, checkpoints, and potential IEDs to obtain
funding and encourage ORHA to honor our requests
for reconstruction. More often than not, the answer
was, “ORHA has the mandate for reconstruction and
humanitarian assistance, but not the resources.”27
Compounding problems for the continuing trash
project, many of the Iraqi workers left. Some left
because of threats and some because they lost faith in
the project and their countrymen. Ironically, 30 hours
after the RPG attack on the bus, the two gunmen were
traced to a sector outside of Baghdad. They had been
hired to come into the sector and disrupt civil-military
cooperation.
After we learned of the plot, our forces immediately
put the word out to the Iraqi leadership and newspapers
that the men who killed the U.S. soldier were not from
al-Risala or al-Shurta. They were Iraqis who wanted
Iraqis to fail. Within 2 days of the attack, we were back
in operation with over 12,000 Iraqi workers. But there
was an important difference this time: our soldiers
were very aggressive toward the Iraqis and suspicious
of every vehicle that came within 500 yards of the work
site. The environment had changed, and it signaled a
type of warfare different from the one we had been
trained to fight: it came to be called insurrection.
We had officially entered the irregular warfare
phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I. Two months
passed before I was called back to the United States
on emergency leave to care for my mother after risky
heart surgery, and I was in the United States for almost
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20 days. My mother survived and was in good spirits.
I could have stayed longer but my place was with my
men in Iraq. I made a trip to Walter Reed Hospital
to see the wounded soldiers from the 82nd and saw
Private First Class Burns, a triple amputee at age 19.
He would receive his Purple Heart and U.S. citizenship
from President Bush later in the week. His spirits were
good, but what struck me the most were the pride and
admiration his father held for America, for my soldiers,
and for our mission. He believed with all his heart
that his son had been wounded in pursuit of justice
and hope for a democratic peace in the Middle East.
We had a wonderful talk, and as I left he said to me,
“Good luck, sir. Take care of the boys.” I choked up as I
walked past the rooms of wounded soldiers and family
members. Some were not American citizens yet—but
they sacrificed for America. I walked away thinking of
how I could help prevent more of these young people
from being injured or killed.
I made a pledge to myself. These men, their
wounds, and their idealistic visions of American
democracy would not be wasted. We had to succeed in
Iraq to justify the pain and sacrifice these young people
experienced. I returned to Iraq with renewed vigor
and sense of purpose. Our unit would rid the streets
of insurgents, rebuild my sector, and provide hope for
the children of al-Risala and al-Shurta.
My experience changed the methods I used in the
Risala and Shurta sectors as a company commander.
The difficult part was convincing my paratroopers
that brute force, large-scale operations, top-down
intelligence, and technology were not the solutions for
fighting the insurgency—they were simply tools that
could be used as appropriate. But Iraqi attitudes had
also changed. “Thank you for removing the tyrant,
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now go home” had become the dominant attitude of
many.28 Anger, frustration, and distrust were building
toward the coalition. Civil reconstruction projects had
dried up, raids were turning up more dry holes than
enemy combatants, and the news most of the Iraqis
were getting was dominated by al-Jazeera. ORHA was
failing in its information operations, and the military
seemed blind to their importance. The seeds of civil
war were sprouting, and we were facilitating the
disintegration of the sector by our failure to understand
the root of the problems. U.S. legitimacy was being
compromised, and the credibility of coalition forces
in Baghdad had begun to erode. Coalition forces
were continuing heavy-handed raids on known or
suspected enemies. Measurement of success continued
to be based on conventional standards: numbers of
raids and enemy killed. Offensive operations seemed
to dominate senior leaders’ rhetoric and evaluation of
subordinates.
What caused the erosion of legitimacy? Who was
best suited to solve the problems the Iraqis faced? How
do we best protect our soldiers in irregular warfare
while enhancing the legitimacy of the fledgling Iraqi
government and our coalition forces? Our unit had in
effect labeled all Iraqis as insurgents and alienated many
of our Iraqi allies by failing to ask these fundamental
questions. The answer to the questions was not more
large-scale operations, more kinetic attacks, or reduced
interaction with the local populace.
As a new company commander in the sector, I
could see that cultural understanding within our unit
was low. Cultural awareness was nonexistent, kinetic
solutions were preferred over “soft power,” and the
majority of paratroopers viewed their job as finished
in May 2003 when the war was “won.” My first
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sergeant and I instituted a cultural awareness class for
every paratrooper under my command. Interpreters
taught the classes. I devoted my energy during the
day to finding political solutions to insurgency-related
problems by meeting with business leaders, council
members, and religious leaders. I rewarded soldiers and
platoon leaders who excelled in reconstruction projects
and interaction with school headmasters and the
underrepresented areas of my mixed sector. The sector
contained 250,000 Iraqis (60 percent Shia, 40 percent
Sunni), 80 percent of whom were unemployed. There
were 32 schools, 23 Mosques, one Christian church,
two medical clinics, two markets, two gas stations,
and a rag-tag collection of 400 Iraqi amputees left
over from the Iran-Iraq War. The sector was large and
diverse, providing ample opportunities for insurgent
recruitment and attacks against our FOB. Actionable
intelligence was the only method of ensuring our unit’s
success, but up to this point in the conflict intelligence
was fed from higher headquarters to ground units for
action. This commonly resulted in raiding the wrong
homes, detaining innocent Iraqis, or getting involved
in longstanding family or tribal disputes.
After taking command of A Company, I decided to
change our modus operandi for gathering intelligence.
We turned our intelligence operations into an integrated
effort on the part of every paratrooper, establishing
systems for the collection and dissemination of
information within our company. We put less emphasis
on firepower during raids and even employed
nonlethal weapons during many operations. Tasers,
rubber bullets, and foam grenades were favorites of
my paratroopers—when we could get them. No longer
was it standard operating procedure to blow up the
doors of suspect houses with C-4 or other explosives.
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Instead, we began knocking unless the threat was
high enough to justify the use of explosives for forced
entry. Intelligence was no longer to be spoon-fed to
my unit from higher headquarters: instead we would
develop our own collection techniques locally and feed
intelligence up to battalion and division.
The change took time, but within a month we
reduced the frequency of attacks against our compound
and soldiers. We increased spending on reconstruction
by two million dollars and regained the trust of
the local council and many of the business leaders.
Intelligence operations were so successful that the
senior commander in Iraq (Lieutenant General Ricardo
Sanchez) told his staff in a Battle Update Brief in late
September 2003 that A Company, 3-325 Airborne,
was setting the standard for operations in Iraq. Unit
cohesion was higher than ever before, and our vision
of purpose in Iraq became more sharply defined.
My paratroopers and I had come to realize that adult
Iraqis were not the future of the country—the children
were. If we could show them that we were there to
help rather than hurt them, our unit would eventually
return to Fort Bragg alive and better prepared for the
next deployment. In sum, two areas of endeavor were
critical to success in al-Risala and al-Shurta: first was
the establishment of credible city councils, and second
was local development of actionable intelligence.
Establishing Democratic City Councils within
al-Risala and al-Shurta, Baghdad.
As noted earlier, on May 1, 2003, President Bush
declared an end to hostilities in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, signaling the beginning of SASO. Phase
IV of the operation had begun. Priorities shifted from
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killing enemy combatants to protecting the local
populace, rebuilding, and establishing city councils
at the local level. Each company sector contained
at least one city council selected from residents who
met specific criteria. As of June 2003, 2/82nd City
Council criteria mandated that members could not be
Ba’athists, could not be former military commanders,
must be high school graduates, and must be a resident
of the neighborhood they represented.
In my sector of 250,000 Iraqis, we organized two
city councils together comprising 23 total members
from Sunni, Shi’a, and Christian backgrounds. The
brigade commander insisted that women serve on
the councils, so each council initially had at least one
female member. After 4 months, the number of women
on the councils had grown to four. The female members
of my councils were strong, educated, and willing to
sacrifice for the sake of their neighborhoods. I came
away from interactions with them with a sense of hope
for the women of Iraq and with an earnest belief that in
rebuilding Iraq women would play crucial roles. Each
council also reflected diverse career backgrounds,
ranging from businessmen to Imams. The common
denominator for all members was their eagerness to
help rebuild their neighborhoods and provide jobs for
constituents. Security, sewage, and electricity were the
top priorities of most citizens.
Meetings initially lasted for 5-8 hours in the blistering
summer heat. At this time military units were starting
to receive air conditioners, but there was no money in
the budget to buy such luxuries for the city councils.
In typical Army fashion, we initially tried to teach
democracy through the use of PowerPoint slides and
visual aids. After burning up a number of projectors,
we realized that the only way to make progress was
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through drinking plenty of chai tea and engaging in
long discussions.
Unit commanders made requests through USAID
and ORHA for basic supplies and equipment for the
councils to dispose. After many trips to the Green
Zone, we were able to secure funding through USAID
for building renovations, supplies, and salaries for the
council members. Eventually we were also issued cell
phones from ORHA to give to council members for
communications. Progress was slow (but noticeable)
during August 2003, and meetings were the weapon of
choice in problem solving.
Initially, many meetings were canceled due to
security conditions, conflicting missions, and even
ultra-high temperatures. In time, the meetings became
part of our daily lives and part of our intelligence and
psychological operations. Members of these councils
spent countless hours debating the best methods of
moving forward, and it took considerable energy for
commanders to convince the council members to make
decisions. Some unit commanders, growing frustrated,
delegated the task of attending and running council
meetings to subordinates. Others took on the role of
“mayor” in their sectors, providing guidance, directing
reconstruction, and detaining suspected insurgent
supporters at night.
Fundamental to the establishment of the councils
was education. U.S. soldiers had no literature teaching
them about democratic principles and procedures, and
no representatives from ORHA to assist in the selection,
training, and administration of city council members. It
was not until September 2003 that I learned of an office
in the palace (the Embassy) assigned responsibility
to assist military units in the establishment of local
governance. Once I contacted the office, it was willing
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to assist in supporting my city councils. I started to
receive funding and support for a district city council
headquarters. An especially difficult problem to solve
was the reluctance of many Iraqi men to take any
kind of initiative. Common citizens under Saddam
were not accustomed to making decisions or taking
responsibility for local problems. This attitude was
very intractable, and only time and mutual trust could
change it.
In late September 2003, the councils in my sector
were functioning with noticeable success. They
conducted town hall meetings in which I was often the
guest speaker and the person they could point fingers
at and blame for problems within the sector. I was often
on the receiving end of bitter language and insults, but
I was never intentionally disrespected. When I spoke,
the room got quiet and the city council almost always
agreed with my assessments. My unit’s credibility was
high, and the local newspaper recognized our efforts.
Electricity, sewage, and security were the top three
concerns of the citizens of al-Shurta and al-Risala and
thus the top priorities for my unit.
Improving security required increasing our success
in locating and capturing weapons caches and those
responsible for funding the insurgency. Bottom-up
intelligence operations enabled my company to capture
many weapons caches while building credibility with
informants in the area. My compound became a haven
for disgruntled Iraqis who had information to sell. The
information came in a trickle at first, but I was finally
able to establish myself as the authoritative point
of contact for Iraqis with information to sell. I took
pains to establish relationships based on trust with
my informants and ensure that their safety would not
be compromised. Over time, my company developed
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a number of sources, informants, and a network of
businesses and individuals dedicated to the coalition’s
success. With more successes came more information,
caches, and compromised insurgents.
The toughest problem I faced was dealing with other
intelligence organizations and negotiating turf wars
over informant ownership. I was fortunate enough to
have a battalion commander who appreciated the art
of gathering intelligence from the ground up. He gave
me the freedom to coordinate with special operations
units in my sector and other agencies whose primary
roles were gathering information and managing agents
and sources.
My company was not resourced or trained to
manage informants, but we were forced to learn the
skill in order to prevent attacks and protect our sector.
In order to pay informants under the Army system,
I would have to wait weeks to receive funds. Other
agencies had cash on hand and could pay informants
on the spot for good intelligence. Special operations
forces had available sizable amounts of cash and could
pay informants immediately. My IOU had to suffice
for many of the informants who came to my FOB.
Occasionally it was not acceptable, in which case I was
forced to spend my own money to keep from losing
valuable information.
Over time, my unit developed good working
relationships with the other intelligence operators in
sector, and we conducted weekly meetings to share
information unofficially. Although I did not always
have cash to pay informants as other agencies did, I
had paratroopers to take action on the information
provided. By October 2003, the system was working
very well. The beneficial second and third order
effects of this success were paramount to maintaining
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the legitimacy of my unit, and by extension the city
councils in our sector. The council members also
became intelligence gatherers for me, and at city council
meetings I would meet privately with certain members
to obtain information. They trusted me completely,
and as a result they were willing to accept the risk of
conducting democratic elections for their jobs.
We were the first sector in Baghdad to ask for
the Coalition Provisional Authority’s permission to
conduct elections. We were given verbal permission to
go ahead with our plan because the CPA governance
representative did not think we would be ready by the
new year (January 2004). Our city council members
spent money on flyers, debated each other in the local
council center, and developed action plans for the
department of public works and local schools. In the
meantime, attacks continued to wane while support
for our company increased in sector. However, there
were also some periods of unrest and protest.
The protests against me and my unit often resulted
from broken promises. For example, an NGO once
promised my city council it would provide new books
and supplies to all children in elementary school.
Unfortunately, the NGO ran out of money before it
could deliver a single book, leaving my unit to answer
to the city council. Protests outside my compound
started out small, but they grew larger over time. Rather
than stop the protests with force, I simply put on my
gear and walked outside the gate of my compound
and spoke to the mob through my interpreter. Many
in the group were afraid that I would retaliate against
them for the protest, and none looked me in the eye as
I addressed them. I simply told them that I was proud
of them for protesting and that they now enjoyed the
right to do so because they were forming a democracy.
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I explained the situation about the NGO’s failure, and
I told them I was willing to listen to them longer if they
could provide me information on a recent rash of RPG
attacks. I left to applause and laughter. The protest
lasted 15 more minutes and dissipated.
Two days later, I had the information I needed
to conduct a raid on the RPG attackers. Word of
our successful capture of the RPG attackers spread
quickly through the mosques and schools. We took the
opportunity to conduct a psychological campaign to
deter further attacks by spreading a rumor of a new
weapon system that could detect and destroy anyone
launching mortars or RPGs within our sector. To give
the rumor further impetus, we told our city council
and police chief that the weapon was top secret.
That night we fired mortar illumination rounds and
artillery rounds into an empty field, telling our council
the next day that the new weapon system destroyed
the enemy vehicle and the men setting up a mortar
outside the sector.29 Upon making the announcement,
my interpreter and I received a standing ovation from
the group. They then told me that they were ready for
elections, and they wanted to know when they could
conduct them.
The city council was prepared to have an election
and had spent time and money campaigning. All that
was left to do was for me to receive written permission
from the Baghdad District Council (BDC) to conduct
the election and recognize the winners at its conclusion.
I was denied permission by the CPA and the BDC—
despite their previous encouragement—and I had to
return to the council with another broken promise.
The trust I had built was beginning to erode with these
broken promises and growing sectarian violence in
other parts of Baghdad. Less than a week later our unit
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received orders to deploy back to the United States no
later than February 2004. We had less than 45 days left
in country, and things were beginning to deteriorate
across Iraq.
Small FOBs were being consolidated into larger
FOBs across the country. The goal seemed logical:
move U.S. forces out of the sectors and allow Iraqi
forces to pick up more of the security and governance
load.30 Our company FOB was closed, with my 136
paratroopers and me moving into FOB FALCON. We
now had a Post Exchange, hot showers, basketball/
volleyball courts, a full gym, and air-conditioned
private barracks rooms and offices. We were ecstatic,
but our council was not. Members knew that the effect
of our moving out of sector would impact negatively
on their security.
They were right. Most units decreased the number of
patrols, raids, and reconstruction projects dramatically
once they moved into FALCON. The top priority for
many units shifted from the Iraqis to taking care of
themselves. The entitlement attitude was contagious,
and it was difficult for even the most motivated
paratroopers to leave the comfort and security of
FALCON to brave the streets of Baghdad. It was as
much a psychological victory for the insurgents as a
defeat for my company, and there was little I could do
about it. The relief in place operation was approaching,
and my last 4 weeks were spent creating a continuity
file for the unit replacing mine in sector. I met with my
councils, business leaders, and informants for the last
time and wished them well. Many tears and heartfelt
hugs were exchanged during those final days, but the
sense of hope was high. The 2/82nd left Baghdad in
February 2004 after a year-long deployment. Our
mission was complete, and I believe our successes far
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outweighed our failures. Yet, we all seemed to sense
that Iraq would take many more years to recover. We
had no idea that sectarian violence and insurgency
would soon engulf every aspect of Iraqi life. Eight
months after returning home, we were called back to
Iraq on 96-hour notice to assist in the Iraqi elections of
2005.
Comparing COIN Doctrine to Tactical Actions in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.
With the benefit of hindsight, I will analyze the
actions taken on the ground in Iraq during Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM I in light of the doctrinal prescriptions
found in FM 3-24. The vignettes I employ are not offered
to highlight the special ability of the 2/82nd or to boast
about the success of any unit. Units across Iraq were
learning and adapting to the environment they faced.
Many had great success, while others experienced
tragic failure. The question that interests me here
is this: Would better COIN doctrine have caused an
outcome different than the one the United States is
experiencing in Iraq in 2007? In order to answer the
question, I shall address two subsidiary questions.
First, were any actions taken during Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM I counter to what is prescribed in COIN
FM 3-24? Second, were any actions taken during
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I like what is prescribed
in COIN FM 3-24? After reviewing supporting data, I
will suggest answers to these two questions.
During the conventional phase of Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM I, leaders of the 2/82nd conducted operations within the parameters of the Geneva Convention
and the rules of engagement (ROE), decisively winning
every engagement with the enemy. At the conclusion
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of the operation, the 2/82nd had suffered 24 soldiers
killed in action and 240 wounded. The majority of
these occurred after the President declared an end to
combat operations, as the insurgency began to emerge.
The fundamental difference in the differing casualty
rates lay in the type of war we came to be waging.
Disciplined, motivated, and well-trained soldiers
can accomplish any mission assigned; however,
none of the 2/82nd soldiers was trained for (or even
aware of) the rising insurgency. Decisions were
being made by ORHA and then by the CPA, as well
as by decisionmakers at CENTCOM, that inhibited
soldiers from taking action on the ground to prevent
the insurgency from growing. Six critical mistakes/
deficiencies are fundamental to understanding why
the insurgency in Iraq gained strength despite coalition
efforts:
1. Disbanding the Iraqi army in May 2003;
2. The order from CPA not to take action against
looters in May 2003;
3. Slow and negligent information operations
across the spectrum of the interagency, including DoD,
during post-combat operations;
4. Decentralized U.S. Army command structure,
with each division conducting unilateral offensive
operations in its area of operations;
5. Lack of a national strategy for conducting COIN
operations; and
6. Lack of concentration on COIN at training/
education centers across the federal government prior
to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, resulting in reliance
on individual initiative and improvisation, ad hoc
organizations, and an uncoordinated overall effort.

544

These deficiencies are addressed in FM 3-24, which
warns that they are the worst possible actions
an occupying force can take when fighting an
insurgency. The 2/82nd’s best and worst COIN
practices while operating in this totally conventional
doctrinal environment, i.e., a doctrinal regime lacking
counterinsurgency-specific content and focus, are
shown in Figures 2 and 3.
•Disciplined soldiers with a desire to positively impact their area of
operations.
•No Rules of Engagement violations or criminal activity.
•Appointed a single authority—usually a dynamic, charismatic
leader to interact with local Iraqi leaders.
•Brigade Commander took the lead on relationships with local Iraqi
leadership.
•2/82nd was first unit to receive funding for a consolidated district
council headquarters for Iraqi citizens to voice concerns, find jobs,
and report questionable activities in sector.
•2/82nd was first unit in Baghdad to establish a weekly training
session for city council members on democracy.
•Brigade Commander empowered company commanders with
resources, time, and support on all civil-military operations.
•Focused on the population’s needs and security.
•2/82nd had the largest amount of reconstruction money per capita
in Baghdad due to the efforts of the CMOC.
•Commanders were empowered to spend CERP funds on projects
in sector ($10,000 per week), soccer fields, job creation, and short
time-span high-impact projects.
•Trained Iraqi military forces to conduct counterinsurgency
operations.
•Established first ICDC training compound in Baghdad.
•Established police liaisons with Iraqi police.

Figure 2. Best COIN Practices of 2/82nd during OIF I.
•Conducted too many large-unit operations:
	-2/82nd reaction to insurgent action was always large-scale
cordon and searches resulting in damage to innocent Iraqi
homes, business, and morale.
	-Operations at the battalion level almost always resulted
in fewer weapons caches and less information than those

Figure 3. Worst Practices by 2/82nd in OIF II.
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conducted at the platoon or company level, yet the preference
was for large-scale operations.
	-Intelligence was usually driven from the top down rather
than the bottom up, leaving much room for error. COIN
intelligence operations are fundamentally driven by
actionable intelligence gathered at the tactical level and fed
up to the battalion for analysis rather than the conventional
top-down approach.
	-No system for quick payments to informants.
•Consolidated all company-level forward operating bases into one
large forward operating base:
-FOB mindset is hard to reverse.
	-Decreased the number of mounted and dismounted patrols
in sector.
-Decreased the amount of contact with potential informants.
-Decreased the number of information operations in sector.
	-Decreased the rapid response time to emergency situations
such as police station attacks or riots in sector.
•Placed priorities on killing insurgents rather than engaging and
protecting the population:
	-Promotion and awards were given primarily to those who
had more offensive action and detainees than those with the
most significant reconstruction and civil military projects.
	-Focus on killing led to increased collateral damage to
include accidental killing of innocent civilians.
•Focused special forces on raids rather than training and advising
host nation police and military:
	-Direct action teams in sector were focused primarily on
killing and detaining insurgents rather than advising and
gathering intelligence.
•Built and trained the host nation police and military to look just
like 2/82nd:
	-The Iraqi Civil Defense Force and police were equipped
and trained to look more like coalition forces than their
own culturally accepted forces. This gave the impression
that these Iraqi forces were just puppets of the coalition and
therefore illegitimate.
•No interagency coordination cell until days before redeployment:
	-Without a system for commanders to interact with USAID,
DOS, and other agencies, progress in sector was slowed.
-All relationships with other agencies were ad hoc.

Figure 3. Worst Practices by 2/82nd in OIF I
(concluded).
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COIN as a Panacea for Irregular War?
Is the American way of war doomed to fail against
any insurgent movement? I do not think so. The
American way of war can adapt to the new challenges
posed by insurgent strategy and terrorist tactics. The
most obvious fact supporting this adaptability is the
new COIN manual. The manual is well-received among
combat veterans of all ranks and those about to enter
the Iraqi theater of operations. Better late than never,
FM 3-24 is replete with practical methods for soldiers
and Marines at the tip of the spear in COIN operations.
Had our unit trained on these tactics, techniques, and
procedures prior to the invasion in March 2003, the
original transition from combat operations to COIN
operations would have gone far more smoothly. FM
3-24 may not be a panacea for COIN operations, but it
does provide leaders at the operational and strategic
level with a framework for understanding the problem
and paradoxes of irregular warfare.
Thus, is the solution simply COIN training for
military forces? Hardly. The point of the 2/82nd combat
vignettes was not simply to show that military forces can
adapt and succeed in irregular warfare. History shows
that the U.S. military is quite capable of overcoming
enormous obstacles when it has the requisite support.
Andrew Mack has observed that “insurgents can
only achieve their ends if their opponents’ political
capability to wage war is destroyed.” This observation
has been validated by our Iraqi experience.
The interagency simply has to receive greater national emphasis. Resourcing, training, and cultures of the
myriad agencies in the federal government must adapt
to irregular warfare and post-combat reconstruction.
The “alphabet soup” of agencies operating in irregular
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conflicts must be better coordinated and resourced in
order to provide targeted effects synchronized with
military operations. Mobilization is more a function of
political will than the ability to produce the bodies and
materials needed to rebuild a country. Deterrence of
terrorists can be effective if undertaken in conjunction
with other tools of diplomacy and statecraft.31 The
precise methods for deterring terrorist tactics and
insurgent strategies are situational.
Determining those methods entails asking the right
questions and then developing the right solutions
from a menu of options. The only menu the military
has is gradations and varieties of force. The 2005 NSS,
QDR, and Presidential Policy Directive-56 formed an
optimistic setting for maintaining American security
at home and abroad. Two themes have pervaded all
strategic literature since 9/11. These themes form the
two pillars of President Bush’s introductory letter in
the NSS, highlighting the optimistic tone of strategiclevel decisionmaking with regard to the GWOT:
[The first pillar is] promoting freedom, justice, and
human dignity—working to end tyranny, to promote
effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through
free and fair trade and wise development policies. Free
governments are accountable to their people, govern their
territory effectively, and pursue economic and political
polices that benefit their citizens. Free governments do
not oppress their people or attack other free nations.
Peace and international stability are most reliably built
on a foundation of freedom.
[After freedom] the second pillar of our strategy is
confronting the challenges of our time by leading a
growing community of democracies. Many of the
problems we face—from the threat of pandemic disease,
to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to
terrorism, to human trafficking, to natural disasters—
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reach across borders. Effective multinational efforts are
essential to solve these problems. Yet history has shown
that only when we do our part will others do theirs.
America must continue to lead. 32

Conclusion.
FM 3-34 provides highly useful guidance for
military planners at all levels. Of course, there is no
easy solution in the GWOT or the war in Iraq. Even
now, soldiers, airmen, and Marines are engaged in the
most complex environment imaginable in waging the
GWOT. Even with the best intentions, actions taken
by these soldiers can backfire in an instant. FM 3-34
shows an ideal version of what the military is capable
of accomplishing if the mission and vision of the
campaign are aligned with the training and capabilities
of the force. The key to success in COIN is for our
military and interagency to adapt and change faster
than the enemy.
COIN operations can be successful with the proper
support of the interagency. Irregular warfare is not
simply a military problem with military solutions.
Interagency roles are critical to the success of COIN. If
my experience in Iraq is any indicator of the operational
capability of the rest of the agencies in Iraq, then there
is great hope as well as cause for concern. The main
areas of concern along with recommendations are as
follows:
1. Lengths of deployment should be brought into
alignment. Current disparities allow for seams in the
transition of key interagency personnel. Lengths of
deployments for civilians should be similar to those
of their military counterparts. The 90-day average
interagency deployment is too short to make an
impact.
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2. Civilian agencies must find a way to arrive in
theater better prepared for the culture, tempo, and
risks associated with reconstruction of Iraq.
3. Interagency working groups should be established prior to deployment and continue during
deployment, utilizing technology to share information
and streamline approval processes for projects,
intelligence, and strategic planning.
4. Key agencies involved in the rebuilding of
Iraq should train with military counterparts at the
maneuver training centers prior to deployments so as
to educate the military and civilians on each federal
organization’s unique capabilities.
5. Turf wars should end upon entrance to the Iraqi
theater of operations, with Congress mandating that
agencies share resources, information, and expertise.
A Goldwater-Nichols type of reform of the interagency
would not solve all current problems in Iraq, but
it would lay the foundations for successful future
operations.
6. The National Security Council’s role in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM
should be evaluated for best and worst practices.
7. Information operations in the United States
and abroad are more important during COIN than
conventional operations. A complete review of
standard operating procedures should be conducted
to determine possible areas for improvement.33
8. The military must adapt to the insurgency and
fight COIN rather than attempt to shoehorn COIN into
a conventional construct.34
The political will of the American democracy
must match the determination of those executing
the missions in support of the GWOT. All resources
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must come to bear on the problem facing the future
stability of American security. The proper questions
must be asked in order to identify and solve the most
important problems. Just as the problem my unit faced
in Southern Baghdad was exacerbated by our initial illconceived response to the enemy, U.S. policy should
be recalibrated to avoid making analogous mistakes.
My unit adapted to COIN by coming to understand
the fundamental questions facing our security. We
adapted in order to succeed. Adaptability is the key to
winning the irregular warfare of the 21st century, and
FM 3-24 does an exceptional job of offering a framework
for planners to operationalize such adaptability in the
conduct of COIN.
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CHAPTER 17
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Aligning and Integrating
the Interagency Process in Support
and Stability Operations
Joseph R. Cerami
Having Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, and Paul Nitze
in mind, [Senator] Jackson believed that people with
experience and good judgment could surmount faulty
organization, but not the reverse; no organizational
gimmick could make up for the absence of public
servants lacking these essential qualities.
					
Robert Kaufman1

Introduction: Defining the Problem(s).
Some authorities, like Senator Jackson in the
epigraph above, posit a stark difference between the
importance of effective organizations and that of
effective people, as if they were polar opposite choices
on a reform agenda. We shall argue here, however, that
effective organization and effective people are coequal
in their contribution to institutional endeavor. That is
to say, no effective and efficient structure will make
up for poor staffers, and no wise men, even the likes
of Cold Warriors Acheson, Lovett, or Nitze, can enjoy
the fruit of sound policy without sound implementing
organizations. Starting with the assumption that
“everything changed” as a result of the international
terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September
11, 2001 (9/11), one of the U.S. Government priorities
should be a heightened awareness of the need for large
numbers of both effective people and organizations.
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Wise policymakers and cabinet officers have always
been needed, but in this age of globalization,
information, CNN and Al Jazeera, nonstate actors,
catastrophic biological and nuclear terrorism, and
the rest of the familiar litany of near-term security
challenges—leadership solely from the top will never
be sufficient given the range of tasks facing the United
States in national and homeland security.2 Rather,
effective people at all levels working internationally
and domestically in multiple public, private, and
nonprofit organizations, are necessary, especially for
effective interagency implementation of support and
stability operations (SASO), the primary concern of
this chapter.3 Management experts point out that
the first step of complex problem solving is to define
the problem, and they are absolutely right.4 To put it
bluntly, without a consensus that the interagency and
national security systems are broken, there will be no
recognition that there is a problem to be solved, and the
current unsatisfactory state of affairs will continue.
We Can Do Better: Aligning and Integrating Processes
and Agencies.
Aligning and integrating the work of U.S. interagency processes and agencies are indispensable to
the creative design and effective implementation of
national security policy and strategy. Interagency
processes and long-range planning by the U.S.
Government, to include coordinating the efforts of
the National Security Council as well as Defense,
State, and other cabinet departments, remain major
shortcomings, as demonstrated in the case studies and
analyses in this volume. These studies and analyses
also highlight the significance of public leadership and
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management, in terms of setting strategic direction,
aligning and integrating the efforts of various domestic
and international stakeholders, and emphasizing
performance measures.
The connections among executive leadership,
policy effectiveness, and government performance
are the subject of continuing research in the public
management literature. For instance, the book
Government Performance: Why Management Matters, by
Patricia Ingraham, Philip Joyce, and Amy Donahue,
offers an insightful performance framework, finding
that effective management leadership is indeed vital.
The Ingraham et al. studies apply to performance
management at all levels of government—federal,
state, and local. The present volume extends the
scope of public management research to emphasize
interagency and international leadership. More
specifically, it deals with military and civilian roles as
policymakers and implementers, aligners, integrators,
and results managers, or what Ingraham et al. call
“grounded leadership.”It deals with the roles of the
leaders and followers in charting the direction of and
in implementing effective public policy.5 The public
management research of Ingraham et al. stresses the
vital role of strategic leadership and management for
coordinating complex administrative systems across
agencies and within government.6 Thus the present
chapter extends the Ingraham et al. analysis from the
federal government generally to the Washington node
in particular and to the country team and international
dimensions.
Ideas and Insights for Interagency Reform.
Military and civilian public managers have to think
more broadly about their domestic and international
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interagency responsibilities. What is to be done about
the current problems facing leaders extending from
the entry level all the way up to executive levels, and
for manageres in the new mix of public, private, and
nonprofit organizations engaged in what the United
Nations (UN) is addressing more broadly as governance
and institution building issues?7 Below are five broad
questions, along with ideas and insights in response,
that address both the structural and personnel problems
facing the United States and especially its interagency
operations for counterinsurgency warfare. These
questions and comments were compiled by members
of the Bush School Capstone research seminar, the
culminating seminar in a 2-year master’s degree
program in International Affairs.8 This semester-long
study addressed the topic of aligning and integrating
military and civilian roles in stability operations by
focusing on the key issues. Following are summary
discussions addressing each of the five: 9
1. What are the military and U.S. Government
agencies’ historical roles and missions in stabilization
and reconstruction efforts in counterinsurgency
warfare (as drawn from case studies)?
The historical record reflects varying degrees of
agency participation in stabilization and reconstruction.
There was no evidence in the cases examined that,
once the hot war ended, there was an automatic
and immediate transition to civilian leadership and
control of post-conflict support, reconstruction, or
institution-building. For instance, in post-World War
II Japan, the military ran operations for 7 years in a
hierarchical structure headed by General Douglas
MacArthur. Some thinking about a transition to
civilian control was discarded after early successes
became institutionalized. In other cases, the guidelines
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on roles and missions were not clear. At times, an
effort to be adaptable and flexible became a way to
avoid addressing the difficult questions related to
interagency as well as organizational responsibilities,
accountability, and oversight.
Under ambiguous and dynamic circumstances,
however, it is usual for the military, because of its
organizational and resource capability, to fill the void.
Especially in crisis situations, the tendency for existing
routines and established relationships will become
hard to change over time, regardless of prescribed
agency roles and missions. For instance, in the case
of Afghanistan provisional reconstruction teams,
there were in place individual agency guidelines; yet,
because of the ad hoc nature of team recruiting, lack
of interagency training, and short-term deployments
and operations, individual agency representatives
were often unaware of their agency guidelines,
responsibilities, and authority. At times, because
of ongoing military conflict, civilian agencies were
subsumed in actions by the better organized and
resourced military components. Roles and missions
under ambiguous conditions and in times of transition
become especially difficult to sort out. Research did
not find examples of planned transitions or orderly
phasing from conflict to post-conflict to reconstruction
activities.
Specific ways of providing incentives for aligning
and integrating agency roles and missions may best be
coupled with performance management techniques.
For instance, in the evolution of provisional reconstruction teams, there were no apparent measures of success.
In most cases, successful interagency operations
resulted from the efforts of experienced leaders, such
as military officers with Balkan peacekeeping service.
561

Synchronizing diverse agencies would benefit from
established performance standards, with systematic
accountability, reporting, and oversight processes.
2. What are the recommended ways to improve
leadership (for integrating and aligning roles and
missions) in the interagency coordination of militarycivilian operations?
A well-supported view is that training and
education programs are needed, especially prior to
deployment. Unfortunately, the nature of crisis action
becomes an excuse for a lack of preparedness. In fact,
however, the often sudden onset of crises demands
a long-term, progressive system for preparing and
certifying leaders and teams for complex contingency
operations. The history of U.S. Government efforts in
interagency education and training is not promising.
For instance, where is the interagency equivalent to
the military’s national training centers? It may not be
an overstatement to conclude that what is needed is
a massive transformational effort to create a civilian
agency training and education culture. A formal
leadership development process would be evolved
so as to explicitly link synchronized and progressive
professional education, training, assignments, and
promotions within a system providing opportunities to
interact in diverse agency and international contexts.
In addition, there is a need for formal interagency
knowledge management processes. The architecture
for an interagency knowledge or learning system
should include several components such as data bases,
on-line learning courses, and simulation networks;
predeployment training and certification systems;
individual leadership development survey and
planning instruments; subject matter networks; and an
interactive center for interagency lessons learned.
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At the same time, the Federal Office of Personnel
Management efforts to enhance individual leader
develop and education should be expanded. The
leadership literature stresses the need for continuous
learning, constant assessments, 360-degree feedback,
and progressive assignments. These efforts to foster
the development of a sense of military/civilian
professional solidarity, partnership, and public service
are critical for interagency coordination.
The military services stress their professional ethic.
Can we define and develop the concept of an interagency
professional ethic that transcends natural but sometime
harmful agency loyalties? The military service’s efforts
to move officers from branch to combined arms to
joint training, education, certification, and promotion
may serve as a model. A new interagency professional
culture that systematically trains in accord with and
promotes its ideals can extend the scope and reach of
individuals positioned to improve the effectiveness and
value of their agencies as well as serving the national
interest in stability, support, and reconstruction efforts.
Leadership can be developed over time with thoughtful
approaches based on legitimate research knowledge.
Shifting from adhocracy, crisis management, and
firefighting to enlightened responses by a trained
and ready professional interagency cadre is not
beyond the reach, capacity, or imagination of the U.S.
Government.
3. What are the military and civilian leadership
skill sets for conflict and post-conflict environments?
Several researchers stress being able to see the
nature of individual and collective tasks within the
context of the strategy and operational priorities.
Linked to this concern for the big picture was the need
to understand interagency resource capacities and
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constraints affecting achievement of unity of effort on
a local, regional, country, area, and wider geographical
basis. One researcher also notes the need for guidelines
and standards providing a baseline for integration of
interagency functions at each operational echelon,
while aligning activities at the strategic, operational,
and tactical levels.
Baselines, guidelines, and standard procedures can
be perceived as barriers to creativity and innovation,
and these findings strongly reinforce the importance
of flexibility and adaptability in dynamic situations.
Without serious efforts to synchronize overall efforts,
however, there is the open-ended possibility for endless
reinvention and inefficiencies. These problems are
especially pronounced in situations of high personnel
and organizational turnover, where the possibilities
for false creativity and wasted motion are very real.
Therefore, educated, experienced, and high-performing
individuals, teams, and organizations are a necessary
condition for interagency effectiveness.
Communication skills are especially important
for enhancing interagency effectiveness at all levels.
Real concerns about overcoming turf and stovepipe
pathologies cannot be erased by achieving false
consensus among diverse agencies for the purposes
of group cohesion and conflict avoidance. Time must
be allocated for agencies to ensure that interagency
communications do not obfuscate facts related to
core competencies, capabilities, possibilities, etc. The
attitude of “I don’t speak State Department” should be
the beginning of an in-depth conversation to discover
the true intent and meaning of interagency written and
oral communications.
The requirement for cross-cultural savvy applies to
both interagency and intercultural communications.
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A common lexicon for unifying understanding of key
terms would improve interagency communications.
While there is no substitute for face-to-face, on-scene
interpersonal dealings, there is no excuse for the
present lack of a common vocabulary to undergird a
deeper understanding among agencies.
4. How should military and civilian agencies
develop those leadership skills needed in the short
term and the long term?
Systematic, progressive, and career-long leadership, education, and development focused on
interagency skills must become part of the culture of
the U.S. Government’s military and civilian agencies.
Interagency subject matter expertise and experience
should become part of selected individuals’ career
progression and be linked to promotion and
other incentives, such as advanced civil schooling
opportunities at prestigious schools of public and
international affairs. Research studies, reports, and
publications should elaborate on interagency work,
stressing its importance, its career-enhancing effects,
and its critical benefits for for the U.S. Government and
the national interests. It is also essential to formalize
mentoring systems to support nontraditional career
paths that extend opportunities for interagency and
international work. As previous national studies of
U.S. Government performance have stressed, there is
in an age of globalization an urgent need to break away
from stove-piped agency education and promotion
systems.
At the same time, creating a reservoir of interagency talent will have to focus on individual as
well as team development. Creative solutions using
on-line educational technology should provide
educational support for individual and team training
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and development. New and distributed educational
networks that can meet individual as well as team/
organizational training and educational development
needs can substitute for or supplement full-time, longterm, traditional schooling. In a period of increasing
demands and decreasing personnel, there is a need
for more focused and efficient skill development
programs.
5. Does the U.S. Government have a means for
rating the effectiveness of civil-military coordination?
The ad hoc and personality-driven nature of many
civil-military operations by the U.S. Government
has been fairly characteristic, especially in the crisis
atmosphere of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is noteworthy
that the successful case of postwar Japan included
more than 2 years of predeployment preparation,
study, policy development, and capacity-building
among several U.S. agencies. Nontraditional measures
of effectiveness are needed for nontraditional missions
and tasks, such as those required for successful
support, stability, and reconstruction activities.
What does it mean to conduct successful interagency
operations over time? What standards are needed to
measure effectiveness in interagency operations in a
counterinsurgency context?
The metaphor of “nested bowls” for aligning
and integrating the military’s strategic, operational,
and tactical levels could well be useful for modeling
interagency efforts to coordinate horizontally and
vertically. In short, there is a need to relate local, taskoriented, mission-essential objectives with regional or
national programs, priorities, resources, and oversight
functions. Furthermore, all of this must be accomplished
in the context of the grand strategy, viewing the U.S.
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national, host country, and, in most cases, international
institutional levels through a big-picture lens.
The amount of information available through
modern information technologies is staggering for
any organization. Aggregating efficient, real-time,
and focused information for improving interagency
effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations will
continue to be a major challenge. A search for the
“deeper meaning” of useful and actionable intelligence
and information requires new ideas, new systems, and
real creativity. Along the same lines, more imagination
would be helpful for satisfying real information needs
while countering the false creativity of allowing all
agencies to go their own way so far as agency-specific
information reporting and coordination documents
are concerned. There is certainly a need for accurate
and meaningful processes for measuring interagency
communications and effectiveness. Using surveys
to rate employee satisfaction along with program
performance measures, e.g., “balanced scorecard”
techniques for assessments of interagency processes,
feedback, and opinions, is the type of step that would
help in creating useful knowledge.10
Current systems developed and underpinned
by agency traditions, cultures, and communication
patterns all serve unwittingly to splinter common
management processes into complex information,
personnel, finance, accounting, and logistics systems.
The effect is to undermine any potential foundation for
creating an interagency culture that reins in the hydraheaded monster, unifying and integrating its impulses.
Everyone with interagency experience knows that we
can do much better.
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Concluding Thoughts: Continuous Improvements
and a Generation’s Work.
The efforts reflected in the Capstone research project,
the Interagency Research Symposium, and assembling
of this volume have contributed to defining the nature
of the problem. Much work remains to be done in
improving agency and interagency structures, as well
as educating and training a core of interagency civilian
and military professionals. Aligning and integrating the
efforts of various agencies and people from the public,
private, and nonprofit sectors in effective interagency
endeavors remain key tasks for the U.S. Government
in the years ahead. This is especially so in the case of
support and stability operations.
Those of us involved in the different aspects of the
effort recognize the huge national commitment it will
take to effect necessary changes. The U.S. ability to
provide international leadership requires adapting to
and, in some measure, shaping the 21st century security
environment, by both forming and implementing
effective national security policies and processes,
and improving organizational designs and leader
development. The strategic environment in an age of
globalization is sure to require our leading international
coalitions, especially in counterinsurgency warfare and
complex contingencies.
Providing effective national security in the short
and long term depends in large part on continuing to
improve current policies, strategies, and operations
while initiating interagency and national security
reforms. This volume provides a foundation for
defining the nature of the interagency problems in
counterinsurgency warfare and thus an approach for
meeting these thus far intractable challenges through
improved interagency effectiveness.
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Fadiman, “Foreword,” in Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1942, p. xxxvi, in commenting on the view
of Van Wyck Brooks notes: “It is true that to make the obvious
not commonplace one has to be a Tolstoy.” This chapter is not
arguing that genius is required to gain an awareness of the many
problems in the interagency. Many, if not all, of the complex
issues and proposed solutions outlined here are said to be
common knowledge in the national security policy community.
The point of this monograph is to collate, analyze, reassess, and
record “what we all know” about the nature of the problems as
well as recommended approaches for problem solving—with the
purpose of building a consensus on the need for interagency and
national security reforms.

569

4. See, for instance, David A. Whetten and Kim S. Cameron,
Developing Management Skills, 7th Ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 2007.
5. Patricia W. Ingraham, Philip G. Joyce, and Amy Kneedler
Donahue, Government Performance: Why Management Matters,
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, p. 152.
Ingraham notes that although her research group’s extensive
examination of federal and state government performance and
management capacity “had not originally intended to study
leadership—indeed, were advised not to do so—leadership
surfaced as an important influence in the effective governments
we studied.” She goes on to write,
We found that strong leadership in public organizations
was most often best described as a team effort, spanning
political and career staff boundaries. . . . We found further
that these leaders and teams had the ability and the will
to move from strategic vision-setting to a very practical
view of making the vision happen. This included a
willingness to be involved with implementation. . . .
Leadership was somewhat situational, in the sense
that effective leaders and leadership teams captured
opportunities for change or created them if necessary.
One consistent characteristic of strong leaders and
teams, however, was a sound organizational base.
Understanding the organization and the management
capacities it required well enough to foster and sustain
effective system creation was central. We called this
leadership model “grounded leadership.”
6. Ingraham, pp. 20-21.
7. See www.un.org/esa/progareas/governance.html, accessed
June 14, 2007.
8. The May 3, 2007, session reviewed the Capstone groups’
key findings, drawn from their individual research projects, as
well as their insights from participating with subject matter
experts during the research symposium held at the Bush School
on April 5-6, 2007. Participants at the May 3d session included
Patrick Baetjer, Christopher Cline, Carlos Hernandorena, Brian
Polley, Katherine Rogers, Amanda Smith, and Tyson Voelkel.
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9. These research questions are adapted from a Creative
Associates International, Inc. conference panel and report on
“Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military
Gap,” held in Washington, DC, on June 20, 2006. The conference
co-sponsors were the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the
National Defense University, the Bush School of Government and
Public Service, and the Triangle Institute of Security Studies. The
questions were refined after discussions with the Office of the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations.
10. Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton, The Balanced
Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action, Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 1996.
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GLOSSARY
ATA
Afghan Transitional Authority
BCT
Brigade Combat Team
CAT
Civil Affairs Team
CENTCOM
U.S. Central Command
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response
Program
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command –
Afghanistan
CHLC
Coalition Humanitarian Cells
CJCMOTF	Coalition Joint Civil-Military
Operations Task Force
COIN
Counterinsurgency
DoD
Department of Defense
EOD
Explosive Ordinance Disposal
FIS
Foreign Service Institute
FOB
Forward Operating Base
FSO
Foreign Service Officer
ISAF
International Security Assistance Force
JRT
Joint Regional Team
MoD
Ministry of Defense
MoEC
Ministry for Economic Cooperation
MoFA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoI
Ministry of the Interior
MOS
Military Occupational Specialty
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and
Civic Aid
PRT
Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSOP
Psychological Operation
QIP
Quick Impact Program
ROE
Rules of Engagement
SASO
Support and Stability Operation
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SSTR	Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International
Development
USDA	United States Department of
Agriculture
USIP
United States Institute of Peace
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international studies from the University of Notre
Dame and a Master of International Affairs degree
with concentration in National Security Studies from
the Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A&M University.
Joseph R. Cerami is a Senior Lecturer in National
Security Policy and Director of the Public Service
Leadership Program for the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University.
During a 30-year military career, Colonel Cerami
served in Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the
United States as a Field Artillery officer, operational
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planner, and strategist. His last assignment was as
the Chairman of the Department of National Security
and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA, from 1998 to 2001. From 1993 to 1998, he
served on the faculty there as Director of International
Security Studies. He was Assistant Professor of
Political Science at the U.S. Military Academy, West
Point, NY, where he taught International Relations,
and Politics and Government. Along with Colonel
James F. Holcomb, Jr., he is co-editor of the Army War
College Guide to Strategy. He has a B.S. in Engineering
from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point; an M.A.
in Government from the University of Texas at Austin;
an MMAS in Theater Operations from the School of
Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS;
and a Ph.D. in public administration from the Penn
State School of Public Affairs. He is a graduate of the
Army War College.
RICHARD A. CHILCOAT retired as a lieutenant
general from the U.S. Army after 42 years of active
military service on September 1, 2000. Currently, he
serves as a member of the Board of Advisors, Naval
Postgraduate School, Class Trustee of the Association
of Graduates, U.S. Military Academy, and member of
the Board of Directors, National Defense University
Foundation. During his military service, Chilcoat
served in a variety of leadership positions, including
Chief of Staff, 3d Infantry Division, United States
Army Europe and Seventh Army; Executive Assistant
to General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy,
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
and Plans, U.S. Army; and Senior Speechwriter for
the Army Chief of Staff, General John A. Wickham,
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Jr. He also served as Assistant to the Academy Dean,
Assistant Professor of Social Sciences, and member,
Academy Athletic Board at the U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, NY. In 1994, General Chilcoat became
43d Commandant of the United States Army War
College. In 1997, he was appointed ninth President
of the National Defense University by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, serving until July 2000.
He has provided professional consulting services to
business and academic enterprises about education,
technology, executive training, and leadership. On July
1, 2001, Lieutenant General Chilcoat was named Dean
of the George Bush School of Government and Public
Service, at Texas A&M University. From January 2001
to February 2002, he directed and facilitated the Army
Strategic Leadership Course for Army general officers.
Lieutenant General Chilcoat holds a B.S. from the
U.S. Military Academy and an M.B.A. from Harvard
Business School, and is an honorary graduate of the
U.S. Army War College.
Chris Cline, an Army captain, has been selected
to serve as the Southwest regional commander in
the Directorate of Admissions at West Point, NY.
His previous assignments include platoon leader,
company executive officer, and battalion S1 in the 51st
Signal Battalion (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, NC; team
leader in the 22d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
at Fort Bragg; and most recently commander in the
22d Personnel Services Battalion at Fort Lewis, WA,
where he deployed to Kuwait in support of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM II. Captain Cline holds a B.S. degree
in American politics from the U.S. Military Academy,
and a Master’s Degree in International Affairs with a
concentration in National Security from the George
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Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A&M University.
Joseph J. Collins is currently a professor of strategy
at the National War College in Washington, DC. From
2001 to 2004, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Stability Operations where he was active in
plans and policy for the war in Afghanistan, as well as in
the initial planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. A
retired Army Colonel, he is a veteran of over a decade’s
service in the Pentagon, and has taught at the U.S.
Military Academy, Georgetown, and Columbia. His
many publications include books on the study of Soviet
policy toward Afghanistan, International Relations
theory, and U.S. military culture. Colonel Collins holds
a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.
Robert H. Dorff is currently Research Professor of
National Security Studies in the Art of War Department,
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Previously, he was the Senior Advisor for Democracy,
Governance, and Civilian Military Relations for Creative Associates International, Inc., working extensively
with their “Security and Development Initiative,”
which focused on strategic approaches and policies
that bridge the civilian-military gap in addressing the
challenges of post-conflict and transitioning societies.
Dr. Dorff is also the immediate past Executive Director
of the Institute of Political Leadership in Raleigh, NC,
a position he held from June 2004 until June 2006.
Prior to that, he was Chairman of the Department of
National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War
College, where he had previously served as Professor
of National Security Policy and Strategy and holder of
the General Maxwell D. Taylor Chair. From 1980 until
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1997 he was a member of the Department of Political
Science and Public Administration at North Carolina
State University. Dr. Dorff is the author or co-author
of three books and numerous journal articles, many
of which focus on U.S. national security strategy,
democratization and failed states, and peace support
operations. Dr. Dorff holds a B.A. in Political Science
from Colorado College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in
Political Science from the University of North CarolinaChapel Hill.
Scott R. Feil is an Adjunct Research Staff Member
in the Operational Evaluation Division at the Institute
for Defense Analyses (IDA). The non-profit Institute
supports the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense
Agencies, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands. His current work focuses on interagency
coordination, reconstruction and stabilization operations, and organizational transformation. Prior to
joining IDA, Mr. Scott was the Executive Director
of the Program on the Role of American Military
Power, a study group chartered and supported by the
Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). He served as
co-director of a project sponsored by AUSA and the
Center for Strategic and International Studies on PostConflict Reconstruction, a multiyear study of tasks,
organizational comparative advantage, and planning
mechanisms for the effective and efficient rebuilding
of countries emerging from conflict. Mr. Feil served
27 years in the U.S. Army where he commanded a
tank battalion and armor brigade and was a Cavalry
Regiment Operations Office during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Mr. Feil
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, received
an M.A. in Political Science from Stanford University,
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and completed a U.S. Army Senior Service College
Fellowship at Georgetown University.
Carlos Hernandorena worked for a large
international law firm as a project finance paralegal
and office assistant and for GlobalSecurity.org, a webbased think tank that specializes in defense and
security issues. He holds a B.A. in Foreign Affairs from
the University of Virginia and an M.A. in International
Affairs from the George Bush School of Government
and Public Service.
H. ALLEN IRISH, a U.S. Army colonel, is currently
assigned to the 352d Civil Affairs Command, Fort
Meade, MD. His military career includes service in
Operation DESERT STORM, as legal advisor to the Joint
Civil-Military Operations Task Force in Afghanistan
during 2002, and as senior advisor to the Ministry of
Environment in Baghdad from 2003 to 2004. In civilian
life, he has served as Deputy Attorney General in New
Jersey and Director of Industry Affairs, National Paint
& Coatings Association, Washington, DC. Colonel
Irish has completed numerous military schools,
including the Judge Advocate and Civil Affairs Officers
Advanced Courses and the U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College. He holds a B.A. in Economics
and History from the University of Virginia, a J.D. from
Washington & Lee University Law School, and was
awarded a Master of Strategic Studies degree from the
U.S. Army War College.
Dennis C. Jett is Dean of the International Center
and Director of the Transnational and Global Studies
Center at the University of Florida. A former career
diplomat, he served as Ambassador to Peru and
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Mozambique; on the National Security Council; and
in Argentina, Israel, Malawi, and Liberia. He has been
interviewed on the Jim Lehrer News Hour, CNN, NPR,
and other national news programs, and has written
over 80 opinion pieces for major newspapers. Dr. Jett
is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and
is writing a book on foreign policy to be published
by Palgrave. His dissertation, “Why Peacekeeping
Fails,” has been published by Palgrave. Dr. Jett has a
Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR., is Director of the
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the U.S. Army
War College. His Army career included a combat
tour in Vietnam and a number of command and staff
assignments. While serving in the Plans, Concepts,
and Assessments Division and the Conventional War
Plans Division of the Joint Staff, he collaborated in
the development of such documents as the National
Military Strategy, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan,
the Joint Military Net Assessment, national security
directives, and presidential decision directives. He also
was Director of Military Requirements and Capabilities
Management at the U.S. Army War College, held
the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research Chair,
and served as Director of Research in SSI. Professor
Lovelace has published extensively in the areas of
national security and military strategy formulation,
future military requirements, and strategic planning.
Professor Lovelace is a graduate of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College and the National
War College. He holds an MBA from Embry Riddle
Aeronautical University and a J.D. from Widener
University School of Law and is a member of the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey bars.
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Robert B. Polk is currently serving as a chief
advisor to the director of the Project on National Security
Reform. He is also co-directing the study, World Order
and Post-Conflict Competence, funded by the Smith
Richardson Foundation. He also works as an Adjunct
Research Member for the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) think tank, Institute for Defense Analyses
(IDA). His work at IDA is related to interagency issues
and is closely associated with his work on national
security reforms. Colonel Polk concluded a 20-year
career in the U.S. Army where he served 15 years
as an infantry officer and 5 years as an Army and
Joint Services campaign strategist. He also served in
various leadership positions, including Base Camp
Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina and more recently
Director of Planning for Jay Garner in the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA)
and Co-Director for Paul Bremer’s Office of Policy
Planning in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
for a cumulative 10-month period in 2003 during and
after the Iraq War. Upon return from Iraq, Colonel
Polk worked on two special staffs supporting the
Secretary of Defense. In these positions, he was a key
planner in developing interagency plans and policies
related to the redeployment of the CPA, in activating
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, and in various efforts
in support of DoD and Department of State policies
in Afghanistan. Colonel Polk holds a B.S. in General
Engineering from the U.S. Military Academy, West
Point, NY; an M.A. in National Security and Strategic
Studies from the U.S. Naval War College, Newport,
RI;, an M.A.S. in Operational Theory and Strategic
Planning from the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College’s School of Advanced Military Studies
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(SAMS), Fort Leavenworth, KS; and an M.S. in General
Administration from Central Michigan University,
Mount Pleasant, MI.
Brian Polley worked as an intern at the Scowcroft
Group international business advisory firm in 2006 and
currently works as an intern at UBS Financial Services
doing capital investment and portfolio management.
His area of concentration is national security, with
a particular focus on defense policy and military
affairs and intelligence as an instrument of statecraft.
He plans to pursue a career in public service as a
counterterrorism analyst. Mr. Polley holds a B.A. from
the University of Texas, Austin, TX, and a Master’s
Degree in International Affairs from the George Bush
School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M
University.
Katherine Rogers interned at 21st Century
Technologies, a small government contractor with
the mission of exploiting emerging mathematical
technologies solving complex problems in the intelligence and military communities. She is preparing to
work in the intelligence community. Ms. Rogers holds
a B.S. in Mathematics from Texas A&M University and
a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from the
Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas
A&M University.
Amanda Smith worked as a Bankruptcy and
Foreclosure Specialist for Mackoff, Kellogg, Kirby,
and Kloster. Ms. Smith plans to pursue a career in
defense policy and national security issues. She holds
a B.A. in Political Science and a B.S. in Psychology
from Dickinson State University, Dickinson, ND; and
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a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from the
George Bush School of Government and Public Service,
Texas A&M University.
James M. Smith is Director of the U.S. Air Force
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), U.S.
Air Force Academy (USAFA), Colorado Springs, CO,
where he is also Professor of Military Strategic Studies.
He has been a member of the civilian faculty since 1994.
He completed an Air Force career in 1993 that included
flying and operations plans assignments in Southeast
Asia, Europe, and the United States. He also served in
faculty assignments at the USAF Special Operations
School, as the Chief of National Security Studies at the
Air Command and Staff College, and as an exchange
professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the
U.S. Military Academy (USMA), West Point, NY, and
as USMA’s Associate Dean for Academic Research.
Dr. Smith manages and directs INSS programs in
the areas of strategic security, international treaties
and agreements, and counterproliferation; homeland
defense and combating terrorism; air and space policy
and planning; information operations and warfare;
and regional and emerging national security issues.
Dr. Smith holds a B.S. from USAFA; an M.S. from the
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA;
and a Ph.D. in Public Policy from the University of
Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL.
John F. Troxell is currently serving as Professor of
Strategic Military Logistics Operations and Planning
with the Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle, PA. Prior to assuming his
current position, he was the Director of National
Security Studies, Department of National Security
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and Strategy, U.S. Army War College. During a 30year career with the U.S. Army, Colonel Troxell held
high-level assignments in the Department of Army,
including staff officer in the War Plans Division from
1990 to 1992, force planner for the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, staff officer
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1994 to
1996, and Chief, Engineer Plans Division, Combined
Forces Command, Seoul, South Korea from 1997 to
1999. Colonel Troxell holds a B.S. degree from the U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, NY, and a Master’s
degree from the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton
University, Princeton, NJ; and is a 1997 graduate of the
U.S. Army War College.
TYSON VOELKEL currently serves as an instructor at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He served as
a company commander in the 82nd Airborne Division
on two separate tours to Iraq. Captain Tyson holds a
Bachelor’s degree in Engineering from Texas A&M
University, College Station, TX; and is a graduate of
the George Bush School of Government and Public
Service Master’s Degree Program in International
Affairs, Texas A&M University.
James J. Wirtz is a Professor in the Department of
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA. He is editor of the Palgrave Macmillan
series, Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies;
section chair of the Intelligence Studies Section of the
International Studies Association; and President of the
International Security and Arms Control Section of the
American Political Science Association. He joined the
Naval Postgraduate School faculty in 1990 after teaching
at Franklin & Marshall College; Penn State University;
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and the State University of New York, Binghamton.
Between January 2000 and January 2005, he served as
the Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School. In 2005 he was
a Visiting Professor at the Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Dr.
Wirtz teaches courses on nuclear strategy, international
relations theory, and intelligence. He is currently
working on a monograph entitled Theory of Surprise and
an edited volume on Navies and Stability Operations.
He was a John M. Olin Pre-Doctoral Fellow at the
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Dr. Wirtz earned B.A. and M.A. degrees from the
University of Delaware, Newark, DE; and the Ph.D.
degree in Political Science from Columbia University.
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about The George Bush School
of Government and Public Service
The George Bush School of Government and Public
Service is located at Texas A&M University in College
Station, TX. It educates principled leaders in public
and international affairs, conducts research, and
performs service. Both the Master of Public Service
and Administration (MPSA) and Master’s Program
in International Affairs (MPIA) are full-time graduate
degree programs that provide a professional education
for individuals seeking careers in the public or nonprofit
sectors, or for activities in the private sector that have a
governmental focus.
The MPSA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program,
combines 11 courses in public management, policy
analysis, economics, and research methods with five
electives. Students select an elective concentration in
one of the following areas: nonprofit organizations;
state and local policy and management; natural
resources, environment, and technology policy and
administration; security, energy, and technology policy;
and health policy and management. A professional
internship is completed in the first summer session.
The MPIA, a 21-month, 48-credit-hour program,
offers tracks in National Security Affairs and
International Economics and Development. Students
fashion a program of study based on two or more
concentrations or clusters of related courses such as
economic development, diplomacy in world affairs,
intelligence in statecraft, national security, or regional
studies. Satisfactory completion of a foreign language
exam is a prerequisite for graduation. At the end of
their first year of study, students participate in either
an internationally oriented internship or a foreign
language immersion course.
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The Certificate in Advanced International Affairs
(CAIA) program is a focused curriculum offered via
distance education or through in-residence study. The
program consists of 12-15 credit hours of graduate
courses designed for those with limited time but a
strong desire to upgrade specific dimensions of their
international relations credentials. The Certificate in
Homeland Security (CHS) program is offered only
via distance education and intended for people who
need to understand the new security environment as
part of their management and supervisory duties. This
program requires students to take 15 credit hours of
graduate course work centered upon homeland security issues and strategies at all levels of the
government and private industry.
For more information on the Bush School please
visit our website at bush.tamu.edu/.
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ABOUT THE Strategic Studies Institute
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is the U.S.
Army’s center for geostrategic and national security
research and analysis. It conducts strategic research
and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College
curriculum, provides direct analysis for Army and
Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a
bridge to the wider strategic community.
SSI is composed of civilian research professors,
uniformed military officers, and a professional support
staff. All have extensive credentials and experience.
SSI is divided into three components: the Art of War
Department focuses on global, trans-regional, and
functional issues, particularly those dealing with Army
transformation; the Regional Strategy and Planning
Department focuses on regional strategic issues; and the
Academic Engagement Program creates and sustains
partnerships with the global strategic community.
In addition to its organic resources, SSI has a web of
partnerships with strategic analysts around the world,
including the foremost thinkers in the field of security
and military strategy. In most years, about half of SSI’s
publications are written by these external partners.
SSI studies are published by the Institute and
distributed to key strategic leaders in the Army and
Department of Defense, the military educational system, Congress, the news media, other think tanks and
defense institutes, and major colleges and universities.
SSI studies capitalize on history and current political,
economic, and military factors to develop strategic
recommendations.
• Books - SSI publishes about 3-5 books per
year consisting of authored works or edited
compilations.
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• Monographs - Policy-oriented reports that
provide recommendations. They are usually
25-90 pages in length.
• Carlisle Papers - These highlight the very best
of student papers from the U.S. Army War
College.
• LeTort Papers - Essays, retrospectives, or
speeches of interest to the defense academic
community.
• Colloquium Reports - For larger conferences SSI
may produce a report on the proceedings.
• Colloquium Briefs - These two-to-four page
briefs are produced after the colloquia which
we have conducted or helped fund.
At the request of the Army leadership, SSI sometimes
provides shorter analytical reports on pressing strategic
issues. The distribution of these is usually limited.
Additionally, every year SSI compiles a Key
Strategic Issues List (KSIL) based on input from the
U.S. Army War College faculty, the Army Staff, the
Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and
other Army organizations. This is designed to guide
the research of SSI, the U.S. Army War College, and
other Army-related strategic analysts.
SSI analysts publish widely outside of the Institute’s
own products. They have written books for Cambridge
University Press, Princeton University Press, University
Press of Kansas, Duke University Press, Praeger,
Frank Cass, Rowman, and Littlefield and Brassey’s.
They have contributed chapters to many other books
including publications from the Brookings Institution,
Jane’s Defence Group, and the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. SSI analysts have written articles
for Foreign Affairs, International Security, Survival,
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Washington Quarterly, Orbis, The National Interest,
Current History, Political Science Quarterly, Joint Force
Quarterly, Parameters, The Journal of Politics, Security
Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Jane’s Intelligence
Review, Occasional Papers of the Woodrow Wilson
Center, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis,
Military Operations Research, Strategic Review, Military
Review, National Security Studies Quarterly, Journal
of Military History, War in History, War & Society, The
Historian, Infantry Magazine, The World and I, Aerospace
Historian, Central Asian Security, Asian Survey, SAIS
Review, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Journal
of Political and Military Sociology, Small Wars and
Insurgencies, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
Special Warfare, Comparative Strategy, Korean Journal of
Defense Analysis, Journal of East Asian Studies, World
Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism, Conflict, Diplomatic
History, Airpower Journal, Low Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement, Politique Étranger, Allgemeine Schweizerische
Militärzeitschrift, and African Security Review.
SSI also conducts academic conferences to examine
issues of importance to the Army, collaborating
with some of the most prestigious universities in
the country. Recent partners included Georgetown,
Princeton, Harvard, MIT, Columbia, University of
Chicago, University of Miami, Stanford, Georgia Tech,
Johns Hopkins, and the Bush School of Government
and Public Service at Texas A&M University.
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